

5TH EDITION

Michael J. McMAINS
Wayman C. MULLINS

CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS

Managing Critical Incidents and Hostage Situations
in Law Enforcement and Corrections



Crisis Negotiations

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Enforcement and Corrections

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Introduction

As the authors write this introduction, an active investigation into the bombing at the Boston Marathon is in progress. One suspect is dead and another is in custody. Both suspects appear to have worn sunglasses and ball caps to blend in at the Marathon so they could plant explosive devices in a crowd of people they did not know, killing and maiming. Later, an MIT police officer was killed by the suspects while responding to a disturbance call in uniform and a marked police cruiser. The question of what makes these two young men different begs to be asked. The media report that one suspect posted on his web site that he had lived in the United States for 10 years and did not have one American friend. His brother's blog is reported as having posts that suggests that they both felt alienated.

In December 2012, a mentally disturbed male shot and killed 20 children and six adults at Sandy Hook Elementary School after his own mother, then he killed himself. Again, the questions are asked: "What motivates him?"; "Why would anybody do such a horrendous thing?" "What kind of monster is he?" Though we will never know for sure, the usual investigations into school shooters' backgrounds tend to emphasize their sense of alienation from others.

Alienation is a common theme. Studies of terrorists from both sides of the political spectrum in the 1970s suggested that they were generally people who felt alienated from their society. They looked to the future or the past in an idealized way, imagining that they would be more a part of things in a different time. They found a community in the terrorist organizations they joined—groups of like-minded aliens.

All of this reminded the authors that giving people an arena in which to tell somebody about their grievances, issues, and frustrations is essential in a democratic country. One of the authors went to a high school that had about 3,000 students. There was an array of students—good ones, bad ones, and sad ones—but there were no shootings. Though unsupported by scientific research, it is our belief that one of the differences between then and now is that each student then had a personal relationship with some member of the staff or faculty. They had somebody who would listen to them. Nobody was alienated.

Additionally, the authors have spent the better part of the last three years teaching hostage negotiations in countries that are struggling with the transition from an autocracy to a democracy, from power resting with the elites to power resting with the people. We have come to realize that negotiations is not just a tactic that saves lives, which it does well; it is a tactic that brings the issue of human rights to the fore. It is a way of contacting and valuing people that sends the meta-message, "We care. We will listen. You have a right to be heard." It helps reduce alienation within societies and between governments, police agencies, and the people those structures are there to protect and serve. Negotiations is far more than a useful tactic that those in power use, it is a dedication to a strategy that supports a world view that values the rights of every person. It uses skills that make officers better people, better spouses,

parents, supervisors, supervisees, and citizens. It fights the alienation of terrorists and school shooters. It is the difference between a 26-year-old who plants bombs and one that runs to help people at a disturbance.

This edition of our book is offered up with gratitude to all those who serve in the hope that it will equip negotiators to be more effective in their job of not only saving lives but as representatives of the equally important goal of reducing alienation in our society.

Like previous editions of the book, this one is based on the mottos below:

Never give a sword to a man who can't dance.

—Celtic Motto

The best general is the one who never fights.

—Sun Tzu

Diplomacy is the art of letting someone else have your way.

—Daniele Vare

Intuitively, all good negotiators know the truth in each of these quotes. They know that they are in a high-stakes game in which the goal is to be prepared to fight and through the skillful use of unconventional weapons, the incident is settled without firing a shot. Each of the mottoes above reminds us of part of that goal.

The Celts remind us that one needs to know what is at stake when force is an option. It is rooted in the ancient Celtic tradition of the warrior-artist. In that tradition, a man needed to see the value of life, to write about its sunrises, flowing streams, and brilliant, crystalline days before he became a warrior. He needed to be able to celebrate all that was good in life. It was through this artful appreciation of life that the warrior came to realize exactly what was at stake in battle. It encouraged the warrior to count the costs before engaging in battle, being sure that the reason for battle was worth the potential costs. It encouraged the warrior to become skilled in his art, dedicating himself to perfecting his skill. It encouraged the warrior to try every tactic he thought might lead to success, even the ones that did not include the use of force. It is our experience that negotiators fit the tradition of the warrior-artist. They are keenly aware of the value of life. They know that every encounter can end in immeasurable loss. They are dedicated to refining the use of their weapons, so if life is lost, it is not due to lack of skill.

Sun Tsu reminds us that the most effective way to win a conflict is to arrange it so the other side sees the value of not fighting. The goal of a battle is not to have to go to battle. Rather, the opposition must be convinced that a peaceful resolution is their best option. Through the skillful use of both the negotiation team and the tactical team, the goal is to “bring the subject to the table, not to his knees.” Through the use of lessons learned from field experience, combined with what we know about behavior change from behavioral science thinking and research ([Chapter 1](#) and [Chapter 3](#)), teamwork ([Chapter 2](#)), the use of unconventional police weapons such as communications/persuasion skills ([Chapter 5](#)), intelligence ([Chapter 4](#)), and special equipment ([Chapter 2](#)), negotiators convince the subject that he has more to gain and less to lose by ending the incident peacefully than he does by using force. By using their knowledge of the crisis and crisis intervention ([Chapter 3](#)), the effects of time on themselves

and others ([Chapters 1, 2, 3](#)), best practices of negotiations ([Chapter 1](#)), the needs of emotionally disturbed individuals ([Chapter 6](#)), negotiating with suicidal persons ([Chapter 7](#)), and special considerations when negotiating with special populations such as juveniles, the elderly, warfighters, or police officers ([Chapter 8](#)) negotiators do everything possible to preserve life.

Daniel Vare reminds us that the strategies, tactics, and weapons the negotiator use are unconventional. Rather than using a nightstick, pepper spray, handgun, sniper rifle, or other weapon, negotiators use understanding, patience, caring, listening, and persuasion. Negotiators must develop the art of getting people to do what they want without challenging them so much that they resist or fight. It takes skill and skill takes practice. They must learn to assess risk ([Chapter 4](#)). They must work as a smooth and well-rehearsed team ([Chapter 2](#)). Teamwork does not just happen, especially with police officers, who are used to working alone and being in control. They must develop an understanding of how they complement each other. They must be dedicated to the practice of their art as a team.

Negotiators develop an art in the use of weapons that the rest of the department frequently misunderstands. Basic classes in the academy do not train officers in negotiation skills, although some departments are beginning to see the value in all their officers having the people management skills that negotiators develop. The increase in crisis intervention training is evidence of movement in this direction. Diplomacy is not a skill taught to most law enforcement officers. Therefore, negotiators are frequently misunderstood, especially when they go against the prevailing attitudes of the department to do their job. They must learn to care for themselves and for each other. Stress management, critical incident debriefing, and peer support are necessary for negotiators to persist in their quest to win without bloodshed ([Chapter 11](#)).

In our experience, negotiators are the brightest and the best in law enforcement and corrections. They are the most motivated and most skilled officers in their departments. They constantly share their experiences and learn from others. It is in the spirit of that sharing that we offer this book. It was not created by us. It was created by negotiators from all over the country who have been gracious enough to share their experiences, lessons, successes, and failures. We are humbled by the trust these negotiators have placed in us. We are awed by the dedication of negotiators. We hope that what negotiators have shared with us and we share with the readers through our words will contribute to the efforts of all the warrior-artists, peaceful generals, and diplomats who practice the art of negotiation.

One caveat: Some people have thought that by taking a single negotiations course or reading this book, they could become qualified negotiators, instructors of negotiations, or consultants. We would like to be clear: Becoming a skilled negotiator requires education, study, dedication, experience, and practice, practice, practice. This book is not intended to make a negotiator of the readers. It is intended to give the student an overview of the field and appreciation of the skill needed to be effective and to give practicing negotiators a resource to use in the development of their art. Without appropriate training, supervision, and commitment, the use of the materials in this book is considered unprofessional and unethical by the authors, and we do not assume responsibility for its use or the outcome of inadequately trained and supervised individuals.

We cannot adequately thank everyone who has contributed to this book. Like negotiations,

it has been a team effort. We would like to thank some especially helpful people, officers and civilians, without whom we would not have been able to do this work. Many people have contributed, as well as having spent hours with us in discussions on a variety of topics important to negotiations.

Much of the material in this book is consistent with FBI teaching and practice, because many FBI agents have contributed to our thinking. They include Gary Noesner, Byron Sage, Steve Romano, “Max” Howard, Chris Voss, Thomas Strentz, and Vic Bazan, retired FBI agents with whom we have worked for several years and who have been instrumental in the development of the field. We have also maintained a close working relationship with agents at the Critical Incident Response Group at the FBI Academy and with FBI field negotiators from around the United States. They have been forthcoming and generous with their knowledge and information. With the fear of omitting someone, we would especially like to thank William Clauss, Trey Atchley, Brenda Dillon, Wayne Furnia, and Troy McAdoo.

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Additionally, we would like to thank those officers who contributed to this edition of the book, including: Chief Inspector Andrew B. Brown, Deputy Head and Chartered Manager of the Leadership & Professional Development Division of the Scottish Police College, Northern Constabulary, Scotland; Sergeant Bruce Baker, supervisor, Task Force, Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office in Jacksonville, FL; Craig Menzies BA, MSc; Sergeant Joseph Jimenez, Richardson Texas Police Department; Sgt. Dan Oblinger with the Wichita (KS) Police Department; Special Agent Brenda Dillon, FBI; Lt. Jack J. Cambria, NYPD, Hostage Negotiation Team; Captain Kevin Hunter with the Fort Wayne, Indiana Police Department, Commander, HNT; Lee Fairchild, Sgt., Oklahoma Department of Corrections; Lieutenant Robert “Rich” Richman, Commander, Austin Police Department’s Hostage Negotiation team and Past President of the Texas Association of Hostage Negotiators; Captain Ron Hagan, Commander of the Delaware State Police Aviation Section; Thad Sarton, Senior Police Officer and Master Negotiator, Houston Police Department; Dr. Tom Strentz, retired FBI agent who designed, developed and directed the FBI hostage/crisis negotiations program from 1976 until 1985; Victor Bazan (retired), former member of the Critical Incident Response Group’s (CIRG) Critical Incident Negotiation Team (CINT); Lt. Jeri Skrocki, Hays County Sheriff’s Office; William Hogewood, Lt, Prince George’s County Maryland (retired), former Program Manager for ATF Hostage Negotiations Program and Instructor for the US Department of State.

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We would like to thank the police administrators who have had vision enough to make negotiations an integral part of their approach to policing. Though not as expensive as SWAT, we know that without the support of department leaders, negotiators would not have the time to train, the equipment to operate, the manpower and time to “slow things down,” or even the permission to do their job. There are many department leaders across the country and across the years who have made it possible for negotiators to save lives.

Last, but not least, we would like to thank again all the negotiators who work without recognition or reward, other than the satisfaction of knowing they have done their job well. Thank you to all those who have taught us more than we have taught them, to all who have been friends and confidants in the hard times and the good (you know who you are), and to all who have advanced the field of crisis response management so that more may live.

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Note

References

Learning Objectives

1. Understand why high-profile critical incidents forced police to consider alternatives to tactical resolution.
2. Understand how the Munich Olympic incident affected the formation of hostage negotiation teams in the United States.
3. Know why departments began relying on negotiation in crisis situations.
4. Know which hostage incidents played a significant role in the development of hostage negotiation tactics in the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.
5. Know how recent incidents have changed the nature of negotiations and how we keep learning from every incident.
6. Know the definitions for *hostage*, *negotiations*, and *hostage situation*.
7. Understand the progression from negotiations/bargaining techniques to negotiations/crisis incidents.
8. Know the types of incidents to which crisis intervention principles and techniques are applied.
9. Be able to explain the SAFE model.
10. Understand the Best Practices doctrine and how negotiations benefit from the application of Best Practices.
11. Be familiar with the resources available to negotiators, including books, research materials, computer databases, and Internet resources.

12. Know what some of the current PDA and cell phone apps are that can benefit negotiators.

Forming the Field

Munich—1972: the defining incident

On September 5, 1972, 13 Arab terrorists invaded the Olympic compound that housed the Israeli Olympic athletes and took 11 hostages. The terrorists demanded the release of 200 Arab prisoners held in Israel and free transportation to Egypt. Israeli diplomats contacted the terrorists and were advised that the threat of death to the hostages was real. Ten minutes later, the terrorists stated that if their demands were not met immediately, two athletes would be killed. If their transportation was not arranged, all of the athletes would be killed. Egypt's President, Anwar Sadat, refused to become involved. Diplomats offered alternatives to the terrorists: free passage to the Far East, payment of money, or trade of hostages for other personnel. The terrorists interpreted this as an effort to stall in order to make plans to assault. They continued to insist on the release of all 200 Arab prisoners and transportation to Egypt. Police officers observed what they thought were two dead athletes and nine bound ones. The terrorists continued to threaten to kill two hostages if transportation was not arranged for them. Plans were made to move the terrorists and the hostages to the airport. During the move the terrorists demanded that they change from the bus to a helicopter and fly into the airport. When they arrived at the airport, four terrorists took some of the hostages and moved toward a plane, leaving the remainder of the group in the helicopter. At 11:00 P.M., police demanded that the terrorists drop their weapons and surrender. One terrorist immediately responded by throwing a hand grenade into the helicopter. Three of the terrorists tried to escape from the area: one was killed and two were captured. The terrorists remaining in the helicopter detonated another grenade. The incident ended at 11:15 P.M. with 11 Israeli athletes, one police officer, and 10 Arab terrorists dead (Schreiber, 1973).

In the context of the close scrutiny of police practices that grew out of the 1960s, and a concern about the loss of life in hostage incidents, the international terrorist incident at the 1972 Munich Olympics described above occurred. It motivated the New York City Police Department (NYPD) to evaluate the effectiveness and value of forceful confrontation in hostage incident management and gave law enforcement what Roger Depue, retired Chief of the Behavioral Sciences Unit at the FBI Academy, called "its most effective, nonviolent tool."

The New York City Police Department, using the talents of Harvey Schlossberg, a detective with a Ph.D. in psychology, and then Lieutenant Frank Boltz (Cooper, 1978; Boltz & Hershey, 1979; Schlossberg, 1979b), developed tactics that led to the resolution of high-conflict incidents without the loss of life experienced in Munich. Schlossberg found that there was little literature on the use of negotiating techniques within police work. Therefore, he surveyed the psychological literature and developed principles that emphasized managing hostage incidents as though they were a crisis for the hostage taker. He and Boltz stressed:

1. The importance of containing and negotiating with the hostage taker in a hostage incident.
2. The importance of understanding the hostage taker's motivation and personality in a hostage situation.
3. The importance of slowing an incident down so time can work for the negotiator.

Schlossberg and Boltz pointed out that there were four alternatives open to the police in an incident like the one in Munich: (1) assault, (2) selected sniper fire, (3) chemical agents, and (4) contain and negotiate (Schlossberg, 1979b). The first three relied on traditional confrontational strategies. As such, they had a high probability of violence. He suggested that containing and negotiating was the safest approach for everyone. The principle of zero acceptable losses continues to be a guiding goal of negotiations today.

Understanding the hostage taker's motivation and personality is an important principle in negotiations. Schlossberg (1979a) emphasized that there is "no such thing as a 'psycho.' Rather, all behavior is understandable, goal oriented, pleasure seeking, and problem solving in nature. To understand apparently meaningless and random behavior, the negotiator needs to understand the person's history, goals, and problem-solving abilities. For instance, the paranoid person who hears voices telling him or her to lash out at others is generally acting out of a deep-seated fear of others attacking him or her. If negotiators understand this, the "craziness" of the paranoid's hallucinations is understandable. If it is understandable, it is less frightening for those who have to deal with it. Understanding focuses attention on the problem of the person's sense of insecurity and fear rather than on the surface issue of the person's "craziness."

Not every hostage taker or barricade subject has a mental illness. The vast majority do, however, have poor adaptation and coping skills when faced with a crisis. When people are confronted with a crisis, physiological internal states become elevated (i.e., blood pressure increases, heart rate goes up, central nervous system (CNS) neural activity increases, etc.) and emotions rise. Most people apply appropriate coping and adaption skills, thinking through the crisis and then employing appropriate coping mechanisms. Many hostage takers and barricaded subjects cannot employ appropriate coping skills. Most hostage takers will utilize what they BELIEVE are appropriate coping skills (i.e., taking hostages). Barricade subjects, however, by and large do not. In these cases, the most valuable tools a negotiator can bring to the crisis situation are *active listening* and appropriate use of time.

NYPD emphasized the importance of slowing down an incident so time can work for the negotiator. It was noted that frustration of a person's goal leads to a series of events that includes arousal, problem solving, creativity, and finally aggression. When a husband is confronted with an unwanted divorce, his initial reaction will be arousal: the body energizes itself to deal with the problem and the person feels tense. He engages in some problem-solving behavior designed to reduce arousal and the feelings of discomfort. The husband may promise to change and become more considerate of his wife's requests for more attention. If his attempts at problem solving are unsuccessful and his wife still insists on leaving, further attempts at changing her mind will be made. If they are unsuccessful, tension continues to rise until aggression may be used as the final solution. At that time the wife may become a hostage.

Defusing anxiety associated with frustrated goals takes time. Therefore, the police need to

respond to hostage takers in ways the hostage takers do not expect: by slowing the incident down and allowing the anxiety to dissipate. Schlossberg called this “dynamic inactivity” (Schlossberg, 1979a).

The New York City Police Department established its hostage recovery program following Schloss-berg and Boltz’s new approach. It was the first program in the country to emphasize the soft negotiation approach to conflict rather than the hard, tactical approach.

The Williamsburg incident—1973: Trying it out

On January 19, 1973, the NYPD had the opportunity to test their new principles and the newly established Hostage Recovery Program (Culley, 1974; Boltz & Hershey, 1979; Schlossberg, 1979b). Four armed robbers entered John and Al’s Sporting Goods Store in New York City. They announced a robbery and threatened employees and customers with a sawed-off shotgun and handguns. A silent alarm summoned the police, who trapped the armed robbers in the store. In the initial encounter, gunfire was exchanged and two police officers were wounded and one police officer was killed. One robber was wounded, and several officers and civilians were pinned down. Rather than storming the building in the heat of battle, the department contained the situation and began to negotiate. The hostage takers released a hostage at 8:00 P.M. This hostage was released for the purpose of taking a message to the police. The hostage takers had the released hostage tell the police that unless the hostage takers were allowed to escape, they would kill the remaining hostages. They demanded a doctor for their wounded companion. Because the robbers presented themselves as Black Muslims, several Muslim clergy were allowed to talk with them. Communications were established using a set of walkie-talkies that were not set up on the police frequencies. Food and cigarettes were given to them. A hostage was released in exchange for medical attention to the wounded robber in the store. A “think tank” was established, staffed by key department personnel, outside experts (including a psychologist), and a representative of the mayor’s office. Outside agencies were contacted in the event the incident spilled over into other jurisdictions. The robbers continued to engage in sporadic gunfire throughout the incident. After the initial cover fire the police used while rescuing trapped officers and citizens, the authorities held their fire. At 12:45 P.M. the following day, the hostages escaped using a stairwell that one of the store owners knew could be accessed by breaking through the plasterboard that was covering it. The hostages, who had been in a separate room from the gunmen, had time to escape through the door that had been blocked by the store owners. To preserve life, the police continued to contain and negotiate with the gunmen, even though their leverage was gone. It took time to effect the escape. Without hostages, the gunmen lost their power. The siege ended at 4:45 P.M. when the gunmen surrendered after being “convinced” that to fight for the oppressed minorities they must first stay alive (Culley, 1974).

The Williamsburg incident was a key incident in the development of hostage negotiations. It proved the effectiveness of the “slow things down and talk things out” approach, even in the face of shots having been fired and officers having been wounded and killed. In place of the usual action-oriented approach to an incident in which emotions run high on both sides, the more controlled, slower, and less reactive approach proved successful in the sense that no

other people were killed or wounded. It was a remarkable change in strategy and tactics that took immense courage, and for which the NYPD, Harvey Schlossberg, and Frank Boltz will be remembered.

FBI hostage negotiations program—1973: Bringing it to the national level

The New York City Police Department asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation to review the curriculum for hostage negotiation. Shortly afterward, the FBI developed a national training program for police officers who wanted to learn about hostage negotiation. The acceptance of hostage negotiation as a legitimate law enforcement strategy took a quantum leap forward when the FBI established its hostage negotiation training program at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, in 1973. In addition to training police officers from around the world in hostage negotiation, the Special Operations and Research Section of the academy brought together behavioral science experts and law enforcement personnel to develop a working relationship focused on hostage negotiation. The International Association of Chiefs of Police followed the FBI's lead by establishing a Hostage Rescue Seminar in 1976 (Noesner, 2010).

The FBI developed a course curriculum on hostage negotiation that has served as the basis for most local law enforcement training. Estimates are that 70 percent of trained police negotiators were trained directly or indirectly using the FBI curriculum. It has generated papers on every aspect of negotiation and has provided a model of cooperation and collaboration between law enforcement professionals and mental health professionals that is being followed today in other areas of police psychology. It published a compendium of some of their most important papers in 1998. In 1995, it organized the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) to plan, coordinate, and train for issues involving hostage/crisis incidents in a coordinated and proactive way.

Hostage taking and negotiations did not start with the NYPD. It has been part of the human condition since the beginning of recorded history. In the Old Testament, both Israelites and their enemies took captives: sometimes as the spoils of war, sometimes as a means of indoctrinating the conquered nation into the ways of its captors, and sometimes to weaken the resources of the overthrown nation. These captives were used to guarantee that the vanquished nation would not wage war on its conquerors. In African nations, people were captured, held hostage, and used as slaves.

Hostage taking has involved the use of persons as guarantees of payment or as security against war. The Romans held hostages as guarantees of treaties (Call, 1999). During the Middle Ages, European nations expected that people would be held captive to assure compliance by warring nations. Merchants were taken captive to guarantee that other merchants of the same nationality would pay their debts (Souchon, 1976). During World War II, Germany took as many as two million French hostages after the division of France in 1942 to assure the cooperation and compliance of the French people. Hostages have also been used to extort payment from a second party. For instance, pirates captured hostages and demanded tribute from people who valued the hostages (Call, 1999).

The United States has been no exception. Hostage taking has been used to make a political point. Outside of law enforcement, negotiations have been used to resolve hostage incidents with varying degrees of success. For instance, the Barbary Coast conflict and Santo Tomas

University were geo-political incidents in which the principles of negotiations were applied to hostage incidents.

Barbary Coast

One of America's early experiences with hostage-taking demands, negotiations, and tactical actions was with the Barbary States of Algiers, Morocco, Tripoli, and Tunis. The rulers of these states owed allegiance and paid tribute to the ruler of the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan of Turkey. To pay the Sultan, they preyed on travelers and merchants sailing the Mediterranean Sea. The sea powers of Europe, Britain, Portugal, Sweden, and France paid an annual tribute to the Barbary States to keep their ships, cargoes, and crews safe. Until the American Revolution, colonial ships sailed under the protective tribute of Britain. With the Revolution, American ships were seized, crews taken hostage, and ransom demanded. By 1785, the problem had become so severe that Congress made tribute payments part of the annual budget (Beach, 1986). In that year, for example, the merchant ships *Maria* and *Dauphin* were taken by Algerian corsairs, and it cost between \$1,200 and \$2,900 per crewman to obtain their release (Hagan, 1991). The system of hostage taking and ransom was so sophisticated that different ranks of crewmen brought different ransom. Captains were much more costly than seamen.

In 1801, the *USS George Washington* carried the annual tribute to the Dey of Algiers, who ordered the ship to carry his tribute to the Sultan of Turkey in Constantinople. As a response to this indignity, President Monroe sent a fleet of warships to the Mediterranean as a "squadron of observation." This squadron was to preserve, at whatever cost, our presence in the Mediterranean and the surrounding area. Commanders were authorized to use whatever force was necessary to protect any ship traveling under U.S. naval escort.

On October 21, 1803, the *USS Philadelphia* ran aground in the harbor at Tripoli. The crew was forced to surrender, and the ship was seized and converted into a Tripolitan warship. On the night of February 16, 1804, Stephen Decatur Jr., commanding a captured Ottoman ketch, renamed the *Intrepid*, attacked and sank the *Philadelphia*. The fleet blockaded Tripoli to prevent merchants from entering the country. On April 27, a force of seven U.S. Marines and 400 seamen, after crossing 600 miles of desert, captured the port of Derna, Tripoli. The Pasha of Tripoli sent a message to the U.S. naval commander to "recollect I have upwards of three hundred of your countrymen in my hands; and I candidly tell you that, if you persevere in driving me to the last extremity, I shall retire with them to a castle of about ninety miles in the interior of the country, which I have prepared for their confinement and my own security" (Hagan, 1991). The United States paid a \$60,000 ransom and retired on June 10, 1805.

This last act of ransom led the U.S. government to conclude that force could not be used to end these practices. By 1807, all American warships had been removed from the Mediterranean, until after the War of 1812. On March 2, 1815, Congress declared war on Algiers. On June 17, the flagship *USS Guerriere* sank the Algerian *Mashouda* and achieved an unconditional peace treaty with the Dey, ending the Barbary Wars (Beach, 1986). The resolution came through a combination of negotiation and force. Many of the principles then employed in response to hostage taking are the same as those that are employed today.

Santo Tomas

One of the earliest recorded hostage negotiation incidents in the United States involved the military, not a criminal justice agency. In the later stages of World War II in the Pacific, in January 1945, General Douglas MacArthur returned to the Philippines. In Santo Tomas University, located in the heart of Manila, 350 American hostages were being held. MacArthur wanted the prisoners freed as soon as possible (Costello, 1982). He ordered Brigadier General William Chase and elements of the 27th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry to “Go to Manila. Go around the _____. Bounce off the _____. But get to Manila.” Chase led two flying columns of tanks and heavy armor south down Highway 5 into the heart of Manila to Santo Tomas University.

The Japanese barricaded themselves in the University courtyard with the American prisoners, threatening to kill all Americans unless the Japanese were allowed to leave Santo Tomas. Surrounded by the Japanese Army of General Yamashita and separated from the main body of the Army, General Chase engaged in three days of hostage negotiations with the Japanese.

Early in the negotiations, Chase was able to provide food and Red Cross supplies for the American prisoners (Brantley, 1993). By the second day, the Japanese agreed to allow Army medical personnel into Santo Tomas to treat and remove the more seriously ill prisoners (Graydon, 1993). Other concessions were granted by the Japanese during remaining negotiations, including the release of all children (Gillooly, 1993). Finally, on February 3, Chase reached an agreement with the Japanese whereby the Japanese soldiers would be allowed to leave Santo Tomas (without any weapons) and flee into the city.



PHOTO 1.1 The main courtyard at Santo Tomas University, Manila, Philippines. Most of the civilian prisoners of the Japanese lived in this courtyard from initial interment on January 4, 1942, until they were freed on February 3, 1945. Most of the prisoners were Americans and British who were working in the Philippines.

(Photo by W. Mullins)



PHOTO 1.2 The main administrative building in WWII at Santo Tomas University, Manila, Philippines. During Japanese occupation, the Japanese forces used this building as headquarters, barracks, mess halls, etc. A few civilian prisoners were allowed to bunk in the building and had a small medical clinic.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

Chase rounded up all American prisoners and retreated to friendly lines some 13 miles outside the city of Manila. During the dash to Santo Tomas, negotiations with the Japanese and retreat, Chase suffered no casualties and no American prisoners/hostages were injured or killed.

Chase relied upon many of the techniques now considered standard practice in hostage negotiations. He used time wisely, deliberately dragging negotiations out for several days to calm the excited and frightened Japanese hostage takers. He negotiated demands, getting something for something. For example, when the Japanese demanded he move his tanks back from the front gate, Chase agreed to do so if the Japanese allowed medical personnel into the University (Irvine, 1993). He “wore down” the Japanese, keeping the Japanese commander awake for long stretches of time and then when the commander went to sleep, waking him after only an hour or two of sleep. He used the threat of firepower (similar to the threat posed by Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) officers), at one point threatening to unleash his entire column if one was injured. In sum, he performed exactly as trained negotiators would perform.

Development of Negotiations in Police Work—The Context

Modern police departments must handle hostage situations that are generally different from geopolitical incidents. With the exception of the 1970s and recent incidents, most of American criminal justice has not had to deal with hostage taking as an act of war, politics, or economics. Criminals and emotionally disturbed individuals do not take hostages to gain large-scale political or economic power; they take hostages to force compliance with demands or to express their emotional needs. Often, hostage taking has been an attempt at gaining personal power by individuals caught in the commission of a crime, or by individuals who

have experienced a long-standing sense of powerlessness (American Justice, 1994). Police departments have had to deal more with law violations or public safety issues when they have dealt with hostage incidents. Additionally, hostage taking in prisons and jails across the country has become commonplace. Prisoners have gained certain rights and guarantees through the courts and continually demand better treatment, better living conditions, and other privileges of prison and jail administrators. Other than legal action, the only redress prisoners may have is the taking of prison property and using hostages (usually prison staff) as bargaining chips.

Significant differences exist between the police management of hostage incidents and international-level management of hostage incidents. Although the United States' avowed policy at the international level is that it will not negotiate with terrorists, even when terrorists hold hostages, law enforcement has generally taken the position that as long as no immediate threat to life exists, negotiations are acceptable. For example, it is quite common for members of Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) and other international criminal/terrorist enterprises to take American citizens hostage for ransom (kidnapping). The FBI and law enforcement will work with the families and help negotiate the hostage's release, even in foreign countries. Many insurance companies that underwrite kidnapping insurance policies hire retired law enforcement negotiators for this purpose as well. For example, in 2001, a Philippine terrorist group, Abu Saaf, kidnapped two American missionaries, Martin Burnham and Gracia Burnham. For approximately a year, FBI negotiators traveled to the Philippines and worked in the United States with the church to try to secure their release (unfortunately, once the hostages were located, a tactical rescue by Philippine authorities was undertaken and Martin was killed, along with a Philippine nurse. Gracia was wounded). Following the English tradition of policing, American law enforcement emphasizes the rule of law and the rights of the individual (Walker, 1992). These elements have led to an emphasis on due process within the American legal system and have been the foundation on which much of American policing has been built. They have been the background against which negotiations have developed.

The individual's rights and the constitutional guarantees that are designed to protect those rights have led to many attempts at law enforcement reforms over the years (Walker, 1992). As early as 1933, the Wickersham Report criticized police use of force as exemplified in the "third degree." Part of the report, titled *Lawlessness in Law Enforcement*, documented the widespread abuse of citizens by police agencies. It cited examples, such as one suspect being hung by his heels from the police department building until he confessed, as abuse of citizens.

1970s—Establishing the Need

Experienced police officers report that, prior to 1973, departments faced with a person holding hostages used one of three methods to manage the incidents:

1. They relied on the verbal skills of the individual patrol officer.
2. They walked away.
3. They amassed manpower and firepower at the scene and demanded that the subject

release the hostages and surrender. If compliance was not obtained within a reasonable length of time, an assault was launched (Russell & Beigel, 1979).

Typical of the first approach was the 1961 incident of a patrol officer responding to a disturbance call at a residence. Upon arrival, he found the husband and wife barricaded in their home. The husband was holding the wife at gunpoint to keep her from leaving. The officer talked with the husband through the closed door of the house. He found out that the wife wanted to leave because she was tired of the husband's coming home drunk every payday and beating her. The officer was able to convince the husband that it was not very manly to hold his wife at gunpoint and that there were other women in the world who would appreciate his better qualities. The officer had knowledge and experience enough not to challenge the man's coming home drunk. Rather, he encouraged the man to seek a peaceful resolution as a positive action, a strategy similar to those used by negotiators today.

There was no training in crisis management, hostage negotiation, or abnormal behavior in police departments prior to 1973. Consequently, the skill with which an individual officer handled such situations depended on the skill he or she brought to the job. The management of hostage incidents varied from officer to officer. Faced with the same situation described above, some officers would simply leave, saying, "It is a domestic dispute and we have no authority." Other officers would call for reinforcements, contain the situation, and demand surrender. The management of crisis incidents was not uniform or professional.

The same situation existed in prisons. When prisoners rioted and took hostages, the typical reaction of the prison administration was to use violence to regain control. Prison guards, police officers, and, in some cases, the National Guard would use nightsticks and guns to retake the prison in a military-type assault operation. Often prisoners, prison employee hostages, and members of the assault operation were injured or killed. The 1974 Carrasco incident at the Texas Department of Corrections (TDC) illustrates this approach (Stone, 2000).

Fred Carrasco was in the Walls TDC unit outside of Huntsville, Texas. He was in prison for a variety of charges, including drug dealing and the attempted murder of a police officer. Plotting escape with three other convicts, Carrasco received smuggled handguns from a trustee who worked in the prison director's kitchen (the trustee smuggled the pistols and ammunition into the prison in a hollowed-out ham). Carrasco and the other inmates entered the prison library, which was on the third floor of a multiuse building in the prison (dining halls and recreation rooms occupied the first two floors). They took a prison officer, 11 librarians, and one teacher hostage. Their plan was to use the hostages to secure escape. Their escape plot soon turned into a 10-day siege. Very few negotiations were conducted by prison officials or the police (neither of which had negotiators or a trained tactical team). One reason the incident lasted 10 days was that prison officials could not decide how to attack Carrasco's position. Plan after plan was discarded, including one plan to blow up the library building.

Finally, prison officials decided upon a plan to give the hostage takers a military armored vehicle and attack the hostage takers when they exited the library. An armored car was delivered and the hostage takers came out. They had surrounded themselves with rolling bookcases stacked with books, with the hostages tied to the outside of the "Roman Turtle." The authorities used high-pressure water hoses in an attempt to break apart the bookcase shield. When this tactic failed, officers using long fire-hook poles ran up and attempted to physically pull apart the shield. During this attempt, both sides opened fire. When the firing

stopped, three hostages had been killed and several had been wounded, three hostage takers had been killed (including Carrasco), and several attackers had been wounded. It was estimated that more than 700 rounds were fired during the three-minute firefight. Not just at TDC, but also nationwide, this “attack with superior firepower” attitude was the norm.

Prior to the Carrasco incident, one of the most violent prison incidents in U.S. penal history occurred at Attica prison in New York. On September 9, 1971, more than 1,000 inmates rioted and gained control of Attica prison. The causes of the riot were multifold. Some inmates wanted improved living conditions inside the prison, while others were mad over the death of an African-American inmate at a different facility. The Commissioner of Correctional Services, Russell Oswald, tried to negotiate with the inmates without success. After four days, New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller ordered New York State Police to retake the prison by force. On September 13, 1971, New York State Police used tear gas, rifle fire, and assault tactics to regain the prison. As a result of tactical actions, 29 inmates and 10 hostages died. In 2000, New York paid \$12 million to inmates and relatives and another \$12 million to the families of slain prison employees (Lohr, 2012).

In arguably the single most violent prison riot in the nation’s history, inmates at the Penitentiary of New Mexico near Santa Fe, NM, on February 2, 1980, took 12 correctional officers hostage and headed toward Cellblock 5, which housed “snitches” and suspected snitches. Cutting into the cellblock, rioter execution squads threw flaming liquids into locked cells, cut through the bars of other cells, and dragged out the inmates, stabbing, bludgeoning, hanging, burning, and torturing the snitches. Some were thrown from upstairs walkways into the basement. New Mexico State Police responded and secured the perimeter. On Saturday morning, New Mexico Governor Bruce King mobilized the National Guard to assist. Unlike Attica and TDC, authorities opened negotiations with inmates early Saturday morning. On Sunday, 36 hours later, negotiations were successful and inmates surrendered. Even when it was learned the inmates had killed other inmates and inmate hostages and had tortured some correctional staff, negotiations continued. In all, 33 inmates were killed and more than 90 others were seriously injured (Stamatov, 2012).

After the establishment of specialized teams (SWAT—Special Weapons and Tactics), assaults were made by specially armed and specially trained police officers. However, their effectiveness in reducing injuries and death in violent confrontations was questionable. Schlossberg (1979a) established that in 78 percent of assaults, people were injured or killed. Police officers often sustained the casualties. Hatcher et al. (1998) point out that the SWAT approach was built on a military model in which the number of acceptable losses was part of the decision. Many departments in this era had seven-man teams so that they could take the expected casualties and still overwhelm the hostage taker.

An example of this approach was a 1979 incident in which an adolescent male shot a patrol officer when the officer stopped him outside a local high school. The officer was not fatally wounded and was able to call for help. The SWAT team was mobilized. They began a house-to-house search of the block where witnesses said the suspect had run. After surrounding the house in which they thought the suspect was barricaded, SWAT officers tried to enter the back door. The suspect burst out, shooting one SWAT officer before he was shot by patrol officers on the perimeter of the scene. The patrol officers also shot one of the SWAT officers. The incident ended with one dead suspect and three wounded officers.

The growth of psychological services within police departments was another factor that favored the development of hostage negotiation. While New York City used an officer with psychological expertise to develop the principles of negotiations, other departments hired civilian, staff psychologists in the early 1970s (Reese, Horn & Dunning, 1991). In response to the recommendations of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967), departments raised their hiring standards and increased their training in an effort to professionalize. As part of this new effort, applicants had to be certified by a mental health professional as emotionally, behaviorally, and cognitively capable of doing the job. Departments began hiring or contracting with psychologists to do pre-employment screening. This brought law enforcement and psychology into closer contact, opening the way for mental health professionals to influence departments on a number of human factors issues, including crisis intervention, management of abnormal behavior, and hostage negotiation.

Defining the field

Initially, the field was called *hostage negotiations* and much of the thinking was shaped by the FBI. It focused on the concerns of the 1970s, which were terrorist hijackings of airliners and bank robberies or other crimes that were interrupted by the police. Incidents like the South Moluccan takeover of a train in Holland and the Hanafi Muslim takeover of the B'nai Brith, summarized below, focused negotiations on what Lanceley (1999) called *intentional sieges*, incidents in which the subjects had predefined goals. The focus was on incidents like the Williamsburg incident, discussed above, in which the people were what

Noesner (1999) called "true hostages" rather than "victims in the making." The model that was applied was a power and bargaining model borrowed from business. For instance, early on, Cohen's book, *You Can Negotiate Anything* (Cohen, 1982), provided a framework for hostage negotiations. The guiding focus was *quid pro quo*, "something for something." Consequently, principles of bargaining served as guidelines for early negotiating theorizing, training, and practice. The field was defined by terms like *hostage*, *negotiate*, and *hostage incident*. Currently, these ideas still apply to some of the incidents criminal justice negotiators deal with. For instance, Dolnik and Fitzgerald (2008) have suggested that negotiating and bargaining principles could have been used during the Moscow Theater siege and the Beslan School siege and that a different result may have been attained. Therefore, we will look at these definitions and principles.

Hostage

The *American Heritage Dictionary* (1980) defines *hostage* as: "A person held as a security for the fulfillment of certain terms."

Several points need to be emphasized when considering this definition. First, it is important to understand the implications of the involvement of a person. A living being, not an inanimate object, is at risk. Inanimate objects can be used in extortion, but it takes a living person to make an incident a hostage incident. The goal of hostage negotiation is saving lives, not preservation of property. In discussing the Williamsburg incident, one authority said, "The

primary consideration in such circumstances is to secure the lives and safety of threatened hostages, the police officers, innocent bystanders, and the criminals themselves” (Schlossberg, 1979a). This makes hostage negotiations consistent with the public safety responsibility of the police, which includes aiding individuals in danger of physical harm, assisting those who cannot care for themselves, and resolving conflict (American Bar Association, 1980).

The emphasis on saving human life does two things for the negotiator:

1. It increases negotiator stress, because of the high cost of failure.
2. It attracts political and public relations attention due to the drama of a life – death confrontation.

In most hostage incidents, the explicit threat is to the hostage’s life. It is not the loss of property, status, or belonging to a community that is at stake. Life itself is at stake. The cost of failure in such an incident places significant stress on negotiators. The recent recognition of the impact of traumatic stress on emergency service personnel, police officers involved in shootings (McMains, 1986; Nielsen, 1986; Solomon & Horn, 1986; Somodevilla, 1986; Reese, Horn & Dunning, 1991), and military personnel is ample evidence that feeling responsible for the loss of life can create significant stress. Negotiators need to plan for this stress.

Incidents that involve life and death have a sense of the dramatic (Keen, 1991). There is rarely a hit television show or film about the adventures of a certified public accountant; there is no life-and-death struggle. However, hostages are different. There is the threat to life; therefore, there is high drama. Terrorists understand and play on this drama. The media, neighbors, family members, and friends are attracted to such incidents. Negotiators and police departments should anticipate this attraction and plan for the management of this audience. All this attention makes negotiation incidents high-visibility and potentially high-liability situations. Because of this public interest, many units of the police department may be needed at the scene. Because of the potential liability, the department’s crisis response teams need to be well trained and well rehearsed.

Second, it is important to understand that the person is “held.” The hostage is not there voluntarily. The holding may be physical or psychological; the impact on the person is the same. A person is traumatized because of his or her lack of control and is made to feel powerless and dependent on the hostage taker. The former points to the need for victim debriefing. The latter sets the stage for the Stockholm Syndrome; negotiators need to know how to recognize and manage both trauma and the Stockholm Syndrome. (For details on the Stockholm Syndrome, see the section in this chapter titled “Sveriges Kredit Bank, Stockholm, and the section titled “The Stockholm Syndrome” in [Chapter 10](#).”)

Knowledge of traumatic stress has led some police departments to expand the use of their negotiators to crisis debriefing in situations other than hostage incidents. That is, some departments have used their negotiators to help search-and-rescue workers manage the emotional impact of their work. Some have used them to debrief crime victims (McMains, 1988; Greenstone, 2005).

Third, the person has utility. The person is being held as security—as a guarantee. The hostage is the hostage taker’s currency, his or her power. Noesner has described these people as “true hostages” to distinguish them from “victims in the making,” because the risk to hostages is lower. The hostage is not a person, and has no value to the hostage taker as a

person (Schlossberg, 1979b). Part of the negotiator's job is to personalize the hostage for the hostage taker. This has to be done subtly, however. If too much attention is directed toward the hostage, his or her worth is perceived as increased. This gives the hostage taker the perception of more power. The negotiator's goal is to personalize without valuing. The negotiator needs to encourage the development of the Stockholm Syndrome.

Fourth, the person is held as security for certain terms. This means that there is an expected return— a quid pro quo for the hostage taker. The hostage taker has needs that he or she expects to be met in return for the safety, security, and/or release of the hostage. The principal job of the negotiator is to find alternate terms for the hostage taker. Goldaber (1979) has pointed out that every hostage taking is reducible to two elements: Who are the hostage takers, and what do they want? Negotiation adds two more elements to the equation: What will they take and what are we willing to give? For instance, rather than the escape a gunman demands during a bungled robbery attempt, he might settle for the negotiator going to court with him to testify about his cooperation in releasing the hostage.

Many students and negotiators ask about hostage taking versus kidnapping. Kidnapping will be discussed in some detail later, but suffice it at this point to say that the major difference between the two is that in a kidnapping, authorities do not know the location where the hostage(s) are being held. Once the location is known, the kidnapping then becomes a hostage taking. Negotiating principles are, in general, the same in both.

Negotiate

The American Heritage Dictionary (1980) defines *negotiate* as: "To arrange or settle by conferring or discussing." Cohen (1982) added to this definition by saying that negotiation is the use of information and power to affect behavior in a "web of tension." He points out that conflict is a natural part of negotiation. It always involves people wanting to maximize their gains and minimize their losses. Again, several points need highlighting:

1. **The attitudes of the people involved in a conflict contribute to the ultimate success or lack of success of a negotiation.** Fisher and Ury (1981) and Ury (1981) have stressed the importance of recognizing that there are two parts to negotiations: resolving conflict and maintaining the relationship. Attitudes influence the relationship. McMains (1988) has pointed out that police officers tend to develop three attitudes that interfere with relationships: everything is either black or white, feelings are not important, and solutions to problems need to be found immediately. Negotiators need to develop attitudes of caring, understanding, and patience to service the relationship element in negotiations.
2. **The settlement comes through "discussing or conferring."** Rather than relying on the tactical approach, negotiations depend on the use of words and people skills. In an effort to save lives, tactical options are the least effective. Assaults result in a 78 percent injury or death rate (Strentz, 1979), sniper-fire in a 100 percent injury or death rate, while containment and negotiation have resulted in a 95 percent success rate (FBI, 1991). Recent research (Butler, Leitenberg & Fuselier, 1993) has suggested

that negotiating teams that have mental health consultants available are more effective than teams that use no mental health consultant. For instance, the San Antonio Police Department, which has used a mental health consultant for 14 years, has a success rate of 99 percent. In addition to developing personality profiles of the subject, a large part of the mental health consultant's job is to keep the team focused on appropriate crisis intervention and communications skills.

Negotiators must not only be good at "discussing and conferring"; they must believe in the effectiveness of negotiating. In the early years of hostage negotiation, it was thought that a good salesman would be a good negotiator. Experience has shown this to be a false assumption. People generally know when they are being "conned" and they do not react well, especially under stress. The solution to the credibility problem raised by the "salesman approach" to negotiations seems to be to have negotiators who believe in the "product"—the peaceful resolution of conflict. This "genuineness" communicates itself for negotiators, the same way it communicates itself in counseling (Carkhuff & Barendsen, 1967).

Discussing and conferring requires some specific communications skills: active listening, persuasion techniques, and problem-solving skills. Active listening is the ability to hear what the other person is saying: his words, his feelings, and his expectations, and to let him know that you have heard. It requires the negotiator to pay close attention, to ask himself what all this means to the other person and to ask the person if he has heard the message correctly. It avoids advice-giving, criticism, or judgments. Active listening is essential in the early stages of every negotiation, to defuse emotions and to establish understanding. Negotiators need to develop all of these.

3. **The goal of negotiation is the settlement of an incident.** Several authors (Goldaber, 1983; Bolton, 1984; Covey, 1991) have pointed out there are three ways of settling conflict. One is a win/lose solution, in which one side must give in. Two is the avoidance solution, in which one of the sides walks away. Three is the win/win solution, in which both sides gain something. Traditionally, police conflicts have been resolved in a win/lose manner. In most conflict situations, the police have relied on having more power than the hostage taker to force a resolution. However, the Munich incident demonstrated the limits of raw power. It showed that sometimes the other side cannot be overpowered without significant loss. Neither can the police avoid conflict. Their role as protectors of society demands that they do something if lives are threatened. Negotiation requires and represents a fundamental change in the exclusive reliance on power to handle conflicts.

Discussion alone does not necessarily solve problems, a fact to which any husband or wife can attest. Rather, the ability to arrive at an agreement with which both parties are comfortable makes negotiation effective. Fisher and Ury (1981) have suggested that a wise agreement involves three elements. Negotiators need to keep these three elements in mind, because they provide a framework in which the negotiator's skills and abilities are practiced. An agreement must:

1. **Meet the legitimate interests of both parties to every extent possible.** This

principle emphasizes the point that there are usually two sides to every issue. Negotiators have to pay as much, if not more, attention to the other side's goals and needs as they pay to their own. They need to ask: "What does the hostage taker want? What do they need? If I were the hostage takers, how would I be thinking and feeling?" Without consideration of the other side, negotiations become nothing more than power struggles.

2. **Resolve conflicting interests fairly.** This element focuses on the idea that there has to be some standard by which parties involved in a negotiation can judge the fairness of an agreement. It is not just the exercise of the most power that determines the correct solution to a problem. Rather, negotiators have to be able to show how a solution benefits both parties. In a hostage incident, benefiting both parties does not necessarily mean going along with the hostage taker's initial demands. Rather, it means helping the other person expand his or her view of his or her own needs and showing him or her new options for meeting these expanded needs. For instance, the depressed person who has lost her boyfriend and takes a hostage to force the police to kill her needs to see that there are other ways of meeting her need for care and concern from others, for finding relief from the pain of the loss, and for the embarrassment of having lost the "perfect mate."
3. **Take community interests (relationships) into account.** This element recognizes that the relationship is an important issue in negotiations. Negotiators need to separate issues from relationships and demands from people (Fisher and Ury, 1981). They need to discuss them as different issues. When this is done, it is easier for the negotiator to say, "I care about you, but I disagree with your behavior." In addition, negotiators need to understand that their actions during an incident are being viewed by the larger community. The things they do are the things the community expects them to do the next time. For instance, if, during an incident involving family members being taken hostage by an emotionally disturbed person, a negotiator agrees to take that person to a mental health clinic and then does not, the negotiator is neglecting the relationship issue. This will make it more difficult for the hostage taker to trust police in the future. This will also make it more difficult for the larger community to trust the police.

[A hostage incident](#)

A **hostage incident** is any incident in which people are being held by another person or persons against their will, usually by force or coercion, and demands are being made by the hostage taker. Hostages are used to gain compliance or attention in several kinds of incidents.

Traditionally, hostage incidents have been looked at from the context within which hostages are taken. These contexts include hostages taken in the commission of a crime, hostages taken by emotionally disturbed individuals, hostages taken during prison riots, and terrorist hostage taking (Hassel, 1975; Miron & Goldstein, 1979; IACP, 1983; Goldaber, 1983; Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986). Negotiators should have a working knowledge of each kind of incident, because they will need to modify their approach to accommodate each type of situation.

In looking at hostage takers' motivation and goals, Miron and Goldstein (1979) point out that incidents have both an instrumental value and an expressive value to the hostage taker. Hostage taking is both an act designed to gain compliance with demands—the instrumental nature of the incident—and an act designed to display the power of the hostage taker—the expressive nature of the relationship. An armed robber interrupted during the commission of a crime takes hostages with the primary purpose of forcing the authorities to comply with his demands for escape. His are instrumental demands. On the other hand, the terrorist who takes hostages to draw attention to his cause and who wants to demonstrate the powerlessness of the existing government is emphasizing the expressive nature of the incident.

Hostage takers can be arranged on a continuum. The continuum starts with those who emphasize the instrumental nature of hostage incidents (Miron & Goldstein, 1979). They run from the antisocial personality who wants money and transportation (at the functional end) to the emotionally disturbed hostage takers who use the incident to express their outrage, anger, or fear of a situation (at the expressive end). Terrorists are in the middle, wanting to gain both political and economic concessions and to show their power.

Understanding the differences in these motivations is important because they will determine the strategies, tactics, and skills needed in a specific incident. Hassel (1975) has pointed out that terrorists who are dedicated to their cause have the option of choosing martyrdom by getting themselves and their hostages killed. He suggests withholding media coverage, if this is a possibility, to play on their need for publicity—their expressive needs. The SAFE model emphasizes the fact that there are at least four dimensions to which negotiators must attend in every incident: Substantive issues, Attunement or trust issues, Face or self-image, and Emotions. The first and the last correspond to instrumental and expressive demands.

Although not all criminal justice negotiators agree, the definition and development of the field has always been an interplay between experience and theory. Schlossburg and Bolz represent that interplay. NYPD called upon the Ph.D. psychologist who used crisis intervention principles to develop a response to high conflict incidents. The field commander implemented the design. The incidents provided the experience against which to test the theory. At the same time, experiences in the field were providing ideas and focusing on issues that shaped the field. Some of the significant incidents are summarized below.

[Downs v. United States: The legal foundation—1971](#)

Even before the Munich massacre, the legal foundation for the use of hostage negotiation techniques in the United States was laid by *Downs v. United States*. On October 4, 1971, FBI agents from the Jacksonville field office intercepted a hijacked aircraft that landed at Jacksonville International Airport for refueling. On board were two crew members, two hijackers, and the wife of one hijacker. The gunman and his wife were reported to have a long history of marital difficulty. Communication was established by radio with the plane's captain. The hijackers demanded fuel, an engine restarter, and the clearing of law enforcement personnel from around the plane. The fuel demand was refused. The captain reported that one gunman had 12½ pounds of plastic explosives on board. The copilot was allowed to leave the aircraft to negotiate for fuel. Again, the fuel was refused. A few minutes later, one gunman

deplaned and asked for fuel, saying that the man left on board was extremely upset. He was arrested. The decision was made to assault the aircraft. A car was moved to block the aircraft. The Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) approached the plane, identified himself as an FBI agent, and ordered everyone in the plane to leave. Two shots were fired from inside the plane. The ASAC tried to deflate the right rear tire by shooting it, and ordered the right engine disabled by gunfire. When the engines were quieted, he approached the plane and found two dead hostages, and a mortally wounded hijacker (FBI, 1985).

The district court ruled that the FBI was not negligent in its handling of the hijacking. It ruled that the use of force was not unreasonable under the circumstances and that the agent in charge had taken the course of action that would maximize the hostages' safety.

The appeals court, however, found that there was "a better-suited alternative to protecting the hostages' well-being." It pointed out that the degree to which law enforcement officers will be excused for errors in judgment in emergency situations is "qualified by training and experience he has or can be expected to have, in coping with the danger or emergency with which he is confronted" (*Downs*, 382 F. Supp. at 752). Because the FBI guidelines on the handling of hijackings established the safety of the hostages to be of primary importance, and because there appeared to be positive (the release of a hostage and attempts to negotiate using both a hostage and one of the gunmen) rather than negative reactions from the hijackers to being delayed, negotiations were a viable alternative to force. Because the ASAC was trained on these guidelines, the court found that the district court was in error and its decision was reversed. This ruling established negotiation as a third alternative to force or escape in emergency situations.

[Sveriges Kredit Bank, Stockholm: Impact on the hostages—1973](#)

The robbery of a bank in Stockholm, Sweden led to the development of another principle for law enforcement officers: the Stockholm Syndrome. At 10:15 P.M., a lone gunman initiated a 131-hour hostage incident at the Sveriges Kredit Bank. He demanded the release from prison of his ex-cellmate, who joined him and four hostages in the bank vault. In addition, he asked for transportation out of the country and \$750,000, which the authorities refused. During the siege, the hostages came to fear the police more than the hostage takers. The hostages came to believe they knew better than the authorities what needed to be done to preserve their own lives, and they overtly sided with the hostage taker's position against the authorities. This allegiance to the goals of the hostage takers has become known as the Stockholm Syndrome (Cooper, 1978).

Though it does not occur often, the Stockholm Syndrome is important in negotiations for two reasons:

1. It can be purposely developed by either the police or by the hostage to build a relationship between the hostage taker and the hostage that may save the hostage's life. For instance, when General Dossier, a U.S. Army military commander in Italy in the 1970s, was taken hostage by Communist dissidents, he developed a relationship with one of his guards. They talked about politics, family and their personal lives over a period of days. When the Italian authorities raided Dossier's prison, this same

guard turned and pointed his weapon at the General, but could not fire (FBI, 1991).

2. Negotiators need to understand that strong emotional ties develop between hostages and their captors. These ties may lead the hostages to return to the scene with hostage takers who have not surrendered. It leads to hostages downplaying the aggressiveness of the hostage taker. It sometimes leads to hostages making statements to the media favorable to the hostage taker's cause. Negotiators need to be prepared for these aspects of the Stockholm Syndrome. They need to contain and isolate the released hostages and they need to carefully evaluate any intelligence information they receive from hostages.

The South Moluccans: Success after the first loss—1975

Another incident helped to solidify negotiation as an effective alternative to armed assault even in the most demanding circumstances. Seven members of the South Moluccan Independence Movement took over a Dutch train near the town of Beilen. Even though hostages were killed early in the incident, the patient application of hostage negotiation principles resolved the incident. The hostage takers demanded:

1. A statement by the Dutch government admitting injustice to the Moluccan cause;
2. Television time for the Moluccans to explain their cause;
3. A meeting between the South Moluccan Independence Movement and the Dutch and Indonesian governments, under United Nations auspices; and
4. The bringing of the South Moluccan cause to the United Nations by the Dutch government.

All demands were refused and a 12-day siege began. The authorities gave the hostage takers only minor concessions; food, water, blankets, and medicines. The strategy was to attend to basic survival needs and nothing else. The importance of personalizing the hostages was brought home when the terrorists chose one of the passengers to execute in order to prove the seriousness of their demands. The passenger asked to speak to his daughter and say goodbye. The terrorists changed their minds about him and chose another passenger. On December 14, 1977, the hostage takers surrendered (Cooper, 1978).

Two additional issues were illustrated by the South Moluccan incident: negotiation can be successfully pursued even after there has been violence, and hostage incidents are highly effective in publicizing situations or causes that until that time are obscure. Even though there had been shootings of the hostages during the incident, the government's refusal to give in to the terrorists' demands resulted in the eventual surrender of the subjects. Frequently, the question of when to use a tactical solution is important in hostage incidents. The usual answer is that when violence occurs, law enforcement officials have a responsibility to stop the violence. It is a logical conclusion when police responsibility for public safety is considered. The South Moluccan incident suggests that a peaceful resolution can be obtained in hostage incidents even if there has been prior loss of life.

Prior to the taking of hostages, the plight of the South Moluccans was an issue only for Holland. Most of the world had no idea where South Molucca was or what issues surrounded

the conflict between South Molucca and the Dutch government. Few people knew that the Dutch had promised South Molucca its independence during World War II. However, during the incident, the world learned of the plight of the South Moluccans. Hostage incidents are effective in bringing attention to otherwise unknown causes.

The Hanafi Muslim incident: The role and the impact of the media—1977

The Hanafi Muslims were a sect of the American Black Muslim movement that in March 1977 took over three locations in Washington, D.C. They were outraged by the murder of women and children at the Hanafis' home in Washington by a rival Black Muslim group. Even though the hostage takers had been caught, tried, and imprisoned, the Hanafi Muslims' leader, Hamaas Khaahlis, did not think they had been punished in accordance with dictates of the Koran, the holy book of Islam. He took over the headquarters of B'nai B'rith, a Jewish service organization, to gain attention to his demands. He wanted a film on the Muslim faith removed from the theaters nationwide, the murderers of his people as well as the murderers of Malcolm X brought to him, the police to reimburse him for the \$750 fine levied against him for contempt of court, and all Muslim countries notified that he intended to kill Muslims and create an international incident. During the 40-hour siege, many people, including media representatives, were able to get through to the Hanafis on the telephone. The media let slip the information that one of Khaahlis's bitter enemies, Wallace Muhammad, was at the Washington airport, defeating negotiators' attempts at avoiding his demands. The incident was resolved after a District Court judge agreed to allow Khaahlis to remain free on bond until his trial (Miron & Goldstein, 1979; American Justice, 1994).

The Hanafi incident was important to the history of hostage negotiations because it spurred a national debate about the news media's role in the theater of hostage taking. Is the media a help or a hindrance in terrorist hostage incidents?

On one side is the media's argument that they are exercising their constitutional right to freedom of the press under the First Amendment when they do things such as telephoning the hostage taker and interviewing him. According to this argument, a free people have the right to be fully informed about matters of public safety and the media have a responsibility to report the news fully, gathering it by whatever means they think appropriate.

On the other hand, some critics point to the media's part in creating the problems of terrorism and hostage taking. They contend that part of the reason for terrorism is that otherwise powerless people are able to gain international publicity for sometimes unknown causes. In fact, this exposure is what terrorists often seek. Additionally, they argue that detailed media exposure has what social learning theorists call a "disinhibiting effect." Through watching others use violence, threats, and intimidation, an imitator is likely to see hostage taking as a legitimate and effective way to power.

The Hanafi Muslim incident brought to law enforcement's attention the need to have a working relationship with the press. It highlighted the importance of isolating the hostage taker's communications.

Additionally, the incident opened the debate on the social, economic, and political consequences of agreements made during negotiations that is still debated at the time of this writing (Miron & Goldstein, 1979; American Justice, 1994). The question of whether an

agreement made during negotiations is valid has been addressed in case law. For instance, in *United States v. Crosby* (713 F.2d 1066 [5th Cir. 1983], *cert. denied*, 464 U.S. 1001 [1983]), the court ruled that the jury could not hear the portion of a negotiation tape in which negotiators promised the defendant that he would not be prosecuted if he released his hostages because it might induce unnecessary sympathy for the defendant. Similarly, in *State v. Sands*, the court ruled that a written letter of immunity signed by the local sheriff was invalid because it was signed under duress. However, the other side of the argument comes from negotiators themselves, who say that the failure to follow through on promises destroys their credibility, making it more difficult not only to negotiate with the same individual a second time but, because negotiations are a public event, making it more difficult to negotiate in good faith with anyone.

Refining the Field

From hostage negotiation to crisis intervention

Hatcher et al. (1998) have discussed the changes in negotiations from 1971 to 1998. They point out that negotiations moved from concern about hijackings, terrorist acts, and political statements to incidents that are more personal in nature, i.e., domestic incidents and barricaded subjects. Along with the change in types of incidents came a change in strategies and tactics. Negotiators in the “first generation” emphasized reducing the confrontational nature of incidents, defusing the high emotions in most incidents, negotiating small issues to set the stage for agreement on larger issues, the use of the passage of time to allow for the reduction of the hostage takers’ ability to sustain the encounter, the development of the unique relationship between the subject and the victim (Stockholm Syndrome), and reaching the point in the incident in which the subjects’ interests shifted from their initial demands to concern about how to end the incident safely.

In the 1980s, the emphasis among negotiators moved away from prisoners and terrorists to emotionally disturbed individuals, trapped criminals, and domestic incidents (Hatcher et al., 1998). This was “the second generation” of negotiations in which the application of crisis intervention techniques and active listening skills came into use. It recognized that although time was generally on the side of the negotiator, there were situations in which the passage of time increased the risk to the victim. A careful analysis of the relationship among the context, the perpetrator, and the hostage was necessary (Hatcher et al., 1998).

Initially, police negotiators focused more on bargaining principles than crisis intervention techniques. One of the federal government’s concerns in the early 1970s was aircraft hijackings. Ten percent of airline hijackings between 1931 and 1989 occurred in 1969. Five hundred and twenty-eight airline hijackings occurred between 1969 and 1982 (Feldman & Johnson, 1999). Negotiation/bargaining techniques were the choice in dealing with these incidents, in which the subjects wanted something (substantive demands). Bank robberies also were federal concerns. Frequently, bank robbers made substantive demands and bargaining was appropriate. Local departments followed suit in approaching incidents they handled using

bargaining techniques.

The FBI guidelines were heavily loaded with bargaining techniques. Suggestions such as the following emphasized the bargaining aspects of crisis, as opposed to crisis intervention techniques:

1. The use of time to increase basic needs, making it more likely that the subject will exchange a hostage for some basic need.
2. The use of time to collect intelligence on the subject that will help develop a trade.
3. The use of time to reduce the subject's expectation of getting what he wants.
4. Trades can be made for food, drink, transportation, and money.
5. Trades cannot be made for weapons or the exchange of hostages.
6. The boss does not negotiate.
7. Start bidding high to give yourself room to negotiate (ask for all the hostages).
8. Quid pro quo: get something for everything.
9. Never draw attention to the hostages, it gives the subject too much bargaining power.
10. Manipulate anxiety levels by cutting off power, gas, etc.

All of these guidelines are designed to deal with bargaining issues in a negotiation. The problem was that bargaining-oriented guidelines did not always fit the incidents that arose.

The types of incidents in which municipal police agencies use negotiators are not restricted to hostage incidents. Gist and Perry (1985) found that the majority of negotiator deployments were to domestic, barricaded, or suicidal situations. Surveying major police departments on the value of negotiators and negotiator training, McMains (1988) found that departments were using negotiation skills in a variety of nonhostage incidents. Over a five-year period, 18 percent of negotiator calls in the 15 largest U.S. cities were for hostage situations. Fifty percent of the calls during this same period involved barricaded subjects who had no hostages, 17 percent involved high-risk suicide attempts (suicide attempts in which people other than the subject were placed in danger), eight percent were to debrief people who were involved in crisis situations (victims of crimes, victims of stalking, rescue workers who were involved in mass casualty incidents, etc.) and seven percent were to help manage the taking into custody of people who were being involuntarily committed to a mental health facility. It has been suggested that of the 18 percent of incidents identified as hostage incidents, some of them really did not meet the criteria of someone being held to guarantee a demand.

Research on hostage negotiations began to show that most of the people involved in them are likely to respond to crises in their lives in maladaptive ways. In reviewing 3,330 randomly selected hostage incidents occurring between 1973 and 1982, Head (1990) noted that 70 percent of the cases he reviewed involved criminals, prisoners, or emotionally disturbed individuals—populations that would be expected to be easily overwhelmed by unplanned incidents. Similarly, Butler et al. (1993) found that the majority of hostage takers in the United States were emotionally disturbed. Feldman (2001) reported on his review of 120 incidents, in which 81 were personal/domestic disputes, mentally ill patients, workplace violence incidents, alcohol or drug related, or students; all groups that are easily thrown into crisis. Of the 144 subjects in Feldman's study, 140 (97%) had psychiatric diagnoses.

At the same time that negotiation was developing in law enforcement, others were exploring the use of crisis intervention principles in policing. For instance, Rosenbluh (1974),

in collaboration with William Reichart and Lt. James Olney of the Louisville, Kentucky, Police Department, developed extensive training programs in Crisis Intervention for the Louisville-Jefferson County Police Academy. Their objectives were to: (1) Help intervenors set disputants and sufferers at ease; (2) Help intervenors zero in on solvable problems; (3) Help intervenors bring individuals to workable solutions to their problems; and (4) Trace the development of maladaptive responses to crisis, such as suicide. Schlossberg (1979b) emphasized the use of crisis intervention principles as he and Frank Boltz developed the NYPD program. Professionals in other areas of the country began applying crisis intervention ideas to a broad range of policing issues. Greenstone and Leviton (1982) suggested that most of the people with whom officers deal are in crisis and crisis intervention principles are the preferred method of managing incidents. In the late 1970s, Lanceley (1994) realized that police officers were infrequently asked to deal with incidents like Munich. In most of the incidents negotiators dealt with, bargaining techniques were inappropriate. He integrated crisis intervention techniques and suicide intervention into the FBI curriculum in 1983. This change led to an even wider use of negotiators in crisis situations. Currently, they are being effectively used to intervene in:

1. Barricaded Subject Incidents
2. High-Risk Suicide Attempts
3. Domestic Incidents
4. Prison and Jail Riots
5. Mental Health Warrants
6. High-Risk Warrants
7. Debriefing in Crisis Incidents
8. Stalking Incidents
9. Violence in the Workplace
10. School Violence

Crisis: Definition

The shift in emphasis from hostage to crisis introduced new definitions and concepts into criminal justice negotiations. Terms like *crisis* and *crisis intervention* started to define and refine the field.

A *crisis* is defined as a situation that exceeds a person's ability to cope (Hoff, 1989). One of the fathers of crisis intervention, Caplan (1961), emphasized that a crisis occurs "when a person faces an obstacle to important life goals that is, for a time, insurmountable through the utilization of customary methods of problem-solving"—it exceeds the person's ability to cope.

When confronted with an insurmountable problem, people feel a rise in tension. They attempt to solve the problem. If that attempt is unsuccessful, there is a further rise in tension. Caplan says, "A period of disorganization ensues, a period of upset, during which many abortive attempts at solution are made." It results in what the Network of Victim Assistance (NOVA) (1992) has called a cataclysm of emotions. People are overwhelmed by feelings that range from fear to panic, from anger to rage, and they experience mental confusion.

Most spontaneous sieges (Lanceley, 1999), barricaded subjects, high-risk suicide attempts,

emotionally disturbed individuals, and people who have been victimized by violent crimes are people who are facing a situation in which they are having problems coping. They can be considered in crisis. For instance, domestic disputes that erupt into violence are not usually new problems. There is frequently a history of unproductive attempts at problem-solving that cycle through the same argument time after time. In frustration, one of the partners threatens to leave as an attempted solution to the discord in the relationship. At this point, the other partner is faced with a new problem—how to keep the partner from leaving. The crisis has intensified. This is when the risk of violence increases, because the person being left has no other ways of achieving his goals. Both parties are in crisis.

Spontaneous sieges (Lanceley, 1999) involving “victims in the making” (Noesner, 1999) involve people who are in crisis. Any incident in which the actor did not plan on dealing with the police/corrections officer can be seen as a crisis.

Stages of a crisis incident

Table 1.1 Summary of the Goals, Issues, and Skills Important to Negotiators at Each Stage of a Crisis

Stage	Attitudes	Goals	Techniques
Pre-Crisis		Practice Planning	Public speaking Intelligence gathering and analysis
Crisis/Defusing	Acceptance Caring Patience	Prevention Establishing Relationship Credibility Safety Encourage Ventilation Assess problem Validate	Reassurance Active listening Emotional labeling Paraphrasing Reflection of feelings Effective pauses Mimic
Adaptation/Negotiations	Acceptance Caring Patience	Facilitate Prediction of consequences Planning a different action	Open-ended questions Problem-oriented questions Persuasion and influence techniques I-messages
Resolution/Surrender	Acceptance Caring Patience	Peaceful resolution Managing increased tensions	Guided imagery Stress management techniques

Source: Michael J. McMains, Ph.D. used with permission.

Crises can be seen as happening in stages that have different characteristics and require different skills to manage (See [Table 1.1](#)). Although authors vary somewhat regarding the exact nature of the stages of a crisis (Caplan, 1964; Tyhurst, 1986), each emphasizes the usefulness of viewing crisis as a process, with predictable stages through which people move. Each stage has different issues with which negotiators must deal and requires different skills

that are valuable in dealing with the issues of that particular stage. An understanding of the stages of an incident helps negotiators select the right skills for what is going on at the moment, provides an organized evaluation of the incident to command, and projects strategies for moving to the next stage of negotiations. The stages are:

1. Precrisis
2. Crisis
3. Accommodation/Negotiation (Stabilization)
4. Resolution

Kelln and McMurtry (2007) have criticized the stage model for its lack of specificity in the applications to criminal justice negotiations. They point out that most of the discussion of the Stage model focuses on the Crisis stage and Active Listening skills. They suggest the use of what they call the STEP model in dealing with issues of moving actors from a position of Pre-contemplation to Change. The current authors have dealt with this issue by integrating principles from Motivational Interviewing and Intentional Interviewing into the response to crises. A more thorough discussion of the issue is found in [Chapter 3](#).

1980s—Putting Negotiations into Practice

Rochester, New York: Suicide by cop—1981

In June 1981, an incident at a bank in New York raised law enforcement's awareness of the possibility of subjects using police officers as instruments to end their own lives: suicide by cop. William Griffin, age 38, engaged the police and FBI in a 3¹ 2-hour standoff at a neighborhood bank. He had entered the bank, ordered customers out, and taken bank employees hostage. He had the bank manager call police and tell them that if they did not "execute" him that he would start "throwing bodies out" in one half-hour. He shot and wounded two police officers who responded to the bank's silent alarm. Griffin refused to negotiate with authorities. At 3:00 P.M., he had teller Margaret More stand in front of the door of the bank and he shot her with the shotgun he had brought to the bank. He then went to the window and exposed himself to the police sniper he knew was across the street and was shot and killed. He had shot and killed his mother and a handyman and wounded his stepfather at his home prior to going to the bank. Authorities found his diary, which had a carefully worked out plan for forcing the police or sheriff to take his life. This incident brought the issue of suicide by cop (SbC), incidents in which the actor uses the police as instruments of their death, to the attention of FBI negotiators. Van Zandt (1993) used this and other incidents in the 1980s to illustrate the need for negotiators to recognize and learn to deal with this subset of suicidal people. He suggested a profile that could be used to raise officers' awareness of the potential for the subjects' forcing a violent confrontation in order to be killed. Issues of SbC will be discussed in more detail in [Chapter 7](#).

The anatomy of a siege: Post-traumatic stress—1981

Wesselius and DeSarno (1983) reported an incident that illustrated the emotional and psychological impact of being a hostage. These authors reported that, on a weekend morning in 1981, a 24-year-old male forced his way into the headquarters of a police agency. He took the security officer and clerical personnel hostage. He told the office personnel to continue their duties as usual. He demanded to see five police officers and a specific black chaplain with whom he had dealt before. His behavior was volatile, switching from calm to agitated with little provocation. His voice would rise in pitch, and his rate of speech would increase. He ordered food from the “best restaurant in town,” and he referred to the secretary in the building as “my secretary.” Clearly he was grandiose and paranoid. He released one woman early in the incident when she began to cry uncontrollably. He released three other women after a discussion with negotiators about whether he was giving up control and showing a weakness in character by doing so. Negotiators had to reassure him about his safety.

He was assessed to be a paranoid schizophrenic and thought to be a threat to the hostages. The authorities decided to end the siege tactically, and a police sniper shot him when he was pointing his gun away from the hostages. Four months after the incident, the employees were interviewed by a psychiatrist, who discovered that virtually all hostages used denial to deal with the threat during the incident. They did not think it was real. However, after the denial faded, the hostages experienced a range of feelings from fear to terror, despair, abandonment, resignation, and rage. After the incident, they reported classic signs of post-traumatic stress disorder, including excessive startled reactions, emotional numbing, withdrawal from their usual activities, reliving the experience either in flashbacks or nightmares, inability to concentrate, and avoidance of situations that reminded them of the incident. [Chapter 10](#) discusses hostage behavior and post-incident psychological and physical issues for hostages.

The Oakdale and Atlanta prison sieges: Application to corrections—1987

Several hostage incidents have proven the utility of hostage negotiation principles in the prison setting. The largest such incident was the simultaneous rioting of Cuban immigrants at Oakdale, Louisiana, and Atlanta, Georgia, in November 1987. A total of 1,570 inmates took a total of 126 hostages at the two locations. They demanded to be heard. They thought the U.S. government, through the Immigration and Naturalization Service, had lied to them and that the agreement between the United States and Cuba to return them to Cuba posed a serious threat to them. After nine days at Oakdale and 12 at Atlanta, the siege ended. The FBI found the following negotiation principles particularly useful (Van Zandt & Fuselier, 1989; Van Zandt et al., 1989):

1. Allowing time to pass
2. Negotiating with the identified leader
3. Negotiating in English rather than Spanish
4. Tape-recording and reviewing negotiations
5. Using mental health consultants
6. Providing a surrender ritual

1990s—Learning Additional Lessons

Two landmark cases spurred further development in negotiations in the 1990s: (1) the Ruby Ridge, Idaho, standoff in August 1992, and (2) the Branch Davidian Siege at Waco, Texas, in 1993. Additionally, two high-profile prison cases facilitated the development of negotiation resources in correctional agencies.

Talladega: Dealing with “non-negotiable” incidents—1991

On August 21, 1991, Cuban detainees awaiting deportation to Cuba took over the Alpha Unit of the Federal Correctional Institution at Talladega, Alabama. They took eight Bureau of Prisons staff members, three Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) staff members, and 15 American inmates hostage. A combined Bureau of Prisons and FBI negotiations team was established. The FBI brought considerable experience in negotiating both street and prison incidents, including the Atlanta and Oakdale incidents. The Bureau of Prisons negotiators had considerable knowledge about riots, correctional populations in general and the current population in particular, as well as prison management issues.

Demands were slow in developing because of the general disorganization of the inmates. When they got organized, they demanded press coverage of their plight, medical attention for inmates, and the establishment of a “commission” of prominent citizens who could plead their case to the general public. They were displeased with the outcome of the Oakdale and Atlanta incidents and wanted more than just federal involvement in the followup to their situation. When it became evident to the scene commander that negotiations were not progressing and that the safety of the hostages was threatened, he ordered a tactical entry early on August 30.

Fagan and Van Zandt (1993) reported that even though the incident was resolved tactically, negotiators were a valuable part of the overall operation. They were able to identify the more moderate leaders among the inmates and focus on negotiating through them. They tested out an approach that alternated between English and Spanish, using English when initiating negotiations and switching to Spanish later when a more complete understanding of the issues was needed. Most importantly, they found that even though the inmates would not negotiate with them, they were able to “support the entire crisis management process” by:

1. Allowing the detainees an opportunity to vent their frustrations with the system, calming them and reducing the risk to the hostages;
2. Buying time for the tactical team to gather resources, develop a unified assault team, collect needed intelligence, and develop a workable assault plan;
3. Gathering intelligence on conditions in the unit that was helpful in tactical planning;
4. Introducing changes in the situation that benefited the tactical team;
5. Lulling the detainees into a sense of safety and security, increasing the element of surprise for the tactical team.

Ruby Ridge: Third-party intermediaries—1992

On August 21, 1992, the United States Marshal's Service had an armed encounter with Samuel Weaver, the son of a suspected terrorist, Randall Weaver, and Randall Weaver's friend, Kevin Harris. In the incident, Marshal William F. Degan was shot and killed, as was Samuel Weaver. This resulted in a 10-day siege involving the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team, in which Randall Weaver's wife, Vicki, was shot and killed by a FBI sniper. Weaver and Harris were wounded prior to Vicki Weaver being killed. Randall Weaver was known to be an anti-government radical who did not recognize federal authority. He was considered extremely dangerous. Weaver's suspicion of federal authorities along with the assault on him and his family, led to his refusal to talk with negotiators. Consequently, negotiators used a variety of innovative techniques to try to communicate with him. They sent Weaver messages from his wife's family, not knowing that his wife was dead. They had Weaver's sister try to talk him into surrendering. Finally, they used third-party intermediaries to influence him. Bo Gritz, a retired Army colonel who was well-known to the radical right, and Jack McLamb, a retired police officer, were used as intermediaries because Weaver said he was willing to speak with them. It was through these third parties that negotiators learned that Vicki Weaver had been killed and that Randall Weaver and Kevin Harris were wounded. Gritz and McLamb took on the role of protectors and, even under these difficult conditions, negotiations resolved the incident without further injury or death. For the negotiator's view of Ruby Ridge, see Lanceley (1999).

Branch Davidians–Waco: Coordinating response—1993

In the spring of 1993, agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) initiated a raid on Mt. Carmel, a compound located near Waco, Texas, which housed David Koresh and his followers. The raid plan called for three teams, one of which had the job of getting between the compound and the men who were normally working away from the main structure at the hour of the raid. A second team was to enter the front door to arrest and restrain everyone in the building, particularly David Koresh. A third team was to go to the side of the compound on which the armory was located, climb ladders to the second floor, enter the armory and secure it so that members of the Branch Davidians could not use the weapons to resist. Unfortunately, the Davidians were warned and a firefight followed, leaving four ATF agents dead and 16 wounded. The FBI assumed command and control of the incident, bringing in their Hostage Rescue Team and negotiators. Using bargaining techniques, they obtained the release of many of the children by giving Koresh time to get his message out to the general public. After 56 days, the FBI-initiated actions ended in the Mt. Carmel compound being burned, with significant loss of life among the Davidians.

This incident and its tragic outcome led FBI negotiators to rethink their approach to siege incidents. It led them away from the linear approach to a parallel approach to hostage intervention, in which both the tactical teams and the negotiators work concurrently as part of a coordinated approach to resolution of the problem. The Waco siege led to the recognition that sieges are best managed through the parallel application of tactical and negotiations. A parallel approach integrates the tactics of the two elements from the start of an incident, rather than through the linear model that allows negotiators to try to resolve the incident, but if they are not successful, then use a tactical approach (Noesner, 1999).

Lucasville prison riot: Raising awareness in corrections—1993

In April of 1993, the maximum-security prison in Lucasville, Ohio, gained national attention when inmates took hostage correctional officers who were responding to another officer's distress call. Four hundred and fifty inmates barricaded themselves in the L-block of the prison. Both prisoners and officers were beaten. One correctional officer and nine inmates were killed in the initial uprising. Prisoners demanded amnesty for the riot, replacement of the warden, free expression of religious beliefs for Muslim inmates, more flexible telephone and visitor privileges, that nepotism be stopped, and that forced integration of cells be eliminated. As the 11-day siege progressed, inmates organized across traditionally conflicting gang lines. They had several spokespersons. They released two hostages after being given access to the press. Before the final release of officers was agreed upon, the prisoners insisted on the media being allowed to film the surrender and that attorneys and religious leaders be present to witness the end of the siege. The negotiation techniques utilized during the siege were described as "textbook" tactics. Once again, negotiation principles were utilized successfully, even though a death had occurred in the early stages of the incident. Negotiators learned the importance of teamwork and training. The Lucasville incident, along with the Oakdale and Atlanta incidents, helped bring attention to the utility of negotiations in correctional settings.

The Freeman standoff: Pre-incident planning, TPIs, and coordinated action—1996

The FBI, concerned about the chaos after the sieges at Ruby Ridge and Waco, initiated several changes in the way they handled large-scale sieges. They included a more integrated approach to planning and responding to incidents through the Critical Incident Response Group based at the FBI Academy; systematic pre-incident assessment; greater use of third-party intermediaries; a more permeable perimeter; and a lower key presence at the scene. During the 80-day confrontation with the Freeman in the spring of 1996, many of these changes were evident.

The Freeman were a group of antigovernment ranchers who believed that the federal government had no authority over "sovereign" men, that people governed themselves, that America was in a decline, and that their rights to govern themselves came from the Bible, the Magna Carta, and the Bill of Rights. They had financial troubles, had lost their farm subsidy, issued bad checks, placed fraudulent liens on property, received stolen goods, and refused to vacate land they had lost in foreclosure. When federal authorities intervened, local law enforcement had limited resources and there was growing unrest in the community.

The FBI had the Freeman under surveillance for months prior to planning the arrest of two of their leaders, LeRoy Schweitzer and Daniel Peterson, at a ham radio setup on the Clark Ranch outside Jordan, Montana. The purposes of the pre-incident assessment were: (1) to take a proactive approach to planning; (2) to obtain a holistic assessment that included tactical and negotiation evaluations; (3) develop intelligence sources prior to the incident to allow sufficient time for profiling, tactical planning, and strategic planning; and (4) to help reduce the impact of the "action imperative" during the actual incident.

After the arrests of Schweitzer and Peterson, communications were attempted with the

Freemen who were still at the ranch house. Because the Freeman did not recognize the authority of the FBI, they would not talk with FBI negotiators. Consequently, two types of third-party intermediaries were used to facilitate communication and influence different members of the barricaded Freeman. Family associates were used to influence their loved ones to come out, and public figures who were recognized as having some status with the Freeman were used to influence decisions that affected all Freeman.

The FBI gained the following from the Freeman standoff (Romano, 1998a):

1. Validation of the use of active listening techniques to defuse intense emotions
2. Validation of the use of the passage of time
3. The effectiveness of the parallel planning process involving both negotiators and the tactical team
4. Unreasonable positions lead to eroding support
5. The importance of surrender with dignity

Additionally, they suggested the following guidelines for the use of third-party intermediaries (TPIs) (Romano, 1998b):

1. TPI use should be carefully timed. They are best introduced after the crisis has stabilized and a thoughtful assessment of the incident, the needs of the negotiators, and the value of TPIs can be made.
2. Select TPIs that will benefit your goals. It is essential that a TPI have some specific value in advancing the goals of the negotiators in the incident. During many incidents, a number of people come forward offering to help. If there is no clear reason or goal for using them, it is not a good idea not to put them on the line “just to have something to do.”
3. Script them carefully, so that the interaction is focused on the goals. Do not allow TPIs to vary from the script.
4. Use safe methods of contact.
5. Use them to help guarantee surrender.

[Columbine High School: Need for violence prevention—1999](#)

On April 20, 1999, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold attacked students and faculty at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, with four guns and bombs. They killed 12 students and one teacher. Subsequently, they committed suicide. The compelling scenes from the tragedy and its aftermath brought to the public’s awareness the importance of intervening in school violence. Because the majority of school violence incidents are over before negotiators become involved, some negotiators have taken a different approach to school violence. They have used their crisis management skills to help school authorities develop prevention programs designed to identify, assess, and manage “at-risk” youth before a crisis incident occurs. Additionally, they have recognized the importance of pre-incident planning and coordination with school officials, so that the most expedient response to an actual incident can be made. The large number of hostages in these incidents and the tendency of subjects involved in these

incidents to be heavily armed have led negotiators to approach these incidents with concern and caution (Feldman, 2001).

2000s—Unexpected Issues and Adapting to a New World

Negotiations continue to evolve as new, noteworthy, and media-intensive incidents occur. In the post-September 11 era, crisis situations have taken on added media and public emphasis, with all eyes on responders to see how these incidents will be handled and resolved. Several incidents affected the focus of negotiations in the criminal justice system since 2000. Both the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001 and the attacks on the Moscow Theater and Beslan School siege have had implications for the development of negotiations.

World Trade Center—2001

The new century began with an event that changed the tone of every segment of the United States. The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, brought a new militancy to the United States. The war on terrorism took center stage. Monies were made available for equipping and training tactical response units across the country. Negotiation took a back seat to issues of security and safety. The official policy became “you cannot negotiate with terrorists,” especially suicide bombers. They are intent on dying, so do not bother talking to them. This attitude influenced negotiators as well as tactical teams. For instance, Klein (2006) argued that we cannot negotiate with terrorists because the necessary conditions of negotiations—containment and time—were not all in place in dealing with terrorists. The doctrine began to develop that negotiations is an activity in which CRTs engaged in order to gain intelligence and to gain time for the tactical officers to prepare an assault.

Nord-Ost—The Moscow theater siege: Costs of a tactical response—2002

On October 23, 2002, an armed group took 979 people who were attending a performance of Nord-Ost hostage at the House of Culture in Moscow. They secured the theater by installing approximately 30 explosive devices around the building to make an assault difficult, separating hostages into ethnic groups, and strategically placing hostage takers in positions that allowed them to cover all entrances and exits, as well as all of the hostages. They instructed the hostages to notify their relatives that they were hostages.

The gunmen demanded that Russian forces withdraw from Chechnya. They set a deadline of one week and threatened to kill the hostages if their demands were not met. They released a videotaped statement that they were willing to die for their cause. In addition, the terrorists demanded that Russia quit using artillery and air strikes in Chechnya, starting the next day. They wanted Russia to stop the “mopping up” operation in Chechnya, and that Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly declare that he was working toward stopping the war. As

the event played out, the terrorists did not appear unrealistic about the time frame they placed on their demands. For instance, when it was pointed out that one week was not enough time to withdraw all the troops from Chechnya, they changed their demands to withdrawal of any Russian troops from anywhere in Chechnya. The attackers released about 150 – 200 children, pregnant women, Muslims, some of the foreigners, and people requiring health treatment in the hours after the takeover.

The first person was killed the second day, when Olga Romanova, a 25-year-old shop assistant who lived within the inner perimeter, was shot and killed when she entered the theater and tried to get the hostages to leave. The hostage takers thought that she was a spy sent in by the Russians. The Russians had used such a tactic in a previous siege (Dolnik and Fitzgerald, 2008).

Thirty-nine hostages were released by the rebels on October 24, 2002, but the rebels repeated via one of the hostages an earlier threat to start shooting their captives if Russia failed to take their demands seriously.

A second person was killed by the subjects on October 24 at 11:30 P.M. after he claimed to have entered the building to retrieve his son. No son could be identified and the subjects again thought it was a Russian attempt to plant a spy in the theater. Shortly after this shooting, one of the hostages attacked a female subject. Two people were shot by accident during the conflict. The Chechens asked for medical help for the injured.

The rebels released seven Russian citizens on the morning of October 25 and eight more children (ages seven to 13) around noon with no conditions. At 9:55 P.M., four more hostages (citizens of Azerbaijan) were released. Fearing for the safety of the hostages after the shooting on the night of October 24, the timetable for an assault of the theater was moved up. On the morning of October 26, troops from Russia's Spetsnaz (or "special purpose") and from the FSB surrounded and stormed the theater. It is thought that they pumped an aerosol anesthetic, fentanyl, into the theatre through the air conditioning system.

Russian officials claimed that the raid was prompted by a panic among the captives due to the execution of two female hostages. In fact, the raid had been planned shortly after the hostages were initially seized and the shooting cited as a proximate cause had actually occurred about three hours before the operation began. At least 33 rebels and 129 hostages died during the raid or in the following days. Of the 129 hostages who died, 126 are thought to have died as a result of the gas used in the assault.

In an in-depth analysis of the Nord-Ost incident, Dolnik and Fitzgerald (2008) raised several issues. Some of them were issues recognized by early police negotiators in the first phase of the development of the field and strongly suggested that negotiators revisit the principles of bargaining used to deal with the deliberate sieges of that day. Some of the implications of the Nord-Ost incident for negotiators include:

1. **Negotiate with the decisionmaker**— Even though Mansur Salmov was the designated commander of the incident and he had a reputation for violence, negotiations were actually conducted by Abu Bakar, a Chechnyan living in Moscow. In addition, the presence of many hostage takers complicated negotiations because many people could be on the phone, extending negotiations because of different goals and the need to build relationships with different people. Additionally, in order to

assess the risk of violence, the history of each individual negotiator has to be assessed, if there are multiple negotiators. It is important that the decisionmaker be the person with whom negotiations be carried out.

2. **Assess the actors' planning and discipline**—the fact that there was extensive planning, training, and discipline involved in the theater siege suggests that the commandos had studied the past confrontations with Russia and were prepared for the usual tactical response. It illustrates one of the reasons for negotiating with such groups. Ury (1981) has suggested that when there is an ongoing relationship, both substance and the relationship (attunement) must be taken into account. The level of trust in an ongoing incident, and the amount of time and energy the negotiator needs to develop trust, will depend on the history of the relationship. Clearly, the history of conflict between Russia and Chechnya was one of little trust.
3. **Distinguish between positions and interests**—Location, timing, and suicidal posture, as well as their willingness to modify their time frame around their original position, indicate that the Chechnyan goals were not just interested in the cessation of the war. Dolnik and Fitzgerald (2008) suggested that their primary goal was cessation but that they had secondary goals of raising awareness of the world about the plight of Chechnya and the brutality of the Russian government.
4. **Develop a nuanced threat assessment**—Several factors suggested that the terrorists at Nord-Ost were a threat: the incident was premeditated and well planned; there were weapons and, based on the history of the organization carrying out the incident and some of the history of some of people involved, credible threats; there was an apparent absence of changes in the subject's demands; and the subjects' were willing to die. Dolnik and Fitzgerald (2008) point out that despite the terrorist unwillingness to give up their primary demand, they did change the specificity of the demand as they went. For instance, they recognized and modified their demands on the basis of the need for more time. Additionally, Dolnik and Fitzgerald (2008) points out that the willingness to die is not the same as wanting to die; the apparent suicide risk is high only if there is no negotiations.
5. **Pay attention to indicators of de-escalation**—Several indicators of de-escalation of violence were present in the Nord-Ost incident: there was evidence that the Stockholm Syndrome was forming; there was an absence of premeditated murder; violence was defensive; and several deadlines set by terrorists were ignored without harm.
6. **Use effective communications**—Dolnik and Fitzgerald (2008) suggest that the most serious problem with the negotiations was that of communication. Most contacts were indirect, through the media, released hostages, or hostages' cell phones. Indirect communication makes assessment of the negotiations difficult because the ongoing changes and the nuances are lost. For instance, it is difficult to track changes in demands and to conduct an ongoing threat assessment when communication is indirect. A second problem was that several untrained negotiators were used during the incident.
7. **Use time**—Dolnik and Fitzgerald (2008) pointed out that even though the political pressures on the Russian government were great, and their need to protect the safety

of their people legitimate, they tended to rush the resolution. He states that it was actually the terrorists who wanted to slow things down, by asking for state negotiators who were not at the location.

8. **Deal with the expressive issues in the negotiations**— Dolnik and Fitzgerald (2008) suggests that the Russian authorities did not deal with the expressive nature of the Nord-Ost incident. Rather, they tended to adopt a strategy that offered an exchange of safe passage early in the incident without allowing time for the Chechens to express their grievances.

It can be argued that Russia's handling of the Moscow Theater incident was an effective resolution to the problem. It certainly gained the approval of the Russian people. Shortly after the siege, President Putin had a public approval rating of 83 percent. However, Dolnik and Fitzgerald (2008) have argued that it was Russia's refusal to negotiate in the Moscow theater incident that led to the Beslan School siege (see below). It is ironic that a deliberate siege, the Munich Olympic attack, led to the formation of negotiating principles in criminal justice but those same principles were not used in Moscow.

Lewis State Prison (Arizona Department of Corrections): Refining issues in corrections—2004

On January 18, 2004, two inmates at Lewis State Prison (south of Phoenix, Arizona) initiated one of the more notorious hostage-taking incidents in recent years. At approximately 3:00 A.M., inmates Ricky Wassenaar and Steven Coy (who were cellmates) reported for kitchen duty in their housing unit (Morey Unit). The lone officer present was attacked by Wassenaar, who took his uniform. The officer and a female civilian worker were restrained in the kitchen office. Other inmates (who refused to take part in this escape attempt) were locked in a storage area. Inmate Wassenaar changed into the officer's uniform, shaved his beard and went to the Morey Tower to get weapons. In the meantime, Inmate Coy sexually assaulted the female kitchen worker. Shortly thereafter, Coy managed to take a second correctional officer by surprise and restrained him in the office.

At about 4:55 A.M., two other correctional officers and an inmate reported to the dining hall. Coy fought with one officer, cutting him with a homemade weapon. The other officer went for assistance. Inmate Coy left the dining hall and headed toward the Morey Tower. Outside the dining hall, Coy was confronted by other officers and staff who had arrived. He attempted to confront the staff members and was pepper-sprayed, with little effect. Meanwhile, Wassenaar had managed to fight and restrain the correctional officers in the Morey Tower and obtain an AR-15 assault rifle. Coming to Coy's aid, Wassenaar fired about 14 or 15 shots at the Lewis staff and secured Coy's release to the Morey Tower. At 5:30 A.M., the communications center at the prison was advised that a hostage incident was under way.

In the Morey Tower, inmates Wassenaar and Coy had gained control over both Tower officers—a male officer who had worked for the Department of Corrections for less than one year, and a female officer who had less than four years' experience. On the first day of the incident, both inmates sexually assaulted the female corrections officer. Ricky Wassenaar was

serving 28 years for armed robbery and eight counts of aggravated assault and had been incarcerated since 1997. It is worth noting that during the armed robbery, Wassenaar wore a bulletproof vest. According to his psychological profile, Wassenaar was a sociopath. Coy was serving life for armed robbery and sexual assault. Both were in the protective segregation unit, Wassenaar because of a threat on his life, and Coy because of his having been assaulted by other inmates and almost killed. Later debriefings with Wassenaar revealed that he had been planning this escape attempt for more than three years and continually modified the plan as prison security procedures changed.

The Morey Tower was just short of 20 feet tall, with stairs leading to two enclosed floors and a roof observation deck (a total of three stories). The second level contained the control panel and had two-inch-thick Lexan safety windows all around that were tilted at 27 degrees. The first level had the restroom and was reached via circular metal stairs. The observation deck, on the third level, was accessed via a ladder through a roof hatch. The building itself was constructed of eight-inch-thick reinforced concrete. Like all prison observation towers, it was constructed to be unbreachable. As a general rule, given the actions, violence, and sexual assault committed by inmates, this incident would be a tactical team problem, not a negotiated problem. In this case, however, there was no way to tactically resolve the situation without costing the life of the two officers held hostage in the tower. Authorities were forced to negotiate.

During the course of the incident, which lasted 15 days, more than 30 negotiators were utilized. The negotiating team was a mixed team, with representatives from the Arizona Department of Corrections, the Arizona Department of Public Safety, the Birmingham FBI office, the Crisis Negotiation Unit of the FBI from Quantico, the Glendale Police Department, the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, the Phoenix FBI Office, the Phoenix Police Department, the San Diego FBI Office, and the Tempe Police Department. In addition to the normal team functions of primary negotiator, secondary negotiator, scribe, intelligence-gatherers, and team leader, the negotiators also used a team coordinator to work with the prison command center, a profiler, a tactical liaison officer, and various advisors.

On the first day, Wassenaar presented an initial list of seven demands; to speak with the governor, to speak with the warden, to speak with the media, to speak to his sister, a helicopter for escape, a radio, and a handcuff key (the Arizona Department of Corrections listed handcuff keys as a non-negotiable demand). On the second day, Wassenaar requested a different negotiator (which was refused) and offered to give up a "shank" for blankets, towels, and washcloths. When negotiators tried to make substantive trades, the inmates threatened to cut off one of the hostage's fingers. On days three and four, very little progress was made on any of the issues, other than the Arizona Department of Corrections offering to drop Wassenaar's protective custody status. On day five, an interstate compact was presented, with letters guaranteeing the compact presented. An interstate compact is an agreement to transfer the inmates to a facility in another state (which both Wassenaar and Coy requested). On day six, Wassenaar offered to release a correctional officer and on day seven, the male correctional officer was released.

From the outset, Wassenaar was the leader of the inmate hostage takers. He was the "talker," decision-maker, and instigator of demand issues and other issues negotiators would have to deal with. Coy was the "doer" of the pair, the one who took orders and followed

Wassenaar's lead. Their relationship was predictable and easily understandable from the perspective of having two psychopaths together (Hare, 1993). Negotiators relied on these specific behavioral and personality characteristics to negotiate with them.

The only significant movement on days eight, nine, and ten were the introduction of a TPI (Wassenaar's sister in a tape-recorded message). Also, on day ten, the negotiators delivered several small items to the inmates as a rapport-building technique. During this period, other than the Interstate Compact Agreement, the only demands were small items of food and personal comfort. As one negotiator put it, the inmates asked for items as though they were walking down the aisle of the prison commissary (Dubina & Ragsdale, 2005). And that is all they wanted. On day 12, Wassenaar's sister and Coy's uncle were introduced as live TPIs (versus tape-recorded), and the Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections was presented as a guarantor of the Interstate Compact Agreement. On the thirteenth day, there was a split in the hostage takers, with Wassenaar telling the negotiators they needed to kill Coy. Not much progress was made on day fourteen, other than the negotiators taking a "hard line" (hanging up the phone, turning off the power, etc.). Finally, on day 15, February 1, 2004, the inmates surrendered to federal custody and the remaining hostage was freed. Authorities kept their end of the agreement. Coy was transferred to a prison in Maine and received seven life sentences for his role in the Lewis Prison incident. Wassenaar was taken into federal custody. In May 2005, while acting as his own defense attorney, Wassenaar was found guilty by a jury on 12 of 20 charges and was sentenced to 16 life sentences plus 25.75 years. As of September 2005, no decision has been made on whether to send him out of the state of Arizona.

There were eight lessons learned from the Lewis Prison incident (Dubina, 2005; Dubina & Ragsdale, 2005):

First, the chain of command had to be educated. Other than the prison warden, incident commanders and decision-makers had no corrections or law enforcement experience. The Director of Corrections in Arizona was a political appointee and was awaiting senate confirmation. Her boss, and ultimate authority, was the governor of Arizona. This is not to imply that either made bad decisions, but only to say that both had to be "educated" about issues specific to the critical incident process and negotiations.

Second, if law enforcement officers are negotiating (and/or serving as tactical officers) in a prison situation, they need correctional advisors on the team to bring them up to speed on correctional issues (language, terms, nonnegotiable demands, prison policies, etc.). Prisons are an alien environment to law enforcement officers and present some unique challenges to negotiators. To avoid mistakes in the negotiation process, correctional advisors are a must.

Third, care must be taken in selecting the Negotiation Operations Center (NOC). At Lewis, the NOC was selected by law enforcement negotiators and selected using subjective criteria they would likely use at a law enforcement situation. Thought was primarily given to the incident being rather short in duration, so space issues were neglected. It soon became apparent that the NOC was much too small for a protracted incident (but by then was established and could not be changed).

Fourth, it is crucial that negotiators establish prior working relationships with other negotiators in their geographical area. At Lewis, more than 10 agencies were brought in and more than 30 primary negotiators alone were used. Many team members were strangers when

they were thrown together to resolve a crisis incident.

Fifth, early on, work schedules have to be established and adhered to. In a large-scale incident like Lewis, the use of the ICS approach would guarantee that scheduling and personnel requirements were met.

Sixth, be flexible, able, and willing to modify the negotiation team structure to meet the unique demands of the situation. Early into negotiations, a team coordinator position was added to facilitate communications with the command structure.

Seventh, use the power of the team. Each contact should be carefully planned for (issues to cover and avoid, what to say, how to say it, questions to ask, intelligence to gather, etc.). Brainstorming sessions are invaluable for communication planning as well as problem-solving, handling demand issues, and team building.

Eighth, negotiations do not occur in a vacuum. The prison facility still has to operate. Even though Lewis Prison was locked down for the duration of the incident, inmates still need to be fed, maintained, and cared for. Staff still have their normal functions to perform and the facility has to be maintained. Only a small portion of the total facility can be isolated and cleared. Negotiators have to realize the unique demands of operating a prison and what is involved. Unlike a law enforcement situation (at an apartment building, for example), the prison cannot be evacuated and cleared, streets closed, etc. The overall environment has to continue to operate.

Beslan school siege: The need to return to negotiations and bargaining—2004

On September 1, 2004, at 9:00 A.M., the Beslan school siege began when a group of armed terrorists— Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs—took 1,200 people hostage at School Number One (SNO) in the town of Beslan, North Ossetia-Alania. The leader inside the school was identified as Sheilu, also known as “The Colonel” (Howard, 2006). They secured the building using 127 homemade explosive devices and barricades. They separated hostages but soon moved them all into the gymnasium of the school. They shot one parent who violated orders to speak only in Russian. Hostages were guarded at all times by shifts of seven guards, including two female suicide bombers. The terrorists set up a control center apart from the hostages in which they could monitor the media, and televisions were set up. They could detonate the bombs by remote control from there as well. A note was sent out: “You kill one of us, we kill 50 hostages. You kill five of us, we blow up entire school” (Howard, 2006).

The terrorists’ initial demands were for: the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, the Independence of Chechnya, and four people they would accept as negotiators for the Russian authorities: (1) Aslambek Aslakhonov (a Chechen), Putin advisor and former president of Dumas; (2) Leonard Roshal, a Moscow pediatrician used as negotiator during theater siege; (3) Alexander Dzasokhov, current North Ossetian president; (4) Murat Zyazikov, current Ingushetia president.

There is some disagreement among experts as to whether the terrorists wanted to negotiate with people who had power to affect the decisionmaking, stall for time (Dolnik and Fitzgerald, 2008), or kill them because of previous conflicts (Howard, 2006). Russia is reported to have offered to release 31 terrorists involved in a previous incident, the Nazran Raid.

Early in the incident a group of men was selected to help barricade the building. They were executed in a classroom after they finished their job. Five or six more men who had been kneeling in the hall were killed when one of the female terrorists' bombs was detonated. It is thought that the bomb may have been detonated as punishment for her challenging the idea of the terrorist's holding children hostage (Dolnik and Fitzgerald, 2008). The terrorists were frustrated by the Russians' reporting that there were only 354 hostages at the school and that the terrorists had not presented any demands, when in fact they had sent out letters with their demands. For instance, on September 1 at 11:00 – 11:30, a letter was sent along with a hostage emergency room doctor (Case papers of Nur-Pashi Kulayev's criminal trial. File pages 196 – 198, the vetting protocol. Cited at the trial session January 19, 2006):

8-928-738-33-374

We request the republic's president Dzasokhov, the president of Ingushetia Ziazikov, the children's doctor Rashailo for negotiations. If anyone of us is killed, we'll shoot 50 people. If anyone of us is wounded, we'll kill 20 people. If 5 of us are killed, we'll blow up everything. If the light, communication are cut off for a minute, we'll shoot 10 people.

The terrorists cut off the water and food to the hostages. The hostages began to dehydrate.

On the second day, Ruslan Aushev entered the gym, spoke reassuringly to hostages and negotiated the release of 26 nursing mothers and infants (Howard, 2006). In addition, Putin was reported to have said, "We must save the children at all costs. Agree to everything, but the demand to leave Chechnya is impossible" (Howard, 2006).

Later in the negotiations, the terrorists were still frustrated by the Russians' continued underreporting of the number of hostages and the press statements that the children were not at risk because of the lack of water (Dolnik and Fitzgerald, 2008). Their mood changed on the third day when they thought that Alan Maskhadov, President of Chechnya, announced that he was flying to Beslan to negotiate. Before he arrived, Russian security forces stormed the building using tanks, thermobaric rockets, and other heavy weapons. A series of explosions shook the school, the cause of which is an open controversy. A fire that engulfed the building and a gun battle between the hostage-takers and Russian security forces followed the explosion. The terrorists seemed to have three separate action groups. The first engaged the assaulters in a gun battle. A second group changed clothes and tried to exit in the community. The third group covered for the second group. Troops and locals pursued those that did escape into town. Explosions and gunfire were heard in various parts of town as the escaping group was pursued (Howard, 2006).

Casualties included the following—Fatalities: 344 hostages, including 186 children; 4 emergency workers; 11 Special Forces. Wounded: 700 hostages, 19 Special Forces.

As with the Nord-Ost siege, Dolnik and Fitzgerald (2008) analyzed the Beslan siege and concluded that there were several issues that interfered with effective negotiations. They included understanding the goals of the terrorists, accurate assessment of the risk, awareness of indicators of de-escalation, missed opportunities to negotiate, and the management of the

incident.

The goal of the terrorists again seemed to be multifaceted (Dolnik and Fitzgerald, 2008). Like the Moscow siege, they included the stated goals of ending the war in Chechnya, forcing the Russians to the negotiating table, and the strategic goal of undermining international support for Russian by again forcing them to kill their own citizens in a violent rescue attempt. In addition, they expected to precipitate a conflict between Christians and Muslims in Ossetia.

Understanding the psychology of the individual terrorists was an important issue because it appeared that not all of the assault group agreed on the use of children as bargaining chips. By identifying and developing an understanding of the individual terrorist's history, a better risk assessment and more tailored tactics can be developed.

Risk factors involved in the Beslan siege included:

1. The highly planned and practice nature of the incident made a swift resolution difficult.
2. The killing of hostages early on raised the risk and supports McGowan's research on NYPD negotiations that showed that violence, as opposed to threat, early in the incident was a significant predictor of further violence.
3. The use of heavy weapons and bombs gave the terrorists immediate access to lethal means of carrying out their threats.

De-escalation— Dolnik and Fitzgerald (2008) report that the signs of de-escalation were fewer in number than in the Moscow siege. They were present and included: letting deadlines pass and the release of nursing mothers. However, it appeared that the terrorists had taken a harder line than in Moscow, in an effort to force negotiation. Dolnik and Fitzgerald (2008) point out that the Beslan siege took place in a history of conflict in which Russia had taken a hard line. The implication of this for the negotiator is that both sides have to be committed to negotiating in good faith. If negotiations are just a stalling tactic, a settlement with minimal loss of life is not possible. Support for negotiations has to come from the top.

Failure to focus on expressive issues and develop a relationship with terrorists— Dolnik and Fitzgerald (2008) emphasized the importance of dealing with the expressive issues in the negotiation. They point out that Russian negotiators focused on their unwillingness to accede to the substantive demands of the terrorist. Putin's comments about the non-negotiability of leaving Chechnya was a response to the substantive demands made by the terrorists. By focusing on the emotions that led the terrorists to such a brazen act, there may have been some way to reach them on a personal level. The argument that they were going to die anyway is not necessarily valid in light of the fact that they had at least one group who were trying to escape during the assault.

Lack of communications—Again, Dolnik and Fitzgerald (2008) argue that the biggest mistake the Russians made was not even attempting to negotiate. They point out that the political realities could have been managed if a low-level, low-profile, behind-the-scenes negotiations had been attempted, and lives might have been saved. In addition, they suggest that dealing with the expressive demands by assuming a listening posture would have limited the perception of a terrorist victory.

Disorganized command—A final problem was the disorganization in the government's

response to a well-organized, highly trained group that was willing to die for their cause. There were six command centers for the incident. The operation included special forces, regular army units, local police, national security personnel, all having their own command centers and chains of commands (Dolnik and Fitzgerald, 2008). There was divisiveness between troops and citizens who armed themselves to protect the school (Dolnik and Fitzgerald, 2008). Coordination, control and communications were lacking within the operational structure. This underlines the importance of having a pre-set process and structure for managing multi-agency responses in siege situations. The application of the Incident Command system to deliberate sieges like Beslan is an important lesson for negotiators and commanders.

To summarize the lessons learned from the Moscow siege and the Beslan school siege:

1. Use more empathy to understand the terrorists. The goal is to influence them.
2. Understand the difference between empathy and sympathy—understanding is not agreeing with terrorist's actions.
3. Recognize the terrorists' logic and rational decision—tactics are designed to achieve what they see as legitimate ends, even if they involve methods that are unacceptable to us.
4. Be flexible in implementing accepted negotiating principles.
5. We need to change our expectations.
 - a. Getting everybody out alive may not be achievable. Perhaps it is a more realistic goal in barricaded, deliberate sieges to get as many people out alive as possible.
 - b. Apprehending the terrorist may not always be possible.
6. The request for free passage needs to come from the terrorist.
7. Modify risk assessment. Recognition that many of the usual risk factors are part of the deliberate siege. [Chapter 4](#) deals with this issue.
8. Killing a hostage during an incident may not be the act of a psychopath who will not negotiate. It may not be reason enough to assault.
9. Recognize that a suicidal posture is not an intent to die.
10. May need to increase the use of third-party intermediaries.
11. Recognize that containment may not be possible given the organizational structure of terrorist operation (the leadership is often at another location) and the availability of modern communications (cell phones, the Internet, etc.)
12. Use of active listening skills to deal with the expressive elements of an incident, increase rapport, and ultimately increase influence.

[A false dichotomy](#)

Dolnik and Fitzgerald's (2008) discussion of the Nord-Ost and Beslan sieges draws our attention to the difference between substantive and expressive demands and the importance of attending to both in all negotiations. Miron and Goldstein's (1979) work drew the distinction

between expressive and substantive demands. Expressive demands are those that involve the need to express intense emotion and substantive demands are those that involve tangibles that can be traded. This distinction seems to be at the heart of the change from the first generation to the second generation of negotiators described by Hatcher et al. (1998). The change in emphasis from dealing with substantive demands to dealing with incidents that were expressive in nature marked the change from bargaining to crisis intervention in police negotiations. Though some have tried to draw a clear dichotomy between incidents that involve bargaining principles and those that require crisis intervention techniques, the dichotomy seems artificial.

The bargaining/problem-solving approach to negotiation assumes that negotiation is an interchange between interdependent people—that is, neither side can accomplish its goal without the other, and interchange has rewards and costs for both sides. The goal is to maximize rewards and minimize costs. The process is one of bargaining that emphasizes quid pro quo—this for that. It is a powerful model for negotiating on instrumental demands (Hammer et al., 1997).

Hammer et al. (1997) point out that there are limits to a pure bargaining approach to negotiations in policing. First, crisis negotiations are not like business negotiations, in which the two sides bargain in good faith and have rational, well-thought-out positions, goals, and needs. Second, crisis situations involve high levels of stress that may interfere with rational decision making. Third, a majority of incidents involve emotionally disturbed subjects; therefore, there are limits to the rationality of at least one side of the bargaining process. Finally, saving face is frequently an issue in most police crisis incidents.

Call (1999) has made a similar point. He suggests that a characteristic of hostage negotiation is its “brinksmanship” nature. By this he means that the subject deliberately creates a situation of risk, designed to make it so intolerable for the opposition that they will give in to the subject’s demands. The inflexible nature of most hostage takers’ demands is an example. He points out that the subject tries to force the authorities into a situation in which crisis bargaining principles apply. Crisis bargaining is characterized by:

1. The use of force—both the police and the subject have force available during an incident.
2. Bargaining for high stakes—lives are threatened and failure may result in injury or death.
3. Focusing on one alternative—demands of the subject are often presented as the only options.
4. A high degree of emotional content—anger and fear are integral parts of hostage incidents.
5. A preponderance of “saving face” issues—saving face becomes a major issue when coercion, force, and threats are used in negotiations.
6. The feeling of urgency—because the stakes are high, there is a sense of pressure and stress to incidents that are negotiated at the brink.
7. A lack of complete information—early in an incident, neither the police nor the subject have complete information about the others’ capabilities, resources, goals, or methods. Intelligence develops over the course of the incident.
8. The failure to work out a detailed implementation plan.

The recognition that both expressive and substantive needs are involved in every incident suggests that it is helpful for negotiators to think of an incident as involving issues of degree and not of kind. That is, both crisis intervention skills and bargaining skills are needed in every incident, because each incident has expressive and substantive issues in it to a greater or lesser degree and it is the negotiator's job to recognize when what skill is appropriate.

The Discovery Channel: Dealing with wildly irrational demands—2010

In the early afternoon of September 1, 2010, James J. Lee entered the Discovery Channel headquarters building in Silver Spring, Maryland, wearing an explosive device strapped to his chest and brandishing a firearm. He took three persons hostage, two employees of Discovery Channel and one security guard (unarmed). When the Montgomery County Police Department Hostage Negotiation Team made first contact with Lee, he immediately stated, "I have a bomb strapped to my chest and I'm ready to die" (Greenberg, 2010). He then told negotiators to go to the Internet and look up his manifesto. The Montgomery County Police SWAT team, incident commanders, negotiators, and other responding officers were also initially confronted with a dire need to evacuate the entire building, as it also housed about 100 children in a day care center as well as approximately 1,500 other people.

Lee's manifesto, as published on the web (Wyllie, 2010), demanded that people should stop giving birth to "filthy human children since those new additions continue pollution and are pollution. A game show format would be in order." He went on to add statements about ways to halt and reverse human population growth, stopping shows that promote war and showing television programs about disassembling civilization, all peace movements being fake, stopping all immigration, promoting Malthus and Darwin science, dismantling the U.S. world economy (a "disasterous Ponzi-Casino economy"), and stopping all shows on Discovery and TLC networks that glorify humans, among many others. (See Wyllie, 2010 for the full manifesto.)

From the outset, negotiators knew that trying to humanize hostages, an accepted tactic negotiators will usually attempt, would be futile and possibly even dangerous in this situation. A second difficulty confronting negotiators was the lack of intelligence gathering. Lee had a 2008 arrest for protesting at the Discovery Channel, but little else was learned about him. After approximately four hours of negotiating with Lee, the hostages attempted to escape (while Lee was on the phone with negotiators). He saw their attempt and pointed his pistol at them, whereupon SWAT entered and shot the actor, killing him.

Even given the inherent difficulties and issues involved in this incident, there were still many positives accomplished by negotiators and the responding police. One, the building was successfully evacuated, safeguarding all personnel from the actor's actions. Two, negotiators successfully employed basic negotiating tactics and skills. They used active listening skills (emotional labeling, minimal encouragers, extended pauses, etc.). Negotiators relied on their training to stay calm and focus on hostage release and calming Lee. Three, negotiators were able to "delay and distract" (Marcou, 2010) by using prolonged dialogs with Lee and delay harm to hostages. The delaying tactics allowed SWAT, bomb squad, and other police units to improve their tactical and strategic positions (as well as evacuate the building). According to Greenberg (2010), distraction was what prevented any hostages from getting hurt. While Lee

was busy talking with negotiators, he ignored the hostages, which allowed them to try to escape and provided the SWAT team the opportunity to end the situation.

As in any negotiated incident, not every negotiator tactic worked. Negotiators never believed they were making progress with Lee because his stated intent was to die that day. Lee's antipathy toward the human race never allowed negotiators the opportunity to create empathy toward the hostages nor humanize them. Intelligence was lacking about the actor, his family, home, work, etc. (In fact, one significant issue that was not resolved until the incident ended was whether he was acting alone or working with others.) Most significantly, any time negotiators made a concession or responded to a demand, Lee would modify his position or demand so negotiators could not satisfy him.

There is no question that negotiation skills prevented any loss of innocent lives. A wildly irrational hostage taker was intent upon causing his death, the death of others, and significant damage to a building. Even though it was SWAT tactics that resolved the incident, it was the skill of the negotiators that allowed them to enter the building and stop Lee.

The Monster in Mayport Case Study

Jacksonville Sheriff's Office

Sergeant Bruce Baker has been in law enforcement for 26 years, for the last 17 years serving with the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office (JSO) in Jacksonville, Florida. Sergeant Baker's police experience has been in the Patrol and Investigation Divisions, where he worked in the Homicide Unit, Burglary Unit and Violent Crimes. Sergeant Baker was a member of the JSO Hostage Negotiation Team for seven years and currently supervises a task force for the Sheriff's Office. Sergeant Baker also continues to teach and train crisis negotiators with Crisis Systems Management L.L.C. and as an adjunct instructor with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

On Saturday, May 24, 2003 (Memorial Day weekend), the owner of Melanie's Kitchen and Oyster Bar called 911 and advised, "Someone may have been murdered." During the initial phone conversation, the owner reported that his cook, Mr. Lukas, had visited the suspect, William Wells, the previous night. Wells confided in Lukas that he had murdered his wife and was now planning on fleeing. Mr. Lukas reported this information to his boss the next morning while he was working.

Two patrol officers were dispatched to Well's residence, which was physically located across the street from the restaurant. The first patrol officer to arrive responded to the restaurant to speak to the original complainant and Mr. Lukas. Wells observed the police officer's arrival from his residence and made a telephone call into the restaurant to speak to the officer. Wells advised the officer that he had shot his wife, the shooting was an accident, and if anyone approached his residence he would kill his four-year-old son, who was inside the residence, and himself. Preliminary attempts by patrol to gain Wells' surrender failed, which resulted in a SWAT and hostage negotiator call-out.

The teams were paged and responded to the command post. Typically, the response time for the tactical units to respond, get dressed out, and establish the inner perimeter is around one hour. One of the lessons learned from this incident was that, during the response time, while the tactical teams were responding, patrol officers continued to encourage Wells to surrender by speaking to him over their vehicle PA system. During this timeframe, Wells called 911 and spoke to the Watch Commander of the

Communication Center. During this phone call, Wells gave intelligence information that would have been helpful during the standoff. However, the negotiation team never checked with the Communication Center to see if there was additional information and the Communication Center never advised the negotiation team the call was received.

It is common practice for the negotiation team not to begin negotiating until directed to do so by the Incident Commander after the inner perimeter has been set and containment achieved by SWAT. However, during the initial response the newest member of the negotiator team was the first to arrive on the scene. The on-scene patrol lieutenant was on the phone with Wells when the new negotiator arrived. During the phone conversation the lieutenant observed the new negotiator approaching him and handed the phone to her saying, "Here, talk to him." The negotiator reassured Wells that the police were not going to "rush" his location, which was Wells' suspicion. Hostage Negotiation Team Leader, Sergeant Jesse York, arrived on the scene and also communicated with Wells, emphasizing all the police activity was for everyone's safety outside the residence. Sergeant York asked for Wells' cooperation by walking outside and surrendering. Upon Wells' refusal, Sergeant York asked Wells to keep everything "safe" inside the residence. Wells continued with the murder/suicide threats while the rest of the tactical teams responded.

Up to this point the only intelligence available involved Wells making claims that he had accidentally killed his wife, Irene Wells (aka "Tootie"), and was now threatening to kill his son, William S. Wells (aka "Frog") and himself. We began seeking intelligence information by conducting interviews with Mr. Lukas, canvassing the neighborhood and researching our own databases for Wells' history with JSO to include his arrest record. No pertinent information was obtained from researching the JSO databases. It was learned that Wells and his wife "Tootie" were living with "Tootie's" brother, John McMains. A search was conducted for "Tootie" but everyone in the small community claimed that "Tootie" had not been seen in a couple of weeks. Attempts were made to locate John McMains. John hadn't been seen in a couple of weeks either. However, other interviews indicated John would "disappear" for a couple of weeks to go on a "crack binge." We could not locate "Tootie" or John.

Once the team assignments were made by Sergeant York and the perimeter was established, the Incident Commander set the objective as, "Get the child out." We immediately began our negotiations by asking Wells if he would allow "Frog" to leave. Wells stated that he wanted to watch a movie with his son before he allowed "Frog" to leave because he knew this would be the last time he would be able to spend time with his son without there being "plexiglass between us." Wells made several statements about only being able to see his son during "visitation hours" when he was incarcerated.

Wells had three demands. First, he wanted a face-to-face exchange of "Frog" with his mother. Second, Wells wanted a phone delivered through the chimney, although there was no chimney in the residence. Third, Wells demanded that he did not want anyone approaching the residence, warning that he had "booby trapped" the doors with wind chimes.

It was learned early into the situation that Wells was using his cell phone during the negotiations which was unreliable at best. This was already becoming a problem, with

Wells receiving personal phone calls during our conversation. Wells agreed to accept a throw phone in order to improve our ability to communicate with him. However, before the throw phone was delivered, Wells would regularly get off the phone with the primary negotiator, Detective Michael Paul, to take personal phone calls. Two negotiators equipped with a bullhorn, were moved close to the residence where they attempted to communicate with Wells. The “up-front” negotiators were only to encourage Wells to get on the phone with Detective Paul.

Because of the threat that Wells had “booby trapped” the doors, the Incident Commander decided the bomb squad should be called out and should use their robot to deliver items. This initiated a bomb squad call-out. Logistically, this was going to require time as the bomb squad’s warehouse was located at the opposite end of the county from where the incident was located.

We continued to negotiate for “Frog’s” release while awaiting the bomb squad. During the two-hour wait, Wells confessed that he murdered his wife but said the shooting was an accident. Wells made it clear that he wanted to explain what happened because no one would understand. With our focus on gaining “Frog’s” release, Detective Paul constantly assured Wells he would be given an opportunity to tell his story but kept Wells focused on “Frog.” Wells did go on to say that he had killed his brother-in-law, John McMains.

With the situation developing that we were dealing with a double homicide and a four-year-old boy being held captive, other resources were also called to assist. The Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office Homicide Team responded to the scene to listen to the negotiations and to begin their investigation. The Department of Children and Families was also contacted to respond to assist with “Frog” once he was released.

When the Bomb Squad arrived, the throw phone, a pizza, and a two-liter soft drink were secured to the robot. We freely offered the pizza and soft drink to Wells in an attempt to build rapport. Wells was given direction to come out the front door where the robot would be located, unarmed, and retrieve the items from the robot. Instead, Wells came out of the residence with “Frog.” Wells’ left hand was tied to “Frog’s” right hand and Wells had a handgun in his right hand. Wells kept the weapon down to his side as he made “Frog” take the items from the robot. The Incident Commander maintained control of the snipers.

Wells and “Frog” went back inside the residence and the command was given to “stand down” for thirty minutes to allow Wells time to watch the movie with “Frog.” Instead of taking the time given to him, Wells called Detective Paul asking for a lighter. Wells continued to talk, never taking the time he asked for to spend with his son.

During the several conversations with Wells, who was concerned with telling his “story,” Detective Paul kept reminding Wells that he never released “Frog.” Wells stated he would release “Frog” if he was given flowers so he could make “peace with his wife.”

As negotiations with Wells continued, a patrol officer was sent to get flowers. Once the flowers were delivered to the command post, they were immediately placed on the robot and sent to the front door. Detective Paul instructed Wells to allow “Frog” to come out the front door, place the flowers inside the door and let “Frog” walk away from the residence. It took three additional phone conversations including a conversation about

“Frog” wanting to bring out the pet snake, before Wells allowed “Frog” to leave the residence.

It was never communicated to the apprehension team position closest to the residence who was going to take control of “Frog.” It took a few seconds for the teams to realize “Frog” had no idea where to go when he stepped outside. So everyone close to “Frog” began to call out to him at the same time. The negotiators who were up front with the bullhorn had the loudest voice. “Frog” ran toward the bullhorn, running past a few members of the SWAT team. “Frog” was taken by Detective Nick Burgos to the command post.

There was a sigh of relief in the command post when “Frog” was released, as this incident was gaining momentum in the media and the department. The Sheriff had responded to the scene at this point. William S. Wells (“Frog”) was unharmed and placed into the custody of the representative of the Florida Department of Children and Families.

With “Frog’s” release the objective changed to talking Wells into surrendering. Wells had already made several references to suicide but was still determined to tell his story. We believed Wells wanted to confess to killing his wife and brother-in-law. This is what Wells had discussed with Detective Paul and had repeatedly stated that no one would understand. Based on our own intelligence gathering and statements by Wells, we were certain Wells had murdered “Tootie” and John McMains sometime in the last 14 days and their bodies were still inside the residence.

Wells began his story by talking about the incident involving his wife, “Tootie.” Wells confessed they were having marital difficulties and were about to go through a divorce. Wells described the morning when “Tootie” was getting ready for work and he was trying to get “lovey-dovey” with her. “Tootie” pulled out a handgun, advising Wells she had it just in case he tried anything stupid. Wells stated there was no “clip” in the gun and he playfully wrestled the gun away from “Tootie.” Wells emphasized again they were just playing around with the gun which had no “clip.” Wells then stated he shot his wife by accident.

In the negotiation vehicle with the homicide team, we listened as Wells told his story. We were not surprised to hear this information but the details he provided verified what had become known throughout the day. Detective Paul continued to talk with Wells, expecting to hear about John McMains.

Wells continued his story by stating John came home from work later the same day he had murdered “Tootie.” Wells stated John observed “Tootie’s” body and began to fight with Wells. Wells described John as a large man, over 400 pounds. Wells stated during the fight they wrestled over the gun, which Wells finally gained control of. Wells stated he was in fear for his life as John had threatened to kill him in the past and was a much larger man than he was. Wells described how he shot John in the head, stating he felt he was defending himself.

When Wells finished describing how he murdered John, we were not surprised as our intelligence supported this incident. Detective Paul was going to continue to negotiate for Wells’ surrender, but Wells continued with his story.

Wells started to talk about “Tootie” and John’s father, Bill McMains. Wells stated Bill

came over looking for his children, “who he hadn’t seen in a few days.” Bill became nosey and looked into the room where “Tootie’s” body was located. When Bill saw his daughter’s body he ran to the kitchen and grabbed a knife. Wells stated Bill came at him with the knife and he shot Bill in the head. Again, Wells stated he was defending himself.

Wells captured everyone’s attention in the negotiation vehicle during this story, as this caught us completely by surprise. There was no intelligence that suggested Wells had murdered three people. Although it does not occur very often, we have had triple homicides in our city so, although this was new information, a triple homicide was not that shocking, especially to the homicide investigators. Detective Paul continued talking to Wells, expecting to direct the conversation toward getting Wells to surrender.

However, Wells continued his story by describing how he invited Richard Reese to his residence. Wells described Richard as “Tootie’s” boyfriend. Wells stated he had a conversation with Richard, advising him that he would not be seeing “Tootie” anymore. Wells stated at this point in the conversation, Richard stated “I’m going to get you” and reached into his bag. Being in fear for his life, Wells shot Richard in the head. Wells stated Richard pulled his hand out of the bag only holding a cell phone charger.

You could have heard a pin drop in the negotiator vehicle while Wells was confessing to this murder. There was no indication of three bodies inside the trailer, and now Wells had just given a detailed confession to a fourth murder. It became painfully obvious why Wells wanted to tell his story since “no one will understand.” Wells was correct. Although this was completely unexpected, our objective remained the same. Talk Wells into surrendering.

Wells didn’t stop with the Richard Reese murder. Wells continued his story by describing how his drug dealer, James Young, came to the residence to collect money on a drug debt. Wells became at a loss for words describing this murder. Wells attempted to justify the previous four murders as an accident and self-defense. However, Wells struggled with describing this murder but finally concluded “it was not justifiable to me.”

Everyone in the negotiation vehicle was completely silent. Detective Paul stayed focused and continued to negotiate with Wells. There are no words to describe how you feel after listening to a man tell how he murdered five people over a period of two weeks and then lived with the bodies. However, the objective remained the same and we continued to work toward getting Wells to surrender.

Negotiations continued with Wells. There were moments where Wells was calm, rational and having a “normal” conversation with Detective Paul. However, some event would happen that would upset Wells and he would start to cry, become irrational, scream and yell. One of the constant issues we continued to face was Wells’ use of his cell phone. As Detective Paul negotiated with Wells, we worked on determining who the provider was for Well’s cell phone. Once we determined that information we contacted the security officer for the provider. This was not an easy process as it was Saturday of Memorial Day weekend. The situation was explained to the security officer for the cell phone company, who was happy to assist and turned off Wells’ cell phone. We believed this was a big assistance to the negotiation process as it would prevent Wells from

accepting personal phone calls.

However, Wells was able to contact the customer service department of his cell phone company even when his phone was turned off. He spoke to a customer service representative who could not explain why the phone had been deactivated and kindly reactivated Wells' cell phone.

This was a lesson learned from this incident. Although technology is vastly different with cell phones today than it was ten years ago, it is imperative to have a plan in place on how to manage cell phones prior to the incident.

At one point during the negotiation Detective Paul had Wells to the point where he was agreeing to come out and surrender. Wells even stated that he was going to the bathroom, wash his face, and he would come outside. Wells said this as the 10:00 p.m. newscast began on the television. The top story showed "Frog" running out of the residence and into the arms of Detective Burgos. This angered Wells, you could hear Wells screaming, throwing things, and yelling at the television. This set things back as Detective Paul, once again, had to talk Wells down and try to get Wells to surrender.

Because the outside perimeter was so close to the incident the media was able to capture this footage, besides having the ability to show tactical positions. This was another lesson learned during this incident.

The negotiations continued for a couple more hours with Wells' suicide threats becoming more frequent. At one point Wells asked us to kill him. The Incident Commander decided to deploy a "SWAT Rock" into Well's residence. At the same time Detective Paul was advised to "step up the tone" in the negotiations. With the increase in pressure, Wells grabbed the phone and yelled, "hold your fire," and ran out the front door. Wells fell down in his front yard, surrendering, and was taken into custody by members of the SWAT team.

The standoff lasted over 12 hours and when SWAT cleared the residence they discovered the five bodies inside the residence. On September 30, 2004 Wells pled guilty to five counts of first-degree murder and was sentenced to five consecutive life sentences.

In the debriefing of this incident it was discussed how well the team functioned by sticking with their assigned duties, especially the job done by the primary negotiator, Detective Paul. Calling in additional resources, the bomb squad, the homicide unit, and Department of Children and Families, early into the stand-off proved to be an invaluable assistance.

The lessons learned from this incident also proved to be very valuable. Missing the conversation Wells had with the dispatcher was one lesson that has been corrected. With the improvement in technology, all recordings of phone calls made to the Communications Center can be forwarded to the negotiation vehicle. There is also a plan in place on dealing with cell phones.

At the conclusion of this incident, it was apparent this was one of those "once in a lifetime" call-outs. It was a tragic situation with the murder of five individuals. However, the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office Hostage Negotiation and SWAT teams performed in an exceptional manner by resolving the incident without any further loss of life.

[The one-man siege—Alabama hostage event, 2013](#)

On January 29, 2013, 65-year-old Jimmy Lee Dykes boarded a schoolbus near Midland City, Alabama, and tried to abduct two boys (6 and 8 years of age). The bus driver, Charles Poland, attempted to stop Dykes, whereupon Dykes shot and killed Poland. His plan interrupted, Dykes grabbed a 5-year-old child named Ethan and whisked him away to an underground bunker Dykes had preprepared for this incident. Thus began a standoff with a single hostage taker with a single hostage that would last for 7 days (4 Feb 2013; Gray & Carbone, 2013).

Dykes's bunker was small, only 6 × 8 feet, but well-supplied with food, water, supplies, power, and a small television. State and federal negotiators were forced to negotiate with Dykes through a small PVC pipe connecting the bunker to the surface. During the 7-day siege, the only concession Dykes made to negotiators was to allow the delivery of medicine to Ethan (who has Asperger's syndrome), along with coloring books and small toys.

A veteran, ex-truck driver and loner, Dykes has only had minor contact with law enforcement. While living in Florida, he was charged with improper exhibition of a weapon in 1995 (dismissed) and marijuana possession in 2000 (convicted). At his home in Alabama, he has threatened to shoot neighbors if they trespass, killed a dog with a pipe for entering his property, and threatened other area children. Those who knew him said he was a survivalist with anti-American views (Cavaliere, 2013). His anti-Americanism worsened recently with government discussion of increased gun control legislation. Authorities never fully understood why Dykes committed murder and took a hostage, but he was due in court for trial on charges of menacing involving a neighbor (Alfa, 2013).

FBI hostage negotiators were able to keep Dykes from harming his hostage by utilizing active listening skills, allowing Dykes to vent, and validating his communications. Most significantly, negotiators were able to use time as a tool, delaying any violent action by Dykes while the SWAT team developed a plan, constructed a similar bunker, and practiced assaulting that bunker (DeLuca & Gutierrez, 2013). On February 4, 2013, Dykes started becoming agitated and emotional and authorities feared he would harm Ethan. Tactical officers employed a flashbang to distract Dykes, entered the bunker with an explosive breach charge, and killed Dykes when he fired at them.

As they have in prison sieges, negotiations proved useful and successful in a siege with a lone gunman holding a hostage. Negotiators were able to utilize their skills and training in preventing a hostage from getting harmed. They used their communication skills, active listening, dealt with demand issues (being able to trade medicine and toys for a promise to not harm the hostage), and effectively used time to assist the tactical team to prepare and practice for a dynamic entry.

[Refining the Field Further](#)

Several developments since the turn of the millennium are refining the role of negotiations in the criminal justice system. Research and critiques of the existing crisis intervention model from linguistics (Hammer et al., 1997; Hammer, 2007; Rogan, 2011) have led to more comprehensive models of intervention—the SAFE model (see following section). Research from political science has spotlighted the importance of a more refined analysis of whether or not crisis intervention or bargaining principles are applicable (Dolnik and Fitzgerald, 2008). Research on “best practices” (Kidd, 2005; NCNC website, 2008) have begun to set standards of practice and the development of professional groups has begun to truly professionalize negotiations. Research on police negotiations as an academic enterprise has begun to develop “evidence-based practices.” The developments in person management training within policing have led to a reduction in the need for classic negotiators (McMains & Flood, unpublished manuscript). New schemas, based on research in other, related areas of people management have been introduced as ways of dealing with identified but unexplored issues affecting negotiation, like ambivalence, resistance, and the process of change (McMains, 1988; 2008; Kelln & McMurtry, 2007). A more detailed analysis of the communication skills needed to accomplish specific goals has led to the application of interviewing skills and training techniques that have been validated by research in counseling (Ivey & Ivey, 2007; McMains, 2009).

Expanding on crisis—the SAFE model: An integrated model

Hammer et al. (1997) have suggested a formulation and technology that integrates bargaining and crisis intervention, which they call the SAFE model. They suggest that in any police negotiation, it is important to track and deal with the Substantive demands made by the subject, the Affiliation needs (liking and trust) involved in the relationship, need for the subject to save Face during the incident, and the need to attend to and manage the Emotions of the subject. By carefully tracking the statements made by the subject, negotiators can define which issues are leading to conflict and the dimensions that demand immediate attention—a strategizing tool that lets negotiators systematically review critical issues so that interventions can be designed to deal with the most pressing issue as defined by the subject. The SAFE framework is based on years of behavioral science research and incorporates the valuable insights of countless crisis negotiators (Hammer, 2007).

The SAFE model asks negotiators to be aware of four “triggers” that, if not dealt with effectively, will lead to an increase of tension and a reduction of problem-solving in any negotiation. It provides an integrated structure that can be used in bargaining and crisis intervention. It focuses on Substance and Emotion, Expressive and Substantive needs in negotiator parlance, as well as the areas usually discussed as attitude and self-esteem. It suggests issues and intervention techniques for each trigger and states that negotiators can expect all the triggers to be issues in every negotiation.

The four “triggers” are:

- Substantive demands: The instrumental wants/demands made by the parties (e.g., subject and negotiator)
- Attunement: The relational trust established between the parties

- Face: The self-image of each of the parties that is threatened or honored
- Emotion: The degree of emotional distress experienced by the parties

There are three general strategies in the SAFE Model. They are:

- Identify the predominant SAFE frame of the subject
- Match communication to the SAFE frame of the subject
- Shift to another SAFE frame after achieving some “progress” in de-escalating the situation within the existing SAFE frame of the subject

Hammer (2001; 2007) points out that each trigger has specific issues associated with it and the negotiator needs to choose the appropriate intervention to deal with the issue at hand. Only after the identified issue is addressed does the negotiator shift and refocus the discussion on another issue. The point is that by tracking carefully the actor’s communications, his or her issues can be identified and the tactic that is expected to defuse the issue chosen and implemented. An in-depth discussion of the choice of interventions will be found in [Chapter 3](#).

Best practices

A definition of a professional is a person who has a unique body of knowledge that he or she applies to life problems and a set of standards that govern the application of that knowledge. Kidd (2005; updated 2013) has suggested that negotiators have reached a level of professionalism that requires that they look critically at their organization, performance, training, and skills so they can continually improve their performance. In addition to the operational debriefing discussed above, he has suggested that there is value in negotiators and teams assessing themselves using a set of “best practices” so they can identify problems that need to be corrected as they can come closer to the goal of “zero defects” in their managing critical incidents. He has compiled the following list of “Best Practices”¹ as standards for individuals and teams that want to evaluate their performance to improve their professionalism:

1. Organizational issues: negotiators are a part of an organized and trained crisis management team that is recognized and supported by their agency.
2. Negotiators are selected using a standard process that is available to department personnel and that is consistent with guidelines set by the National Council of Negotiator Associations (NCNA).
3. Policies are in place that cover the team’s mission.
4. All team members have successfully completed a basic negotiations course.
5. The majority of the team members attend update training outside the department.
6. All negotiators attend in-house training four times a year and one training is a joint exercise with tactical and command.
7. The agency has a written call-out procedure.
8. The agency is able to deploy at least one negotiator to the scene of an incident within one hour, and a full team within 90 minutes.

9. The negotiating team is able to utilize the appropriate communication equipment for the incident.
10. Clear guidelines are in place and understood covering face-to-face communications.
11. The CNT has a protocol for employment of “up front” negotiators who are to facilitate the transition from officers to the primary negotiator.
12. Negotiators are trained in interviewing skills that will allow them to gather information about person, place, and incident intelligence that can be used to plan the negotiating approach.
13. Intelligence collection and analysis is done at a central location.
14. Intelligence is disseminated from the central point to all elements that need it.
15. CNT will continue to evaluate and modify plans on the basis of the changing situation and intelligence.
16. Primary negotiator will identify himself to the subject and reassure him that the goal is to work together toward a peaceful resolution.
17. The primary maintained patient and unhurried approach.
18. The primary built trust and rapport utilizing the appropriate nonjudgmental, nonthreatening, sincere, and concerned attitude.
19. CNT used appropriate active listening skills to defuse emotions, encourage the person to ventilate, draw the subject out.
20. The primary used active listening.
21. The negotiator handled demands appropriately.
22. The CNT worked effectively as a team, showed competence, communicated effectively, stayed within accepted guidelines, brainstormed between contacts.
23. All CNT are trained in selection, scripting, and monitoring third-party intermediaries.
24. CNT maintains effective communications with tactical.
25. CNT maintains effective communications with command.
26. The team made appropriate use of mental health resources.
27. The agency has an established surrender procedure worked out by CNT leaders and tactical commander and all team members are trained on it.
28. The agency has the capacity to provide post-incident debriefing to mitigate the emotional impact of an incident on negotiators and has written policies governing the use, attendance, and procedures to be used during such a debriefing.
29. The agency has a written protocol for written documentation of incidents.

People management skills in policing—CIT

The Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training, developed by the Memphis Police Department, is an example of the impact of the enhancement of people management skills training in policing. Endorsed by more than 30 states (CIT website, Memphis Police Department, 2008), CIT training prepares first responders to deal with calls involving mentally ill people on the streets. It is a collaborative program, integrating the mental health community and the police. Training is conducted by both police and mental health professionals focused on recognizing and managing the mentally ill, active listening skills, community resources, legal issues and coordination and cooperation between police and mental health professionals. It is the kind of

cooperative blending of skills that made negotiations successful in the first place. It has led to a significant reduction in callouts in cities like Memphis, Tennessee; Albuquerque, New Mexico; and Houston, Texas, where it has been implemented. Negotiators are exploring new roles as a result of the increased sophistication on the part of patrol (McMains, 2009, McMains & Flood, unpublished manuscript). A recent web-based survey at Negotiator Central (2008) asked: “Does your agency have a Crisis Intervention Team to act as first responders to calls involving the mentally ill (Memphis Model)?” (Posted from 7/28/2008 to 9/25/2008.) Twenty-four percent of the 69 responding negotiators said, “Yes and CNT works closely with them.” Ten percent said, “Yes and the CNT helps train them.” Another 19 percent said, “No, but we should because they would be immediately available to patrol.” Eight percent said, “A team is in the planning stage.”

Professional Resources Available to Negotiators

Professional organizations

The field has taken a huge step in defining its special knowledge by developing professional organizations. As of this book’s publication, there were 21 state and regional negotiator associations in the list below; those with an asterisk “*” are listed on the National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) crisis negotiator team (CNT) webpage at <http://ntoa.org/>, but the authors could not verify their existence. The association with a “+” has been an active association but has not conducted any association activities for several years. There are members in the process of reactivating the association. Several other states and regions were considering or discussing the possibilities of forming an association. Each of those conducts training, sponsors conferences, provides Internet and hard-source training and reference material for negotiators, and makes available other resources of value and utility to negotiators. For example, most associations host a web page that lists resources, training opportunities, equipment and professional links, and other valuable information for negotiators. As of March 2013, those associations include:

+Arkansas Crisis Negotiator Association

California Association of Hostage Negotiators (CAHN)

Crisis Negotiation Association of Wisconsin (WICNA)

www.cahn.us

www.wicna.com

Delaware Valley Negotiators Association	www.delvalnegotiators.org
*East Bay Hostage Negotiator Association	
Florida Association of Hostage Negotiators (FAHN)	www.fahn.net
Illinois Crisis Negotiators Association (ICNA)	www.icnaonline.com
Indiana Association of Hostage-Crisis Negotiators, Inc.	www.iahcn.org
Kansas Association of Hostage Negotiators (KAHN)	www.ksnegotiator.com
Louisiana Association of Hostage Negotiators (LAHN)	www.lahn.us
Michigan Association of Hostage Negotiators (MAHN)	www.miahn.com
Missouri Association of Hostage Negotiators	
Midwest Crisis Negotiators Association	
New England Crisis Negotiators Association (NECNA)	www.necna.com
*New Jersey Association of Crisis Negotiators	
New York Association of Hostage Negotiators (NYAHN)	www.nyahn.net
Ohio Negotiators Association	www.members.tripod.com/OCNA
*Pittsburgh Area Negotiation Association	
Rocky Mountain Hostage Negotiators (RMHN)	www.rmhnonline.com
*San Diego County Hostage Negotiator Association	
*Santa Clara Hostage Negotiator Association	
South Carolina Crisis Negotiators Association (SCCNA)	www.sccna.com
Texas Association of Hostage Negotiators (THAN)	www.tahn.org
*Tri County SWAT and Hostage Negotiators Association	
Upper Red River Valley Crisis Negotiators	
Western Pennsylvania Negotiators Association (WPNA)	www.wpna.net
Western States Hostage Negotiators Association (WSHNA)	www.wshna.com

Under the guidance of the FBI CIRG (Critical Incident Response Group) unit, many of these associations met and formed a collaborative organization, the National Council of Negotiator Associations (NCNA). At the time of press, NCNA is comprised of board representatives of 16 of the negotiator associations and has worked to formulate a set of guidelines that suggest standards and criteria for negotiators. As examples, NCNA guidelines recommend: (1) negotiations is the preferred strategy in crisis situations, (2) all law enforcement and corrections agencies should have a negotiation team, (3) negotiators should be trained, (4) negotiation teams should have a minimum of three members, (5) teams should have a relationship with a mental health professional, (6) have selection criteria for team members, (7) receive basic training (minimum 40 hours) and on-going training (40-hours/year), (8) have a formal organizational structure, (9) have equal input as SWAT to the Incident Commander, (10) utilize accepted practices as based upon research when negotiating, (11) use the passage of time as an important tool of the negotiation process, (12) understand the phases of a hostage situation and which present the most danger to all persons involved in the situation, (13) closely coordinate with the tactical element, and (14) conduct full debriefings (operational and, if necessary, emotional/psychological) following the resolution of an incident. The full text of guidelines can be found at <http://www.ncna.us/default.aspx?MenuItemID=96&MenuGroup=Home>).

The National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) started a CNT division several years ago. They sponsor an annual national seminar/conference for negotiators, provide additional training and education for negotiators, and publish negotiator-themed articles in their national publication, *The Tactical Edge*. In fact, one regular feature in *The Tactical Edge* has been short excerpts from this book. The recognition and integration of a negotiations section into the National Tactical Officers Association has helped define it as a field apart from but closely tied to the tactical functions of policing.

The International Association of Hostage Negotiators (IAHN) is an association formed and presided over by Dominick Misino, a retired negotiator for the NYPD. According to the website, the IAHN (and their website, HostageNegotiation.com) was “developed to help bring together those wanting to share their experiences, information about their profession and to help others learn the art of negotiation. This website is sponsored by Det. Dominick J. Misino (retired) who is president and founder of the International Association of Hostage Negotiators (IAHN).... **HostageNegotiation.com** information sharing, networking, and communications resources are facilitated through the site’s secure **Member’s Area** which is made exclusively available to IAHN members.”

Negotiator competitions



PHOTO 1.3 A judging team is evaluating the performance of one of the competing negotiating teams at the 2013 Hostage Negotiation Competition at Texas State University, San Marcos, TX. 2013 marked the 23rd year of the competition, making it the third oldest negotiator training venue in the United States. Since the Arkansas Association of Hostage Negotiators has not met nor been active for several years, the competition can legitimately claim to be the second oldest, surpassed only by the Baltimore conference.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

Most of the negotiator associations listed above host an annual conference and regular training seminars (from 40-hour basic schools to one-day regional training classes). One unique training seminar that began in 1990 (making it the third oldest negotiator conference in the United States) is the annual Hostage/Crisis Negotiator Competition at Texas State University-San Marcos, Texas. There are many unique and special negotiator training aspects to the competition:

1. To fully participate, teams must send most or all of their negotiating team. At many negotiator training events, one or two team members may attend, then take the learning material back to the full team. At the competition, teams must have most team members attend.
2. The emphasis is on performance. Unlike negotiator conferences and seminars, teams

actually negotiate a problem, not sit and listen to a classroom speaker.

3. Negotiators are evaluated on their performance. The competition requires teams to demonstrate their skills acquired in training and practice, not be passive observers. Organizers utilize experienced negotiators to evaluate performance. A standardized evaluation form has been developed and is used by evaluators to assess team performance.
4. To maximize stress and make stress comparable to the stress experienced at an actual situation, negotiators are evaluated by their peers, and other attendees can watch their performance. Many participants have reported the stress at the competition is greater than at an actual event.
5. The knowledges, skills, and abilities critical to resolving an actual crisis negotiation event are evaluated. The evaluation conducted focuses on communication skills, active listening, team functioning, brainstorming, intelligence gathering, and technical issues (i.e., boards, information sharing, etc.).

As much as possible, tactical and command elements are removed from the competition scenarios. Every attempt is made to maximize negotiator KSAs (knowledges, skills, abilities). Multiple debriefings are conducted by the evaluators and actors to provide adequate feedback on performance, another critical component of learning and skill improvement.

Several other negotiator associations have started a similar competition (or discussed starting one). The Upper Red River Valley Association started a competition in 2007, CAHN in 2012, and ATOA (Arizona Tactical Officers Association) in 2013. Iowa State University now has an annual seminar and competition. Other associations have discussed conducting a competition with the authors.



PHOTO 1.4 Judges meet and score teams using a standardized evaluation form that examines all aspects of negotiator team performance, including Communication and Active Listening Skills, Team Roles, Team Functioning, Brainstorming, Intelligence Boards, and other factors. Teams are given comprehensive written evaluations to take home and train with.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

Books and publications

As crisis negotiation teams have proliferated and become more numerous, it has become important to have written resources for negotiators. Some recent books that have been written on crisis negotiations include those following (this is not an all-inclusive list, but are texts with which the authors have a familiarity). Some of the books (including this one) are available for the Kindle, and that is indicated at the end of the reference.

- Davidson, T. N. (2002). *To preserve life: Hostage-crisis management*. Indianapolis, IN; Cimacon. (also Kindle)
- Dolnik, A., & Fitzgerald, K.M. (2007). *Negotiating hostage crises with the new terrorists*. Santa Barbara, CA; Praeger. (also Kindle)
- Dyregrov, A. (2003). *Psychological debriefing: A leader's guide for small group crisis intervention*. St. Leonards, Australia; Chevron Pub. Corp.
- Goergen, M. (2010). *Crisis negotiator's field guide* (2nd ed.). Minneapolis, MN: Eagle Training.
- Greenstone, J.L. (2005). *The elements of police hostage and crisis negotiations: Critical incidents and how to respond to them*. New York, NY; Routledge.
- Hammer, M.R., Rogan, R. & Van Zandt, C.R. (1997). *Dynamic processes of crisis negotiation: Theory, research and practice*. Santa Barbara, CA; Praeger. (also Kindle)
- Hammer, M. (2007). *Saving lives: The S.A.F.E. model for resolving hostage and crisis incidents*. Santa Barbara, CA; Praeger.
- Kidd, W. (2005). *Best practices for negotiators*. Presentation at the annual Hostage Negotiation Competition, Texas State University – San Marcos, TX (Jan).
- Kidd, W. (2013). *Update on best practices for negotiators*. Personal communication (Feb).
- Lanceley, F. (2003). *On-scene guide for crisis negotiators*. Boca Raton, FL; CRC Press.
- Noesner, G. (2010). *Stalling for time: My life as an FBI hostage negotiator*. New York, NY; Random House. (also Kindle)
- Rogan, R.G. & Lanceley, F.J. (2010). *Contemporary theory, research and practice of crisis and hostage negotiation*. New York, NY: Hampton Press.
- Slatkin, A.A. (2009). *Training strategies for crisis and hostage negotiations: Scenario writing and creative variations for role play*. Springfield, IL; Charles C. Thomas, Pub.
- Slatkin, A.A. (2010). *Communication in crisis and hostage negotiations: Practical communication techniques, stratagems, and strategies for law enforcement, corrections and emergency service personnel in managing critical incidents*. Springfield, IL; Charles C. Thomas, Pub.
- Strentz, T. (2011). *Psychological aspects of crisis negotiation* (2nd ed.). Boca Raton, FL; CRC Press. (also Kindle)
- Strentz, T. (2013). *Hostage/crisis negotiations: Lessons learned from the bad, the mad, and the sad*. Springfield, IL, Charles C. Thomas, Pub.

In 2004, the History Channel did a special titled “Dangerous Missions: Hostage Negotiators.” That DVD is available from the History Channel store.

There are also several journals and trade publications available for negotiators. The *Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations* is published twice per year and is available online at: <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/wpcn20>. The NTOA (National Tactical Officers Association) has a CNT section and until 2012, published *The Negotiator*, a quarterly journal for negotiators. In 2012, the NTOA restructured and now publishes negotiator articles in *The Tactical Edge*. Most past articles published in *The Negotiator* and *The Tactical Edge* are available on their website at <http://ntoa.org/site/crisis-negotiation/>. The *Negotiator Magazine* is an online publication that has articles and information about hostage and crisis negotiations. That publication can be found at <http://negotiatormagazine.com/index.php>.

Internet sites

Most state and regional associations have web sites (their sites are listed above). The journal and magazine sites are also listed above. In addition there are several other sites that have

valuable utility for negotiators. Chief among the web sites is the FBI's HOBAS database, available to any police negotiator through LEO (Law Enforcement Online).

Recognizing the need for a nationwide database on hostage/crisis incidents, the Crisis Management Unit at the FBI Academy established the Hostage Barricade Database System (HOBAS) to systematically collect data from law enforcement agencies across the country. Until then, there had been no nationwide format for collecting data on hostage/crisis incidents. HOBAS is part of the LEO (Law Enforcement Online) system developed and managed by the FBI. LEO has several specialized areas, including a bomb data center, National Academy Associates section, a joint terrorism task force section, and a Law Enforcement Negotiator Support (LENS) section. HOBAS is contained within LENS and the database serves two important purposes. First, it is a repository of information about incidents, allowing for a standardized format. It forms the basis on which research can be done and is a valuable resource for law enforcement agencies that are engaged in an active incident. Critical incident response group members can draw from HOBAS profiles of similar situations and advise negotiators on others' experiences in similar incidents. Second, it collects data on both the subjects and the victims in hostage/crisis incidents, including:

1. Demographic data, including age, sex, marital status, and race of the victims and the subjects
2. Language fluency of both the victims and the subjects
3. Health factors that may have influenced the incident
4. Religious background of both victims and subjects
5. Treatment of the victims
6. Criminal history
7. Whether the subject had mental health problems
8. Prior suicide attempts on the part of the subject
9. Substance abuse before or during the incident
10. Type of weapons involved in the incident
11. Whether explosives were used in the incident
12. Movement the victims were allowed
13. Whether the Stockholm Syndrome developed
14. Relationship of subject to victims prior to the incident
15. Whether the victim was released or rescued and the types of action necessary for release or rescue
16. Outcome of the incident
17. Status of the subject at the resolution of the incident—not injured, injured, killed, etc.

Other HOBAS data includes planned/unplanned, time of day, day of week, location (for example, 53.2% of all reported incidents occurred at a private residence), whether a TPI (third-party intermediary) was used (and type of TPI), who initiated contact, how officers communicated with the subject, language negotiations conducted in, how resolved (approximately 70% resolved by negotiation strategies), tactical use of negotiators, injury and death rates, and whether violence was used by the subject, among others.

To use LENS and HOBAS, law enforcement and correctional officers need only apply by completing a short application form that the agency authorizes. Once employment is verified,

the FBI provides the user with a CD containing complete information and instructions for using HOBAS. The user calls a provided number to activate their account, establish a user name and password, and install the software needed to use the system.

Negotiator Central is a web-based resource and can be accessed at <http://www.negotiatorcentral.com/>. It is a California-based, interactive site that provides “one central location where we could offer our experiences and information to all in this, or related, fields. We want this to be the central point for negotiators worldwide to access—we have our own virtual community for communicating and sharing” (Negotiator Central, 2009).

Resources found on Negotiator Central include:

Discussion Forum—In which negotiators can communicate with negotiators from around the globe on issues of current concern to them.

Calendar—A posting of events related to negotiations: conferences, etc. Members are allowed to post events on the calendar as well.

Opinion Polls—Negotiators can post a question and get direct statistical feedback on their issue. For instance, a recent poll question was: “Should police agencies allow Reserve Police Officers to be part of an active negotiations team?”

Guest Articles—Helpful information from professionals in the business and members. Articles include: “Peer Support for Public Safety”; “Understanding Stockholm Syndrome,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, July 2007 HOBAS Online; “The Tacoma Police Department Hostage Negotiator Selection Process”; “The Weapon of Choice Against Terrorists”; “The Negotiator Position Papers: Some Development in Issues to Cover.”

Incident Briefings—Members may post summaries of recent negotiation incidents, with “lessons learned” from their experience.

“Training Room”—A place to download and upload training scenarios and to share training recommendations and opportunities with the membership.

Private Messages—A portal that allows members to communicate directly with one another, individually and privately about issues of concern.

Policeone.com is a general web site for law enforcement officers. They publish information and news that impacts law enforcement in general, but often carry stories and articles that are relevant for negotiators. They publish current incident news stories, incident reviews (such as the Discovery Channel incident debrief by Greenberg, 2010), and educational articles (such as the Marcou, 2010, article). Their website is at: <http://www.policeone.com/>.

General browser searches often turn up articles of general interest for negotiators, although the efficacy, accuracy, and quality of those articles may be questionable. Some are quite valuable, such as one found in February 2013 at <http://www.lectlaw.com/files/cjs10.htm>. This article by Bruce Wind (at the time of writing, a member of Seattle, WA, Police Department Hostage Negotiation Team) is an excellent summary of basic skills, issues, and techniques.

YouTube often has videos and audios valuable to negotiator training. As with anything on the Internet, *caveat emptor* (buyer beware) applies. Many of the videos are news or bystander videos of incidents. One, *The Bridge*, is a documentary filmed by a professional filmmaker that documents one year of suicides and suicide attempts at the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco. The authors have used segments of that film in negotiator training classes.

PDAs

One of the biggest technological advances of the past decade has been the development and proliferation of personal digital (or data) assistants (PDAs) and smartphone technology. These devices have opened an entirely new level of connectivity, networking, information sharing, and for negotiators, information acquisition. Many, if not most, negotiating teams include

laptop computers, WiFi networks, and printers as part of their team equipment. Most negotiators now also carry PDAs and smartphones. PDAs and smartphones have significantly improved the ability of negotiators to resolve crisis incidents. As one small example, negotiators in the past relied on radio contact with tactical team members who verbally attempted to describe the structure an actor was inside. The tactical team member may have said something like, “I’m on Charley side. It is brick, single story, with a metal door approximately 6 feet from the Baker edge. Approximately 5 feet from the door is a single pane window ... etc., etc.” Now, that tactical person would just take a photo with their smartphone and send it to the negotiators, who would download, print and distribute copies to everyone who needed one.

Like laptops, PDAs and smartphones can access the Internet from virtually any location within the United States. What was available via WiFi networks can now be accessed via cellphone networks. Any Internet information negotiators might have accessed (or wanted to access) via laptops can be accessed with PDAs and smartphones.

The applications (or “apps”) for these devices have literally exploded. There are millions available, from games, to business, to notetaking, photos, and so on. Furthermore, they are constantly in flux; new ones are added daily, while others are modified, and others are deleted from the app libraries. It would be impossible to proffer a list of useful apps for these devices. Instead, what the authors suggest is that teams hold a training session(s) and as a group identify apps that may be useful and beneficial at a crisis incident. The intelligence gatherers may want an app that helps them take and organize notes. Another team member may want a mapping app, or a police radio scanner app, or a local news app. The list of possibilities is virtually endless and should be limited only by the team needs.

Summary

Although the history of hostage negotiation is relatively short in criminal justice, it has been marked with many successes. It has proven the value of an interdisciplinary approach to police problems. Both experience and a small, but growing, body of research are showing the value of crisis intervention principles in policing, as well as helping to define the limits of their use in a variety of high-conflict situations for which law enforcement is responsible. Combining the knowledge of police officers with that of the mental health profession, a set of sophisticated techniques, based on theory, research, and experience, has been developed to reduce conflict and save lives.

Note

- ¹ The list of best practices is a summary of the “best practices” that are currently being developed. Negotiations teams and police departments should contact Deputy William Kidd, Sonoma Sheriff’s Office, for a complete version of the standards.

Discussion Questions

1. Do you think that the public would have allowed United States police agencies to form hostage negotiation teams before the Munich Olympic incident?
2. Given what we now know about negotiations as compared to 1973, if Williamsburg occurred today, what might the response elements do differently?
3. What impact do you believe *Downs v. United States* had on municipal police departments? Do you think many police departments would have formed hostage negotiation teams without this case?
4. What conditions must be fulfilled before a person is considered a hostage?
5. Does the fact that a hostage taker makes substantive demands make a difference in a hostage situation? How would you deal with the person differently if he or she made no substantive demands?
6. What are the differences between a barricade incident and a hostage incident? How would the police response be different for each?
7. In school violence incidents such as the Columbine High School incident, how do you think negotiators can be used?
8. Assume the Beslan school incident occurred in your community. Outline a response plan to manage that incident. What negotiation strategies might be employed with the terrorists to hopefully resolve the incident without loss of life?
9. Kidnappings are not a typical hostage taking situation that would employ negotiators. For the most part, they do not fit the requirements of a negotiated situation. Assume you were called as an incident commander at a kidnapping (where the perpetrator makes phone contact with the victim's family). What could you do to make that a negotiated incident?
10. Can you think of a hostage situation in which assault would be the preferred option? Use of a police sniper? Use of chemical agents? What factors would you have to consider in the use of each of these options?
11. Go to the Negotiator Central Web site and look at the discussion threads. Can you identify five factors that are common to each thread? Do you see a thread where you can contribute something or a thread you can start? What about a new survey question?

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Chapter 2

Crisis Management: Crisis Response Team Elements

Chapter Outline

1988

2012

2013

Definition of team

Crisis management team

NIMS/ICS-supporting the team in the field

The NIMS incident command system (ICS)

The crisis response team

Triad of command

Strategic and tactical planning

Strategic goals

Strategy and tactics at the incident

Tactical planning

REACCT model in tactical planning

Recognition

Engaging

Assessing

Controlling the actor

Contracting with the actor

Transferring

Incident commander

Tactical team commander

Negotiations team commander

Communications within the crisis response team

Establishing the negotiation area

The negotiating team

Selection of negotiators

[Selection model for negotiators](#)

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Types of training

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Crisis negotiating equipment

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The tactical team

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[Selection of tactical team members](#)

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Outside agency support

The ten most common mistakes

[Negotiator skills and techniques](#)

[Negotiation team management](#)

[Critical incident management](#)

Note

References

Learning Objectives

1. Know the definition of team and how a team can be built to manage crisis incidents.
2. Understand the nature of the NIMS/ICS organization. Its value and the place of the Crisis Management Team in the organization.
3. Define the Triad of Command and explain its importance.
4. Explain the unique contribution of negotiators to tactical planning in an incident.
5. Understand the responsibilities of the on-scene command (OSC).
6. Explain the responsibilities of the tactical team commander.
7. Know the role of the tactical team at a critical incident.
8. Explain the role of the negotiator supervisor.
9. Understand the functions/tasks needed at any crisis/hostage incident.
10. Understand how the principles of redundancy and clarity of communications aid in managing a crisis incident.

11. Explain the composition of and roles of members of the negotiating team.
12. Know how to organize situation boards.
13. Understand how negotiators should be selected.
14. Know how to develop a microskills training plan from the After Action Report.
15. Know what basic equipment each hostage negotiator should have.
16. Know possible sources for obtaining equipment.
17. Know the various roles and responsibilities of the tactical team.
18. Know the ten most common mistakes made at a negotiated situation.
19. Understand the need for outside agency support, what those agencies are, and how to establish working relations with those agencies.

1988

The FBI responded to an incident that started with religious fundamentalists filling the cultural hall of rivals with dynamite and ammonium nitrate, detonating the bomb, and notifying church officials that they were bringing them to account for the death of a sect member. They were tracked to the fundamentalist's farm. When police ordered them to surrender, they refused, and promised a battle if lawmen stepped onto their property.

The sheriff's office immediately requested assistance from the Department of Public Safety, who summoned experts with the ATF and the FBI. Approximately 100 law enforcement officers responded to the scene. Fifteen people were inside the home, including six children under the age of six.

Authorities used a variety of tactics to pressure the actors into surrendering. Low-flying aircraft buzzed the house and circled the farm; Spotlights were extinguished and aerial flares were fired over the compound; emergency vehicles activated lights and sirens; and a public address system was installed which directed high-pitched electronic static at the house. Water was cut off to the house.

During this period of time, law enforcement officers were often fired upon but held their fire while negotiators tried to talk with the actors.

The incident lasted 13 days. On the final day of the siege a Department of Corrections K-9 officer was hit and killed by a gunshot fired by one of the children inside the house. Officers attempting to recover the body of the fallen officer came under intense gunfire from the house. During this exchange of gunfire, one of the actors was shot in the wrist. Two armored personnel carriers (APCs) were called in to evacuate the shot officer. The wounded suspect emerged from the house, waving a white towel stained with blood. He surrendered without further incident. His injuries were not life threatening. The rest of the group surrendered to authorities soon afterward.

—Adapted from the FBI Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) web page

2012

A chain of crisis events began one morning when an actor who was "high on drugs" ran into an apartment with a pistol and a shotgun. He set the apartment on fire and escaped as police responded. He broke into two other apartments in an attempt to avoid being arrested. In the third apartment, he had a woman gift-wrap his guns.

He drove through a cordon of police cars and fire engines, injuring two firemen.

He barricaded himself in an apartment of a young couple with a small child. The Police Department, which only has 21 sworn officers and does not have a SWAT team, called a department of correction's crisis team for help.

By the time the negotiating team arrived, the woman and child had been released, but a man was still being held hostage with a shotgun aimed at his head.

The crisis team's chief hostage negotiator decided that the local police officer had established some rapport with the suspect and shouldn't be interrupted. During the five-hour standoff, negotiators coached the officer and consulted with the suspect's father who had come to the scene. The father recorded a message for the suspect, which was played over a bullhorn. It appeared to calm the suspect and he passed the shotgun out a window before surrendering.

In addition to corrections officers, 35 Border Patrol officers controlled the crowd.

2013

As noted in the previous chapter, a lone gunman [Dykes] shot and killed a school bus driver, taking an autistic child as hostage. He had been scheduled to appear in court. He barricaded himself and his hostage in a homemade, underground bunker instead. The siege lasted 7 days and ended with the death of the actor and the rescue of the boy.

Critical events during the siege included:

***Day 1:** Local officers called upon assistance from neighboring county all-local emergency services. officers spent most of the first day trying to negotiate with the actor because it was believed that he was a Vietnam veteran, and had a gun and pipe bombs. FBI was called in after a few hours and began operations.*

***Day 2:** Dogs trained in detecting explosives and ground penetrating x-ray was used to detect explosives. The decision was made not to lower any wire or camera into the bunker. Negotiations continued.*

***Day 3:** Negotiators continued talking to Dykes through an air pipe. The community held candlelit vigils, praying for the standoff to end peacefully. FBI's Hostage Rescue team practiced rescue attempts in a hidden bunker.*

***Day 4:** A plane landed at the local airport, bringing specialized equipment. In media releases, officials sent the message that they were grateful to the actor for caring for the boy and they were not planning a move any time soon. They knew that the actor was monitoring the local TV outlets.*

***Day 5:** Law enforcement presence increased at the site of the barricade. Two tactical vehicles arrived on the scene, bearing the FBI emblem and initials. A large black mobile Crime Scene Unit was driven up to the edge of the large barn behind the bunker lay. Heavily armed Hostage Rescue Teams were seen moving up on either side of that barn. Reporters were asked not to report on the increase in security for fear of agitating the actor. Negotiators changed shifts between 3 and 4 P.M. each day.*

***Day 6:** Authorities believed the boy's life was in danger because the actor's emotional condition seemed to be deteriorating. They said that "it got tough to negotiate with him."*

***Day 7:** FBI special agents were positioned near the entrance of the bunker and used flash-bangs when the actor lost his balance during a delivery. The actor fired at agents and they returned fire, killing him. The boy was taken to a nearby hospital. Bomb technicians checked the property for improvised explosive devices.*

The above incidents represent both planned and spontaneous high-risk incidents that require crisis management by police. Even though they span two decades, involve agencies of different sizes, and have different outcomes, all require responses involving multiple functions/tasks that have to come together in an organized way. These tasks cannot be done by one or two officers. They require a team.

To manage a crisis/hostage incident successfully, many elements within the police department and the public and private sector must develop a quick and effective working relationship. They must have clear and effective channels of communication, and they need an agreed-on "game plan." There has to be a team approach to managing crises. This chapter will look at a definition of teams, identify problems during incidents that are related to team issues, and describe the roles and structures of response teams that will help overcome the problems that have developed in the team management of crisis incidents. It will focus on the team approach to crisis management, with an emphasis on the tasks of the triad of command: the on scene commander, the tactical team, and the negotiators.

Definition of team

Katzenbach and Smith (1993) have defined a team in a way that is helpful for both police decision makers and negotiators. They say that a team is "a small group of people with complementary skills who are committed to a common purpose, performance goals, and approach for which they hold themselves mutually accountable."

A group of 10 to 12 is considered a small group. Limiting the size of a group is important in

building a team, because a smaller group allows better communication, better handling of logistical problems, and more effective problem-solving than a larger group (McMains, 1995). The National Incident Management System/Incident Command System (NIMS/ICS) guidelines suggest that an effective span of control is about five people. Because most departments have fewer than 10 negotiators, limiting the size of the negotiating team is not difficult. When the incident is high profile, of political interest, or attractive to the press, it may require a response that involves much more than just negotiators. It requires the presence of tactical officers, command officers, traffic control officers, and public information officers. The total number of people involved can quickly grow beyond 10 or 12. To the degree that it does is the degree to which communications, control, and problem solving become more difficult.

On January 18, 2004, two inmates at the Lewis State Prison in Buckeye, Arizona, took two correctional officers hostage in one of the unit control towers. The situation was successfully resolved with no loss of life after 15 days. More than 60 negotiators were used from more than seven different police departments. Negotiators from the FBI, both field personnel and negotiators from the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) in Quantico, assisted. Tactical personnel were used from the prison, surrounding police departments, Arizona Department of Public Safety, and FBI. Command personnel included the unit warden, Director of the Department of Corrections, and the Arizona governor's office. Additionally, the command center was off-site and decisions took hours or most of a day to be made. The incident was successfully resolved because of teamwork. As Dubina (2006) stated, "it did not take long for a six-person (negotiators in the Negotiators's Operations Center (NOC)), multi-agency team to form into a cohesive and effective unit." Teamwork is why the Lewis Prison incident was safely resolved.

Team members have complementary skills. That is, team members are selected for their contribution to the purpose and goals of the team. Not all team members are alike, because there are many tasks to be performed in managing a critical incident. There need to be tactical, negotiators, and command. Each has different skills, but the different skills must contribute to the team achieving its goals. The incident at the Talladega Federal Correctional Institution in 1991 illustrated the value of using team members with different, complementary skills. Both the FBI and Bureau of Prisons (BOP) had negotiators and tactical officers on the scene. The negotiators complemented each other, because the FBI had personnel who were experienced negotiators, while the BOP negotiators were familiar with riots, prison management, and specific information about detainees. They were assigned to teams that worked eight-hour shifts and included both FBI and BOP negotiators working together to utilize their respective strengths (Fagan & Van Zandt, 1993).

Teams need to be committed to a common purpose, to common performance goals, and to common approaches to the problem. It is the purpose and goals that give the team direction. They answer the question "Why does the team exist?" This helps define success, because success is accomplishing the purpose or goal. Goals help define progress. Generally, in crisis/hostage incidents, the purpose and goals are understood to be saving lives and resolving the incident as safely as possible (Stites, 2005).

At a critical incident, there are in fact several teams that must come together as one working team or at least must overlap in their purpose, goals, and approaches. There is the *crisis management team*, which is made up of the departmental, city, political, and support

personnel who are responsible for managing crises in a particular jurisdiction. There is the *crisis response team*, which is responsible for managing critical incidents for the police department. There is the *tactical team*, which is responsible for bringing assault capabilities, containment capabilities, and deadly force options to the incident. There is the *negotiating team*, which is responsible for the peaceful resolution of the incident.

A major issue in the team approach is that there are really several different teams that have to come together during a crisis, each with different purposes, goals, and approaches to solving the problem. The tactical team and the negotiation team may agree on the goal of a peaceful resolution, but not agree on the idea that there are no acceptable losses. Negotiators and tactical personnel have different tools or approaches to bringing the incident to an end. Similarly, if supervisors are more concerned about overtime costs than peaceful resolution of the incident, they will be working at cross-purposes with the negotiators and tactical teams. The team approach in police crises requires an integration of several teams. Without prior discussions and practice, the purposes, goals, and approaches may generate ineffective actions at the scene.

A second issue is whether the decision makers at an incident have the same purpose, goals, and approach to the incident. Historically, negotiators have identified the incident commander's (IC's) lack of understanding and training in negotiation principles as a problem for the team (FBI, 1993). The FBI's Negotiations Concepts for Commanders course was developed as a result of the commanders at Waco, Texas receiving sound advice from the negotiators, but not following the advice due to their lack of understanding of the crisis negotiations perspective (Noesner, 1999). Such a lack of understanding of negotiation concepts makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the crisis management team to respond to the crisis in a well-coordinated, efficient, and effective way. It reflects the lack of a team approach, in that even though there may be a common goal, if there is not an understanding and acceptance of a common approach, things are likely to become confusing, with elements of the crisis response team working against each other. Noesner (1999) has pointed out that one of the significant shifts in command principles for crisis/hostage incidents since Waco has been the shift from a linear decision-making model (talk, then use tactical) to a synchronized model that emphasizes the coordinated, simultaneous application of tactical and negotiations approaches. The synchronized approach includes both negotiators and tactical team members in every decision made by the commander at an incident. The planning is based on what the best option is at the time, and how both tactical and negotiators can send the same message. Synchronized decision making must have real teamwork in order to be effective.

The answer to the problem of bringing different teams together, focusing them on a common purpose, common goals, and common approaches is cross-training of all crisis response personnel and crisis management teams—from the mayor down to the patrol officers who respond to hostage/crisis incidents.

[Crisis management team](#)




FIGURE 2.1 General organization of a typical hostage negotiation incident

Source: McMains, M. Basic Hostage Negotiation School, San Antonio, 1984

[Figure 2.1](#) shows the general organizational structure of a typical hostage incident. With so many elements involved, an incident requires communication, command, coordination, and control. Communication between the disparate elements of an operation is essential to guarantee that all elements are working toward the same goals. Clear, effective, and timely communications are necessary to ensure that critical intelligence, tactical information, and command decisions are available to the relevant personnel when they are needed. Control is essential so that no one acts on impulse or does anything that will inflame the situation, making it more difficult to resolve. The immediate control of the negotiating team, the tactical team, and the support elements (patrol/traffic/communications) is in the field. The political control is in the chief's and mayor's offices. In incidents that draw public attention, control will fluctuate between the IC, the chief, and various politicians. These shifts in responsibility need to be coordinated. The primary decision maker needs to be clear to everyone at all times. Control is essential to guarantee a coordinated response that maximizes the saving of life, as well as making the most efficient and effective use of resources.

The degree of involvement of upper echelon personnel will depend on the politics, the economics, and the public relations consequences of a particular incident. For instance, an incident that occurs at city hall during the noon hour will have more political or public relations implications than one that happens at 3:00 A.M. in a lower middle-class neighborhood. The former is likely to receive the personal attention of the mayor and the police chief, while the latter is likely to involve only the usual command structure.

People who make decisions, whether they are the mayor, the police chief, or the shift supervisor, must know the capabilities of their crisis response teams. Many supervisory personnel are not involved in the training and daily functioning of tactical officers and negotiators. They frequently do not know what negotiators can do. The FBI (1993) has found that a common problem in negotiations is that commanders do not train with their teams. A briefing at the beginning of the incident for decision makers who are not normally involved in training is helpful.

NIMS/ICS—supporting the team in the field

The NIMS incident command system (ICS)

Since 9-11, the most significant change in incident command is FEMA's (Federal Emergency Management Agency) implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The NIMS system is intended to provide a proactive and systematic incident command system to respond to crisis incidents of any nature, including hostage and crises incidents in the criminal justice system. The command system is an integrated approach to help prevent, respond to, manage, and recover from crisis incidents, whether they be natural or man-made (weather, terrorist, large-scale criminal events, hostage events, etc.). As FEMA (2009) states, "NIMS benefits include a unified approach to incident management; standard command and management structures; and emphasis on preparedness, mutual aid, and resource management."

[Figure 2.2](#) is a general overview of the ICS structure. It shows the major organizational elements of the system.

In the ICS organization, each organizational element is responsible for different tasks, as shown in [Figure 2.3](#).

In most local law enforcement agencies, the incident command staff will include what has been called the *triad of command* (Hogewood, 2005; Chavez, 2013). It will be made up of an on-scene commander (OSC), tactical commander and negotiations commander. This triad will fit into the Operations section of the ICS/NIMS organization. Most incidents will not require an agency to stand up a full ICS/NIMS system. However, it is important to note that the logistical issues, the operational planning issues and the financial issues will have to be dealt with, even in the smaller incident managed by most local agencies. Frequently, these responsibilities fall to the OSC, and he/she should be prepared for them.




FIGURE 2.2 The overall organization of the NIMS/ICS system for managing critical incidents. The triad of command

generally fits under Operations Section but on smaller incidents, the triad of command led by the IC, may assume the responsibility for planning, operations, logistics, etc

Operations	Carries out operations to reach the tactical objectives. Establishes tactics and directs all operational resources.
Planning	Supports the tactical action planning by tracking resources, collecting/analyzing intelligence, and maintaining documentation.
Logistics	Supports operations by arranging for equipment, personnel, resources and needed services.
Finance & Administration	Monitors costs related to the incident. Provides accounting, procurement, time recording, and cost analyses.

FIGURE 2.3 Elements of the ICS organization and their responsibilities in a high-conflict crisis incident

Though most hostage incidents managed by local law enforcement are small (less than 8 hours in duration and involving only one department), the response can be expanded when needed, such as when the encounter with the police is a planned event by an organized group such as a terrorist takeover of a school or church. In larger situations that may require the response of multiple agencies, whether police, corrections, emergency medical services (EMS), fire, hospital, Red Cross, public health, utilities, public works, and others, or a response that is multijurisdictional, NIMS provides a framework for unified incident command and response agency communications. All responders will fall under a common response paradigm that has a unified command structure, all responding units will have the same training for managing the incident, and all agencies will be under one communication system. NIMS assures that all responders have training in preparedness, communications and information management, resource management, command management, and ongoing management and maintenance.

The NIMS/ICS system may not be implemented in a hostage or barricade event at the local level, but it still provides a benefit to the response units. NIMS requires that ICs receive training, so even if ICs have not attended any other incident command school or training classes, they at least have completed the NIMS command course. All personnel receive the same training, so there will be continuity across ICs.

What NIMS/ICS is not is the federal government arriving on scene and taking over an incident. A fundamental tenet of NIMS is that incidents are responded to, managed, and resolved at the local level. Resources from the federal government are available to local responders, but only when requested by the local incident command structure. Likewise, state governments fall under the NIMS system as facilitators to local agencies. There may be instances in which the crisis event is of such size and magnitude that federal or state agencies assume command, but those are the exceptions to the purpose of NIMS. If local responding agencies are overwhelmed by the scope and magnitude of the incident, federal and state agencies may then step in with command and communication support.

The Significance of the Incident Command System and Leadership in Managing Law Enforcement Critical Incidents

Captain Ron Hagan is currently the Commander of the Delaware State Police Aviation Section with 28 years of law enforcement experience. He is a member of Delaware's FEMA Type III Incident Management Team serving as an Incident Commander or Operations Commander. Capt. Hagan has been a trained negotiator for 26 years and participated in over 200 incidents involving hostage takers, barricaded subjects, and suicidal subjects. He has also been instructing hostage/crisis negotiations training for over 15 years in the US and abroad for new negotiators and command staff.

Today's ever-evolving and expanding field of critical incident management in law enforcement requires a great deal more than just specialized teams. Even though highly trained and capable teams with experienced negotiators, special weapons and tactics (SWAT) operators and explosive ordnance and demolition (EOD) technicians, to name a few, are a requirement for many law enforcement agencies, there are few agencies who have specialized critical incident management teams and leaders/commanders.

While the fire service has been using an Incident Command System (ICS), which is the foundation of the National Incident Management System, very successfully since the 1970s, the law enforcement (LE) community has been very slow to embrace such a system. Some LE leaders may believe, based on their current policies, procedure, rank structure, staffing and volume of incidents, there is no need for such a system, specialized unit or personnel to manage critical incidents. My experience and research is contrary to such thinking and Gordon Graham will tell you low-frequency, high-risk incidents are the ones that initiate a significant amount, if not the greatest volume, of litigation for LE organizations.

The management and leadership of critical incidents are just as significant as the special teams who operate on these situations, and the ICS system is a tool to help organize and manage situations so they run efficiently, effectively and safely.

The basic premise of the ICS system is to organize functions by size, location and specialty to allow for a manageable span of control. As mentioned, the system dates back to the early 1970s when it was first called "Fire Ground Command" and then the "Incident Command System." The Federal Emergency Management Agency (2013) describes ICS as follows:

The ICS is a widely applicable management system designed to enable effective, efficient incident management by integrating a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures and communications operating within a common organizational structure. ICS is a fundamental form of management established in a standard format, with the purpose of enabling incident managers to identify the key concerns associated with the incident—often under urgent conditions—without sacrificing attention to any component of the command system. It represents organizational "best practices" and, as an element of the Command and Management Component of NIMS, has become the standard for emergency management across the country. Designers of the system recognized early that ICS must be interdisciplinary and organizationally flexible to meet the following management challenges:

- *Meet the needs of incidents of any kind or size.*
- *Allow personnel from a variety of agencies to meld rapidly into a common management structure.*
- *Provide logistical and administrative support to operational staff.*
- *Be cost effective by avoiding duplication of efforts.*

ICS consists of procedures for controlling personnel, facilities, equipment and communications. It is a system designed to be used or applied from the time an incident occurs until the requirement for management and operations no longer exists.

The command structure is set up with a Command Staff and General Staff. The Command Staff consist of the Incident Commander (IC), Public Information Officer (PIO), Safety Officer, and Liaison Officer. They are responsible for establishing incident

strategies, objectives and priorities. However, the IC is responsible for all ICS functions until the particular function is delegated. The General Staff consist of Operation, Planning, Logistics and Finance/Administration. The Operations Section determines tactics and resources for achieving objectives and directs tactical response. Planning Section collects and analyzes information, tracks resources and maintains documentation. Logistics Section provides resources and the Finance/Administration Section accounts for expenditures, claims and compensation.

While most incidents will not develop to the level of all sections being activated, it is paramount to train and know the system. It is also paramount that the IC knows all the components of the ICS system as well as the duties, functions and responsibilities of each section. This knowledge must be learned and practiced and, in order to achieve this, the IC must be properly trained and have experience. Ijames (1997) writes “The required crisis leadership and strategic planning skills, as well as in-depth knowledge of progressive tactical and negotiations concepts, demand that this job be delegated to specialists—men and women who have been specifically chosen, trained and prepared for the task.”

One of the most significant justifications for proper training and experience of an IC can be found in the case of *Souza v. City of Antioch*. In Antioch, California in 1993 a man distraught over marital problems threatened to kill his wife and children. Police arrived and began negotiations. Over the next five hours a police corporal commanded the operations until an off-duty captain arrived and took over command. Four hours later and some nine hours after the incident began, the captain ordered the negotiators to “give him ten minutes.” Nine minutes after the ultimatum was issued, the subject killed his two children and himself (Calibre Press 1997).

This incident resulted in years of litigation, with the wife suing the city for the “negligent wrongful death” of her children. The final outcome was the city paying \$175,000.00 in an out of court settlement (Calibre Press, 1997). Why would a commander order a negotiator to give a person holding hostages an ultimatum? Was it lack of knowledge and training related to negotiation’s techniques and procedures, a lack of confidence in the ability of the negotiators, a lack of patience, or simply bad judgment?

While we don’t know what training or experience this captain had, with this example and knowledge, why would we appoint a lieutenant, captain or major as an IC just because of their rank and/or prior experience with SWAT, Negotiations or other specialized unit? While most, if not all, quality ICs come from those ranks, it’s not an easy transition. And while the individual may have a great deal of knowledge and experience in a particular field, managing and leading all parts of a critical incident requires much more than just a one-dimensional view.

Miller (2007) states there is an “*inventory of skills and traits that most psychologists and emergency service professionals would agree on as the basis for effective incident command leadership during most kinds of critical incidents.*” They are: communications, team management, decision making under stress, planning, implementing and evaluating, and emotional stability. Along with these traits come subsets of knowledge and experience.

Finally, to function effectively, an IC must receive training and instruction, and must

gain experience by participating in training that includes simulated incidents and actual incidents.

As a quick aside, do we really understand how significant experience is, and how significant a role experience plays in the decision made? Klein (1998) explains “*there was never a doubt as to how experience came into play in decision making. The challenge was identifying how that experience came into play.*” “*We have found that people draw on a large set of abilities that are sources of power.*” “*Yet the sources of power that are needed in natural settings are not analytical at all—the power of intuition, mental simulation, metaphor, and storytelling. The power of intuition enables us to size up a situation quickly. The power of mental simulation lets us imagine how a course of action might be carried out. The power of metaphor lets us draw on our experience by suggesting parallels between the current situation and something else we have come across. The storytelling helps us consolidate our experiences to make them available in the future.*” These powers are not developed through classroom training alone.

While this may appear very academic, as a cop I like to explain things as basically as possible. Simply said, it is not a requirement to have been a tactical operator, negotiator or other specialized team member in order to be an IC, although it is a desirable attribute. However, it is a requirement that an IC have both classroom training of the ICS principles and hands-on experience applying those principles.

ICs should *participate in training exercises* with each specialized team that would operate on a critical incident with him or her and participate in full-scale training exercises before ever being placed in the role of an IC. *Shadowing a trained and experienced IC during a real incident* is also a valuable training tool for new ICs. Fulfilling these training suggestions and understanding the capabilities of each team, their equipment, their personnel, and their resources, as well as practicing integrating them into an ICS framework, will go a long way in assisting the IC with understanding, managing and leading these highly complex, fast-moving teams to successful incident resolutions, thus allowing the organization and its personnel to increase efficiency and effectiveness, which will in turn save lives and reduce risks.

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Ron Hagan

The crisis response team

The crisis response team for the department should be made up of the key personnel necessary to respond to a negotiation incident. It may vary in makeup and number depending on the nature of the incident. For instance, a suicide attempt by a barricaded person will receive less of a response than a hostage taker who shot a police officer and took a hostage during an aborted robbery. However, there are basic functions that are necessary in any situation:

1. The hostage taker needs to be contained and tactical options developed. Tactical elements can range from patrol officers who are designated as a containment/arrest team to a fully trained and armed tactical unit.
2. Communications need to be established with the hostage taker. There is a need for a negotiator element. Because the communication skills and conflict management skills used by a negotiator are different from those normally employed by patrol officers, it is important for departments to have trained negotiators.
3. Information needs to be gathered. There is a need for an intelligence element that focuses on information about the incident, the people involved, and the tactical needs.
4. The situation needs to be free of bystanders, rubberneckers, and curiosity seekers. A security element is needed so that there is no unauthorized intrusion in the area between the inner and outer perimeters.
5. The media needs to be taken into consideration and an area established where they have access to information. They need frequent updates on what is happening, to the extent that the information does not compromise the tactics of the incident.
6. Overall control of the situation must be maintained. A command element is necessary. The designated commander needs to assume overall command. He or she is the final approving authority for operational decisions and is responsible for ensuring that the other elements function as they should.
7. In the last 10 years there has been a growing recognition in some departments that

the hostages/victims need to be serviced beyond what the average officer or even average negotiator can do. Therefore, many departments are including victim services in their planning for crisis incidents.

Triad of command

To assure that the tactical plan utilizes the resources of both the SWAT team and the negotiators most effectively and “in parallel” (FBI, 2011), tactics are developed by what has come to be known as the *triad of command* (Hogewood, 2005; Chavez, 2013). The triad of command includes an on-scene commander or incident commander (IC), a tactical commander (TC) and a negotiations commander (NC). Together, they are responsible for setting tactical goals for the overall incident and determining how, when, where and who will do what to manage the incident.

Strategic and tactical planning

In many jurisdictions and agencies, strategy and tactics mean the same thing. In others, they mean the goals toward which the team is working and the actions they are taking to get there. However, in the author’s opinion, there are some differences that may be helpful to negotiators, tactical team members and commander. For our purposes, *strategy* is defined as the utilization of all of an agency’s resources, through large-scale, **long-range planning and development**, to ensure security or victory during a high conflict incident and it plays out at two levels: the strategic planning for the entire department and at the scene of a high-risk incident. Setting the mission of conflict management, defining the resources needed to attain that mission, providing manpower equipment and training before, during and after an incident are all part of strategic planning at the department level. Strategy is the attainment of goals through the development and utilization of resources, including manpower, financial support, training and equipment. It includes both strategic goals and objectives.

For example, in many countries in which the authors have taught, police agencies are going through major changes as the country transitions to a more democratic society. Policing is changing to integrate the new emphasis on human rights, and agencies are recognizing the need to gain the support of the people they are policing. They are realizing that it is not enough to rely on the authority of their position and the power of office. They must become more service oriented and democratic. Many agencies are doing strategic planning to “win the hearts and minds,” to steal a phrase from the military. Negotiations fit this strategic goal. Police agencies in these countries are including negotiations in their strategic planning for crisis management. In the US, if a department adopts the community policing model, it may adopt negotiations as a strategic goal in its application of the model. [Table 2.1](#) illustrates the strategic goals and objectives of a crisis management.

[Table 2.1](#) Definition and Characteristics of Strategic Goals and Objectives

Strategic Goals	Strategic Objectives

Definition:	The purpose toward which an entire department is directed.	Specific things or actions intended to implement strategic goal; purpose; target.
Action:	A general generic action or outcome toward which the department strives.	The objective is a specific action that helps attain the goal.
Measure:	Goals may not be strictly measurable or tangible.	Is measurable and tangible.
Time frame:	Longer term	Mid to short term
Example:	In Crisis Incidents, we want to save as many lives as possible while safeguarding the rights of all the people we serve.	We want to select, train and maintain a Crisis Management Team that includes a negotiating element, a tactical element and a command element by April 1 of this year.

Strategic goals

Strategic goals in management of any crisis include more than just what needs to be done to resolve the incident; they are also influenced by the political climate of the day and what the managing agency wants to communicate to its constituency. In a democracy, the power and authority of the law enforcement agency and the criminal justice system are based on the will of the people. Police actions are seen as enforcing that will or running counter to it. If it is seen as being consistent with the will of the people, faith in the law enforcement institution will be high. On the other hand, if the actions of a department or agency run counter to the will of the people, faith in the agency is undermined and its legitimacy is compromised. The authors have taught hostage negotiations in 15 countries around the world in the last 3 years and have become aware of the degree to which the use of police powers is either supported by the people or not, depending on how the power is used.

Crises always involve the potential for the use of extreme power, the power to take life, and, as such, have the potential for extreme abuse. Every crisis sends a message to the community about how well the police use the power they are delegated, and every incident is a political incident as well as a crisis; there are strategic political goals as well as crisis management goals in every incident.

In the United States, the strategic objectives of critical incident management in law enforcement are: to save as many lives as possible and to guarantee the rights of all the people to be protected from the abuse of power by limiting and focusing the use of police powers. The strategic goals include: settling the incident using negotiators alone; settling the incident using a combination of a negotiators and tactical team with an emphasis on the negotiated solution; or, settling the incident using a tactical team with the negotiators supporting the tactical operation. Each of these strategic methods requires a commitment by the department to support the development of a crisis management team that includes the assignment of an adequate number of personnel, training of those personnel and the resources, including time, equipment and money necessary to save lives.

Strategy and tactics at the incident

Strategy at a high-risk incident involves setting the overall goals of the intervention and the ways the personnel, equipment and time will be used to attain the goals. It includes the mission for the incident: as many as possible go home, and it guides the use of SWAT, negotiators, armored vehicles, etc. Generally, the strategic choices are two: utilize negotiations and a peaceful resolution, using the SWAT to support the negotiations tactics, or emphasize the SWAT team and use the negotiators to support the SWAT tactics.

Tactics are the tasks needed in **securing of objectives set by strategy**, especially the effective deployment and directing officers, equipment and resources to achieve the strategic goals. It is done at a lower level than strategic planning and generally over a shorter period of time; it is done at the scene.

Tactical planning

As previously discussed, in many agencies, the group that organizes, plans and implements the activities at the scene of an incident includes an on-scene commander, a tactical commander and a negotiations commander, in what has been called the triad of command (Hogewood, 2005; FBI, 2009). This group is responsible for developing the tactics for dealing with the specific incidents, deploying and managing the resources, and obtaining the strategic objective of saving as many lives as possible while protecting the rights of all.

REACCT model in tactical planning

Tactical planning requires an idea of the objectives to be attained and a plan for getting to those objectives. The plan will include who is to do what, when, how, and why. It needs to have a general roadmap for deciding where to go. It is important that each element has an understanding of the capabilities of each of the other elements in the triad, a common vocabulary and a general idea of the tasks to be performed. The REACCT model is a tool that can provide such structure for the triad. As discussed in detail in [Chapter 3](#), the REACCT model outlines the six tasks that need to be accomplished in every incident. They are:

1. Recognition of the risk in the incident
2. Engaging the actor
3. Assessing the risk of violence as the incident progresses
4. Controlling the actor in ways that do not raise his or her resistance
5. Contracting for a surrender
6. Transferring responsibility for the actor, the victims and the witnesses to the appropriate agencies.

Recognition

1. From the negotiator's perspective, the first question that needs to be answered is: "What kind of incident is this?" The answer will help in the decisions about the strategic goals for the incident and the tactics that are likely to be the most effective in obtaining those goals. For instance, the FBI has recognized the importance of determining if the incident shows evidence of planning or not; is it a planned siege or a spontaneous one? Planned sieges usually last for extended periods of time and require a multiagency response. They need a coordinated intervention, using both SWAT and negotiators. Therefore, they require a fuller implementation of the ICS/NIMS system than spontaneous sieges, which according to FBBI data last an average of 6 hours.
2. A second question important in planning the tactical response is: Is this incident likely to be negotiable? The answer will help determine if the tactical approach will be primarily a negotiated one or a tactical one. If it is likely to be negotiable (using the eight characteristics of a negotiable incident as discussed in [Chapter 3](#)), the negotiators will take the lead. If it is not likely to be negotiable, the negotiators assume the role of support for the tactical team (see [Chapter 3](#)). If the eight characteristics are not in place at the first of the incident, an important question for tactical planning is, can they be gotten in place? Of course, the triad of command can only change the elements of the eight characteristics over which they have control. So, the issue of whether the actor will communicate cannot be assessed early in the incident. This is one argument for making an early contact with the actor, to assess his or her willingness to communicate.
3. A third critical question in recognizing the nature of the incident is: "What is the risk level in this incident?" The initial risk level is determined by the context of the incident and includes elements of the eight characteristics of a negotiable situation and the static risk factors (see [Chapters 3](#) and [5](#)). A high risk level suggests that a tactical response is probably going to be needed and negotiations have goals that support the preparation for an assault, while a low risk level suggests the primary use of the negotiators and coordinated support by the SWAT team. A moderate risk level suggest that both teams need to be involved in a well-planned use of both teams to bring about the surrender of the actor with minimal loss of life.
4. The fourth question for the triad of command in their planning the tactical response to an incident is: Are the people being helped hostages or potential victims? The FBI has pointed out that people who have prior relationships and are being held are more likely to be potential victims and the risk level is higher for these people than those who are true hostages (see discussion in [Chapter 3](#)).
5. Finally, the triad of command needs to deal with the type of person that is holding people and whether they need to be managed differently than the usual actor in a high-risk conflict. Special issues of personality require some adjusting of tactics (see [Chapter 6](#)) and an early determination of the personality of the actor will help refine the negotiating tactics.

Engaging

The triad of command needs to consider how to engage the actor. Will the SWAT team be highly visible or low-profile? Will the negotiators plan to use crisis intervention techniques or power and bargaining skills (see [Chapters 1 and 3](#) for a more in-depth discussion). How much emphasis on authority can the negotiator use when he or she introduces himself or herself? If the actor is nonresponsive, what will the tactics be: persistent use of the negotiators or increased pressure from the SWAT team?

Assessing

Assessment of risk needs to be an ongoing task because the risk level is fluid; it decreases or increases as the incident unfolds and the tactics chosen by the triad of command can influence which way it goes. The initial risk assessment done under recognition of the incident is based on factors that are available in the early stage of the call out. Ongoing risk assessment is based on intelligence gathered during the course of the incident and the reaction of the actor to the tactics of the negotiator. As the triad learns more about the actor, his or her motives, his or her history, his or her current needs, and his or her expectations for the future, the risk level will change. As the triad tries different tactics, they will work as intended and the actor will move closer to the team's goals or they will not work and the actor will move away. The triad needs periodic updates on changes in the risk level as determined by the intelligence resources and the negotiators.

Controlling the actor

Controlling the actor involves dealing with his or her demands and influencing him or her in ways that do not raise resistance to the control. Generally, managing demands involves methods of stalling for time (see [Chapter 3](#)). The triad needs to plan how to build influence without raising resistance because resistance tends to lock the actor in place; it is a sign that he or she is ambivalent about something and is arguing for the side of the ambivalence that minimizes change. The triad needs to be able to recognize when their tactics are meeting resistance and when necessary change the focus to move past the resistance (see [Chapter 3](#)). The use of indirect suggestions and the Reality Principles have been found useful.

Contracting with the actor

The triad needs to work out a surrender plan early in the incident, so negotiators have it on hand when the actor starts considering surrendering. It needs to be tactically sound and acceptable to the SWAT team. In fact, it needs to come from the SWAT team and the negotiators' job is to sell it to the actor. It needs to be presented in as detailed a way as possible to reduce misunderstanding and fear on the part of the actor. It needs to emphasize the importance of a safe plan for everybody, actor as well as police, and it needs to clearly show how the plan benefits both sides.

Transferring

The triad's responsibility does not end with the surrender. If a violation of the law has occurred, records of the incident become evidence and need to be handled as evidence. The case has to be handed over to the follow-up units for investigation. The victims of the crime and the witnesses need to be cared for, as well as the police personnel involved. A debriefing needs to be organized, first to manage the emotions associated with the incident and then to capture and preserve lessons learned in an after-action report (see [Chapter 11](#)). It is our recommendation that the triad take the lead in organizing the debriefings, usually as independent teams and then as the whole crisis management team. The value of the after-action report is that it serves as the basis for policy changes, standard operating procedure (SOP) revisions, and future training. The identification of problems with the operation and the development of solutions can be tested in future training exercises (see later in this chapter for more discussion on training).

[Incident commander](#)

The incident commander (IC) has overall responsibility for managing the entire incident. He or she is responsible for assuring that the incident is managed in keeping with the strategic goals of the department, the standards acceptable to the community, and the relevant laws, not to mention assuring that the procedures (tactics) are in keeping with what are standard procedures in the profession. He or she is the final decision-making authority when SWAT and the negotiators recommend different courses of action.

To facilitate communication, problem solving, and control of an incident, a command post needs to be established. A commander who is not in a specific location is difficult to find, keep updated, and communicate with when a decision is needed. A specific location for the command post can be established as soon as the field/IC arrives at the incident (IC is the common vernacular and is what will be used throughout the rest of this book). The command post should have sufficient room to accommodate the IC, tactical supervisor, negotiation supervisor, other necessary supervisors, intelligence/recorder/communications officer, and public information officer (PIO). The location of the command post should be in close proximity to the negotiators, tactical team, and representatives of other agencies, but not commingled with those other units. This will allow the commander to monitor negotiations without distracting the negotiators, keep updated on intelligence, coordinate tactical issues, resolve disputes between team members, and coordinate with other agencies.

The IC must understand the key negotiation concepts so that he or she can make the best use of resources during an incident. Negotiators need to be aware that not all ICs know the capabilities of their negotiators, nor do they understand the principles on which negotiations are founded. Just as with all other response personnel, ICs need training in commanding crisis incidents and crisis response teams. The negotiator may need to educate the commander on the scene. Noesner (1999) has outlined the following as the important concepts for decision-makers in a crisis incident:

1. The difference between a hostage incident and a nonhostage incident
2. The dynamics of a hostage and a nonhostage incident
3. The strategies that apply to hostage and nonhostage incidents
4. The decision-making criteria
5. The necessity of a team in crises
6. The importance of a unified strategy in crises
7. Indicators that progress is being made
8. Risk factors
9. Tactical role of negotiations
10. What constitutes success?

Usually, the IC is the ranking police officer at the scene of a hostage incident. He or she is responsible for tactical management of the incident. The specific responsibilities of the IC include:

1. Establishing a command post at the scene in an area that is safe from confrontation.
2. Establishing communications with and briefing the chief or the chief's representative.
3. Ensuring the establishment of both inner and outer perimeters.
4. Having a specific radio channel designated as an emergency channel and having all incident personnel use only the designated channel.
5. Ensuring evacuation of any civilians inside the inner perimeter, when possible.
6. Ensuring that only necessary manpower is on the scene.
7. Making decisions and ensuring control and coordination of tactical and negotiating teams.
8. Designating a press representative.
9. Periodically, he or she needs to check on the welfare of his or her officers (NYPD, 1973a, 1973b).

The IC is in overall charge of the operation. He or she is there to ensure that the incident is controlled, that reasonable decisions are made, that departmental policies are followed in regard to critical incident management, and that the chief or chief's representative is informed, when necessary. The IC needs to keep a checklist of relevant questions that might include:

1. Is this an appropriate incident for negotiations, crisis intervention, or a tactical solution?
2. What are the relative risks of the negotiation, crisis intervention, or tactical intervention?
3. Is the plan an integrated plan with clearly defined roles for all operational elements? Does the plan make clear how tactical and negotiators complement each other?
4. Is it negotiable? Are all the elements of a negotiable incident in place? Can they be put into place?
5. Is the situation secured? Have both inner and outer perimeters been established?
6. Have the appropriate personnel been notified?
7. Is the command post set up at a central location?

8. Are communications established between operational elements?
9. Is intelligence flowing?
10. Is the incident criminal, emergency, or mental health in nature?
11. Have the chief and other key city staff people been alerted?
12. As the incident progresses, have officers' needs for food, drinks, and restrooms been considered? Have officers manning posts been relieved periodically?
13. Has the risk changed?
14. Are the tactical and negotiator supervisors keeping me informed?
15. Are the actions we take necessary to save lives?
16. Can we expect the action to be more effective than our other options?
17. Are the actions we are considering acceptable to our profession and our community?

Tactical team commander

As a member of the triad of command, the tactical team commander (SWAT commander) is responsible for advising the IC about the tactical options in an incident. He is responsible for the development of the emergency assault plan, the hostage recovery plan, and the delivery plan. He assures that perimeters are appropriately staffed, designated defensive marksmen (DDMs) are deployed, and the assault team, arrest team, and tactical medics are in place and practiced. He stays in close touch with the IC and his operational teams. Timely intelligence is fed to him by both the tactical team and the negotiating team, because he has to be responsive to the changing tactical situation.

Negotiations team commander

The negotiations team commander advises the IC about the negotiations issues relevant to managing the incident. He brings the unique perspective of the negotiators to the triad of command and must be an effective lobby for the negotiator's position. He needs to assertively present the team's analysis of the incident, the options available for negotiations, and the tactics the team recommends. He must be a manager and a leader (IACP, 1983). His team must respect him while, at the same time, he must have trained the team well enough to function without him. Questions the negotiations team commander needs to ask and be prepared to answer for the IC are:

1. What type of siege is it?
2. Is it negotiable? If not, can we make it negotiable? How?
3. What is the probability of violence?
4. Are the people being held hostages or potential victims?
5. Are all negotiator tasks being done by somebody?
6. Is the proper equipment available?
7. Have the IC and tactical commander been consulted?

8. Is there an overall tactical plan?
9. Has the negotiating area been set up?
10. Is there an effective intelligence gathering operation under way?
11. Has the opening been planned?
12. Are the primary and secondary ready?
13. Are we projecting an attitude of respect, caring and patience?
14. Are we responding to the actor's needs?
15. Are we developing trust and rapport?
16. As the incident progresses, are we keeping the IC informed (NPP prepared)?
17. Are we tracking the risk level for increasing or decreasing risk?
18. Are we reviewing our tactics after each phone call to see if they have accomplished what we wanted?
19. Are we changing tactics as needed?
20. Are we dealing with our own stress-breaks, time outs, deep-breathing exercises?

Communications within the crisis response team

Timely and accurate communication is essential among members of a crisis response team. Intelligence information needs to flow freely from the negotiations team to the IC and tactical team and vice versa. Tactical plans for both the negotiations team and the tactical team must be communicated to the IC for consideration and integration. Decisions by the IC should be quickly communicated to both operational teams. Input from the "think tank" and the mental health consultant (MHC) needs to flow to the IC for consideration. All of this makes it essential that channels of communication are clear, responsibility for communications is designated, and all the key personnel take responsibility for ensuring effective communications.

The principle of redundancy is important in setting up communications at an incident. It is important to have different communications channels available within and among teams. Redundancy maximizes the chances of keeping effective communications flowing during the incident. Having the primary communications mode backed up keeps vital information flowing. In addition to the departmental radio net, hard telephone lines, cellular telephones, and runners can be used.

Principle of Clarity: The importance of clear, understandable, and understood communications within the crisis response team cannot be overemphasized. Members of the crisis response team need to make every effort to reduce or eliminate noise that interferes with communications. For instance, having the tactical team assign a team member to the negotiations area to facilitate the flow of intelligence helps reduce the distortion in communication that results from information being passed along by too many people. The communication between the commander and the negotiation team can be made clear by using a speaker that allows the commander to monitor negotiations. The commander can then ask the negotiator supervisors about the process.

Each method of communication has advantages and disadvantages. The appropriate choice of a communication channel will depend on the communication needs at the moment. The

department's radio net has the advantage of being readily available to department personnel, being staffed by trained personnel, and being familiar to department personnel. However, it has the disadvantages of being easily monitored by the press and having a limited number of available channels. Hard-wired telephones have the advantage of being difficult to monitor. However, equipment has to be bought or found; this requires an extra expense. Citizens will be inconvenienced if their telephones are used. Cellular telephones have the advantage of being mobile. However, they may not work in every location, can be monitored, and have limited battery life when they are not plugged into a reliable power source. Though old-fashioned, runners have the advantage of being unmonitorable. However, disadvantages are that they may distort messages if they do not write them down, they are slower than direct communications, and they require personnel.

In a negotiation incident, there are overlapping patterns of communication. Communication is nothing more than the flow of information back and forth between people who need information. The IC and the team supervisors (negotiation and tactical) are key to effective communications. The IC communicates vertically with higher command. He or she is responsible for information flow up and down the chain of command. Negotiation and tactical supervisors are responsible for the information flow between their respective teams and the command post. In addition, they are responsible for information flow between one another. This redundancy of information flow is essential so that there are no mistakes due to miscommunication.

To facilitate communications, a method the FBI recommends is the Negotiation Position Paper (see [Chapter 3](#)). It is a brief summary of the incident, an assessment of the current situation, and recommendation for how to handle identified problems from the negotiator's point of view. It is short and to the point and can be done frequently during the progression of an incident. It provides critical input in written form so there is less chance of it getting lost in the shuffle.

Establishing the negotiation area

Because the negotiator's job is to solve problems and because excessive stress interferes with problem solving, an appropriate environment is necessary for negotiation. The environment should be designed to meet the negotiators' needs for safety and security, freedom from distractions and criticism, and control of their environment. The location should be based on the principles of separation and isolation. That is, the negotiators' area should be separate from activities at the scene that do not contribute to the performance of their job and it should have the capability of locking out all distractions during the actual negotiations.

The location should be between the outer and inner perimeters of the operation. However, it should be out of the line of fire, so negotiators do not have to worry about their physical safety while they are trying to concentrate on the problem. It should be separate from, but close to, the commander and the command post, so the negotiator supervisor and the IC can monitor the negotiations, coordinate with other departmental units, and coordinate with resources outside the department. It should allow the primary negotiator, secondary negotiator, and the MHC to be isolated during the actual time the hostage taker and the

primary negotiator are talking. At the same time, it should allow other team members to monitor communications. It should be close to the holding area for witnesses, victims, and released hostages, so intelligence can be gathered with an economy of effort. It should also be close to the think tank, so the necessary expertise and ideas can be communicated efficiently.

The negotiating team

One thing that distinguishes experienced negotiators from street officers is their ability to work as a team (McMains, 1992). They recognize that the successful resolution of a crisis incident requires the efforts of many people. Instead of working alone, they develop the ability to work with others, communicate with others, and solve problems with others (IACP, 1983). They learn to work as a team.

Teamwork requires several skills that must be developed systematically (IACP, 1983). They include members knowing their own role well and having a working knowledge of other team members' roles. They must be able to fill in for missing members, so that all the necessary jobs are done. They must recognize the importance of each role. Even though one role may receive more attention, each member of the team must recognize that all roles are essential to success.

Teamwork requires a joint problem-solving approach. It recognizes that in unfamiliar situations, the more people that are working on a problem, the better the solution. It recognizes the value of each individual, but it also understands that brainstorming by many generates more ideas than the efforts of a few. If it is true that two brains are better than one, it is even truer that four or five brains are better than one. There are no superstars.

However, teams do need leadership, especially in a crisis situation (IACP, 1983). One person has to take charge—not to exercise arbitrary power, but to be sure that the necessary expertise is brought to bear on the problem. The leader has oversight responsibility. He or she brings people together, assigns roles and responsibilities, and facilitates problem solving and communication.

Noesner's emphasis on a synchronized response in crises assumes that the crisis management team is well developed and functional. It assumes that elements of the team have worked, trained, and studied together enough to know each other's strengths and weaknesses. It assumes that good teamwork does not just happen—it is developed. The following are some guidelines for developing a working team (McMains, 1995; Katzenbach & Smith, 1993):

1. Limit the size of the team;
2. Select people for the skills they bring to the job;
3. Be sure all members of the team have a clear idea of the goals and are committed to them; and
4. Hold each other accountable.



PHOTO 2.1 Selection of negotiators is second in importance only to training of negotiators. It is critical that negotiators not only know their specific role and duties at any incident, but that they know all team roles and duties. Every negotiator on a team must know every team role

(Photo by W. Mullins)

Katzenbach and Smith (1993) point out the importance of eight steps in building an effective team:

1. Establish urgency and direction;
2. Select members for their skills and their potential for developing skills—not for their personality;
3. Carefully construct the first team meeting;
4. Set clear rules for behavior;
5. Set and pursue a few immediately productive tasks;
6. Challenge the group regularly with fresh facts and goals;
7. Spend lots of time together;
8. Use the power of positive feedback, recognition, and reward.

The incident at Talladega provided an example of how diverse groups can come together as an effective team in a short period. The problem was how to bring both Federal Bureau of Investigation and Bureau of Prisons (BOP) negotiators together as a working team. They used a number of the principles listed above. Initially, both groups worked toward stabilizing the riot situation. The goal was clear. A counselor from BOP who had credibility and the respect of the inmates made initial contact. Three teams of negotiators, with a combination of FBI and BOP negotiators, were established, allowing a mix of experienced negotiators and prison expertise on each team. The teams were selected to complement each other. There were four coordinators—two from each agency—who resolved conflicts between team members, developed strategies, and supervised the teams in 12-hour shifts. If there were disagreements in strategy suggestions, the rules were that the commander had the final decision after hearing the suggestions from all coordinators. Each team spent eight hours a day together. At the end of each shift, they briefed the oncoming team. Additionally, they got to know each other's assets and liabilities quickly, so that by the fourth day, they were working together smoothly. Each shift was brought up-to-date through these briefings and through written situation

reports that were generated periodically during the incident. These techniques kept everyone apprised of events and developments in the incident, as well as keeping the team “challenged with new facts.” During the incident, the primary role was taken over by the FBI because the Talladega staff found it difficult to negotiate and talk with hostages who were friends and co-workers. The BOP staff served in a liaison role, orienting new negotiators to the facility, providing key information about subjects, and locating resources for other negotiators. This was another flexible use of the complementary skills that the combined team brought to bear on the incident.

Teamwork can be developed through experience or training. Teams that have worked together over a period of time and in many different incidents learn each other’s strengths and weakness and roles. They learn to communicate and solve problems together and to compensate for one another’s weaknesses. The problem with leaving the development of teamwork to experience is that sometimes teams do not work together often enough to learn these things. When an incident actually occurs, they tend to make mistakes because of their lack of knowledge of one another.

Training is the best method for developing teamwork. By having regular training sessions that require team members to work together, team functioning can be assessed and specific team-building skills can be taught. Assessment of team functioning evaluates to what degree the team shares a common vision of what they are doing, what their communications patterns are, what both individual and team motivation is for the job, the team’s ability to solve problems, the team’s morale, and their ability to learn from experience. Training can include both negotiator skill training and team-building exercises. The former is the type of material found in this book. The latter is the type of material taught in organizational development programs and is one of the areas with which the team’s MHC can help between incidents.

Teams must work in close proximity for long periods under high stress. It is critical that team members be carefully selected, train together, and engage in team-building skills.

The negotiating team can range in number from three to five people. The FBI (1993) recommended that a negotiating team have at least two people. Mullins (2008) argued two was not enough to be effective, a sentiment echoed by others. By common practice, we know of no negotiation team that operates with fewer than three people (and then only a couple with this few—most teams have a minimum of five people). A team solves problems better than an individual and team members provide support for one another. A negotiation team must:

1. Gather intelligence about the incident, the hostage taker, the hostages, etc.
2. Develop tactics that will defuse the incident, influence the hostage taker, and reduce the risk of loss of life.
3. Establish communication with the hostage taker.
4. Record relevant intelligence information.
5. Keep a record of the negotiations, including demands and promises.
6. Maintain equipment.
7. Coordinate and communicate with IC and tactical team.

Team members must understand and be able to function in multiple roles. Manpower availability may make it impossible for a department to maintain a five-person team. The different stages of an incident will require an emphasis on different roles at different times.

During the early part of the crisis stage, the initial emphasis is on intelligence gathering. All team members will function as intelligence officers, with the team leader coordinating activities. As soon as a strategy is developed and communications with the hostage taker are necessary, the team will be divided into their roles as primary negotiator, secondary negotiator, etc. Team members need to be flexible, not becoming too focused on one set of skills to the exclusion of others.

FBI guidelines (McMains, 1991) suggest the following organization of a negotiating team:

The *negotiator supervisor* (or team leader) is responsible for the overall functioning of the negotiating team. In addition to supervisory skills, the supervisor must have leadership ability (IACP, 1983). Team members must look up to and respect this supervisor. However, the negotiator supervisor is obligated to have trained them well enough that they can function without him or her. He or she needs to be sure that the incident is negotiable, appropriate personnel are available, intelligence is gathered in a timely way, communications can be established, a negotiations strategy is worked out, an appropriate record of the negotiations is kept, and that the commander is kept informed.

The *primary negotiator* is the direct communication link to the hostage taker and is responsible for developing verbal tactics, monitoring and assessing the hostage taker's level of emotional arousal, and helping the hostage taker engage in problem-solving. The primary has to be able to manage stress and remain calm when talking with someone who has possibly committed horrendous acts. How many police officers have the ability to lock away their emotions and talk with someone who has sexually molested a baby? The primary must be able to remain calm, cool and collected in the most stressful environments. One key attribute of a primary negotiator is that they must be able to control their emotions and voice. The primary may be on an emotional roller coaster, but their tone of voice and inflection must be controlled and calming.

It can be argued that the most important role on the negotiation team is the *secondary negotiator* or *coach*. The secondary is the pipeline between the negotiation team and primary, helps develop verbal tactics, and provides moral support for the primary. The secondary is the planner who develops communication strategies and tactics for the primary, plans for the direction negotiations should take, relays communication suggestions, and is responsible for blocking distractions for the primary negotiator. One criterion for a good secondary negotiator is the ability to multitask, for the secondary will routinely do several tasks (mental and physical) at once.

The *intelligence officer* is responsible for gathering intelligence from various (human and nonhuman) sources, interviewing all relevant persons involved in the incident (family, friends, victims, observers, released hostages, etc.), collating and disseminating that information, maintaining and updating status boards, and making sure all response units are receiving accurate and timely intelligence. With larger teams, several people may be assigned to the intelligence-gathering function. In these cases, one person should be placed in charge of this effort and all team members report to that person. Without this "clearinghouse" function, intelligence gets lost, garbled, inaccurate, and status boards do not get updated properly.

The *mental health consultant* (MHC) is responsible for evaluating the personality of the hostage taker, recommending negotiating strategies, monitoring team stress, monitoring stress among the hostage takers and hostages, and consulting with command. The MHC can be a

psychologist, psychiatrist, or social worker trained and experienced in crisis intervention, conflict resolution, and negotiation principles (Fuselier, 1986; FBI, 1993). The MHC has several areas of value (McMains, 1991): (1) expertise in human behavior to evaluate the personality type of the hostage taker for making risk assessments; (2) help reduce exposure to liability by adding to the agency's resources in trying to peacefully resolve the incident; (3) enhance the agency's public image by adding resources to a peaceful resolution; (4) monitor stress levels among all participants and improve decision-making; (5) provide counseling to victims; and (6) suggest communication skills and techniques (McMains, 1988a). MHCs have been part of crisis response teams since their inception and have increased in use over the intervening years (Schlossberg, 1979; Fuselier, 1988; McMains, 1988b; Butler et al., 1993).

Hatcher et al. (1998) suggested that MHCs could be used as primary negotiators or primary controllers of an incident (in addition to their being either a consultant/advisor or an integrated team member). We do not think MHCs should fill either of those roles. As stated previously, each member of a team brings unique strengths to a situation. The strength of the MHC is to assess human behavior, stress levels, communication strategies, and techniques.

As the team grows in size, several other assignments can be given to team members. One job is *recorder*, the person who maintains a log of negotiations. The recorder is responsible for maintaining an incident log, producing a physical record of that log, and interfacing with team leaders and supervisors to provide critical summaries of negotiations. If the situation becomes protracted and teams have to switch out, the recorder makes the log and summaries of the log available to incoming teams. The log should contain the time of each communication, a summary of what was said by the negotiator and hostage taker/hostage (by name if more than one person involved), any demands, "hot" or "cool" buttons (statements or words that elevate or lower emotions), and emotional state of the hostage taker. Any other relevant information should also be recorded.

A team member can be designated an *equipment officer*. This person should be someone who understands technical information regarding radios, computers, the phone system, mechanical systems, etc. and can make minor repairs. The equipment officer is responsible for maintaining equipment on a routine basis and making sure all necessary small parts for emergency repair are on hand (i.e., wire, fuses, batteries, tape, etc.). Additionally, the equipment officer makes sure that the team has plenty of paper, pens, markers, and other sundry items used during an incident.

The recorder, equipment officer, and even in some cases the intelligence officer, do not have to be members of the negotiating team. The authors know of many teams that assign these functions to nonnegotiators who are part of the response effort. If personnel doing these jobs are not part of the negotiating team, they need to at least be trained in negotiations and the negotiation process, and take part in team training prior to being utilized during an incident.

[Selection of negotiators](#)

One important issue for crisis negotiation teams is that of replacing members who leave the team. In the past, many teams simply asked for volunteers and accepted anyone who volunteered. As teams have grown and the demands on them have increased, skills have become more sophisticated, and more knowledge is required, it is imperative that teams

establish a set of criteria and a selection process that will allow them to select the best-qualified applicants from the volunteer pool. Teams can use the guidelines presented here as a template to assist them in developing a selection process.

For agencies that want to begin a team, the same guidelines can be used, but they need to first conduct some background research and answer some basic questions about their future team. The agency first needs to review local data to determine what the community needs may be for negotiators and what type of incidents they will respond to. The agency should review past dispatch records, EMS records, fire department calls, survey hospital emergency rooms, and talk to local women's shelters to determine the types of incidents negotiators will address. The type of person selected for the team, the training for the team, the mission of the team, policies and procedures guiding team call-outs and actions, and even the team name and identity will be established by this review of data. For example, if the majority of incidents in the community are related to domestic incidents, it does not make much sense to select negotiators for their ability to deal with hardened criminals, nor call the team a hostage negotiation team. They will be dealing with people who have elevated stress levels and are in severe crises. Negotiators should have excellent communication and listening skills, patience, and think of and perceive themselves as crisis negotiators.

Next, for the newly formed team, specific roles should be identified and filled. What do people do? Is intelligence gathering a primary and critical function for the team? What amount of equipment will be available to the team and how will it be maintained and repaired? It may be that the team needs one individual who will do nothing but make, obtain, maintain, and repair equipment. In addition to the generally accepted roles of team leader, primary negotiator, secondary negotiator, mental health consultant, intelligence officer, and scribe/historian, there may be special needs that have to be filled.

In terms of number of personnel needed, a survey by Mullins (2003) found that most law enforcement negotiator teams numbered between six and ten people, with some as small as three people, and some as large as 20 people. Prison and correctional teams averaged 16 to 26 people. Their teams were larger because they needed to prepare for siege situations with personnel rotations.

Finally, a decision should be made as to whether negotiators will be selected to perform a specific function (i.e., only as a secondary negotiator, for example) or a generalist who can perform all team functions. In terms of specialized duties, some of the advantages include: (1) training—members train for only one function and can spend more time in the specific training for their role on the team; (2) expertise—team members can become more proficient in their area of expertise because that is all they do; (3) practice—at all scenario and role-play training, team members practice only their job and no other; (4) stress management issues—team members on a call-out will be under less stress than a generalist because they will know going in what their role, job, and function will be. Some of the disadvantages of the team specialist model include: (1) time of calls—all team members have to be on constant call-out status. If the team is small, what happens if the secondary negotiator is on vacation? (2) Personnel required—the team will have to be much larger in size due to personnel being away and not on call-out status; (3) lack of team cohesiveness—team members train and operate only in their specialized job and do not interact with other team members to build team skills. Negotiation efforts are a team effort and specialization of negotiators reduces team building

and unity.

Having negotiators who perform generalized duties also has advantages, most of which are the opposite of the specific duty model. Some advantages of the general model include: (1) time of calls—team members can perform all functions, so members not being available for calls presents less of a problem than the specialized model; (2) personnel required—fewer negotiators are needed as team members can “plug in” and fill the gaps; (3) knowledge of team functions—team members can build a knowledge and ability base for all functions on the team and know what everyone is supposed to do. If a team member is not doing what they should be doing, that can be addressed. Some disadvantages of the generalist model include: (1) lack of expertise—team members do not learn any one job as well as a specialist would; (2) stress management issues—team members responding to an incident do not know until they arrive what they will be doing, which raises individual stress.

Given this discussion, we believe negotiators should follow the generalist model. The disadvantages are not serious and limiting, and the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages of the specialist model. All negotiators should be able to perform all functions on the team (with the exception of the mental health consultant), including being able to fill in as team leader if needed.

[Selection model for negotiators](#)

Below is a proposed sequence of steps that agencies can use to select negotiators. Many departments use this sequence, some using it as outlined below, and others modifying it to fit their agency's needs.

First, negotiators should be volunteers. Making negotiations a mandatory duty assignment is neither recommended nor advised. Because of the job requirements, training requirements, and crisis response duties, team members have to be highly motivated and self-starting. One debate concerns whether persons of rank (i.e., sergeants, lieutenants, deputy wardens, etc.) should be allowed on the team. It has been our experience (and recommendation) that rank should not matter. The negotiator will not introduce him/herself as “Sergeant Mullins.” They should have the ability to accept and follow orders from someone lower in rank than themselves. Team leaders are selected by experience and ability, not by rank, and many teams are led by non-ranking persons. Volunteers should not have any other special assignments. They should not be on SWAT, special investigative task forces, etc. The time demands for negotiators are high and flexible. Other duties will likely interfere with both training and call-outs. Experience in the agency should be a requirement. Most agencies require two to five years of experience before allowing personnel to join the negotiating team. The Federal Bureau of Prisons requires one year of experience in their agency (Mullins, 2000). Finally, volunteers can be selected to fill special needs on the team. If the team needs a Spanish speaker, or a female, or another specialized skill, they can ask for and fill the position with people who have that skill.

One suggested announcement for a team vacancy might be: “The ____ Police Department is seeking interested officers to serve on the Crisis Negotiation Team. Officers should have at least 3 years' experience in policing, good communication skills, a willingness to attend a minimum of 80 hours of training per year, have no other special assignments, and be willing

to be on 24-hour call for two weeks at a time. Volunteers should also submit a letter from their supervisor recommending them for the team.”

The announcement tells officers what the requirements are and, just as important, what the requirements for training and call-outs are. Also, a letter from the officer’s supervisor gives the supervisor’s approval for the individual being selected, assigned, and called away from regular duties for training and call-outs.

As part of the application, all interested applications should complete an interest sheet or application that asks for biographical data, work data (including complaints, grievances, suspensions, etc.), a statement as to why they are interested in the position, and other supporting documents. The interest sheet and written statement is an indicator of their communication ability.

Second, there should be a structured interview with the team leader. A structured interview means each applicant is asked the same questions, and that the answers are numerically scored and tallied. Areas to explore might include the applicant’s willingness to work unusual hours, be on call, acceptance of position responsibilities, perspective of the applicant on teamwork, being in the “background” or lack of public recognition, and communication ability.

Scoring anchors can be provided for this interview. For example, if one of the questions is “How well do you communicate with other people?” scoring anchors might be: (Score of 5 – highest score)—“excellent communicator, proper use of English, no hesitation, no stuttering, ideas and thoughts clearly conveyed”; (score of 4)—“mostly uses proper English, very little hesitation, ideas and thoughts expressed very well”; (score of 3)—“average use of proper English, some hesitation, some ideas unclear, some stuttering”; (score of 2)—“ideas difficult to follow, often changed directions during a sentence or thought, poor use of English”; and (score of 1)—“no clear ideas, no proper use of English, could not understand, mumbled, did not speak to me.” Anchors such as these for each question will help ensure that all applicants are assessed on the same criteria and that the potential for bias is reduced.

Third, a negotiator team interview should be conducted in which team members have the opportunity to interview and assess applicants. Although some teams use or include negotiators from other agencies to remove bias (Mullins, 2001), we believe team members should conduct these interviews. They are the ones who will have to work with the applicant. Negotiators will work hard to select the most qualified individual. Like the team leader interview, the team interview should be structured and scoring anchors should be provided.

The team interview should assess dimensions such as communication skills, adaptability, ability to think on one’s feet, temperament, ability to cope with a variety of situations, team skills, reactions to crisis or unclear situations, ability to handle stress, ability to take orders, and fit with team. Some questions that may be asked include:

1. Define communications.
2. Identify your strengths and weaknesses.
3. What does the word “empathy” mean to you?
4. Tell us what your concept of “team player” means. What could you bring to the team?
5. How does crisis negotiations fit in your philosophy of law enforcement? As a police officer, what does the term “do no harm” mean to you?

6. Without using any names, think of the person you least like to work with (for whatever reason) and tell us what strategies you have used to work with that person?
7. How reliable is your first impression of people? Do you often rely on that first impression? Why or why not?

Fourth, applicants should be put through a short telephone scenario. This scenario should last about 5 to 15 minutes, be scripted and standardized for all applicants, and be scored by team members. One way to conduct the scenario is to complete it at the end of the team interview, using a team member as the actor. The scenario should be realistic and simple. The most commonly used scenarios involve a barricaded subject, domestic situation, depressed/suicidal individual, or an antisocial personality (Mullins, 2000). The scenario should assess the applicant's communication skills, listening skills (communication skills and listening skills are the most critical skills to assess during the scenario), ability to adjust to changes, ability to think/talk on their feet, ability to gather intelligence information, temperament, ability to empathize, ability to handle stress, and demeanor. Regini (2002) says negotiators have to be able to maintain their voice control and have good self-control. The Tacoma Police Department includes active listening skills (ALS) and establishing rapport (Griswold, 2005). Remember; do not expect applicants to have the same level of skill and ability as a trained negotiator. One thing the scenario is trying to assess is the applicant's ability to learn the skills and abilities necessary to be a negotiator.

One potential exercise may be a barricaded subject who is threatening to commit suicide. The subject's wife left and took their two young daughters. The suspect's drinking and gambling problems led to the wife leaving. He has never beaten the children, although on occasion he has hit his wife (although not hard enough to bruise her or do physical damage). In addition to this telephone exercise, teams may conduct a "face-to-face" or "voice-to-voice" scenario.

Some departments require a physical fitness/agility test (Hogewood, 2005). The test assesses upper body strength and stamina. Teams must sometimes carry heavy equipment or travel on foot to remote locations. Members must be able to work long periods without rest or breaks. Physical fitness/agility tests measure applicant's abilities to meet the physical demands of the job.

Some departments employ a psychological evaluation for applicants. Applicants are typically evaluated on their ability to deal with stress, anger management, stability of personality, ability to take orders and not be in charge, ability to solve problems creatively, and frustration tolerance. In a review of psychological evaluations, Logan (2004) reported that applicants are also assessed on knowledge and skill in communications, dealing with general public, verbal fluency, good self-image, reasoning ability, sensitivity to others, general characteristics (maturity, mental agility, intelligence), dependability, reliability, level of arousal, sense of morality, emphasis on cooperation versus manipulation, social withdrawal, and resourcefulness. We do not believe it is necessary to conduct a psychological evaluation for negotiator applicants (or team members). While it may be beneficial and necessary for tactical team members, the job negotiators perform does not lend itself to a prior psychological evaluation. In addition, in police departments, officers are given psychological evaluations when hired. Another evaluation is not necessary.

Team training issues

Most states require negotiators to receive some initial level of training, and even where not required, the “accepted practice” in the field is that negotiators receive training and demonstrate some level of proficiency before being allowed to negotiate. The National Council of Negotiation Associations (NCNA), a collaborative organization established by the FBI, has suggested guidelines for negotiators that propose 40 hours of basic training. Most negotiators have, at a minimum, attended a 40-to 80-hour entry-level course in crisis negotiations. There are numerous negotiator courses offered that satisfy the need for providing initial negotiator training. The FBI offers an 80-hour course, most state and regional associations offer courses of varying lengths, institutions and experienced negotiators offer courses, and some police academies offer courses. One area of concern is with ongoing training. What do negotiators do after the entry-level course is completed (the authors do not like the terms “basic” and “advanced” training for various reasons, so we try to avoid those terms whenever possible—the learning for negotiators is an ongoing, dynamic process, and even highly experienced negotiators can benefit from “refresher” training over topics covered in an entry-level course)? The learning of negotiations is not static. One introductory negotiation course does not prepare a negotiator for life. That course must be supplemented with ongoing training for the length of a negotiator’s tenure.

Some states require negotiators to engage in ongoing training every year. Texas, for example, requires that negotiators receive 40 hours per year of training to still be considered active in the field. Other states have differing requirements. Regardless of whether a state requires it, negotiators must continue to train, learn, refine their skills, and add to their knowledge, skill, and ability arsenal (Logan, 2004). There are various ways negotiators can continue to train and hone their skills; many can be done with their team at the local agency level.

Before discussing specific types of training for negotiators, it is important to recognize that there are some general learning principles that need to be adhered to in any learning or training environment, and some general principles that should guide negotiator training. First, training should be spread throughout the year. If the goal is to get every team member 40 hours of training per year, do not “bunch” it all into one training session. Spread the training throughout the year so team members have time to digest and integrate the training. Different agencies have different training demands (budget, workload, etc.). It is advisable that negotiators train once per month for eight hours (or one day). Second, consider individual differences in ability. Some people learn faster than other people. Make sure the training takes these differences into account and is paced so the slowest learner learns and the fastest learners do not become bored and uninterested. Third, all training should be realistic. Keep training exercises in the context of negotiations. For example, one popular training topic for negotiators concerns illegal drugs and their effects on behavior, emotions, cognitions, thought, etc. If an outside trainer is brought in to teach this topic, make sure their teaching is put in the context of negotiations and how a hostage taker or barricaded subject would be affected, how negotiators could recognize the drug the suspect may be taking, how to talk with that suspect, what the suspect may say or do, etc. Do not get a generalized lecture about drugs and their effects, or how drugs affect a person in a controlled environment (such as a hospital, clinic,

rehab program, etc.). Fourth, all training should be specific. Train for what you will be negotiating. While it is exciting and interesting to conduct a scenario with terrorists taking an airplane hostage with 100 passengers, the reality is that this scenario will likely never occur in the United States (the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior, and there has never been an incident of this type in the U.S.). What negotiators will have to deal with are ex-spouses taking their children hostage and using those children as bargaining chips; they will deal with normal people having a significant event disrupt their lives and threatening suicide; they will have to deal with a mentally disturbed person climbing a radio tower and threatening to jump; they will have to deal with an inmate who is fed up with being abused by other inmates and taking a correctional officer hostage and demanding to be relocated to another facility; they will have to deal with a petty criminal needing money and deciding to up the ante and engage in armed robbery at a bank. These are the incidents that should be trained for. Fifth, joint exercises with the tactical team should be conducted at least once per year and an exercise with the full response elements (command, patrol, investigators, EMS, fire, utilities, media, etc.) once every two years. Practice operating with the tactical unit and other response elements, so everyone learns the capabilities and limitations of the other. Little else is as frustrating at an actual incident as expecting one of the response elements to do something they are not able to do. These joint exercises develop realistic expectations and reduce problems later.

Types of training

External training

Of the various types of training negotiators can engage in, one of the most expensive is external training, or sending team members to a negotiator conference or school. This type of training costs the most, takes officers away for their duties for an extended period (very few external schools last only one day, but there are a few), and may separate the team (that is, only one member may be able to attend a school rather than the entire team). Even with all its associated difficulties, negotiation team members should attend one external training session per year. Team members can develop new contacts and establish working relationships with other negotiators that may be valuable in the future. For example, in [Chapter 1](#) the Lewis Prison incident was described. Negotiators from 10 different agencies and locations were involved in that incident. When they arrived, most knew each other from training that they had attended together. Little time was lost in introductory activities. Negotiators fell right into their team roles and had instantaneous working relationships with other negotiators.

Meeting with, interacting with, and watching other negotiators provide a different perspective on negotiations and the negotiation process. At the Hostage Negotiator Competition at Texas State University, one of the most valuable learning experiences is the opportunity to watch other teams work and observe their techniques, use of equipment, use of situation boards, etc. Almost all attendees have remarked at one time or other that being able to watch other teams operate is one of the primary benefits. This interaction is facilitated by

requiring that all teams have an “open-door” policy and allow others to watch their operations.

Going to external training can give team members reinforcement that what they are doing is correct and is done by other negotiators. Interacting with and watching other negotiators can reaffirm a team’s own practices, or in the worst-case scenario, illustrate what they might be doing wrong.

Finally, external training will help meet and fulfill any training requirements an agency has. Conferences and schools offer law enforcement credit for attendees through their state accreditation agency. Even out-of-state attendees can transfer credit to their state agency. For many departments, external training is the only training negotiators receive.

Internal training

Role-Play Training. One of the most widely used types of internal training, and one of the most valuable, is role-play training. Role play training, when conducted correctly, replicates the types of situations officers will face as negotiators and allows them to prepare for those situations in a controlled, risk-free environment. Role-play exercises can be face-to-face, such as a person threatening to jump from a bridge; or voice-to-voice, such as talking with a person from outside an open window, over a bullhorn or other voice amplification system, or over a telephone.

When done correctly, there is no better situational training negotiators can receive. If done incorrectly, there is no worse training. There are some guidelines to follow and pitfalls to avoid when planning and conducting role-play training (Null, 2001; Mullins, 2003; Burrows, 2004). Prior to anything else, a goal has to be established for the training. What knowledge, skills, or abilities should the training teach? If the focus is to be on crisis intervention skills, the role-play exercise should be developed to concentrate on active listening. If the goal is personality profiling, the actors should be trained to display certain behavioral characteristics, show certain emotions, say certain things, etc. The actors have to “be in role” for a specific mental disorder. But, prior to getting to that point, it is critical to clearly define the goals of the exercise. If that is not done, the training will have no value to negotiators and may, in fact, teach the wrong lessons.

Like a movie or book, role-play exercises have to be written and scripted (Maher, 2004). Goals, a plot, characters, setting, a time period, and motivations have to be written. Imagine what watching a movie would be like if the scenes randomly skipped around, or if the personality of the characters changed in every scene, or if the background scenery did not match the action. Not only would it not be an enjoyable movie, it would be disconcerting to watch. Role-play training that is not planned and scripted is like that movie. But instead of being disconcerting, it can actually teach the wrong lessons and do more harm than good. One good source of role-play exercises is to adapt actual incidents to a training scenario (Regini, 2002).

Once the goals are established, characters in the exercise have to be developed. What is the subject doing, why is he or she doing it, what is his or her motivation, what does the subject hope to gain by engaging in this behavior, what does the subject ultimately want, and what does the subject *not* do are all issues that have to be scripted into the exercise. Hostage takers,

barricaded subjects, and others in crisis, all respond in somewhat predictable ways. A paranoid schizophrenic will not ask for large sums of money, nor will a long-term methamphetamine addict speak perfect English. Hostages will not generally think rationally and calmly when faced with a threat to life. Characters in the role-play exercise have to be planned out and their actions, communications, and emotions defined according to their personality and behavioral tendencies. Intelligence sources have to be developed for the characters. Who are the family, friends, co-workers, and neighbors of the characters in the exercise and what information can each provide? A co-worker will not usually be able to speak in depth about the relationship a father has with his children, nor will a spouse be able to address how their mate interacts with coworkers. If those issues are relevant to the exercise, those intelligence sources have to be developed. Backgrounds for the characters have to be formulated. What is the context of the exercise incident? Is it at home, work, business, school? Because people are being asked to use their imaginations (actors and negotiators), the environment and location of the exercise have to be developed.

The role-play exercise has to follow a timeline. There has to be an introduction of characters, plot line, action sequence, and emotions. The script has to follow this timeline. As in real negotiated and crisis situations, emotions follow a predictable path. Subjects go through the Crisis Stage, Accommodation Stage, and Resolution Stage. The script for the role-play exercise has to follow these stages. During each stage, the actors have to act and react in certain ways. That does not mean the script has to be so tight that there is no leeway for the actors to respond to the negotiators. They have to have some flexibility. But that flexibility begins with a predictable script. Demands are made at certain time during a crisis incident and demands change based on the dynamics of the situation. The role-play exercise has to have the same demand sequence. Subjects do not begin by asking for food and cigarettes and work their way up to large sums of money and transportation out of the country. The developed script should include a timeline. Script the times when actors should be doing certain things. For example, if negotiators arrive one hour into the incident, by hour two, the actors should be moving from the Crisis Stage to the Accommodation Stage. At hour six, the subject should be getting hungry and asking for food.

If it is one of the goals of training, the environment can be written into the role-play exercise. Security access, communication problems, health hazards, the physical layout, and innocent bystanders getting involved can all be written into the exercise. For example, the negotiators could be made to negotiate the subject into a certain location so a phone could be delivered or the tactical team could deliver a phone. Negotiators could be made to negotiate the subject away from a hostage, or the subject could rearrange some furniture to assist a potential assault. Cold, heat, rain, sleet, etc. could all be part of the exercise if they are part of the goals of training.

After goals are identified and a script is prepared, actors should be trained. It is advised that whenever possible, actors not be other officers. There are several problems associated with using other officers (or co-workers). The main problem is that the negotiators know them and will recognize them, which reduces the value of the training. One problem we have experienced in hosting the Hostage Negotiator Competition for the past 16 years is that law enforcement officers, for the most part, all fall into an antisocial personality. Regardless of the script and personality of the subject, the officers rapidly become antisocial personalities and

engage in yelling, screaming, and shouting matches with negotiators. We even had one exercise in which the hostage taker was a retired police chief with a terminal illness. Minutes into the exercise, actors were acting like long-term criminals. These situations will not provide the training for negotiators. Actors can be obtained from local high school drama departments, businesses (for example, if using a bank, train the bank employees to be the actors), or local community theater groups. For the most part, these people will readily volunteer and welcome the opportunity to hone their acting skills.

We have also experienced actors thinking that they knew more about negotiations than the negotiators and not following the prepared script. For this reason (and those listed above), it is recommended that “controllers” be used. These are people who have developed the script and work directly with the actors to stay true to the script. They can help the actors stay true to their personality type, stay emotionally on track, and make sure the goals of training are met. They can also assist the actors when needed and suggest responses to queries or actions by the negotiators and provide suggestions on communications. Trained and experienced negotiators should be used as these controllers. Slatkin (2001) suggested that in many cases, role-play exercises do not allow for skill practice, that they lose focus as actors begin distorting their character or become overzealous, among other things. He suggests that only a cross-section scenario be utilized so training can “focus on process and technique rather than strategy and resolution.” We disagree. It has been our experience in 16 years of hosting the Negotiator Competition/Seminar at Texas State University-San Marcos that role players can stay focused and in character, that actors do not become competitive and frustrate the negotiator, that actors do not become caricatures and develop unrealistic expectations, and that full-scale scenarios should focus on strategy and outcome. The use of controllers helps give actors direction and guidance when needed, for accurate response to negotiator queries and communications.

Role-play exercises are training. It does not do any good to put your most experienced negotiator in the primary seat or your investigator in the role of intelligence gatherer. Use the exercise for training. Put the new team member on the telephone, the least experienced as intelligence gatherer, and the worst typist as recorder. Even take the team leader out of role and make someone else the team leader. Through the course of the exercise, rotate personnel. Swap the primary negotiator, recorder, intelligence gatherer, etc. Make people pick up where their successor left off. During the exercise, stop and debrief what has been happening. Evaluate the performance of the team and then continue the exercise. Make sure that the team debriefs at the end of the exercise. Include the actors in this final debriefing. For the evaluations, make sure to evaluate the goals covered. If the focus of the exercise is on active listening skills, draft an evaluation sheet for the active listening skills and evaluate according to those skills. If necessary, model the correct behaviors. Demonstrate the correct behavior or technique and then allow the team member to practice following the modeling. It is also worth taping (video or audio) the exercise so team members can observe themselves and conduct a self-evaluation (Van Hasselt & Romano, 2004).

One critical aspect of role-play training that must be of paramount concern is *safety*! (Richman, 2008). The facility used should be inspected for safety (actors, negotiators, tactical, and other personnel). Electricity should be inspected for fire hazards, loose items such as bricks, boards, tree limbs, etc., should be secured and moved, hazards in the building (such as

chemicals) should be removed, and glass should be removed whenever possible. Firearms should not be allowed into the exercise unless they are integral to the problem. If firearms are allowed inside the outer perimeter, there should be one officer assigned to check every weapon, make sure it is empty, and mark the weapon in a highly visible manner. All ammunition should be left outside the perimeter. Then, if a weapon is seen without the visible marking, an immediate time-out should be called until the weapon is cleared from the scene. Actors should use toy weapons. If Simunitions are used, one person should be responsible for distributing the ammunition, should check to make sure each participant has only a Simunition weapon and not any real weapons, and no participant has any live ammunition. Neighbors, media, and others must be notified of the training exercise and be kept away. Finally, each exercise should have a designated safety officer to monitor the exercise and participants. A code word should be identified that can be used to immediately stop the exercise. If any hazard arises, violation occurs, or other problem arises, the code word can be given and all participants immediately cease any activity.

Fishbowl Exercise. The fishbowl exercise is a team exercise designed to build active listening skills and improve communications within the team (Burrows, 2004). In the fishbowl exercise, team members are seated in a small circle, facing each other. Two team members are selected at random, one to be the subject, the other to be the negotiator. They are seated back-to-back in the center of the circle. The subject role player is given a short scenario (prewritten and designed to achieve active listening goals) that deals with a crisis situation. The best types of scenarios to use are high-risk suicides and domestic situations, although any hostage taking or crisis situation will work. When cued, the subject says, “Hello” (assume the phone has just been answered). In talking to the subject, the negotiator is to use only active listening skills. If the negotiator gets into problem-solving, the team leader is to identify that and redirect the negotiator to stick with active listening. As the exercise progresses, the other team members are to write down every active listening skill demonstrated: what skill was demonstrated, what was said, what the statement was in response to, and any other active listening skills that could have been used. After about 5 to 10 minutes, the exercise is stopped.

At the conclusion, the team reviews what was said, what could have been used instead, any other active listening skills that could have been used, and how to keep using active listening skills and not problem-solving skills. To facilitate recognition of active listening skills, instead of letting team members free associate, an evaluation sheet can be provided to each team member that lists the active listening skills—team members fill in the blanks. During the critique, it is important that the critique be constructive and team members not take comments personally. The role of team leader is to facilitate the critique and make sure it remains constructive. After the critique, select two more team members and repeat the exercise until each team member has the opportunity to be both subject and negotiator.

Roundtable Exercise. One in-house exercise that is especially beneficial in building communication skills, active listening skills, as well as building a repertoire of potential responses to hostage taker comments, is the roundtable exercise (Null, 2001). In the roundtable exercise, team members are seated in a circle facing away from each other. Each team member should have a notepad. The team or exercise leader stands in the center of the circle with a list of prewritten statements a hostage taker might use during a conversation with a negotiator. Some examples of these statements include; “It’s not worth living anymore”; “If I can’t have

the kids, no one is going to have them”; “If you don’t move that car back within 10 seconds, someone is going to die”; “I want a plane to Mexico in 15 minutes”; “I’m going to come out shooting and make you kill me.” The team/exercise leader should have at least 10 of these prepared statements. A statement is read by the leader, and then each negotiator, working alone, writes his or her preferred response to that statement. As soon as a negotiator has finished writing a response, that negotiator raises a hand and the leader reads the next statement.

After all statements have been read, the team turns to face the center of the circle and then each response is read to each statement. The responses are discussed in terms of which is best, which one would be most/least inflammatory, which one might be most effective at reducing emotions or changing behavior, which one would make the subject pause and think, etc. One of the goals this exercise accomplishes is that each team member can build a full repertoire of responses for use during an actual incident, reduce ambiguity and hesitation, and sound more professional and assured when talking with a subject.

Case Study. Case study reviews are ideal training aids for making specific points, learning to critically evaluate actions, and reversing unfavorable trends (Howard, 2003). Case studies are detailed presentations of a specific event. It is best if the presentation is conducted by someone who participated in the events and has a multimedia presentation (i.e., lecture, audiotapes, video, etc.). Additionally, the presentation can consist of a panel of participants or firsthand witnesses. The presentation should focus on a general overview of the entire incident and then emphasize specific learning objectives from that incident. For example, if the goal of training was to learn active listening skills, the presenters should concentrate on describing the active listening skills that were used or not used. If the goal of training is to learn critical evaluation skills, audience members should be able to provide a critique of actions taken at the incident. Presenters should respond to those critics, as well as pointing out critique points that audience members missed.

One of the things to avoid when using case study training is focusing only on incidents that were not successfully resolved through negotiations. It is important to review cases that do not turn out well to identify the problems and think through and practice a solution. This is certainly the way air safety has been improved over the years and is a compelling reason to operationally debrief. However, it is important to move beyond it in identifying the problem. It is essential to practice a solution. In addition, select incidents that were successfully resolved and focus on what was done to successfully resolve those incidents. For example, Jan Dubina and Robert Ragsdale have given numerous case study presentations about the Lewis Prison incident (Arizona Department of Corrections) from 2004, one of the successes of recent years. Their presentation gives an overview of the incident, and then they focus on two areas: lessons learned, and what was done correctly to peacefully resolve the incident. It is an excellent presentation that hundreds of negotiators have benefited from (see, for example, Dubina & Ragsdale, 2005). A similar presentation has been made by Jim Cavanaugh of ATF concerning a four-day incident in Kentucky in 2004 (Cavanaugh & Mills, 2005). This incident was resolved successfully. Agent Cavanaugh focuses on the actions of the negotiators and stresses the active listening skills negotiators employed to defuse emotions and reduce suicide potential.

Guest Instructor. A training day may be a classroom day conducted by a guest instructor.

Team members may be assigned responsibility to provide a day of training, or a non-team member can be brought in to conduct training. Whoever conducts the training should be a subject-matter expert, should be able to instruct and manage a classroom, and should be familiar with negotiations. There is an expression that “those who cannot do, teach.” Nothing could be further from the truth. Good teachers have the ability to present information clearly, concisely, accurately, and also make it interesting. Not every subject matter expert can do this. If the audience is tuned out or not listening, the instruction is worthless. Instructors should also be familiar with negotiations so their material is directed toward negotiations.

Equipment Day. On occasion, the team should hold a training day in which the goal is to use, repair, and store equipment. As any negotiator will relate, at crisis incidents, Murphy is alive and well. Equipment days can help reduce the presence of Murphy at an actual incident. All equipment should be brought out and all team members given the opportunity to assemble and use the equipment. Any equipment in need of repair should be fixed (or assigned to a specific team member for responsibility to repair and store) and any repair needs anticipated (extra wire, fuses, tools). Team members should also practice storing the equipment correctly so it is ready for use.

Microskills training

An approach to training that has been found to be helpful in developing specific negotiator skills is the microskills training model that originated in the training of counselors (Ivey and Ivey, 2008; McMains, 2013). It is useful in focusing the training needs that are identified in an after-action report. It is a systematic approach to planning and structuring skills training that has several advantages. First, the microskills approach suggests that skills can be arranged in what is called the *microskills pyramid*. The point of the pyramid is that skills build on one another and the skills at the bottom of the pyramid need to be MASTERED before the more advanced skills are learned. [Figure 2.4](#) is the pyramid.

It is clear that the microskills approach recommends that the Basic Listening Sequence (BLS) needs to be mastered before persuasion and influence can be achieved. The BLS includes an opening statement, encouraging the person to tell his or her story and a summary of what is heard.

Second, the model suggests that you *use the skills you expect to get the results you want*. In terms of active listening skills (ALS) used by negotiators, this means that negotiators need to choose their techniques on the basis of what you expect them to achieve. If used, can you expect the skill to move you closer to a tactical goal? [Table 2.2](#) shows the relationship between specific ALS and the expected outcome.




FIGURE 2.4 Microskills training pyramid emphasizing mastering the basics before moving on to the more complicated skills, i.e., master the use of active listening skills (ALS) in Basic Listening Sequence (BLS) before moving on to skills in confrontation, focused attention and influence

Table 2.2 Negotiators Choose the Appropriate ALS on the Basis of the Outcome they Expect

Active Listening Skill (ALS)	Expected Outcome
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Open-ended questions • Encouragers • Paraphrasing • Reflection of feelings • Summarizing • BLS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HT gives more information • HT elaborates on topic • HT feels heard • HT feels more understood • HT sees new relationships in his story • HT discusses more of the facts, feelings and circumstances. Feels heard. Develops rapport

If negotiators use a skill and do not get the expected result, it suggests that it is not the right skill for the issue about which the actor is concerned and that a change of communications tactic is in order.

Third, the microskills approach suggests that there is *a sequence of training that maximizes its effectiveness* when a new skill is being learned or perfected. The sequence is:

- **Define** the skill
- **Observe** the skill.
- **Learn about** the skill.
- **Practice** the skill.
- **Get feedback**
- **Generalize** the skill.

For example, one could use the microskills training approach to organize training about the observation in an after-action report (AAR) of: “Negotiators did not use Emotion Labeling to show understanding. Missed emotional labeling multiple times.” The training process would

then be to:

1. Define the skill. Present a formal, well agreed-upon definition of the skill.
 - a. *Emotion Labeling* is the use of emotionally descriptive words to show that the interveners understand the feelings the other person is experiencing.
2. Observe the skill in action. Use examples of the skill being used well and poorly and discuss the reasons it is used well or poorly.
 - a. A subject whose husband wants to leave her for another woman has the husband and his mistress hostage and says, "I have the two adulterous SOBs in here and I am going to make them pay. Nobody should get away with what they are doing to me. They are going to know what it is like."
 - b. *Good emotional labeling*: "You sound pretty angry and hurt about being left. It doesn't seem fair."
 - i. Because?
 - ii. It recognizes the feelings without judging them. It helps identify the hurt that underlies the anger.
 - c. *Poor response*: "You don't need to feel that way. If he was messing around on you, he was not worth the energy."
 - i. Because?
 - ii. It is judgmental. It tells the person how not to feel. It minimizes feelings that are a major part of who she is

There are many sources of good and poor models of ALS. They include, but are not limited to: tapes of prior negotiations, TV shows with high emotional content, case studies and transcripts of negotiations, political debates, and movies with emotional content.
3. Learn about the use of the skill. Present additional material about the use of the skill in negotiations and resources that are available if the negotiators want to study more about it on their own.
 - a. Uses:
 - i. Defuse high emotions.
 - ii. Show deep understanding
 - iii. Check on understanding of the problem
 - b. Use when:
 - i. People are in crisis
 - ii. Any time people are mad, sad, scared, etc.

- c. Expect:
 - i. Emotions to slowly come down
 - ii. People to confirm or correct
 - iii. People to talk more

Additional resources about emotion labeling could include:

- *People Skills: How to Assert Yourself, Listen to Others, and Resolve Conflicts*, Robert Bolton
 - *Intentional Interviewing and Counseling: Facilitating Client Development in a Multicultural Society*, Allen E. Ivey, Mary Bradford Ivey and Carlos P. Zalaquett
 - *On-Scene Guide for Crisis Negotiators, Second Edition*, Frederick J. Lanceley
- 4. Practice the skill. Set up exercises that fit into your training time that focus on the implementation or use of the skill on the job. They might include:
 - a. Written exercise
 - b. Back to back
 - c. Back to back with coach
 - d. Fish bowl
 - e. Table top
 - f. Case studies
 - g. Role-play with coach
 - h. Role-play with whole team
 - i. Role-play with expanded team
 - 5. Get feedback. Timely, honest, and supportive feedback about how well the skill was used is important. It needs to be given in a constructive and supportive way, with specific examples and modeling of the appropriate responses. Then the skill needs to be practiced again. The goal is to keep giving feedback until the skill is used right. Always end the practice on success.
 - 6. Generalize the skills use. Some discussion about situations in which the skill can be used will help generalize it to life and afford opportunities to practice the skill outside of crises incidents. For instance, some of the places emotion labeling could be used outside of incidents would include:
 - a. Home. Any time somebody at home is upset about something.
 - b. Work. In managing calls or callers who are upset but pose no threat to anybody. Investigators have found that ALS facilitate gathering of evidence.

[Crisis negotiating equipment](#)

One belief many police departments have when they consider implementing a hostage negotiating team is that the start-up costs will be large and equipment costs will be prohibitive. Nothing could be further from the truth. All a negotiator needs to do the job is an ability to communicate. Everything else is a luxury. Some of the most successful negotiators are members of small departments and receive very little financial and material support from their departments. Their equipment consists of what the negotiating team brings from home or can borrow from businesspeople and others they know. Other teams, whose departments purchase the latest and best equipment, become overly reliant on this equipment and forget the basic essentials of negotiating—communication and problem-solving between two people.

As mentioned previously, every year in San Marcos, Texas, a hostage negotiation “competition” and training seminar is held. It brings in teams from all over the United States (and has even included negotiating teams from other countries). Some teams come with 15 to 20 people, two negotiating vans, an equipment trailer, and enough incidental equipment to open a shopping mall. Other teams have three people and a chalkboard in a patrol vehicle’s trunk. Some of the event’s best negotiators are those who do not have the benefit of the “fancy” equipment. Although there is no empirical data to support this contention, we believe negotiators who lack the “bells and whistles” often make the best negotiators because they must work harder and be more creative in resolving hostage incidents. Negotiators may become complacent when surrounded by a large assisting team and expensive equipment that rarely malfunctions (and even when it does, there are support personnel to repair the equipment). It is difficult to become complacent when negotiating on one’s own with no support, no back-up telephone systems, and no van to provide shelter from the elements.

The authors are not saying that a negotiating team does not need equipment. There is some equipment the negotiating team should have, and there is even more equipment that could be considered a luxury. This section will explore the equipment that should be provided to a negotiating team, and equipment that is an asset to the negotiators and that can be purchased, budget permitting. The use, misuse, and pitfalls of that equipment will also be discussed.

Necessary equipment

Any negotiating team should have some basic equipment. Much of this is equipment the police department probably already has in inventory and can be reallocated to the negotiating team. Other equipment can be obtained from an office supply store.

First and foremost, negotiating teams should have a team uniform that is worn to situations and exercises. The negotiating team is a *team* and should have a uniform to reflect this. The uniform should not be the same as the tactical uniform. First, negotiators are a separate response unit and the uniform should reflect this. Second, “clothes make the man/woman” and a tactical type of uniform can reflect a psychological mindset that is not conducive to negotiations.

All negotiating team members should have notebooks, pencils and pens, a clipboard, folders, and sundry items such as paper clips, a stapler, and markers. Each team member should have an alphanumeric pager and the dispatcher should have a list of numbers and clear instructions on calling out team members. We know of many cases in which team members were delayed in arriving at the scene due to a lack of clear call-out instructions/policy.

All team officers should have a concealable weapon with holster, windbreaker/jacket and cap with letters identifying them as police or negotiators, raincoat, flashlight, and full body armor. They should wear comfortable and rugged clothing such as jeans, tennis shoes, or boots with heavy socks, and gloves (in cold weather). It is advisable to have a waterproof rain suit for colder weather, along with torso insulation, polypropylene long underwear, and a wool hat (such as a navy-style watch cap).

The team should have a dry erase board (and pens) for recording information and intelligence, and for keeping notes of conversations (see following section on situation boards). A dry erase board is preferable to a blackboard (or chalk board) for many reasons, including ease of writing on, ease in reading, and they are much easier to update. The team should have two or three audiocassette recorders (with plenty of extra batteries and a large supply of tapes), with a device that allows them to be attached to a telephone to record conversations. This not only allows the negotiators to go back over a prior conversation, it provides a permanent record should one ever be needed and serves as a training aid for other negotiators. The audiotape recorder should be of the three-head type, which allows a negotiator to listen to a conversation immediately after it occurs (Leak, 1994b). Negotiators might also want to keep a duplicating tape machine. At the Lewis State Prison incident, for example, negotiators regularly used a duplicating tape machine to make copies of negotiation tapes. These tapes were used for shift briefings, copies were provided to command elements and the tactical team, and to any response personnel who wanted to review past conversations (Dubina, 2005; Dubina & Ragsdale, 2005). A telephone lineman's handset is invaluable for checking and tapping into telephone lines (most telephone companies will provide one for police use).

Each agency should check with its legal department or state attorney general's office concerning the legal requirements for intercepting wire and oral communications. In Texas, for example, it is necessary to obtain a court order (Texas Penal Code §§16.02 (c) (5), 16.03; Code of Criminal Procedure §§18.20, 18.21; 1990) to intercept these communications. Title 18 U.S.C. § 2510 *et seq.* allow single-party consent recording, so negotiators talking to a hostage taker can record the conversation without a court order (Leen, 1998). If the hostage taker is on a commercial telephone or cellular telephone and is talking to a person other than the police, and there is no immediate danger of death or serious injury, the police must obtain a court order to record the conversation (if the second party does not consent; 18 U.S.C. § 2518[7]). Also, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1) covers a person's expectations of privacy from listening devices that may be introduced into the situation. People have an expectation of privacy in oral communications. It is recommended that negotiators discuss issues of telephone recording, listening devices, and privacy in communication with local and state prosecuting attorneys prior to using such equipment (and prior to the need arising for using such equipment).

A bullhorn can be valuable for hailing a hostage taker who will not answer the telephone. A bullhorn should be one of the first items obtained by a negotiating team. One negotiating team the authors consult with was once placed in the position of having to write a note on paper, tie it to a brick and have the tactical team throw it through a window (as an aside, the brick hit the hostage taker in the head, knocking him unconscious). The bullhorn enables the negotiator to communicate from a safe distance and can be used for other purposes as well (i.e., warning civilians to stay back or getting the attention of perimeter officers, for example).

The team should have cellular telephones. At many hostage locations, finding a public

telephone for prolonged use can be difficult or even impossible. Many businesses will agree to let the police use their telephones until they find out how long their telephones may be tied up. Public telephones have additional problems, as illustrated by an incident related by McClure (1994). In the early 1980s, a hostage taker took over the Atlanta, Georgia, FBI office. During negotiations, the following telephone call and conversation occurred:

OPERATOR: There is a collect call from "John Smith." Will you accept the call?

HOSTAGE TAKER: No.

OPERATOR: They will not accept the call.

JOHN SMITH: I would pay and talk, but I don't have the money.

HT: No.

JS: It is a matter of life and death.

HT: Okay, we will take the call.

JS: This is John Smith from Rome, Georgia, and I want to speak to someone about some narcotics dealings.

HT: We have no agents on duty today.

JS: You mean to tell me that if someone's life was in danger, you don't have agents on duty?

HT: That's right. You will have to call back on Monday. Call the Georgia Bureau of Investigation. (From McClure, 1994).

Cellular telephones have an added benefit. Cellular telephones are not subject to wiretapping laws, and communications over cellular telephones are not protected by Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934. Cellular telephone communications can be monitored using a shortwave radio receiver and a scanner radio. The shortwave receiver is used to receive the base transponder side of the cellular telephone (1.705, 1.735, 1.765, or 1.825 MHz) and the scanner radio to receive the handset side of the conversation (46 and 49 MHz bands). The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA) gives law enforcement the ability to conduct lawfully authorized electronic surveillance over a cell phone. All major cellular providers are CALEA compliant (O'Toole, 2004). Most cell phones today have SMS, or short message service, capability, which allows text messages to be sent via telephone. If an actor is reluctant to answer a phone or verbally communicate with negotiators, it may be that negotiators can establish initial communications using SMS.

The team should consider maintaining a set of prepaid cellular telephones with a restricted number and restricted access. The situation may arise in which an actor does not have a land-line telephone and it is not possible to insert a full throw phone system. Many people today are removing their land-line phones and using only cell phones. A prepaid cellular can be given to the actor and limit the actor's ability to use that phone to contact anyone other than the negotiators. Remember to give the actor a charger and extra batteries. Although quite new and its use not widespread, one of the coming technologies is using the Internet and e-mail for phone services. Negotiators should be aware that an actor may have this capability and negotiators may have to negotiate via the computer, or at the very least, disable the actor's computer to restrict outside communications.

Fuselier (1981/1986) has suggested that, in some situations, a bullhorn or telephone may interfere with rapport building and the development of trust and in some situations it may be preferable to negotiate face-to-face. Direct contact should be attempted only after some type of rapport has been developed through other forms of communication and should only be attempted in barricade situations. Face-to-face negotiations should only be used as a last (and unavoidable) result. If a phone system or "walkie-talkie" type system cannot be used, it is recommended that negotiators engage in voice-to-voice negotiations. With voice-to-voice negotiations, the negotiator is out of sight of the hostage taker. Voice-to-voice negotiations are

somewhat less risky than face-to-face negotiations and have the added advantage of not allowing the hostage taker to watch the negotiators' facial expressions. In addition, in a voice-to-voice situation, the primary negotiator can be supported by a secondary negotiator, mental health consultant, and other team members. This support is virtually impossible in true face-to-face negotiations. If face-to-face (or voice-to-voice) negotiations are attempted, the following guidelines should be followed:

1. Get the hostage taker to agree not to harm the negotiator.
2. Do not negotiate in the face of a gun. Make the hostage taker put the gun down.
3. Never negotiate face-to-face if there is more than one hostage taker.
4. Maintain direct eye contact.
5. Always have a ready escape route.
6. Never turn your back on the hostage taker.
7. Exchange physical and clothing descriptions with the hostage taker before approaching.
8. Give the hostage taker ample body space.
9. To Fuselier's guidelines, we would add: always wear body armor. Officer safety is paramount.

Negotiators should also be familiar with the type of telephone the hostage taker is using (Leak, 1994a). Is the phone a corded telephone (and is it attached to the wall or is the phone itself on a long cord), is it a cordless phone, or is it a cell phone? Each has tactical implications.

The negotiating team should have a desk telephone and telephone adapter for calls other than those to the hostage taker. Each team member should have a police radio. In larger departments, the team should have dedicated frequencies. Another radio option is to use a cell phone carrier that has radio phones. The team should have a toolbox with small and large wire cutters, assorted screwdrivers (standard and Phillips head), electrical tape, pliers (long-nosed and standard), and a set of open-end wrenches, duct tape, and a hammer. The negotiating team should carry an array of extension cords, portable lights, city plat and topographical maps, traffic cones, and police tape. The team should have one or two pairs of good binoculars for observation (7 × 35 mm or 10 × 50 mm). Finally, the team should have a *Physician's Desk Reference* (PDR) and *The Negotiator's Guide to Psychoactive Drugs* for drug use situations (while EMS may be on the scene, communication may not always be possible in a timely manner), suicides, or hostage needs (DiVasto et al., 1992; Worledge et al., 1997).

Negotiators should have a laptop computer with an Internet connection. One recent situation in the Midwest was negotiated via Internet e-mail. More probable than having to negotiate via the computer, it can be a valuable tool in intelligence gathering. For example, if the hostage taker is a cultist, terrorist, or member of another fringe group, his belief systems can be explored via Web sites on the Internet. Many far-right organizations in the United States have sites that outline and discuss their belief systems. Information can be obtained concerning medical and psychological conditions, demands, area maps, etc. Also, the Internet can be used to locate relatives, friends, and others with a connection to the hostage taker (Mullins, 1995; 1997a; 1997b; 1999). Laptops are also valuable for collating intelligence, keeping a negotiating log, providing situation updates, and carrying case history files. With the addition of a modem, most can be linked directly with the department's mainframe system

and dispatch computers

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Since 2002, I have been fortunate to have been one of only four full-time crisis negotiators in the Houston Police Department side-by-side with our SWAT team. While I am grateful to have learned under those whom I consider greats in the art of crisis negotiation, such as Robert Cain, Raymond Matlock, and Allen DeWoody, few can really appreciate what it means to be "on-call full-time" in one of the largest cities in America. Especially one like Houston, which historically averages 50 to 60 special-threat situations per year.

For us, it means that we must be prepared to be called into action at any time. Our time off away from work has to be carefully planned and scheduled with our co-workers so we ensure proper coverage of responsibilities in our absence. Spontaneous weekends away are almost nonexistent, to be able to make allowances for family and personal emergencies that arise. Because of the unpredictable frequency of our call-outs, our full-time staff has learned to make lifestyle adjustments such as strength of will in recreation and taking two cars when going on any group outing, like dinner or to the movies, in order to prevent stranding our loved ones without transportation home as we abruptly go to work for an unknown length of time. We also know that being a full-time negotiator means holidays and special events are tentative as well. As anyone in law enforcement knows, latent familial and relationship problems can be exacerbated without warning, so we must always be ready.

When not actively engaged in scenes involving barricaded suspects who threaten the lives of themselves or others, our time is spent in a multitude of tasks to sustain a high level of preparedness for the "next time." Much of our time is spent managing the administrative tasks for our volunteer corps of negotiators who have other primary responsibilities in our department for whom crisis negotiation is a collateral duty assignment. We are responsible for preparing regular training for our own negotiators on a monthly and annual basis. Our specialization as full-time negotiators allows us to be innovative in our negotiation techniques and equipment. We constantly research high-profile events and behavioral science aspects from around the world that would be useful to us in our operations. We build, maintain, repair, and upgrade most of our specialized equipment ourselves, rather than send it out for someone else. This allows greater flexibility and shorter downtime of equipment so we have it when we need it. My commitment as a Vice President of the Texas Association of Hostage Negotiators provides me with many opportunities to meet and to liaison with other law enforcement

agencies in Southeast Texas and provides training opportunities to them. Our full-time negotiation team staff has had a large part in HPD's department-wide training in safely responding to special-threat situations and ongoing crisis intervention training. We are often called upon and requested to assist other agencies in their training for crisis negotiation and crisis intervention training as well.

Our role is one of self-discipline so that we are ready in the case of any emergency so that when moments count and lives are on the line, we are trained, equipped, and well prepared to serve in the most critical of tasks—saving lives and resolving these volatile situations in the most peaceful manner possible.

for checking criminal histories. Portable fax machines can be invaluable for receiving intelligence, file information, records from outside agencies, and interagency communications.

Situation boards

It has been our experience in the many years of the negotiator competition in San Marcos that the teams that receive the higher evaluations from the judges tend to be the teams that have complete, well-organized, and understandable situation boards. The need to collect and disseminate intelligence has been discussed previously. It cannot be overemphasized that the collection and dissemination of intelligence information is worthless unless there is a way to clearly, concisely, and completely display that information where the people who need it can see it. It is imperative, for example, that the primary negotiator be able to tell at a glance what demands have been made, the deadlines for those demands, and the disposition of the demands and deadlines. The situation board must be maintained in real time and in a convenient and easily accessible location.




PHOTO 2.2 Situation boards must have clearly defined and delineated categories. Teams should, through training and experience, have a template of categories they can use at an incident. The specific type of incident may require a modification of those categories

(Photo by W. Mullins)

Situation boards can be as simple as single sheets of paper, handwritten and taped to the wall in front of the negotiator. They can be as complex as big-screen monitors for computer projectors. The most effective situation boards, however, are white dry-erase boards with dark-colored markers. These boards are easy to maintain and change and the high contrast in background and writing make them easy to read. Headings and topic areas should be clearly marked and separated, and the person given the responsibility for maintaining the situation board should have clear, legible handwriting.




PHOTO 2.3 Negotiators can use any material available for situation boards, as long as team members can read it

(Photo by W. Mullins)

The situation board should be divided into topics. Many teams do this and have arrived at topic areas after much experimentation. Duffy (1997) recommended that the topic areas be divided into: (1) subjects, (2) hostages, (3) weapons, (4) medical history, (5) demands, (6) deadlines, (7) positive police actions, (8) delivery plan, (9) site, (10) third-party intermediaries, (11) surrender plan, (12) escape plan, (13) things to know, (14) things to avoid, and (15) important telephone numbers. Vic Bazan (2003) suggests that topic headings be (1) subjects, (2) hostages, (3) victims, (4) demands, (5) deadlines, (6) positive police actions, (7) surrender plan, (8) escape plan, (9) delivery plan, (10) medical information, (11) weapons, (12) things we need to know, (13) things to avoid, (14) TPIs (third party intermediaries), (15) important telephone numbers, and (16) anticipated concerns/issues. Each topic area should be as complete as possible. The subject topic, for example, should include names, descriptions, clothing worn, motives, association with hostages (if any) health, criminal history, weapons, psychological status, etc. The deadline topic would contain information about the times and dates of deadlines, how the subject set the deadline, response of the authorities to the deadline, etc. The delivery plan topic would have plans for the delivery of any items to the hostage taker, time and date, items actually delivered, how they were delivered, and who accepted the items.

Teams should develop and use situation boards during training scenarios and experiment to find what works best for them. They may discover they need additional categories, or that some can be collapsed and combined. During practice and training scenarios, practice various configurations of the situation board until your team finds a configuration that is preferred. Remember, the situation board has to present information in a visually clear and readily accessible manner.

Optional equipment

Optional equipment is where the sky is the limit. The only constraints on optional equipment are the department's budget and the team's imagination. What is listed here is the optional equipment most often carried by negotiating teams.

One of the very first purchases a negotiating team should make is a throw telephone with a substantial length (1,000 feet or more) of military-grade field cable. Several companies make portable telephone systems specifically for negotiators. These units include headsets for the negotiator with an on/off switch, outlets for additional headsets, jacks for external speakers, and tape-recording capabilities. Some of these systems have an internal, highly sensitive microphone in the hostage taker's unit that allows the negotiators to monitor conversations even when the telephone is not in use. If a system of this type is used, the primary negotiator should not be allowed to listen to the "bug" to prevent him from inadvertently using any information learned from this "bug." The wire can be marked in measured increments so when the hostage taker is on the telephone, his or her exact position can be accurately determined.

Internal "bugs" in a throw telephone must be used with discretion, as federal law regulates their use. Police are not allowed to conduct electronic surveillance of oral conversations in which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy (notwithstanding a court order—Higginbotham, 1994). If one person in a conversation agrees to monitoring, then the conversation can be monitored. When the hostage taker is talking with the police, the negotiator has agreed to have the conversation monitored. A conversation between a hostage taker and a hostage may be monitored because the police represent the interests of the hostage. However, a private conversation between two hostage takers in a home or business and outside the hearing of any hostages presents a situation in which a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. This is a Fourth Amendment issue and at least one court has ruled that in order for warrantless listening to be legal, there must be an immediate threat to the police or public (*O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids*, 1994). Higginbotham (1994) suggests that the department's legal advisors be consulted whenever the issue of privacy is a concern.

Some throw-phone systems now have small, concealed cameras that allow responders to visually monitor events inside the situation. As with listening devices, care should be taken with the use of cameras. While a valuable intelligence tool, it would be easy to make a "mistake" during a conversation and say something to the actor that would indicate he is being covertly monitored. It is recommended that the monitors for these cameras be maintained away from the primary negotiator.

Along with a throw phone system, one of the first purchases the negotiating team should make when the budget permits is a negotiating vehicle (Mattman, 1991). This vehicle could be anything from a panel van obtained in an asset seizure case to a custom-ordered van costing hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Another useful item is a remote-control bullhorn with a listening device. This can be placed close to the location and used in the event that there are no telephones, or if equipment malfunctions (and it will). The team might even consider purchasing video surveillance equipment to use in conjunction with the remote bullhorn. Monitors can be purchased that are no larger than a fat cigar and can be covertly attached to the remote bullhorn. These cameras

can also be purchased in infrared and low-light versions.

A video recorder is useful for providing a historical record of negotiations. It can be set up inside the negotiating vehicle to provide a record of all actions and to supplement tape recordings. Team discussions and command decisions can be videotaped as well. Another valuable use teams have discovered for video recorders is to use them as audio recorders for telephone conversations. The videotape can run for up to six hours versus 30 to 90 minutes for audiocassettes, and is of a higher quality than audiocassette recordings.

Other items a team may find useful are a closed-loop intercom system for communicating between team members, a variety of microphones (directional, spike, and parabolic), night vision devices, a portable generator, and even robots.

Ice chests and drinking water, soft drinks, instant coffee, and snack foods are valuable. The primary negotiator, especially, will need plenty of liquids. Most of these items are nonperishable and can be stored in the negotiating vehicle, a team member's vehicle, or at the police department. One team member can be assigned the task of buying ice on the way to the station when called out. Many teams have added a non-negotiation "runner" or "gopher" member whose job is to get food and drinks for the team, hostage taker, and hostages.

As the team adds equipment, do not overlook the incidentals associated with that equipment. In addition to items such as lights, wire, tape, batteries, plugs, and fuses, the team should keep a small inventory of incidentals, spare parts, and assorted minutiae (screws, nails, connectors, solder, glue, etc.). At any hostage situation, anything can go wrong, and it can go wrong from the least imaginable source.

Following an incident, the team should inventory equipment and supplies, listing any that were used or expended. These items should be replaced immediately. Many teams designate one person to inventory and replace expended items. Any broken equipment should be repaired immediately. The next hostage situation is not the time to realize that the throw phone batteries are bad.



PHOTO 2.4 Constructing a team vehicle can produce an added benefit of being a team-building exercise. Also, it is a way for a team without a large budget to get needed equipment

(Photo by W. Mullins)



PHOTO 2.5 The finished product of the Hays County Sheriff's Office/San Marcos Police Department (TX) bus construction, team-building project

(Photo by W. Mullins)



PHOTO 2.6 There are many companies that will produce a negotiator vehicle to a team's specs. This bus is used by the Comal County (TX) Sheriff's Office CNT

(Photo by W. Mullins)

Obtaining equipment

In today's tight economy, finding the financial resources for obtaining equipment is one of the negotiating team's most difficult tasks. Most police departments do not have the ability to provide equipment funding for everything the negotiating team needs or wants. To fulfill its equipment needs, the negotiating team must become creative.

Some equipment may be purchased through an asset seizure account. Telephones, microphones, tape recorders, and vehicles are all common items eventually procured by the department from criminal activity. City surplus warehouses can also be used to obtain equipment. All cities maintain an inventory of used equipment. The city shop can usually provide a multitude of electrical odds and ends and spare portable generators. Local "100 Clubs" can be approached for assistance. These clubs are for private citizens who pay dues of \$100/year and are primarily to support the families of officers killed or who die in the line of

duty. Unspent funds are often donated for other projects.

Military surplus sales can be used to purchase almost anything a negotiating team would ever need. The procurement office of the nearest military installation will have information on equipment for sale, lists of auction items, and all other necessary information. The General Accounting Office in Washington, D.C. will have information on nonmilitary government surplus. State and federal grants can be applied for in order to obtain negotiating equipment. The team should contact their department or city grant procurement office, the state criminal justice division, or the United States Department of Justice to inquire about these grants.

Many costs can be reduced or eliminated by the team building or “kit bashing” equipment. The team can build storage bins, racks, tables, etc. in the vehicle. Electronic equipment can be modified in-house. Many business organizations will donate equipment or materials. Some equipment can be obtained through loans from other agencies or businesses. Specialized equipment (i.e., night vision glasses) can be borrowed from the military. Local utilities, the telephone company, electronics outlets, and other businesses may all be willing to loan the negotiating team equipment during a crisis. When Pope John Paul II visited San Antonio, Texas several years ago, the negotiator command post had a large bus loaned by the telephone company, equipment borrowed from four different military installations, food and supplies donated by local businesses, and other equipment from city and state shops. Before needing the equipment, the team should prepare written contracts specifying the equipment to be loaned, uses of the equipment, and damage responsibilities. If operators are needed for the equipment, this should also be included in the written agreement.

The tactical team

The tactical team is a necessary component of the police response to a hostage situation. One element that is necessary before a hostage taker will negotiate is containment, a responsibility of the tactical team (Jacobs, 1983). Another role of the tactical team is to prepare for the use of force, should it become necessary (Crelinsten & Szabo, 1979). As mentioned previously, one requirement for a hostage situation is that the hostage taker know that force can be used against him. Proper positioning of the tactical team makes the hostage taker aware of this. Stevens and MacKenna (1989), in a national survey of tactical teams, found that 78 percent of teams were used at hostage situations and 74 percent at barricaded suspect situations (the next most frequent call-out was dignitary protection, at 44 percent).

The tactical team must have a close working relationship with the negotiation team and the command post. In addition to forcing negotiations, the tactical team has other responsibilities during a hostage situation. The tactical team has responsibility for maintaining secure inner and outer perimeters. They block and prevent escape or location movement by the hostage taker. They implement appropriate tactics and provide equipment needed in this high-risk situation. Indirectly, the tactical team motivates the hostage taker to negotiate. The tactical team also provides intelligence and surveillance over long periods. They perform control point missions by securing and commanding positions and keeping desired accesses clear of snipers or other gunmen. The tactical team has the responsibility for making high-risk approaches to the hostage location. If food, drink, or other items need to be delivered, it is the tactical team's

role to deliver those items. If hostages are released, the tactical team ensures their safe release and containment until they can be delivered to an intelligence officer. They also ensure that hostages do not attempt to return to the hostage location. Finally, the tactical team assists and protects other police units and nonpolice units while on the scene at the hostage situation.

In situations in which negotiations must occur face-to-face, the tactical team provides security and cover for the negotiators. This support may be either close-in, such as surrounding the negotiator, or from a distance, such as a sniper providing cover.

The negotiating team has the responsibility to provide continuous, updated information to the tactical team (Wargo, 1988). The negotiators must keep the tactical team updated on the hostage taker's activities and location, location of all hostages, physical descriptions and mannerisms of hostage takers, changes in mental status, and any other relevant information. The negotiators must also pass on intelligence gathered from released hostages or civilians outside the situation who have information on the interior (i.e., friends, family, workers from the building, etc.). The negotiating team coordinates the release of any hostages and the surrender of the hostage taker. Coordinating the release of hostages or the surrender of the hostage taker may seem like a simple matter. However, this is one of the more difficult tasks for both teams. For the tactical team, the surrender phase is the most dangerous time of the entire incident (Moore, 2005). The operations of the tactical team are predicated on the instructions given to the hostage taker. Not only must clear and explicit instructions be given to the hostage taker, but the communications and coordination between the negotiators and the tactical team must also be clear and explicit. The tactical team usually determines the exact procedures for the release of hostages. These instructions must be relayed to the negotiating team, who must pass them on to the primary negotiator, who must pass them on to the hostage taker. Once the actual release is in place, this information must follow the reverse path to the tactical team, who perform hostage apprehension. One small mistake, error, or miscommunication could result in harm to a hostage or a major setback to negotiation efforts.



PHOTO 2.7 Example of a multipurpose throw phone command module. This box gives the negotiator the ability to call the hostage taker directly, allows others to plug in and listen to conversations (headphones or speaker phones), enables use of

recording devices, and allows for the plug-in of other modules such as cell phone modules and video monitoring and recording

(Photo courtesy of Enforcement Technology Group, Inc.)

Linear versus parallel approach to crisis response

It is helpful to think of the tactical team and negotiating team as two legs of a crisis response unit (the third leg being the command element). Negotiators and tactical teams do not operate separately. It requires both to resolve a crisis situation. Negotiators like to think they can resolve a crisis incident without the use or assistance of the tactical element. Likewise, tactical officers like to think they can resolve an incident without the use of negotiators. This type of thinking is linear, in that it is all or nothing. A crisis situation can be resolved through negotiations *or* through the application of force.

The reality is that the successful resolution of a crisis situation requires the parallel application of resources. The tactical team and negotiation team have to work together, applying their assets from both sides of the actor, and “squeezing him in a vise” between the two units. The hostage taker has to understand that if he does not talk with the negotiators, he will have to deal with the tactical team. At the same time, if he is talking with the negotiator, the tactical team will not assault or employ other means to forcibly resolve the situation. The hostage taker also has to be made aware that if he becomes violent or harms hostages, the tactical team will quickly resolve the situation (and there are, of course, exceptions to this automatic “green light” rule). Each team complements the other. If the situation necessitates a tactical resolution, negotiators can assist by the way they negotiate (Fuselier, 1986; Wargo, 1988).

Selection of tactical team members

Careful selection of tactical team members is critical to their later proficiency (Cole, 1989; MacKenna & Stevens, 1989) and to avoid potential liability issues (Mijares & Perkins, 1994; Perkins & Mijares, 1996). For example, in *Moon v. Winfield* (1974) and *City of Winter Haven v. Allen* (1989), the courts ruled that a department can be found negligent if it fails to reassign an unfit officer to a position in which he or she is not likely to be confronted with situations in which he or she has performed poorly, and that departments can be held liable if high-risk actions are conducted by personnel who are not trained, and if detailed planning and coordination of effort is not established.

Tactical team members must receive training in tactical operations prior to their use in the field. This training should be conducted by experienced, well-trained personnel, and should be specific to their assignment (*City of Canton v. Harris*, 1989; Mijares & Perkins, 1998). The training should include, but not necessarily be limited to, instruction in: equipment, basic operations, legal issues, rappelling, team operation and movement, searches, sniper operations, less-than-lethal technology, entry and crisis-entry techniques, night operations, raids, weapon proficiency, bomb scene management, combat shooting, surveillance techniques, intelligence

analysis, dynamic entry, defensive tactics, pyrotechnics, raids, and physical training (Mijares et al., 2000). Additionally, the tactical team should be trained in negotiations and negotiating techniques (Greenstone, 1995). As part of the training, the tactical team should conduct exercises with other elements of the agency that will respond to crises (i.e., negotiators, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)) (Snow, 1996).

Tactical team structure

The tactical team commander is responsible for the mobilization of the tactical team, deployment of the containment team, development of the tactical plan, and operation of the assault and arrest teams. He or she needs to be in close touch with the IC and with the negotiator supervisor. Access to updated intelligence should be provided so that his or her planning can meet the ever-changing tactical situation at an incident.

Three major structures comprise the tactical team. One part of the tactical team is responsible for perimeter control. These team members are responsible for establishing and maintaining inner and outer perimeters. While team members may not actually provide perimeter security, they must arrange to have manpower posted in the proper places with the proper instruction. A second component of the tactical team is the apprehension/assault team. Members of this sub-team make an undetected approach to the location, plan and prepare for the release of hostages, and make an assault if necessary. A third component of the tactical team is the sniper/observer sub-team. The sniper/observer sub-team has two responsibilities. One is to provide intelligence on factors present at the location. These factors may include physical layout, placement of walls, furniture, specific location of hostages and hostage takers, clothing (including any changes in clothing that may be made), and mental state of the hostages and hostage takers. This task has been enhanced by recent developments in technology, such as thermal imaging devices, night telescopes that magnify ambient starlight and a wide variety of electronic eavesdropping devices. A second responsibility of the sniper/observer team is to prepare for a “shot” on the hostage taker. Greenstone (1998) suggests that EMS personnel be trained in tactical operations and be integrated into the team for tactical emergency medical support. In addition, EMS personnel can be used to provide information on medications and drugs used by hostage takers or hostages, recommendations concerning medical issues, and assessment of released hostages or hostage takers.

To perform the required functions, members of the tactical team need to be proficient in many different areas (Flaherty, 1988; Kolman, 1982; Mattoon, 1987; Miller, 1979) and with many different weapon systems. They must be proficient with a myriad of weapons, from specialized weapons like grenade launchers, to rifles, shotguns, and automatic weapons, as well as a wide range of handguns. Many less-than-lethal and nonlethal weapons are available to the police and tactical team, and the tactical team must be as familiar with these weapons as they are with lethal weapons. The selection and use of these weapons will depend on the seriousness of the offense, the threat to the officers, and the degree of resistance offered by the hostage taker (*Graham v. Connor*, 1989). A failure on the part of the tactical team to not consider the use of less-than-lethal and/or nonlethal weapons may even expose the agency to liability (*O’Neal v. DeKalb County, Georgia*, 1988). Some of these alternatives include CS/CN gas (tear gas), oleoresin capsicum (OC) or pepper gas, “flash-bang” grenades, smoke grenades,

star flash grenades, stun plates, shotgun pancake rounds, Taser weapons, and nets. To make entry, the tactical team can use a variety of devices to blow open doors or windows. Once inside the suspect's location, the tactical team can use a variety of less-than-lethal and/or nonlethal weapons to overpower the suspect.

Possibly the most difficult function of the tactical team is that of sniper/observer. Sniper/observers work as two-person subunits. Both members of this subunit are trained snipers and they alternate roles, one as sniper, and the other as observer. Not all tactical team members will be trained in sniper/observer functions, as this is a specialized function within the tactical team.

Tactical team members must be experts in close reconnaissance/scouting operations. They must be able to approach the hostage location undetected, remain in a secure and safe position, and provide intelligence on interior aspects of the location (i.e., placement and construction of walls, doors, windows, partitions, furniture, etc.). Finally, tactical team members must be experts in stealth and dynamic entry techniques.

Intelligence needs

The tactical team must have accurate, reliable, timely, and complete intelligence in order to perform their tasks (Hillman, 1988). While the intelligence needs of the tactical team are no more important than the needs of the negotiating team, the tactical team needs more intelligence than the negotiating team. The negotiating team needs intelligence on the hostage taker and hostages and, in some cases, intelligence on the location.

Without proper intelligence, the tactical team operates in the dark. If the tactical team operates without relevant, timely, accurate, and complete intelligence, people die. Many police departments could open their own files for "locker room tales" of operating without complete intelligence. Three military operations illustrate the point. On March 27, 1945, Task Force Baum, 294 men and 53 vehicles operating on the orders of General George S. Patton, crossed enemy lines to rescue 1,500 German-held American prisoners of war. Following the liberation of the American prisoners and on return to Allied lines, the Germans caught the raiding party. All 1,500 prisoners of war and all but one of the rescue party were killed or captured (McGeorge, 1983). Task Force Baum lacked accurate intelligence—on German deployments, weapons, and strength. On November 21, 1970, a Green Beret-led rescue effort was launched to free American prisoners of war at Son Tay, North Vietnam. The raiders encountered an empty camp. On May 15, 1975, United States Marines stormed Koh Tang Island and attempted to rescue American seamen held aboard the *Mayaguez*, a U.S. merchant ship, by the North Koreans. Fifteen Marines were killed, three disappeared, and 50 were wounded. No seamen were rescued. Both the Son Tay and Koh Tang Island rescue attempts lacked timely and accurate intelligence (Rowan, 1975; Moorer, 1982; McGeorge, 1983).

The tactical team needs complete intelligence on the hostage taker, just as the negotiating team does. Many of the intelligence needs for the tactical team are more critical than for the negotiating team. Some of the intelligence needed by the tactical team includes the hostage taker's criminal history, weapons, potential for violence, military/survivalist/special forces training, complete and accurate descriptions of clothing worn by all the actors inside the location, mental condition/emotional state/stress level of all actors, physical condition of

hostage taker, personality type of hostage taker, and complete medical and employment history.

In addition to detailed information on the hostage taker, the tactical team needs complete information on the hostage taker's location. The more complex the structure, the more detailed information the tactical team must have. Assaulting an office complex is much more difficult than assaulting a house or convenience store. Stairways, halls, partitions, and egress routes that could be used by the hostage taker must all be considered. The tactical team needs, if possible, complete up-to-date blueprints of the hostage location. They need to know the structure's construction; location of power, water, and gas cutoffs; interior construction; location or presence of burglar bars, steel doors, etc.; location and height of fences or other obstacles; and fire doors and fire stops. Blueprints should be augmented by residents or workers. The location of portable walls, furniture, plants, and other obstacles is needed. The team must locate any security systems (internal and external) and dogs or other noise-making animals. Security systems must be disarmed or neutralized, especially those that activate and automatically lock doors and windows. Animals will make noise, alerting the hostage taker to the tactical team's presence. While dogs are the primary concern, other animals can be equally volatile.

Situation security

One responsibility of the tactical team is to provide security for the entire incident (Maksymchuk, 1982). Tactical team members might not physically provide the security, but they will assign patrol officers to these functions based upon tactical team recommendations. A hostage incident typically has two perimeters—an outer perimeter and an inner perimeter. The outer perimeter is the incident's controlled, outermost boundary. The purpose of this perimeter is to restrict vehicle and foot traffic into the incident. The outer perimeters should be established far enough from the incident that no traffic or citizens are in danger (Biggs, 1987). Only approved members of the police, media, or other response personnel are allowed past the outer perimeter. The area between the outer and inner perimeters contains the command post, negotiators, media, EMS, fire department, and utility workers. This perimeter is usually well out of the hostage taker's sight and, if space permits, is out of range of any firearms the hostage taker may possess.

The inner perimeter is usually maintained by the tactical team and is close to the hostage location. This perimeter is designed to control ingress and egress to the target area. The only persons allowed inside this perimeter are the assault and apprehension teams. Depending on the hostage location, the inner perimeter can be as close as the walls of a house, or as far as a city block. At the incident's outset, the inner perimeter may be rather large and then shrink in size as the incident progresses, as the tactical team gathers intelligence, or as the tactical team prepares for an assault.

Assault operations

If the tactical team is called upon to resolve the hostage incident, the most likely course of

action is a physical assault on the location. An assault operation is one of the most dangerous operations in which the tactical team can engage (Hudson, 1989), and next to sniper operations, is a last resort (Whittle, 1988). The assault team must physically confront and gain control of the hostage taker, while at the same time ensuring the safety and security of the hostages (Kaiser, 1990). An assault is also the most complex operation for the tactical team. It requires careful planning and split-second execution. Although there are many things that can go wrong during an assault operation, the courts (in *Taylor v. Watters*, 1987) have provided support for assault operations. In this case, the court said, "It is in the nature of police work that the pressure becomes intense and decisions must be made quickly.... Such mistakes made in the best judgment of the trained police officer should not be the province of constitutional tort suits." An assault by the tactical team requires a minimum of six team members: (1) team leader, who commands and controls the team, communicates with the IC, and makes on-scene decisions; (2) point, who leads the assault; (3) point cover, who provides backup for the point man; (4) observer/cover, who supports both of the above; (5) the rear guard, who provides security for the entire team and transfers prisoners/hostages; and (6) the marksman, who provides intermediate and long-range defense for the entire team.

Sniper operations

The loneliest job on the tactical team (and the entire police force) may belong to the sniper/observer unit. The sniper must keep the hostage taker in his crosshairs for several hours at a time and be ready to fire on a moment's notice. If the sniper is employed, there is only one possible outcome to the situation: a human being is killed.

The sniper's most difficult job is not in making the shot, but in waiting to make the shot. The sniper will get in position when the tactical team arrives at the hostage situation. He/she will then have to wait in position for several hours, constantly watching the target, ready for the command to shoot. Many police officers have the inner resolve to make the shot when ordered, yet few have the inner resolve to remain in one position for many hours waiting to take the shot. Because of the tasks required of the sniper, police snipers should have excellent marksmanship skills, be in top physical condition, have excellent vision (without glasses), be emotionally stable, and possess excellent decision-making skills (Gnagey, 1984).

The training of police snipers should include a multitude of high-stress shooting exercises. Plaster (1990) reported that in a moderate-level stress shooting exercise, one in 12 police snipers failed to make a simple shot. Without high-stress training more than one in 12 could be expected to miss the shot in an actual situation. No room for this type of mistake exists for the police sniper.

The second member of the sniper unit is the observer. The observer has many responsibilities during the hostage situation, including watching the hostage taker, giving intelligence to the tactical team commander, updating intelligence, determining engagement priorities, announcing target indicators, estimating wind, range, and angle, operating communication equipment, identifying target priorities, observing and reporting bullet impact.



PHOTO 2.8 The *STARS System*tm is a new technology designed to help increase situational awareness when responding to a hostage, barricade, and other potentially dangerous missions. It provides team staff with the ability to listen covertly for voices and other sounds taking place from within an environment by attaching up to four (4) wireless sensor nodes to the outside surfaces of the environment's entry points (metal/wooden doors, windows, glass, etc.). The covert audio can assist team staff in determining if a subject or individuals are occupying the environment as well as their approximate location. In the event negotiations are necessary, a negotiator can use the sensor nodes to project their voice onto the surfaces to which they are attached to communicate with the barricaded individual or hostage-taker

(Photo courtesy Enforcement Technology Group, Inc.)

Outside agency support

Frequently, the resolution of a hostage situation requires the cooperation and assistance of many divisions within the police department and many nonpolice agencies. Traffic, patrol, investigations, public relations officers to deal with the media, K-9, and EOD may all be needed to help resolve the situation. If the department does not have an EOD unit, federal agencies such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) can be called upon to assist. Military installations also have EOD units that will assist. EMS and the fire department are routinely called out to crisis situations. The military can be used to supply helicopters or aerial surveillance, in addition to other specialized equipment.

Other agencies and personnel may include the telephone company (hooking up direct lines, isolating phones, changing numbers, specialized equipment), utility providers, building engineers, locksmiths, foreign language consultants, disability experts (i.e., signers for the deaf), medical doctors, Red Cross, victims services personnel, and counselors may all be needed.

All of the above-mentioned agencies will readily provide assistance when asked. However, it is important to prepare for their assistance before a hostage incident occurs. Written and signed agreements should be prepared and completed by all parties. Written directives for the call-out and use of these agencies should be prepared and discussed with these agencies. Finally, training scenarios should be developed utilizing these agencies. At least once per year, a mobilization exercise should be conducted utilizing these agencies.

The ten most common mistakes¹

The ten most common mistakes identified by Kidd (see Box) can be divided into three

categories: (1) negotiator skills and techniques, (2) negotiation team management, and (3) critical incident management.

Negotiator skills and techniques

One common mistake made by negotiators is a reluctance to analyze critically. There is a tendency to overlook problems if there are no deaths or injuries, or to downplay the importance of the hostage taker's problems and emotions. Because the offender surrendered and no one was injured, there is a perception that negotiators were successful and things went well. From these incidents, negotiators take away the wrong lessons by not critically analyzing their performance, communications, intelligence gathering/dissemination, decision-making, and other facets of the negotiation operation.

Another mistake negotiators often make is an ineffective or incorrect assessment of the hostage taker. Negotiators fail to assess, search for, and try to understand the hostage taker's motivations and goals. Because things are going well, negotiators do not focus on using the active listening skills, and concentrate on bargaining/decision making instead of building rapport and trust. Negotiators not making a correct assessment of the hostage taker's motives do not distinguish between instrumental (hostages are tools for freedom, hostages are not integral to criminal conduct, or there is a demand for escape) and expressive demands (hostages are an integral part of hostage takers conduct or motivation—escape may not be desired).

A third mistake negotiators tend to make is to ignore or mistreat hostages when we might need their cooperation or have to actually negotiate through them. Negotiators tend to assume that the hostage's situation and well-being are tactical concerns. When this happens, negotiators tend to focus too much on the hostage taker and fail to adequately protect hostages or ignore a possible tactic to negotiate through the hostages.

Negotiation team management

A common management mistake often made by team leaders is the failure to recognize, practice, or use the "dualistic approach." The resolution to a negotiated incident requires a parallel application of crisis response assets (versus a linear approach). Often, team leaders become locked into the idea that negotiators can resolve an incident without the support and use of other elements, most notably tactical. The team leader motivates negotiators to focus on the overt negotiator skills such as empathy, helpfulness, emotional understanding, and rapport building. The team leader thus tends to de-emphasize negotiators covertly communicating the need for the hostage taker to engage in problem-solving, resolution-based, and objective-based negotiations.

Teams, team leaders, and agencies may not adequately stress the need for established criteria for negotiator selection. When adequate criteria are not developed and a comprehensive selection system is not used, negotiators are not selected based on the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary for negotiating an incident. Communication skills are overlooked, interviewing skills are devalued, and attributes of patience and understanding

are not considered. Instead, officers are selected subjectively, based more upon knowledge of who the person is, rather than what they can bring to the team.

Another common mistake made by team leaders is failure to know or monitor the philosophies of the tactical commander and/or overall IC. This translates at the scene of an incident into a tendency of the team leader to not attempt to educate or train the other commanders in negotiator practices, abilities, or capabilities. Instead, the team leader attempts to badger, argue, or even propagandize with the other commanders to get them to see things the “negotiator way.” This also usually means that the team leader does not develop a contingency plan when the IC emphasizes practices that are contrary to accepted practices (or does not attempt to educate the IC).

Another mistake often seen in team leaders is a tendency to downplay the importance of the secondary negotiator. Instead of putting their “best other negotiator” with the primary negotiator, team leaders assign new negotiators or inexperienced negotiators to the secondary negotiator role as an opportunity to learn.

Critical incident management

ICs can be guilty of failing to maintain or pursue knowledge necessary to adequately manage incidents. In 2005, the state of crisis response was that ICs had the least amount of training of any of the response personnel. There is sometimes a perception in ICs that if they can manage a patrol shift, an investigative

The Ten most Common Mistakes made in Crisis Incidents

Negotiator Skills and Techniques

Reluctance to Critically Analyze Situations

Ineffective or Incorrect Assessment of Hostage Taker

Ignoring or Mistreating Hostages

Negotiations Team Management

Failure to Recognize or Practice a Dualistic Approach to Negotiations

Inadequate Criteria and Selection System for Negotiators

Not Knowing or Monitoring Philosophies of Tactical or Incident Command

Insufficient Focus on or Use of Secondary Negotiator

Critical Incident Management

Unwillingness to Maintain or Pursue Highest Level of Knowledge

Failure to Follow Standard Practices

Ignoring or Violating the Critical Incident Response Triad

division, a prison cellblock, they have adequate training to manage a crisis incident. This is simply not true. Commanders need training and practice to learn how to manage crisis incidents. These incidents have a unique set of problems and challenges. Commanders must be trained in these issues, practice that training (with other response elements), learn from others who preceded them, and learn from the significance of past incidents. All too often, ICs do not receive input from the tactical and negotiator team leaders (Vecchi, 2002).

Commanders can also fail to follow standard practices. Lack of experience, training, and practice (in scenarios) can lead to commanders failing to mobilize sufficient resources to resolve a crisis incident, having inadequate staffing on hand, and disregarding prior experiences. Many watched the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina on the Louisiana coast. One of the largest mistakes made by FEMA managers was failing to adequately prepare, deploy, and allocate resources and staffing in the aftermath of the storm. As a result, many people did not receive needed assistance until days after the incident. Failures in Louisiana were due to failures of incident command.

A third common mistake made by ICs is violating the balanced triad of crisis response. Commanders may rely too much on the use of tactical elements and ignore negotiators, or conversely, rely too much on negotiators and ignore the tactical element. This is a violation of the parallel application of force doctrine. Without force, the hostage taker will not negotiate. Without the use of negotiators, people may become injured unnecessarily. One role of the IC is also to resolve conflicts between team commanders and build a working relationship (Vecchi, 2002). The IC is responsible for reducing conflict between team leaders and teams. In many instances, ICs fail to realize that while the goals of tactical and negotiators are the same, different methodologies are employed to achieve those goals. The IC who fails to realize this will unwittingly promote competition between teams rather than cooperation.

Very often, these mistakes do not occur in isolation. Several may be made at one incident. While any one particular incident may be successfully resolved, mistakes continue to accrue and build across incidents until the team has an unsuccessful incident in which officers, hostages, or the hostage taker is injured or killed. The team then has a tendency to wonder why this particular incident ended badly and what went wrong. They fail to see the accumulation of mistakes and errors over a long period that led to this incident. Operational debriefings do not necessarily prevent the accumulation of mistakes unless all response personnel are open and brutally honest with themselves and with each other during the debriefing. Teams also have to critically question, analyze, and assess their performance at every incident and training scenario. It is recommended that teams develop some type of evaluation form to use for evaluation and assessment. A standardized evaluation process will assist in reducing these mistakes.

Summary

The police response to a hostage incident is a multifaceted response, requiring the

coordination and cooperation of patrol, the tactical team, the negotiating team, and department supervisors. The incident may involve the participation of units such as criminal investigation, public relations, and other specialized units within the department. The key to this police response is prior planning, preparation, and training. Of these, training is the most important. Prior to an incident, the department as a unit should participate in exercises designed to simulate hostage incidents, so that when an actual event does occur, planning and preparation will be in place. The department should prepare for the pressures and intervention of non-police factors at an incident. City officials, politicians, and other parties may respond with the police department. If not prepared, these outside parties may hinder the negotiation effort. Clearly delineated policy and procedure statements may preclude the interference of these parties at an incident.

Communication between the police response units is clearly vital for the successful resolution of the hostage incident. Clear lines of communication must be established and adhered to by the department's various response units. Commanders, the tactical team, and the negotiating team must be kept completely informed with clear, up-to-date, and complete information throughout the incident. Any breakdown in communications may seriously hinder efforts to resolve the incident peacefully.

Much of the equipment a police department can buy for a negotiating team is not absolutely necessary to a negotiator's basic mission. Equipment can make negotiators more comfortable, more confident, and better able to withstand a prolonged situation. Some of the equipment will make the negotiator's job easier, and in the long run, more efficient.

The tactical team is a necessary component in the response paradigm. Without the threat of force, hostage takers (and barricaded subjects) have no motive to negotiate. The specialized functions of the tactical team work to ensure the safety and security of the hostages, civilians, crisis response team, and the hostage taker. If force is required, the tactical team should be able to effectively neutralize the hostage taker before he is aware of their presence and/or before he has time to injure hostages. As a last resort, the tactical team sniper can neutralize the hostage taker to prevent loss of life (hostages, civilians, or responding teams).

In some incidents, the assistance of outside agencies is needed. These agencies should be identified, written agreements prepared, and training conducted. When an incident occurs, they will be valuable only if they are prepared.

Negotiators need to know the mistakes that are common in responding to hostage/barricade incidents. Knowing our past mistakes helps make us better prepared to respond in the future.

Note

- ¹ The information contained in this section was developed by William Kidd over a number of years and refined through numerous public presentations at negotiator conferences, seminars and meetings, such as the California Association of Hostage Negotiators, the Hostage Negotiation Competition/Seminar at Texas State University (San Marcos, TX) the Kansas Association of Hostage Negotiators, the Texas Association of Hostage Negotiators, and many others. Our thanks go to Officer Kidd for allowing us to include this information.

Discussion Questions

1. You are the negotiating team commander at a hostage situation at the county jail. Your team has been negotiating with a barricaded inmate for two hours and he is beginning to settle down. The sheriff, who is acting as on-scene commander, enters your area and demands that you get things wrapped up in the next hour. What would you say to the sheriff to prevent his interference?
2. With a group of three others, individually rank-order the elements in the definition of a team: share your rankings and reasons for the order with the others; discuss the difference until you come to an agreement on the rankings and the reasons for the ranking.
3. You are responsible for setting up the department's first Crisis Response Team. What skills would you look for in the commander, the negotiator supervisor, and the tactical team leader? How would you assess them? What procedures would you use? How would you evaluate their leadership ability? Is there a difference between leadership and supervision? Describe this difference.
4. You want to conduct training on the following topic: The use of active listening skills in rapport building and problem solving. What training techniques would you use? Construct a lesson plan that includes skill building along with a test of whether the negotiator's skill changes.
5. How can you use your negotiation team to support the tactical team? If you decide to continue negotiating, how can you use your tactical team to support the negotiators?
6. You are selecting two new negotiators for your team. What qualities in the applicants do you think are the most important and why? How would you test the applicants for these qualities?
7. Design a van for a hostage negotiation team.
8. Meet with military personnel in your area. Where can you obtain military surplus equipment? What is the procedure for obtaining that equipment?
9. Go to the library or get on the Internet and identify five grant sources for equipment. Identify grant sources specific to police/correctional agencies.
10. Should negotiators specialize within the police department? Why or why not? If not, what duties within the department should negotiators be assigned as their regular duties?
11. You have been asked to select a mental health consultant for the negotiating team. What would you look for when selecting this person? List and rank-order all the criteria you would use in the selection process. How would you train this person?
12. A hostage situation has occurred in your classroom building. Set up the physical arrangements for the police response. Include inner and outer perimeters and command post.
13. Select a single, stand-alone building in your area. Plan a tactical assault on this location. Select and plan an assault of a multistory office or business structure.
14. Assume that a hostage situation occurred in your town in the downtown business section on a weekday. Plan and establish (on paper) outer and inner perimeters. How could you reroute traffic and business to cause the least disruption in the working

day for citizens?

15. Visit a local jail or prison. Based upon the layout of that facility, prepare tactical plans for the possibility of a hostage situation. What specialized equipment would your team need? What would you do with the prisoners who are not part of the incident?

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Chapter 3

Crisis Management: Goals, Tasks, and Skills—The REACCT Model

Chapter Outline

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Learning Objectives

1. Explain the reasons for an integrated model of intervention in crisis/hostage negotiations.
2. Explain the tasks in the REACCT Model.
3. Discuss the goals of each task in the REACCT Model.
4. Explain the importance of empathy in negotiations.
5. Define the *stages of change*, and explain their application to negotiations.
6. Give examples of change talk and resistance talk.
7. Demonstrate methods of dealing with resistance.
8. Define ambivalence.
9. Explain how ambivalence affects negotiations.
10. Explain how to facilitate the resolution of ambivalence.
11. Explain the important SAFE issues for which negotiators must prepare when planning the first engagement with the actor.
12. Know the steps and listening skills in the *basic listening sequence* (BLS).
13. Explain the “client-centered” approach to problem-solving in negotiations.
14. Know the factors that interfere with the actor’s ability to solve problems.
15. Demonstrate indirect methods of influence for making suggestions without raising resistance.
16. Explain the steps in the *problem-solving sequence* (PSS).
17. Know the difference between direct and indirect control of an incident.
18. Understand the importance of managing the increased stress levels during the surrender in a high-risk incident.
19. Explain the importance of planning for transfer of the responsibility for the actor and victims during the resolution stage.

At 1300, this date, man entered County Tax Assessors Office carrying a backpack and wearing an overcoat. He demanded to see the tax assessor and got angry when he was told that she did not have an office at the location and was no longer the tax assessor.

When security (off-duty deputy) got suspicious, the man revealed what looked like a bomb strapped to his chest. He had the guard exit the building, locked the front door and had people in the office push furniture in front of door and windows. He threatened to detonate the bomb if the police tried to enter building. The deputy said, "The man had a shotgun and two pistols, a .357 Smith and Wesson and a Glock. He was visibly agitated, talking fast and loud, pacing the floor and yelling at everybody. He appeared to be wired with explosive and was holding what looked like a dead-man's switch."

Subsequently, an unidentified man called the News stating that he wanted reporters at 640 Smith Street because he was going to blow himself up. He said he had a statement he wanted to make: "The County has completely botched up tax situation on a piece of property our family owns. They failed to provide us with proper information regarding back taxes after my aunt died. In one year they increased the value of the property \$80,000 dollars, then in 2010 they filed a lawsuit after large amount of interest and penalties racked up. Please make sure you review all your tax information in case of 'errors' ... They never sent notices but they sure knew where to find us to serve up a lawsuit? Hmm!!!"

Since it is a county office, Sheriff's SWAT and HN respond to scene. Dozens of armed police officers with bulletproof vests surrounded the tax office while negotiations were carried out.

Security estimated that there were four hostages—only staff, since they had just reopened after lunch and there were no other customers in office—only the usual staff.

There has been a recent spate of suicides in the city, linked to the county's worsening economic recession and a crackdown on tax evasion, with press coverage in local media of stories about businessmen in despair.

What do you need to be thinking about to manage this incident? To some degree, the answer will depend on your job. If you are the Incident Commander, you may be thinking about whether you are going to use your negotiators to resolve the incident or if you are going to use your SWAT team. If you are the Negotiations Commander you may start thinking about assignments. The officer who is usually the Primary may start thinking about active listening skills. The Intelligence Officer may start thinking about sources of information. The Mental Health Consultant may start thinking about the kinds of people who are tax protesters. Whatever the job, all members of the team need to have a basic understanding of what needs to be done to maximize the chances of a safe resolution. This chapter focuses on some of the basic activities that need to happen at an incident. It covers many fundamentals. All team members should be thoroughly familiar with the knowledge, skills, and abilities discussed here. It integrates ideas from current research in behavior change and negotiators' experiences to address some of the shortcomings of the Crisis Intervention (CI) model.

As the ideas in this chapter are presented, most will be illustrated using excerpts from other real-life scenarios. It is suggested that readers think through how the ideas apply to incidents in which they have been involved as they read the chapter. The Negotiator Position Paper (NPP) and modified and abbreviated transcripts will be used to illustrate major points.

REACCT: Integration

In integrating the contributions of Hammer and Kelln and McMurtry (see [Chapter 1](#)), the authors developed the REACCT model for negotiations. REACCT stands for Recognition, Engagement, Assessment, Contracting, Controlling and Transferring—the six major tasks of negotiations. This model describes tasks rather than stages because negotiations do not always follow a set course, but the tasks are basic to the majority of negotiations. Things happen during the incident that may set the process back. The crisis stage may reappear and the tasks may have to be done again. Negotiators frequently re-engage, re-assess, and re-contract with

the actor during the incident. Some tasks may go more quickly during one incident than in others. It is important for the negotiator to stay attuned to the stage and respond accordingly.

Mission

Negotiation is a fluid process. It is like a play in which negotiators and the actor start across the stage from one another with different scripts. They move through a series of actions to the conclusion of the play. The action may take them closer to one another and resolution or it may take them away from each other or both. The negotiator's job is to end at a desired point—minimal loss of life and property—and to bring the actor into the play in synch with the negotiator's goals. To do this, negotiators need to develop a script for managing the incident and for staying in synch with the actor. They need to establish goals, assess options, apply options, assess the impact of their interventions, and modify their approach if they do not get the expected results. They need to have a clear idea about where their play ends to decide how to get there. The mission is essential.

The mission starts with the recognition that the incident falls into the legitimate purview of the criminal justice system. The mission of negotiations in law enforcement and corrections is to manage the incident so there is the least loss and most gain for everybody involved. As one wag said, "It is seeking a meeting of the minds, without the knocking of the heads." In the 1980s, one of the authors was involved with a team whose goal was defined as, "Everybody goes home. There are no acceptable losses." With that goal, the department was willing to take as much time as needed to resolve an incident peacefully. The team's success rate was 99 percent. As times changed and the world situation became more dangerous, the goals of crisis management also changed. HOBAS tells us the national success rate is about 83 percent now. Departments are looking at incidents in different ways and are willing to spend less time on incidents. The types of incidents for which crisis management teams are preparing are more complicated than the spontaneous sieges of the past two decades. As Dolnik and Fitzgerald (2008) suggest, negotiators need to think of themselves as conflict/risk managers who use influence to solve problems. Risk management has to do with minimizing losses and maximizing gain, rather than not losing anybody. Planning is geared toward how to influence the subject so there is the least risk of violence and how to respond in a way that minimizes loss when there is violence.

Principles from Behavioral Science

Before discussing and illustrating the REACCT model, this chapter examines several principles from behavioral science that help negotiators understand the ebb and flow of negotiations, select appropriate tactics and make decisions when the incident does not fit the script. These principles include Empathy, Expectations, Frames or Triggers, Stages of Change, Ambivalence, and Resistance. In focusing on these issues, the authors have taken an approach that other fields have called "technical eclecticism." That is, the ideas presented below were chosen

because they have been empirically validated in other areas of human behavior change and, through experience, found applicable to a defined technical problem: crisis/hostage negotiations. They have not always been empirically validated in crisis negotiations. They are not theoretically pure, but they are empirically established as effective when change in human behavior is the goal and they are defensible.

Empathy

Researched in therapy and counseling, empathy has been established as a necessary condition in facilitating change in a person. Much research (Carhuff and Berenson 1967; Truax & Carkhuff, 1967; Miller et al., 1980; Valle, 1981; Carkhuff, 2000; Egan, 2002; Ivey & Ivey, 2008) has demonstrated the importance of empathy in establishing contact with another and in defining the issues with which they are struggling. Empathy allows the counselor to anticipate how the actor will respond to specific skills during counseling. The same principles apply to negotiations. Many negotiators have discussed the importance of empathy. For instance, the FBI's Behavioral Change Stairway Model (Vecchi et al., 2005) suggests that empathy, based on active listening, is basic to influencing actors to change their behavior during negotiations.

Ivey and Ivey (2008, p. 107) define empathy as “experiencing the world as if you were the client, but with the awareness that the client remains separate from you.” This means putting yourself in the actor's place without imposing your thoughts, feelings, values, etc. on them. It includes being able to communicate your understanding of their issues, motives, life circumstances, etc. in a way that shows you understand. It is based on listening carefully and confirming what you think you hear. It is based on *active listening*.

Empathy can be thought of as a spotlight focused on an actor in the center of a stage: the spotlight can be diffuse, focusing on the area around the actor as well as the actor, or it can be an intensely focused spotlight, highlighting only the actor. It is the latter focus that empathy is about. It is an intense focus on the actor. The questions for negotiators are: “What is going on with the actor?” “What is he doing?” “How is he feeling?” “What is he expecting to happen?” “What is his or her story?” Later, the focus will need to be broader, on the surrounding circumstances. But initially, the focus needs to be on the actor and his or her concerns.

Dramatic plays involve three acts, each having a different purpose. Act One usually sets up the tension and conflict between the principal parties. Act Two brings the conflict between parties to a head. Act Three usually resolves the conflict. For negotiators, intervening in a crisis is like an actor entering the play in the middle of Act Two, but without a script. He or she has to figure out what is going on, what happened in Act One to get the action to where it is, how the tension came to a head and how the actor's script suggests the conflict is to be resolved. At the same time, he or she is trying to write a script and to direct the subject who already has his or her own script toward a new ending. It all starts with empathy—an understanding of where things started, how they have played out so far and where the subject expects them to go.

Hogewood (2005) has discussed the application of empathy in negotiations, pointing out that there are levels of empathy that negotiators can obtain. The deepest level shows the most understanding and establishes the best relationship. The negotiator's level of understanding can take away from the relationship between the negotiator and the actor, promote alienation

and misunderstanding and reduce trust. It depends on how well the negotiator understands. The three levels of empathy are (Hogewood, 2005; Ivey & Ivey, 2008):

1. **Subtractive empathy**—reflecting understanding in such a way as to misconstrue the actor’s meaning by being incomplete, critical, or focused only on the negative. Subtractive empathy takes away from negotiation.
2. **Basic empathy**—reflecting understanding in a way that captures the meaning in the actor’s message. The actor’s message and the negotiator’s response are about the same.
3. **Additive empathy**—reflecting understanding in such a way that helps the actor see a new connection to previous ideas or additional relationships that give the actor a new perspective on an issue. It connects the dots in the actor’s story (see below). It draws connections between the actor’s life experiences or expectations and his or her current behavior during the incident. Additive empathy generally facilitates negotiations.

The FBI (2003) states that empathy is “seeing through the eyes of another” and that it is based on active listening skills (ALS). They present the Behavioral Change Stairway that suggests that ALS is the foundation for empathy (See [Figure 3.1](#)). It is by using ALS that empathy is shown. Empathy in turn leads to rapport (see Engagement below), which leads to influence (see Controlling and Contracting below) that allows the negotiator to suggest changes in behavior.

Similarly, Ivey and Ivey (2008) suggest that the *basic listening sequence* (BLS) is the fundamental model for demonstrating empathy. They tell us, on the basis of research in counseling, that we can expect certain results from verbal tactics (active listening skills) even in a high-stress situation and that we need to pick our intervention on the basis of the response we expect from the other person. The basic listening sequence includes the use of *open-ended questions*, *encouragers*, and *reflection* to gain an understanding of “where people are coming from” and showing them that you understand them.



FIGURE 3.1 The FBI’s Behavioral Change Stairway suggests that active-listening skills are the basis of empathy, rapport, Influence, and behavior change.

The BLS includes the following skills discussed and accepted by negotiators. (Note that only six of the traditional active listening skills are expected to show empathy—the authors find that the remaining skills are more applicable to facilitating problem-solving rather than showing empathy.) In addition, note that the negotiator can expect specific results from using these skills. If the negotiator is not getting the expected results from the use of the skills, it is a clue that he or she needs to change tactics.

1. **Open-ended questions/statements**—questions or statements that encourage the subject to talk and invite them to tell their story (McMains & Lanceley, 1995; Noesner & Webster, 1998). Use: Open-ended questions are used any time during negotiations when more information is needed to understand what is happening, or the negotiator needs to stall and cannot think of anything else to say, or to keep the attention on the subject. It is important to ask open-ended questions in the crisis stage to help clarify what is going on with the actor and to show the actor that the negotiator is paying close attention to him or her. They can be used with any type of person and any type of incident.

The negotiator can expect the actor to talk more, give more detail about themselves or their situation.

Example: A local businessman barricaded himself in his apartment, threatening to kill himself when his wife showed him the credit card receipts from his affair. He said, “I just can’t have it known that I had an affair. It would be too much if people knew that my wife and I are having trouble. People have always thought we were the perfect couple.”

A good open-ended question would be “Sounds like a tough deal. Tell me how it all happened.” It is nonjudgmental, shows interest, and is likely to lead to more information about the man’s situation.

A poor response would be “Do you have a gun? What kind? How many bullets do you have?” because it forces the man into one-word answers, gives the impression that the negotiator is more interested in the gun than the man, and communicates a sense of urgency that will build rather than defuse tension.

2. **Effective pauses**—periods of silence that are used to emphasize a point (Noesner & Webster, 1998) or to encourage the subject to say more (McMains & Lanceley, 1995). They can be used to help defuse an intense emotional harangue. By being quiet and not responding to an attack, negotiators can sidestep a confrontation and allow the subject the time to vent his frustration, anger, and hurt.

Use: The technique of effective pauses is used after the subject seems to have finished saying all he has to say about a topic, or when the negotiator has made an important point. It is simply waiting 10 to 15 seconds before saying anything more or simply not responding after an emotional outburst or an attack. It can be used at any time in a negotiation or crisis intervention. It is particularly important to wait after a person who is depressed seems to have finished, because they sometimes have more to say, but process thoughts more slowly than a non-depressed person. It generally follows an open-ended question to allow the subject time to respond.

The negotiator can expect more details about topic.

Example: In trying to assess the resources a depressed person has available, the

negotiator may ask, “What did you do to feel better when you were depressed before?” but does not get an immediate response.

A good response would be simply waiting 10 seconds more, because it allows the depressed person time to respond and it uses a person’s discomfort with silences to put subtle pressure on them to talk.

A poor response would be asking two more questions in that 10 seconds, because it does not give the person time to work at their pace and it exposes the negotiator’s discomfort with silences and with the lack of action and it increases the stress on the person.

3. **Minimal encouragers**—brief, well-timed responses that let the subject know the negotiator is paying attention (Bolton, 1984; McMains & Lanceley, 1995; Noesner & Webster, 1998). Most people want an audience, so showing that you are paying attention is a powerful response that generally keeps the subject talking and begins to build a relationship.

Use: Minimal encouragers can be used any time during the incident to show the subject that the negotiator is listening, interested, and wants to hear more. It is a neutral, nonthreatening response that can be used with any subject. If it is effective, it keeps the subject talking and leads to more information.

The negotiator can expect more openness, more detail, smoother tone, more complete story, and fewer jumps in topic.

Example: If a prisoner says, “Get back. I want you guys out of the pod. I want to talk to the governor and I want to transfer to the Dominguez Unit.”

A good minimal response would be “And?” because it opens the door for more explanation without challenging the subject.

A poor response would be “All the units are alike. Why don’t you stay here?” because it is challenging, forcing the subject to defend his or her position, and is likely to lead to an increase in tension.

4. **Mirroring**—the negotiator repeating the last word or phrase. It communicates to the subject both that the negotiator is attending to what is being said and that the negotiator understands what is being said.

Use: This technique can be used in the negotiation to gather more information about the actor and the incident without being confrontational. It helps build rapport. It allows the subject to lead the conversation, so the issue of who is in charge is avoided. It is particularly effective in the crisis stage, when the negotiator is still trying to get enough information to understand what the subject’s issues are.

The negotiator can expect more openness, more details, a smoother tone, more complete story, and fewer jumps in topic.

Example: A trapped armed robber in a bank might say, “I have to get out of here with the money. It’s for my kid. It’s not for me.”

A good mirroring response would be “For your kid.” To which the robber might say, “Yeah. He’s got a fever and an infection and we don’t have money for the pills he’s supposed to take. He needs the money for the pills.”

A poor mirroring response would be “You expect me to believe that it’s not for you?” because it is too judgmental and misses the primary point of the subject’s message. It

reduces trust by not taking the subject's needs seriously.

5. **Paraphrasing**—the negotiator repeating the subject's meaning in the negotiator's words (Bolton, 1984; Noesner & Webster, 1998). It shows that the negotiator is listening and understands the content of the subject's message. It allows the subject the opportunity to clarify the message if it was not completely understood. It allows the negotiator to show empathy after using open-ended questions or statements to invite the actor to tell his or her story and uses encouragers to gain a fuller and deeper understanding of the subject's message.

Use: Paraphrasing can be used any time the negotiator wants to be sure he has understood the subjects' message, any time he wants the subject to know that he has understood the message, or any time he needs to stall for time. It is a particularly effective way of responding to the subject's demands, because it makes it clear that the negotiator has heard the demands without agreeing to anything. It can be used with any subject, regardless of personality, because it is essentially a straightforward information exchange. It can be used in negotiations or crisis intervention.

The negotiator can expect the subject to feel heard, to provide more details without repeating exactly the same story, and to correct any inaccuracies.

Example: A subject who was barricaded in his apartment with his common law wife after the neighbors called about a disturbance said, during the initial contact, "Get out of here or I am going to kill this bitch. I never did like her know-it-all smile and it is really beginning to bug me."

A good paraphrase would be, "You would like us to leave or you may hurt somebody. You are bothered by her attitude" because it shows that the negotiator has heard the message. It softens the person's statement and it invites the subject to say more. It shows interest. It shows basic empathy.

A poor paraphrase would be, "I can't do anything for you when you talk like that" because it begins to set limits too early. It negates the person's message about his irritation with his wife's attitude and it communicates a lack of understanding on the part of the negotiator that will make it difficult for the subject to talk because he has to work too hard to be understood.

6. **Emotional labeling**—the use of emotionally descriptive words to show that the negotiator understands the feelings the subject is experiencing (Bolton, 1984; McMains & Lanceley, 1995; Noesner & Webster, 1998). It is used without comment about the validity of the feelings. It helps deepen the relationship between the negotiator and the subject because feelings are more personal than content and reflecting them accurately shows a deeper understanding of the subject.

Use: Emotional labeling can be used any time the subject expresses strong feelings that need to be defused. It can be used to communicate a deep understanding or to check on the negotiator's understanding of the problem. It is particularly effective with normal people who are in crisis, inadequate, borderline, dependent, suicidal, or angry people who need to be defused. It is the keystone of active listening in crisis intervention.

The negotiator can expect the actor to elaborate more on feelings and reasons in his or her story and/or correct misperceptions.

Example: A subject who was angry about her husband's wanting to leave her for another woman said, "I have the two adulterous SOB's in here and I am going to make them pay. Nobody should get away with hurting other people this way. They are going to know what it is like."

A good use of emotional labeling would be "You sound pretty hurt about being left. It doesn't seem fair." because it recognizes the feelings without judging them. It is a good Additive Empathetic response because it identifies the hurt that underlies the anger the woman feels and adds the idea of justice to the actor's message, an idea that can lead to other ways of getting justice.

A poor response would be "You don't need to feel that way. If he was messing around on you, he was not worth the energy." It is judgmental. It tells the subject how not to feel. It minimizes the subject's feelings, which are a major part of who she is. It is Subtractive Empathy.

Empathy and what to listen for

A basic question is: "What are negotiators listening for that will help them develop rapport, trust, and influence?" Traditionally, the answer has been for the actor's message and feelings (FBI, 2003; Hogewood, 2005). However, the authors suggest that negotiators are listening for more than that; they are listening for the actor's "story" in the sense that they are listening for the values and the significant life events that form beliefs that guide the actor's actions and life.

As Strentz (2013) in reflecting on his "almost 40 years" as an FBI negotiator reported that:

"... ..Of all the approaches, the one that has the most universal application is active listening. Contrary to popular belief and media representation, a good negotiator is a good listener, not necessarily a good talker. We learn when we listen. As we listen, we learn. As negotiators, we listen for the words, phrases, what is said, what isn't, as well as the subject's version of reality. This tells us how to best extricate him or her from this self-created crisis that is their present and dangerous dilemma (p. 13)."

For instance, not everybody is overly sensitive to that threat of abandonment. However, because of their early life experiences in which the significant care givers in their lives were not reliable, were sometime abusive, and/or neglected the actor's basic needs, some people are hypersensitive to being abandoned. They adopt a set of beliefs that makes it hard for them to trust people in positions of power and authority while they recognize their intense need for the same people. Their story is that they have to depend on undependable people for their very survival, and they are angry about it at the same time that they do not think they can survive without the other. They are highly ambivalent, frightened, and angry in their relationships and often take hostages in an effort to keep the person on whom they depend involved with them. They are called *borderline personality disorders* in the clinical literature. If negotiators are able to hear that ambivalence and reflect it to the actor, they can show a depth of understanding that the person feels cements their relationship. They can focus the actor on the side of the ambivalence that will move them closer to a peaceful surrender.

Mullender (2012) makes a similar point. He says that we generally approach an incident listening for three things: (1) ideas that support our agenda; (2) the other person's story; or (3) the other person's beliefs and values. By story, he means the reasons the person ended up in a

confrontation with the police and what it is that makes them think that the confrontation is the only way to get heard or to get their needs met. By beliefs and values, he means the reasons the person is using to justify his or her actions. Using ALS to reflect the other person's values and beliefs is the depth of listening that allows negotiators to develop influence and trust. The FBI (2003) says it this way: "People don't always say what they mean. Attempt to listen for the meaning (unsatisfied needs). Negotiators are not in the business of meeting demands, but rather of satisfying needs."

Needs

What people need are the basic motivations for which they strive as human beings. Behavioral scientists have disagreed on what they are, how many there are, and how they are translated into actions (behavior). However, to "satisfy needs" as stated above, negotiators have to have a working definition of wants and needs. The FBI suggests that the following are basic human needs:

Security – physical and emotional safety; freedom from harm

Recognition – his or her view is understood

Control – feels he has some say, especially in the decisions that affect him

Dignity – being able to save face

Accomplishment – a sense of having achieved something

The importance of this is that actors have needs they are trying to satisfy and they think of their demands as the way to satisfy them. If negotiators can identify the needs, they can explore other options with the actor that will satisfy their needs. By focusing on the needs rather than the demand, a wider range of possibilities is opened, moving negotiations beyond the "position bargaining" that characterizes the early stages of a crisis.

Expectations

Neither the actors nor the police/corrections officers engage in negotiations in a vacuum. Both sides come to the incident with a history of experiences with people, perhaps with one another. This history is part of the reason it is important to be concerned about personality (see [Chapter 6](#)). The history sets both sides' expectations: "a looking forward to; anticipation, a looking for as due, proper, or necessary." Expectations tend to guide attitudes, feelings, and behavior. The history may include direct experiences, cultural norms, education, and training.

To fully understand the other person, to be empathetic, negotiators need to listen for the subject's expectations: "How is this play going to end?" For instance, the depressed/suicidal person expects pain to last forever; it is part of the hopelessness he or she feels. The negotiator needs to be able to recognize and reflect the feeling (depression) and the expectation (that this will last forever) to show additive empathy, an in-depth understanding of the person.

Expectations affect feelings and the definition of the problem for the negotiator. A strategic goal in dealing with depression is instilling hope (see [Chapter 6](#)) and the tactics are the skills

needed to help the actor resolve the ambivalence about hopelessness. Therefore, understanding expectations helps the negotiator understand where he or she needs to go and how to get there. A two-time loser who expects to go back to prison for a mandatory life sentence may be violent, thinking that it won't cost him any more to fight police who are blocking his path to freedom than to surrender. The negotiator can reflect both the actor's anger and his expectations to show that he is understood and choose tactics that focus the action tendency of anger toward resolving the actor's ambivalence about going back to jail.

Expectations in negotiations are of several kinds: the actor has expectations about the police. The subjects have expectations about the future outcome of the incident. The actor has expectations about the person they hold, either hostage/victim. Police have expectations about the subject, about how the subject will respond to different tactics and about the outcome. Both actor and police/corrections officers have expectations about how interpersonal strategies ought to influence one another. Empathy is understanding the actor's expectations, as well as the actor's story and feelings. In the scenario above, negotiators need to be asking themselves, "If I were in the subject's situation, what would I expect of the police?" "How would I expect them to act?" "How would I think this will turn out?" "What will it mean to me and the people I care about?" "What were my original goals?" "What are my current goals?" "How is holding people captive helping me?"

Violations of expectations can lead to an increase in tension. When police/corrections officers do not respond with threats and force when the actor expects it, tension is likely to rise. When negotiators do not follow through on promises, tensions rise. When the actor's experience with police/corrections officers has been primarily negative and the negotiator is a police/corrections officer, tensions rise. Lazarus (1984) has pointed out that the way the violation of expectations affects a relationship depends on how well the people involved in the relationship like and trust each other—again, underlining the importance of negotiators spending the necessary time to build a relationship, trust and liking, before offering suggestions. Deal carefully with attunement first.

[Frames or triggers: SAFE model](#)

Another thing to listen for is the "frames or triggers" discussed by Hammer in the SAFE model of negotiations. Hammer (2007) has presented the SAFE model of resolving hostage and crisis situations. It identifies four major areas of concern (frames/triggers) for most actors during any negotiations: S ubstantive issue, A ttunement, F ace, and E motions. Communications in negotiations are generally focused on one of these issues. It is these frames/triggers with which negotiators can expect to deal during the incident and for which negotiators need to be listening to be empathetic. Negotiators need to pay close attention to and deal with the issue that is on the actor's mind at the time the negotiator is talking with him or her to establish contact, build rapport, and gain influence before he or she moves on to the issues that concern the negotiator. A disconnect develops if the negotiator is dealing with an issue that is not the one on which the actor is focused; they are out of attunement. There is not trust and rapport. For instance, take the actor who is barricaded, asking for his estranged wife. If the negotiator does not deal with the substantive demand well, he or she can expect it to undermine his or her relationship with the actor, resulting in a lack of rapport and trust. Without rapport and

trust, the negotiator cannot hope to influence the actor.

Stages of change

Kelln and McMurtry (2007) have pointed out that change is a process that needs to be understood by negotiators in order to choose the best intervention at the appropriate time. They present the STEP model, based on the Trans-theoretical Model of change, as a way of looking at negotiations because it has been applied successfully to a number of behavioral change issues. The Trans-theoretical Model posits that a person must recognize that there is a problem with his behavior, must decide to change the behavior, must develop a plan for change, and must follow through on that plan. It fits neatly into the crisis model (see below), beginning at the Crisis Stage and running through the Resolution Stage. The stages of change are the:

Pre-contemplation stage—in which the subject sees no reason to change and is likely to resist suggestions that he or she change. It is manifest in the crisis incident by arguing, ignoring, discounting, and so on.

Contemplation stage—in which the subject is thinking about change, is weighing alternatives and may be open to input about the strengths and weaknesses of each option. During this stage, he or she may be ambivalent about change, so they are not committed to change. Questions like, “What will happen, if I come out” suggest the actor is contemplating change. Negotiators can guide the actor to consider the reasons change is good and why staying where he or she is is not so good.

Preparation stage—in which the subject recognizes the need for change and is willing to develop a plan, but is not ready to execute the change.

Action stage—in which the subject carries out the plan.

Kelln and McMurtry (2007) suggest that during the precontemplation stage the goal is for negotiators to develop rapport and to get the actor to recognize there is a problem. These goals can be facilitated by: Validating the actor’s lack of readiness to change— making resistance normal; supporting the actor’s effort to re-evaluate his or her behavior and situation; and using reassurance, empathy, sharing commonalities, humor, being nonjudgmental, and active listening during this stage.

When the actor expresses some awareness of the seriousness of his or her situation and begins to explore the possibility of change (not necessarily surrender), the negotiator’s goals become developing an alliance, creating discontent about the current situation and moving the actor to consider the possibility of surrender (Kelln & McMurtry, 2007). They suggest that the negotiator use the following tactics to achieve the goals of this step in the change process: Validate the actor’s lack of readiness to change; encourage an examination of the pros and cons of their situation; encourage a re-evaluation of their behavior; explain and personalize the risk to the actor; identify and promote positive expectations of future plans and expectations; and show concern for the actor’s safety.

During the Preparation stage, Kelln and McMurtry (2007) suggest that the negotiator’s goals are to focus the actor on active problem-solving and planning an exit strategy and to keep the actor from regressing to an earlier stage of the change process by: removing obstacles to exiting safely; making sure the actor has the physical ability to leave the location when surrender occurs; identifying key supports to surrender; planning in small, discrete steps; and showing concern for the actor’s safety.

Finally, during the Action stage, the negotiator’s goals are to get the actor to exit and to keep him or her from regressing to an earlier stage. Skills for facilitating these goals are:

issuing short, discrete, simple instructions; reinforcing the decision to surrender; and showing concern for safety and security.

It is important for negotiators to understand that the actor may have to move through the stages of change for each SAFE issue encountered at each stage of the negotiations process. For instance, in the crisis stage, when attunement is likely to be a major issue, the actor will likely start from a position of mistrust and dislike for the negotiator. He will be in the Precontemplation stage of the Trans-theoretical model. He or she will have to change his or her assessment of the trustworthiness of the negotiator (his or her cognitive behavior) in order to move on to other issues. The Trans-theoretical model suggests that we can expect the actor to move to contemplation of different ideas about the trustworthiness of the negotiator in the same way that the actor changes other behavior. The negotiator can facilitate this change in cognitive behavior using tactics such as those the SAFE model suggests for dealing with attunement (doing favors and expressing liking) and the skills suggested by motivational interviewing for recognizing and dealing with resistance and ambivalence (focusing the actor on the reasons that changing his or her ideas about police/corrections officers would benefit them and supporting self-efficacy).

During the Adaptation Stage of Crisis Intervention, the substantive issue of surrender will become the focus. Safety will likely be an issue. The actor may have reservations about coming out and fear is likely to be a core emotion. The negotiator will need to help him or her work through the fear the actor feels about putting him-or herself in harm's way. The negotiator will have to go through the stages of change again on the new issue of safety during surrender.

Different types of sieges are likely to progress through change at different speeds. For instance, a spontaneous siege in which the hostage is truly a hostage is likely to move through the stages of change faster than an anticipated or planned siege in which the actors were prepared for and planned for police intervention. A spontaneous siege in which the person being held is a victim in the making is likely to become stalled in the Precontemplation stage and a good deal of time is likely to be needed to facilitate the actor's recognition that change is needed. Negotiators need to be aware of the different time requirements involved in the different type of sieges, plan their own staffing accordingly and advise command of their estimates, so appropriate strategic and tactical plans can be made.

Ambivalence

Developed to use with a particularly difficult group, substance abusers, the motivational interviewing model, a complement to the Trans-theoretical model, was designed to help people resolve ambivalence when changing. Miller and Rollnick (2002) state that: "Ambivalence takes the form of a conflict between two courses of action (e.g., indulgence versus restraint), each of which has perceived benefits and costs associated with it." Take the actor who did not plan on getting caught during a bank robbery. He is likely to have mixed feelings about the negotiator's suggestion that he surrender. On the one hand, it would end the stress of managing an unplanned-for event; on the other, it would have the disadvantage of going to jail. At the same time, staying in the bank with his hostages has both pluses and minuses: it increases the difficulty he faces managing the hostages who may have a variety of

needs, increases his basic need for food, water, etc., and increases the chances of an accidental event making things worse, while at the same time it provides him with some sense of safety.

The authors have found several ways in which ambivalence becomes an issue during a crisis/hostage incident, including:

Ambivalence about negotiators—most people have mixed feelings about the police/corrections officers or anybody else with power. They recognize the need to deal with the authorities but do not trust them to be helpful. Ambivalence about the negotiator speaks directly to the issue of attunement because the relationship is built on trust and liking between the actor and the negotiator. Negotiators must be able to recognize and manage ambivalence toward authority when it occurs.

Ambivalence toward self—the actors may have mixed feelings about themselves, about their ability to handle the situation in which they find themselves—their self-efficacy. People who are suicidal will have mixed feelings about their ability to handle the problems and pain in their lives. They are “face attacks” in the SAFE vocabulary. Self-attacking statements should suggest to the negotiator that the actor does not see himself as capable, having self-efficacy, or the ability to manage the situation. They are likely to see themselves as inadequate or broken and feel ashamed and disgusted. Both their self-attacking and emotional issues will need to be addressed by negotiators to resolve the incident well and managing their ambivalence in a way that instills hope will be necessary. This usually involves helping the actor explore the positive side of his or her ambivalence toward themselves.

Ambivalence toward others—people who take hostages who are in ongoing relationships with them frequently have mixed feelings about their “significant other.” For instance, dependent people frequently recognize their dependence and both value and hate the person on whom they depend. Attunement with the significant other is likely to be an issue. The actor may use a lot of “face attacking” statements when talking about their hostages. Anger is likely to be the obvious feeling. It is a clue that risk to others is an issue. At the same time, it suggests that the actor is only focused on one side of his or her ambivalence toward the other and that the negotiator needs to help the actor refocus on the other side of the ambivalence, while assessing risk and managing the anger.

Ambivalence about the situation—sometimes, actors will have mixed feelings about being in the situation. Frequently, this is ambivalence about allowing themselves to end up in the situation. It is about Face and Shame. For instance, the officer whose wife reported him to be drunk and suicidal when faced with an order from his immediate supervisor may feel the stress of obeying an order versus being embarrassed by appearing on the 5 o’clock news.

Ambivalence about the negotiator’s suggested course of action—actors who do not trust the negotiator are likely to have mixed feelings about suggestions offered by them. They will tend to resist suggestions, become argumentative and stall the negotiations. For instance, the actor who has been asking for his girlfriend to come to the scene and has been ignored by the negotiator in favor of repeated suggestions that he should come out and talk to the negotiator is likely to have mixed feelings about the negotiator and his suggestion, seeing it as a possible way of achieving his ends, talking with his girlfriend, but not trusting the negotiator to take his needs seriously, because he has ignored them during the negotiations. Before an actor will take the negotiator’s suggestions seriously, he or she must believe they have his or her best interests in mind. That is the essence of trust. Negotiators need to be prepared to deal with the trust issue early on, to reduce ambivalence about their suggestions.

Ambivalence about surrendering— again Face and Attunement come to the fore as issues when dealing with surrender. The actor is asked to trust the negotiator when the negotiator says that the actor will be safe—an attunement issue. The actor will have to deal with the failure of his or her original quest—a face issue. He or she is likely to show self-attacking behavior and negotiator-attacking behavior.

[Table 3.1](#) shows the relationship between the stages of a crisis, the ambivalence the actor may feel about the primary SAFE issues and feelings that can be expected at each stage. Identifying the emotion may help alert the negotiator to the specific frame (issue) with which the actor is concerned. Identifying the frame may give insight into what emotion and action tendency is driving the actor.

[Table 3.1](#) Stages of Crisis and Expected Ambivalence and Emotions at Each Stage *Negotiators need to be prepared to deal with ambivalence by using the guidelines from Motivational Interviewing*

Stage	Expected Ambivalence	Expected Emotions
Pre-Crisis		
Crisis	Attunement Face	Fear, Anger Shame, Disgust
Adaptation	Substance	Ambivalence
Resolution	Attunement Face	Fear Shame

Miller and Rollnick (2002) point out that people generally see both the pluses and the minuses in any option and, when faced with arguments for one side, they tend to take and defend the opposite side. Defending a position tends to keep people locked in place, making it difficult to change their ideas, feelings, and behavior. It leads to resistance. In addition, they suggest that a major reason people do not change is that they do not believe they can. They do not have a sense of self-efficacy. *Motivational interviewing* (MI) presents several principles that are helpful for negotiators to keep in mind when trying to influence subjects to change. They include:

1. Motivation to change is elicited from the HT, not imposed from without by the negotiator.
2. It is the HT's task, not the negotiator's, to articulate and resolve his or her ambivalence.
3. Direct persuasion is not an effective method for resolving ambivalence.
4. The negotiating style is generally a quiet and eliciting one.
5. The negotiator's style is directive in helping the client examine and resolve ambivalence.
6. Resistance to change is not an HT trait, but a fluctuating product of interpersonal interaction.
7. The negotiating relationship is more like a partnership or companionship than expert/recipient roles.

They suggest the following strategies in facilitating change in others:

1. Express empathy
2. Develop discrepancy
3. Roll with resistance
4. Support self-efficacy

Empathy has been discussed above.

To motivate the actor to change, the discrepancy between his or her current thoughts, feelings, or actions and his or her goals must be articulated by the actor. Discrepancy is developed by getting the actor to think about and recognize the difference between his or her long-term goals/values/needs and where they are at the moment (Miller and Rollnick, 2002;

Mullender, 2013). Miller and Rollnick (2002), suggest that discrepancies are developed by:

1. asking questions that focus on change talk
2. asking actor to elaborate on reasons for change
3. asking about extremes
4. looking back
5. looking forward
6. exploring goals and values

When negotiators hear the subject start to talk about the reasons change would be good for him or her or the reasons not changing is bad, he or she can make a point of reinforcing that talk and asking the subject to elaborate on it.

Elaboration can be used once the actor starts talking about changing. It is simply asking something like, “Tell me more about what it would be like if ____.” It generally focuses the subject on change, generating more reasons for change and increasing motivation.

Asking about extremes basically involves asking, “What is the best thing that can happen if you do not change?” “What is the worst that can happen, if you don’t change?” “What is the best that can happen, if you do change?” or “What is the worst thing that can happen if you don’t change?” In the scenario above, the actor did not initially want to talk with the police, forcing the resident to answer the phone when negotiators called. Through the resident, the negotiators asked, “What is the worst that could happen, if you talk with us?” and “What is the best?” It helped the actor focus on change talk and develop his own reasons why talking was in his best interests.

Asking the subject to look back at better times will help generate change talk by helping him or her identify the things that were better then and that can be better again. For instance, the suicidal person who is stuck in the pain of loss and the depression that goes with loss can be asked to think about better times, how they were different, and what he or she can do to make things better again.

Focusing the actor on a future that is better than the present often helps them identify what needs to be done to make things better. It leads to change talk and helps the actor focus on the difference between where he or she is when dealing with the negotiator and where he or she would like to be.

Another approach to developing discrepancies in the actor’s mind is borrowed from reality therapy (Glasser, 1965). After establishing a working relationship with a person (attunement), change can be facilitated by asking him or her three questions:

1. What is it that you want/need?
2. Is what you are doing getting you those things?
3. What are you going to do differently to get them?

Note that these questions highlight the discrepancy between the actor’s goals and how things are currently, and they put the responsibility for change on the actor.

The case of a business manager who was concerned about the bad press his affair was likely to generate and who threatens suicide to deal with the shame, illustrates the principles. Negotiators asked him what was the worst thing that could happen if his affair was made

public. He said embarrassment (shame). “Everybody would know I messed up.” The negotiators suggested that like everybody, he really wanted people to think well of him. He agreed. The negotiator asked him how he thought killing himself would help people think well of him? He had no answer, recognizing the stigma that usually accompanies suicide. The negotiator suggested that he handled a lot of problems for others well and that he could handle this one of his own using his well-developed problem-solving skills. Then the negotiator asked him what he could do differently to gain people’s respect in handling his own problems.

Resistance

Ambivalence is recognized by resistance. Motivational Interviewing suggests that when negotiators encounter resistance in negotiations, we need to examine and change our tactics, because resistance is seen as something that happens as a result of the interaction between people, not as a result of the personality of the actor. Recognizing resistance talk helps negotiators plan interventions and assess the need to change tactics. If the negotiator gets resistance talk when expecting another outcome, the responsibility for changing tactics is on the negotiator.

As noted above, resistance talk is the subject giving the negotiators the reasons that change is a bad idea and/or the reasons not changing is a good idea. For instance, if the negotiator suggested to the subject in the introductory scenario that he send out the elderly woman he was holding and he got a response like, “Are you kidding? She is the only thing between me and my dying,” the negotiator would be hearing resistance talk—the reason complying with the suggestion is a bad idea from the perspective of the subject.

The SAFE model suggests that one reason negotiators meet resistance is because they are not attending to the same thing as the actor. Negotiators are addressing a different frame/trigger than the actor and they need to change tactics. This is the specific focus when we do not get the response we expect when using a specific skill that normally works in obtaining our tactical goal. For instance, if the negotiator keeps asking the actor to surrender and the actor keeps talking about how he has messed up his whole life, the two are not on the same page and the negotiator needs to change tactics.

Wikipedia (2008) defines “**Psychological resistance**, the act of defending one’s position in response to confrontation.” It is recognized in negotiations in the following responses from the actor:

1. **Arguing**—challenging the observation, authority, expertise of the negotiator.
2. **Interrupting**—breaking in in a defensive manner; not letting the negotiator finish his or her statement.
3. **Negating**—unwillingness to accept problem, cooperate, accept responsibility, or advice from the negotiator: “You don’t know what you are talking about” and “You shouldn’t even be here” are examples.
4. **Ignoring**—not following negotiator’s lead.

Managing resistance

According to Miller and Rollnick (2002), the overriding principle for dealing with resistance is to “Roll with Resistance,” meaning that it is better to sidestep resistance than to argue, debate, or persuade, because arguing generally makes the subject defend his position and reduces the probability of change and problem-solving. When confronted, most people defend the side of the ambivalence not presented by the confronter, committing themselves to a position that they find difficult to change. Using an Aikido approach to conflict, stepping to the side (see [Chapter 5](#) for a discussion of stepping to the side) reduces resistance and increases the chances of the person re-evaluating their situation, thoughts, and/or behavior for themselves. Motivational interviewing suggests several strategies for managing resistance that are applicable to negotiations. They include:

- a. Use the BLS model to define the problem from the subject’s point of view, as discussed above—empathetic.
- b. Elicit change talk from the subject.
- c. Shift the actor’s focus away from the reasons change is not possible to another issue. For instance, when a subject says something like, “This whole thing is probably going to be on the 10 o’clock news and ruin me,” the negotiator might say, “Let’s take this a step at a time. We have to be sure everybody gets out safe before we worry about the news.” The SAFE model suggests that negotiators shift focus to other SAFE issues.
- d. Reframe reasons that change is bad and not changing is good. Validate observation with a new interpretation. For instance, the subject might say, “My wife is always on my back about not making enough money. I get really tired of her nagging,” the negotiator might say, “It sounds like she thinks you can do a lot, be a good provider.” Or when the subject challenges the police’s right to be at the scene by saying something like, “This is between me and my husband. Just go away. I didn’t call you,” the negotiator might say, “We know you didn’t call. Somebody who was worried about you did and we need to be sure everybody is OK. Public safety is our job.”
- e. Agree with a twist is a reflection followed by a reframe. This involves validating the subject’s observations, feelings, and thoughts, and puts a different interpretation on it. For instance, if the actor says, “I’ve dealt with you guys before. You lied to me about just wanting to talk to me when I was drunk at home. Asked me to come out into the yard and arrested me for Public Intoxication. Why should I mess with you?” the negotiator could say, “Yeah, it’s pretty frustrating when you can’t trust people who are supposed to protect you and I can’t tell you to trust me. I know you have to earn trust and that takes time. How about you give me a chance to show you what I can do for you. How about you give me a little time?”
- f. Emphasize personal choice to enhance self-efficacy. One reason for resistance is our need to be in control of our own life. As the song goes, “I’ll be damned if he’ll run mine.” Most of us have a rebel inside us that tends to resist authority. Some have more rebel than others. The way around this issue is to emphasize to the actor that the outcome really depends on him or her.
- g. Come alongside (see [Chapter 5](#) for a discussion of coming alongside).

Motivational interviewing is both client-centered and directive. That is, it recognizes that the motivation for changing has to come from the person, but that the negotiator can focus the person on discrepancies between what the actor wants and what he or she has or is likely to get if he or she keeps doing what he or she is currently doing. Whether or not it is more or less client-centered or directive depends on the stage of change the person is in.

The REACCT matrix

Pulling together all of the above principles and overlaying the stages of a crisis, [Table 3.2](#) outlines the REACCT approach to negotiations.

Recognition

There are several things a negotiator can recognize early on that are helpful in anticipating and planning their intervention to minimize losses. They include recognizing the initial risk of violence, the conditions needed to make an incident negotiable, the type of incident it is, the type of siege, and the type of person or people they are dealing with.

Initial risk

First, negotiators benefit from recognizing the potential risk involved in an incident. McGowan (2007), studying NYPD incidents, concluded that three things predict the potential for violence: *Context*, *Containment*, and *Communication*. Context is focused on whether there was violence before or as the police arrived at the scene. McGowan points out that threat is not violence. Violence means actual acts, not just threatened acts in which someone is hurt or killed. Containment means just what we have always thought: Is the situation controlled? Communication is focused on whether or not the actor is willing to engage in dialogue or not: Will he get on the phone, tell the negotiator what is going on and respond to the negotiator's comments? Will he stay engaged with the negotiator over time?

Generally, incidents that start with violence directed at a hostage or other person and at the police when they arrive turn out to be more violent. Incidents that are not well contained are more violent than those in which there is containment. Incidents in which there is good, continuous communication are less violent than those in which there is poor, erratic communication.

[Table 3.2](#) REACCT—The Integration of Behavioral Science Principles to Provide a Roadmap for Managing High-Risk Incidents using Negotiations. *The REACCT Model—The Goals, Issues (SAFE), Stages of Change, Tasks, and Skills Applicable to Each Step of the Model*

Pre-Crisis	Crisis		Adaptation		Resolution
	Recognition	Engagement	Assessment	Contracting/ Controlling	Terminating/ Transferring
Goals	Planning Strategy and Tactics Develop Safety and Security	Build: Rapport and Reassurance Facilitate: Ventilation and Validation	Evaluate risk	Facilitate: Prediction and Planning Develop: Problem-solving Resolve: Ambivalence Gain: Surrender	Transfer: Responsibility
SAFE Issues		Substantive Attunement Face Emotions Pre-contemplation	Substantive Attunement Face Emotions	Substantive Attunement Face Emotions Contemplation Preparation	Substantive Attunement Face Emotions Action
Stage of Change Tasks	Assess: Initial Risk Characteristics: Type of siege Type of person Stage of change	Check Attitude Establish Communications Plan Introduction Credibility Show Empathy- Understanding Use BLS	Assess: Suicide Risk Homicide Risk Issues Resources	Influence actor to surrender Help actor resolve ambivalence Roll with Resistance Support: Self-efficacy Facilitate Problem-solving	Show: Empathy Provide: Resources
Skills		Open-Ended Questions EP Minimal Encouragers Mirroring Paraphrasing Emotion Labeling	Questioning Summarizing Reflection of meaning	Problem-solving Skills Motivational Interviewing BLS or OARS Eliciting Change Talk Shift Focus Reframe I-Messages Brainstorming	Guided Imagery Relaxation

The initial issue in assessing risk is estimating the chances of violence occurring and how negotiators best fit into the plan to manage the risk of violence. The initial assessment tells us where we are starting, and where we need to go, given the strategic goal of minimizing loss. If the risk is high: How do negotiators support an assault plan? By stalling, gathering intelligence, and setting up the psychological conditions that will maximize the effectiveness of an assault, or do we develop negotiations tactics to reduce risk and facilitate a peaceful resolution when an assault is not feasible or acceptable? Are we going to have to deal with and develop tactics for managing impulsiveness, and the actor's expectation that the worst will happen because of the violence he or she has already committed? How can we reduce the risk of the actor aggressing again? If the risk is low, how do we avoid aggravating the situation so that the subject does not become violent? All of these are questions that flow from the initial risk assessment.

A caveat: McGowan's research applies to spontaneous sieges more than planned or anticipated sieges. Dolnick and Fitzgerald (2007) have pointed out that in planned sieges like the Beslan School siege, violence does not mean that the actors are not willing to negotiate, nor does it mean that they will keep on killing. Sometimes it is a part of their strategy to bring the other side to the negotiating table.

A recent Delphi study by the National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA Study Group, 2011) looked at the criteria experts in the field thought favored negotiations and the factors that favored SWAT interventions. In the executive summary, they concluded:

48 Influences, behaviors, actions and/or events were identified that the Delphi experts believe favor (SWAT) intervention as the preferred course of action. Of these, 33 included intentional injury or death to a hostage. The remaining 15 all involved circumstances which involved credible threats that hostages were in imminent danger (e.g. gunshots heard from inside the

location).

66 Influences, behaviors, actions and/or events were identified that the Delphi experts believed favored negotiations as the preferred course of action. Of these, all involved some indication that negotiations were succeeding. 36 involved a concession of some sort by the hostage taker, especially the release of a hostage.

Despite the predictive value of the factors, Influences, behaviors, actions and/or events, none were considered conclusive in nature, in and of themselves. The single recognized exception was when a hostage taker kills a hostage and intentionally injures a hostage. When such an event occurs the group expressed a strong belief that intervention was necessary. (pp. 1 – 2.)

Characteristics of a negotiable incident

In the early 1980s, the FBI suggested eight characteristics that are necessary for an incident to be negotiable. They are:

1. There must be a need to live on the part of the hostage taker (HT).
2. There must be a threat of force on the part of the authorities.
3. There must be demands by the hostage taker.
4. The negotiator must be seen by the hostage taker as a person who can hurt the hostage taker but is willing to help him.
5. There must be the time to negotiate.
6. A reliable channel of communication must exist between the hostage taker and the negotiator.
7. Both the location and the communications of the incident need to be contained in order to encourage negotiation.
8. The negotiator must be able to deal with the hostage taker making the decisions.

There must be a hostage taker who needs to live—without the need to live; the negotiator's bottom line is removed. Mental health professionals (Maslow, 1954; Glasser, 1998) have defined the basic needs that motivate most normal people as: the need to survive; the need to belong—to love, share, and cooperate; the need for power; the need for freedom; and the need for fun (Glasser, 1998). Needs may conflict with one another, but generally the need to survive takes priority over all others. This priority of the survival need gives negotiators a powerful bargaining tool. An example of the power of the survival need is a hostage taker who claimed to have killed a person and then ran his family out of the house by shooting at them. He barricaded himself in the house with a “friend” and did not respond to negotiators’ attempts to contact him using the telephone and a bullhorn. After five hours of not responding and after an assessment of his psychological status, he was presented with an ultimatum: “Either give up or the tactical team is going to assault the house and kill you.” Suddenly, he asked to talk to the negotiator, claiming he did not know that the police had wanted to talk with him. He thought that the telephone that had been ringing every 30 seconds for five hours had been for somebody else. The threat to survival is a powerful attention-getter for most people.

However, people who have decided to die do not feel threatened by death. They would rather die than live with what they think of as unbearable pain. They are difficult to negotiate with because they have no desire to live. Without the need to live, there is rarely something the negotiator can bargain with. For instance, Dolnik and Fitzgerald (2008) have pointed out that the Chechen rebels who assaulted the school in Beslan were willing to die to achieve their

goals, removing the power of the threat of force by the authorities and making the incident more complicated to negotiate. Similarly, people who are suicidal are often ambivalent about their need to live, requiring negotiators to work at helping them to decide to live.

Ergomas—Military & Police Relations: Civil-Military Relations in an Age of Austerity

Countering the Insider Threat: Police Crisis Negotiation Training to The Royal Regiment of Scotland

Chief Inspector Andrew B. Brown has served in Northern Constabulary, Scotland, for over 26 years and is Deputy Head and Chartered Manager of the Leadership & Professional Development Division of the Scottish Police College.

He is former Area Commander of Caithness, Sutherland & Easter Ross. Trained as a Licensed Negotiator in 2001, he has special interest in dealing with maritime incidents, a subject on which he has lectured both nationally and internationally. As the 2011/12 Scottish Fulbright Police Research Fellow he conducted doctoral research and lectured in maritime terrorism and negotiation as a visiting professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, The City University of New York and at Texas State University. He has taught hostage/crisis negotiators since 2002 and has participated in a number of the highest UK government level counterterrorism exercises in key roles and was deployed to the Algerian Hostage Crisis. As an associate lecturer, he is one of the founding members of the Police (Special Operations) Research Group within Aberdeen Centre for Trauma Research at the Robert Gordon University and has facilitated workshops at the International Conference on Disaster Psychology, Bergen, Norway. In 2009, he was awarded a Practitioner Fellowship from Scottish Institute for Policing Research and is conducting research into the effectiveness of police negotiators' deployment to incidents of deliberate self harm. He has instructed on the FBI Crisis Negotiation Course, and helped assess the Bureau's response to a Homeland Security maritime terrorist incident exercise at the US Naval Weapons Station, Earle, New Jersey. He recently co-authored Modern Piracy & Maritime Terrorism: The Challenges of Piracy for the 21st Century available at <http://www.kendallhunt.com/store-product.aspx?id=51846>. In 2012, both he and Emeritus Professor D. A. Alexander were invited to design and deliver Hostage Negotiation Skills to selected officers at the School of Military Intelligence, Murree, Pakistan. He has also designed and delivered negotiation and de-escalation skills training to The Royal Regiment of Scotland, 2 Scots prior to their deployment to Afghanistan to combat Green-on-Blue attacks.

The “insider threat” has always been a theme in insurgencies. The threat can never be completely removed but it can be minimised as much as possible. Insider threat consists of insurgent infiltration and GREEN-on-BLUE attacks when a member of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) directly and deliberately targets a member of ISAF. Between 2007 and 2012, there have been over 90 insider attacks in Afghanistan. Many of these incidents have been shown to be caused by personal confrontations that involve cultural insensitivities.

Whilst determining the true motivations behind these attacks is difficult (as the attacker is usually killed or escapes) analysis suggests that the underlying causes include a perceived challenge or insult to any of the following:

- Personal Pride
- Ego
- Cultural Identity

It also suggests that the effects of this perceived challenge or insult may be aggravated by the effects of combat fatigue, poor discipline and drug use.

Instruction on conflict de-escalation and resolution techniques has been identified as an integral part of pre-deployment training, with various cross-cultural conflict

escalation scenarios being utilised for role play exercises. In November 2012, The Royal Regiment of Scotland approached the Scottish Police College, Tulliallan Castle, Fife with a request for bespoke training in communication skills and de-escalation tactics. The programme was to be designed and delivered to The Royal Regiment of Scotland, “2 Scots Brigade” prior to their deployment to Afghanistan in March 2013. Agreement was reached that the training would be delivered at no financial cost to the military, as part of the Scottish government’s drive towards collaborative working and as part of the Scottish Police College contribution to supporting the troops in Afghanistan.

In designing the training, the team took account of current military training techniques, cultural issues and literature surrounding the history of the insider threat during the Afghan Campaign, as well as researching the Soviet experience in Afghanistan during the late 1970s. In addition, they were provided with real-time information from officers currently “in theatre” who reported that negotiation tactics and communication skills were effective at reducing conflict “on the ground.” In delivering the training, the team specifically requested the assistance of Afghan personnel to assist in contextualising the training and demonstrating communication barriers in live play exercises.

In January and February 2013, training was initially delivered to officers and Senior NCOs before training the following troops:

- Ground Soldiers from various platoons
- Military Police Instructors from the Lashkar Gah Training Centre
- Military Police Mentors
- Fire Response Group

Training commanding officers prior to troops was considered appropriate as it assisted in developing relevant and realistic exercises and ensuring the training was fit for purpose and pitched at the correct level to engage the various groups. Following the initial delivery, the programme was adjusted to include the Afghan role play scenarios and thereafter delivered to approximately 120 troops. Delivery of the training identified three distinct groups of individuals within the Brigade:

- Naturally skilled communicators who quickly grasped the concept
- Those who “learned” the skill and would be able to apply it with practice
- Those who struggle from the outset to develop existing communication skills, apparently as a result of poor vocabulary and intellect.

Taking cognisance of traditional and proven military training methods, the training was delivered in the following format:

- Theory input
- Instructor demonstration
- Live role play exercise in English
- Live role play exercise in Pushtun with Afghan role players and interpreters

Initial feedback indicated that the training was of value and the majority of personnel

understood and benefited from it. They also indicated that they could see its potential value in application in theatre.

In conjunction with 2 Scots Brigade, the team will evaluate the effectiveness of the training pre-and post-deployment. This is essentially important given the nature of Afghan-led Security Forces and the staged withdrawal of British troops from Afghanistan in 2014. The team experienced shared learning from this and is now in the process of making recommendations to roll out the training across other brigades in The Royal Regiment of Scotland. In addition, it is hoped that this initiative will lead to future collaborative training and exercising between the Royal Regiment of Scotland and the new Police Service of Scotland. The team consisted of Chief Inspector Andrew Brown, Detective Inspector Samantha McCluskey and Inspector Craig Menzies, all of whom are currently operational negotiator coordinators, police negotiator instructors and recognised experts in their field. All three are currently based at the Scottish Police College.

There must be the threat of force on the part of the authorities. Without a credible threat, hostage takers may have no reason to negotiate, because they have little to lose. In conjunction with the need to live, the threat of force frequently gives the negotiator leverage. However, the threat has to be believable. The authorities have to be seen as both having the force (firepower) and the will to use it. For instance, in one bank robbery, the police let the hostage taker get to the parking lot, where he took a female hostage. He started to walk around a car and was not stopped. He moved up and down the street, saying “Man, I am going to get away.” He never believed that the police had the will to use their force against him. This is one of the important reasons negotiators and tactical teams need to work closely together—to provide a credible threat.

It should be pointed out that the threat does not have to be articulated or overt. It is implied by the very presence of the SWAT team. It is the reason actors frequently demand that SWAT officers be moved back, because the actor fears this threat.

The hostage taker must make substantive demands (Noesner, 1999). Without demands, negotiators have nothing to work with. There is little that can be used to buy time; time enables negotiators to show a willingness to help. Hammer (2007) has pointed out that one way of building trust in an incident is to negotiate about and to give up peripheral demands like food, water, and contact with people who can facilitate surrender. Without demands, there are no negotiations.

The SAFE frames tell us that Substantive issues are only one of the issues with which negotiators need to attend. Without demands, Face, Emotions, and Attunement may need attention and give negotiators a focus. There are tactics open to the negotiator. The negotiator can use crisis intervention skills to manage the incident. They can focus on and deal with the action tendencies involved in the feelings associated with the relationship, helping the actor to re-examine his or her ambivalence about the hostage, and he can help the actor develop other ways of using the emotions rather than hurting the hostage. For instance, a police officer took his estranged wife hostage after finding out that she was seeing another man. He made no demands, other than that the negotiators go away, and that it was between him and the “bitch” he had with him. Recognizing the core emotion of anger, the negotiator used the BLS

to get the man's story. He had been married for 15 years and had provided a good living for his wife. They had no children. However, he had several affairs over the years, frequently not coming home on his days off. When his wife realized what had happened, she demanded that he move out and started an affair. He was hurt and angry, went to their home and held her at gunpoint. Negotiators, after getting a clearer picture of the problem, help him realize that he still loved her, or he wouldn't be hurt and that there were other ways of using the energy of his anger, like working hard at resolving the conflict between the two of them. The wife agreed that her actions were driven by her hurt and anger and agreed to work with the officer, even though he was likely to go to jail and lose his job over the incident.

The negotiator must be seen by the hostage taker as a person who can hurt the hostage taker but is willing to help him. By being both a source of harm and of help, the negotiator can maximize his or her worth to the hostage taker. By using the contrast of potentially deadly harm and a genuine desire to help, negotiators can be seen as powerful allies for the hostage taker. The contrast between the violent confrontation the hostage taker expects from the police and the understanding and help the negotiator provides makes the negotiator look like even more of an ally than he or she really is. The contrast effect is a powerful tool of influence (Cialdini, 1984). Being seen as helpful in the future is basic to building trust and attunement and negotiators need to focus subjects on the ways they are and can be helpful to the subject.

Negotiations take time. Without sufficient time, a relationship cannot be built between the negotiator and the hostage taker, intelligence cannot be gathered, emotions cannot be defused, self-efficacy cannot be enhanced, and problems cannot be solved. If either side is unable or unwilling to allow the time, successful negotiation is impossible. For instance, if a depressed person has a suicide plan that calls for him to shoot himself when he finishes counting down from ten to one and he is on seven, time is limited. Likewise, if a paranoid schizophrenic's delusions lead him to insist on an airplane landing in front of his house to take him to Mexico within the hour, there are limits on the time within which the negotiator has to work. The impact of frustrated expectations on the actor's actions and the implications for risk management need to be addressed by the negotiators and the whole crisis management team. Other options may be needed.

A reliable channel of communication must exist between the hostage taker and the negotiator. By definition, negotiation is the settling of conflict through conferring or discussing. Without a channel of communication, there can be no discussion. As McGowan's research has shown, without effective communication, the risk of violence is increased.

A reliable channel of communication implies that there not only must be reliable equipment, but there must be reliable communicators. The people must speak the same language, have a similar meaning for words, and use language consistently. Negotiators and hostage takers not only have to speak the same language, but they also have to use the same dialect. Castilian Spanish is not the same as Puerto Rican Spanish or street Spanish. The lack of a common meaning for words is one of the reasons negotiating with emotionally disturbed individuals is problematic. They frequently use language in an idiosyncratic, unique way. The negotiator must be sensitive to the personal meanings of words in order to have a clear channel of communication. It is wise to keep a log of words to which hostage takers react (barbs) so the negotiator does not trip over them a second time. Finally, it is essential for the

negotiator to recognize that as more people become involved in a communication, the more room there is for distortion. Negotiating through a third party opens the possibility of an unclear message because it is being interpreted and translated by an additional person. As with the children's game of whispering a message from one person to another, distortions can be introduced. Negotiators should always talk to the hostage taker directly (American Justice, 1994).

Historically, it has been an axiom in negotiations that both the location and the communications of the incident need to be contained in order to encourage negotiation. Hassel (1975) suggested that a successful response requires the development of team tactics, using blocking and containment techniques. It was suggested that the hostage taker needed to feel the limits on his freedom and on his social support. This was one reason for establishing a tight perimeter and for isolating the hostage taker's telephone lines. It forced him to deal with the negotiator and it gave the negotiator a better chance to be seen as the hostage taker's best resource for resolving his problem.

In recent years, advances in communications technology have complicated containment of communications. Cell phones, MP3 players, Skype, and other forms of Internet-based or satellite-supported personal communication technology have made isolating communications nearly impossible, removing one of the powerful methods negotiators had of demonstrating control and encouraging communications. Many departments have developed lists of contacts with communications companies, so they can limit services during an incident. However, the problem of containing communications still exists. Some have considered jamming equipment, but federal law restricts the use of such equipment to federal agencies. At this point in time, it is safest for negotiators to assume that the communications is not contained and plan their tactics accordingly. Implications of this are:

1. Allow more time for subjects to respond, because they may be talking to others.
2. Assume that you are negotiating with more than just the actor when he or she has open communications.
3. If the communication is not contained, determine who the decision maker is in the incident—the actor at the scene or the actor on the phone.
4. If the actor on the phone is the decision maker, identify and negotiate with him or her.

The negotiator must be able to deal with the hostage taker who is making the decisions. This does not present a problem if the incident involves just one hostage taker. However, if there is more than one hostage taker, the negotiator must identify early in the process who is the decision maker, so tactics can be developed for the right individual. It does little good to analyze the needs of a person and develop ways of dealing with them if they are not the one in power.

Command and supervisory personnel should be trained in the nature of a negotiable incident so they can make informed decisions in the field. In addition, negotiators should keep a checklist of the characteristics of a negotiable incident with them so they can do a quick assessment of the negotiability of any given situation. Finally, these characteristics can be used as a guide to what needs to be done to make an incident negotiable. For instance, if no inner perimeter has been established at a scene when a negotiator gets there, a quick review

identifies the need for containment. The negotiator can advise that the situation needs more containment before the hostage taker will see the sense in negotiating.

Technology can assist a team and make the negotiation process easier, but success ultimately depends upon communication skills, both with the actor and within the team.

A caveat: Although helpful, categorizations are roadmaps of real life, not life itself. That is, any system shows a sketch of what goes on in real incidents, just as a roadmap shows a sketch of the cities, roads, and features of an area. Neither is complete and conditions sometimes change, so neither the roadmap nor the categorization of incidents fit exactly. Some incidents have elements of both a hostage and a nonhostage incident. Therefore, the use of any system needs to be seen as a guide, like a roadmap is a guide, not as reality or the final word. Both maps and systems are tools to be used when they fit the situation.

Hostage incidents versus nonhostage incidents

Noesner (1999) has drawn a distinction between incidents that involve hostages versus incidents that involve people who are potential victims. He defines a hostage incident as one in which a subject holds other people in order to force a third party to comply with his or her substantive demands. Substantive demands are those that the subject does not think he or she can obtain without the use of hostages. Therefore, the hostages are leverage in these incidents, not targets. It is only by keeping the hostages alive that the subject has leverage with the police. Demands are reasonable and goal-directed.

Nonhostage incidents involve the subject acting out of emotion, having ill-defined goals, and making no substantive demands – expressive demands (Noesner, 1999). The demands seem unrealistic— demands that no reasonable person would expect to be fulfilled. In these incidents, subjects either are barricaded, or they hold others to express their frustration, hurt, or disillusionment about events or, more dangerously, about the individuals they are holding. The people in these incidents are not hostages; they are victims. The risk to the people being held is considerably higher in nonhostage incidents than in hostage incidents.

Types of sieges

Lanceley (1999) discusses three types of sieges in which negotiators may become involved. They are: (1) deliberate, (2) spontaneous, and (3) anticipated sieges. It is important for the negotiator to understand the differences because the types of demands made by the subject vary, the risks posed to the hostage (victim) differ as a function of the type of incident, the strategies and tactics vary as a function of the type of incident, the length of time required to manage an incident varies, and the state of mind of the subject varies.

Deliberate sieges

In a deliberate siege, the subject or subjects initiate the confrontation. The incident is designed to bring attention to the subject's cause or point. They involve substantive demands and the

people involved are hostages in the true sense of being held as bargaining chips. The subject's state of mind is usually rational and negotiation techniques are generally the strategy of choice. The Chechen rebels taking hostages at the school in Beslan is an example of a planned siege. The subjects had substantive demands that included the removal of all Russian troops from Chechnya, the release of rebel detainees, and the resignation of Vladimir Putin as president of Russia.

Dolnik and Fitzgerald (2008) have made the point that we cannot abandon our bargaining roots when dealing with incidents like Beslan, a deliberate siege. In their estimation, the goal of the terrorists in this incident was to bring Russia to the negotiating table, not to express pent-up emotions. Although there is an emotional overlay in deliberate incidents, because of the confrontational nature of the incident, the expressive needs are secondary to the planned instrumental goals. Frequently, deliberate sieges have political goals and need to be seen as bargaining opportunities rather than crises.

Research on negotiator tactics has found that negotiators do choose tactics on the basis of the type of incident.

Spontaneous sieges

In a spontaneous siege, the subject does not want or anticipate the authority's involvement. They do something that unexpectedly draws the attention of law enforcement. The motivation is usually personal, the demands expressive, and the person held is usually a victim in the making or a hostage. The subject's state of mind is emotional. Alcohol or drugs are frequently involved. Crisis intervention techniques are the strategy of choice. Many of the incidents managed by local law enforcement agencies are spontaneous sieges. Family violence incidents that become sieges because of the intervention of law enforcement, school violence incidents in which the subject is trapped, and workplace violence incidents are examples of spontaneous sieges.

Noesner's distinction between negotiable and nonnegotiable incidents (see below) is helpful to the negotiator in dealing with spontaneous sieges because it allows the negotiator to distinguish between spontaneous sieges in which the hostage is a bargaining chip and the sieges in which the hostage is more likely to be a victim. For instance, an armed robber who is caught in the act of robbing a convenience store is more likely to use the clerk as a bargaining chip and engage in bargaining than the irate boyfriend who is holding his unfaithful girlfriend at gunpoint.

Anticipated sieges

In anticipated sieges, the subject expects the authorities to initiate the encounter. The subjects' goals are to survive the encounter with the authorities and maintain their freedom. The demands in these incidents are generally substantive and the people involved are usually followers or family members. The motivation for subjects is political or religious and they are usually prepared with shelter, food, water, arms, and ammunition. The subjects are usually rational in their approach. A combination of active listening and bargaining techniques is the

approach. The Freeman encounter in Montana and the Republic of Texas siege are examples.

Type of person

To some degree, the type of person with whom a negotiator is dealing is important in planning because different people have different sensitivities and needs that influence the negotiations. Not all people who are involved in a family dispute have the same concerns. They have different concerns from the person who is in the middle of a psychotic break or the terrorists taking over a school or train. Not all terrorists have the same focus and understanding the specific person with whom you are negotiating may help the negotiator identify and resolve the issues most important to that person.

Negotiators need to develop skill in recognizing the type of person with whom they are dealing; it will allow them to anticipate and manage issues that are not obvious from the ongoing interaction. For instance, several years ago a gunman took several staff members of a well-known hospital hostage because he did not think that the staff had treated his son properly. The man was using a doctor he was holding to talk to the police for him. He had been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic and did not trust the police. Negotiations were going well and the man put his weapon on a table in the room in which he was barricaded, preparing to surrender. He agreed to come out. In an effort to reassure the man, the negotiator asked the doctor to, "Put your hand on his shoulder and tell him that you love him." When the doctor followed the negotiator's instructions, the man snatched the gun up, pointed it at the doctor and yelled, "Nobody is coming out of this alive." Subsequently, he was shot and killed by SWAT in the assault of the room. The negotiators were confused about the sudden change in tone and actions. A dynamic understanding of the issues in paranoia would have allowed the negotiator to anticipate that the violation of the man's personal space would raise his anxiety level and that touching him was not a good tactic.

A second issue in recognizing the type of person is the degree to which the person's problem-solving may be compromised by his or her personality issues. For instance, it has long been part of the folklore of negotiations that we need to keep antisocial persons busy because they tend to be impulsive, bore easily, and are more likely to act out if they are left alone too long. Other significant personality issues that influence negotiations are the person's attitude toward authority, their need to depend on others, the degree to which they want to belong to a group, their sense of safety and security, their expectation of special privileges, and their need to be in control of the incident. These issues are discussed in more detail in [Chapter 6](#).

Training in Foreign Lands

William Hogewood has been in law enforcement for over 37 years, first serving as a police officer with Prince George's County, Maryland, as a negotiator and then team leader with that department. After retiring, he served as training program manager for negotiators with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosive. After retiring from AFTE, he returned to Prince George's County PD and worked in counseling police officers. He currently resides outside of Kansas City and does extensive training overseas for the U.S. Department of State.

I am one of a lucky group of negotiators and trainers who have had the pleasure of facilitating two-week negotiation training courses abroad. These courses are offered by the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program, which is offered by the US Department of State. There are more than 50 courses offered primarily to those countries that do not have the availability of sophisticated law enforcement training, either because of budgetary restraints or lack of available expertise. To qualify, the countries must be categorized as critical or high threat for terrorism and cannot adequately protect US facilities and personnel in that country; they must be served by a US air carrier and have no bilateral policy interests, which may be supported through the provision of the program.

There are many other entities that provide overseas training in law enforcement, such as the International Law Enforcement Educators and Trainers Association, DynCorp International, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, and many other private and government programs.

Many important issues should be addressed when asked to do a program of this magnitude. If you are ever asked to put a program together for other countries, think out of the box and way ahead in terms of issues that may arise.

First and foremost is language. French, Arabic, and Spanish are the main languages you may face. French, for instance, is spoken in many countries in Central and Northwestern Africa while Arabic is the primary language in Northeastern Africa and coastal countries in the Northwest. Many of the populace speak both languages. English and Portuguese are also spoken in some African nations. In the Middle East, Arabic is primary for many. In countries that I have visited, we taught in English, French, Spanish and Arabic. I know only English.

Culture has a big influence on language, learning habits, scheduling and work ethic. I have experienced many energetic participants in many areas of the world. Great is good, but dealing with not-so-great is a chore. I remember in the late eighties and early nineties, countries were sent to the United States as part of the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program and how great it felt to take part in such training. It was not without speed bumps though. One class went to prayers and lunch during the one and one half hour break. They returned three hours later! They contended that they could not get prayers and lunch into that time restraint. We politely told them that we were working off of an approved schedule, so please be on time. The next day, the same thing occurred. Fortunately for us, a call to their embassy by an ATA representative solved that problem.

Recently, our team experienced a class that had no leadership, no work ethic, no time schedule and an addiction to smoking every 15 minutes. We did have a no-smoking policy in the classroom or in the break room. They solved this by getting up to leave the building or go to another hidden room to smoke. They did this whenever they felt like it, not during designated breaks. They were late in the morning, and late coming back from breaks and lunch. We were desperate to get the material in during the allotted time and this caused some frustration. In this class it was not only culture, but also a lack of leadership and example within the class. Yet, in the class right before this one, we had participants from a neighboring country that were some of the most polite, attentive and eager students one would want to have in a class. These things happen. It is important to

research as deeply as possible the culture in the targeted country.

I guess the most memorable culture miscue occurred to me in a class in the United States in the early nineties. I was with a former Soviet bloc country, which had become free during the fall of the Soviet Union. The representatives were former police officers, who had embraced communism and who now embraced human rights and democracy, maybe to save their lofty positions. For two days I noticed them moving their heads left and right as if they disagreed with everything I was saying. Yet, I could not elicit questions or discussion with them about those points. My interpreter saved my shattering ego, after I asked “what gives?” She told me nothing was wrong; in their culture, this meant agreement!

Speaking of interpreters, they are invaluable not only for the interpretation of the training material, but also as a valuable resource for understanding the culture of the participants. They will tell you about nuances of behavior, language quirks, type of humor, and more. With many of the interpreters I have worked with, I have had very engaging discussions concerning politics within their country, dress, religion, home life, attitudes toward America and I have found all of them very forthcoming. In many of these conversations it was apparent that we in America share the same frustrations, i.e., economy, bureaucracy, crime and overbearing zealots with fundamentalist beliefs that are the root of terror.

Don’t bet on all languages being understood by all who claim to speak the same language. Dialect plays a major part in Spanish and Arabic, for instance. Interpreters should be from the same country to match as closely as possible the language spoken in that country. They know the language and the dialects of the region. This is extremely helpful to the instructional staff. This is also true of translated materials. Again, if the translators are not from the same country, they may well translate material that does not fit other same-language countries.

If you have any influence over equipment in the planning stage of an overseas program, be sure of the quality used by the interpreters. Equipment that allows for smooth simultaneous interpretation adds to the training. If it falters though, be ready to slow down because it becomes consecutive interpretation, which is slower and requires patience. Speak in sentences, not paragraphs, so that the interpreters can keep up. Incidentally, I am one of the worst at this. I would always forget that we had switched.

Overall planning of the course is critical, as it should be. A lot of participants you may train do not have the more global view of law enforcement that we might have. Their view is primarily from movies and television. Once I had to break the news to them that all car chases do not end when the vehicle flips eight times, rolls over parked cars, slides into a building and ignites an explosion that destroys the neighborhood. They may not even understand words like “surrender.” The selection of the audience has much to do with this.

Many of the participants are high-ranking officials who take the training just to punch their ticket for the move upward. Yet, some are there to investigate the possibility of establishing and training actual teams, which does occur. You will identify them. They show great interest. Several police departments in countries serviced by ATA have established crisis/hostage negotiation teams. Some of these teams come out of that

nation's anti-kidnapping squads. Shortly after one class with these folks, one of them successfully brought about a hostage release and a peaceful resolution. Those personnel are highly motivated, dedicated and trained. These are participants that enjoy learning, ask many questions and eagerly participate in scenarios.

Now, scenarios are another issue. With usually 20 to 24 participants, breaking into two or more groups would be great. Remember though, in your planning, that this will take more instructors to facilitate and more interpreters to assist. Scenario training is very much enjoyed by the participants. They don't mind being tested and they usually do well. At times, we have uncovered those who really get the idea of supportive, empathic communication. Some are just simply pure communicators.

Lesson plans and slide presentations should be as simple as possible. Slides should not be overburdened with words. If you develop solid learning points for each section, then concentrate on hitting the learning points. You accomplish this through the written material, your style and your experience.

A lot of these folks do not have the benefit of the sophistication of law enforcement that we have here in the US. Believe me, sometimes the participants, especially those that have graduated from a police college in their respective countries, have no idea of patrol, beat integrity, or community policing. There is one cardinal rule concerning lesson plans that we should all follow. Acronyms, so familiar to us, are not translatable. So, models and strategies with acronyms should not be identified that way; instead the material should be broken down and taught within the course where applicable. For instance, BATNA means nothing to these folks, who have never explored negotiations as a tactic, so break it down and explain the meaning without using the acronym. Negotiation in most impoverished nations is not an alternative. Most use only tactical resolutions. One side note: those participants with tactical experience have proven to be top-notch students. They want an alternative to injury or death.

I think my personal best learning experiences have come from the five Arab countries that I have been fortunate to visit. I mean it when I use the term "learning experiences." A major plus of going to teach abroad is what you learn by teaching abroad. I've gone from visiting battlefields and monuments to our 230-plus years of history to wandering in places with 4000 years of history. Every day is a learning experience. The Arab countries are so rich in culture and history. In most, Muslims and Christians live in peace. Yet, there is constant political turmoil.

The South American countries that have hosted the training program have also shared their own rich histories and cultures. The Spanish-speaking interpreters have been very technically outstanding but also gracious in sharing hours after work. We have learned much of South and Central American history and culture, not to mention the best places to eat.

Lodging overseas for instructors can be fantastic or not so good. Many places have American hotel chains and they are really user friendly and make you feel at home. Although the staff speak mostly their native language, you can always find English speakers to assist. Sometimes the accommodations are a bit sparse. Countries with very low incomes, minimal resources and not a lot of tourism would offer the best they can, but certainly different than what we might be used to. These are also the countries

where shots, medicines, sprays and creams are so important for your safety. The State Department puts out necessary information in that regard. Take heed. And certainly, don't drink the water if there is a warning given. Bottled water is always available.

If I were to measure lodging in the ten countries that I have personally taught in, I would use the bathrooms as the guide. I have had showers that barely measured the size of a human body with vinyl curtains that didn't reach the tray with daily flooding. Then again, I have had glassed-in showers with a built-in steam bath and 24-inch flat screens. We all know this going into the programs and really can't complain. After all, we are there for two weeks!

So, if you train overseas, keep it simple, keep it real. Don't be surprised that the law enforcement is so very different in many ways. Especially in those impoverished countries lacking in basic equipment, you may find an inability to get real-time information, and chain of command that is enamored of itself and which seems to be staffed from the top down without much focus on basic patrol. Be prepared for long flights in economy (unless you are lucky enough to use mileage for coach), huge crowds and lines in "International Airports" that are really just steel buildings put on a pad. Get used to disembarking on the tarmac and busing or walking to the terminal. Having said that, I still feel blessed to take part in training those around the world.

Application

To illustrate the application of the above ideas, consider the following case:

A man called the dispatcher at 2:30 P.M. and reported an intruder with a gun in his home with him and his wife. The man and his wife were barricaded in their upstairs bedroom. The dispatcher heard shouting and the sounds of a door being broken. A different man came on the phone, telling her to keep everybody away from the house. Responding units observed an open garage door, a Jeep parked at an angle across the driveway, and no apparent activity in the house. As officers approached the house, an elderly man came to the door and yelled at them, "He has a gun. Please. Stay away." They retreated, established a perimeter, and called a supervisor, who assessed the situation and called the Emergency Response Team.

A command post was set up, containment was established and intelligence gathered. Running the license, officers discovered that the Jeep had been stolen by a man suspected of being involved in a robbery of a savings and loan, earlier in the day.

The robber had entered the savings and loan at 12:15 P.M. dressed in jeans, a hooded sweatshirt with the hood up, and sunglasses. He stood at the entrance, apparently surveying the lobby for several minutes before moving to a service counter. A teller, noticing the suspicious person, triggered the alarm and ran to the back office, barricading herself in. The robber ran from the lobby into the street, encountering an armed citizen on the way. The citizen challenged the actor. The robber fired a shot in the air and escaped on foot, running toward the residential area from which the Jeep was stolen.

Witnesses noticed a car, with a second man dressed like the robber, exit the parking lot across from the savings and loan at a high rate of speed. They gave responding officers a description of the car and a license number. The car was stopped 15 minutes after the robbery call. The driver was not armed and admitted driving his friend to the savings and loan, but he claimed that he did not know that his friend intended to rob the place. He identified the robber as Robert Johnson and stated that Johnson was married and lived with his wife in the Bellaire apartments, where they had recently moved after losing their house to foreclosure.

A records check revealed that Johnson had multiple arrests and two prior convictions for possession of a controlled substance and public intoxication.

At the request of the negotiators, detectives went to Johnson's house and interviewed his common-law wife. They were told that he had graduated from high school and attended community college, taking basic courses and welding classes. He had a job with a construction

company until six months ago when he was fired for smoking marijuana on the job. As a result, they got behind on their house payments and lost their house. He had not been able to get another job. His alcohol and other drug use had gotten worse. He had no mental health history that she knew of, but had been in drug rehab as part of his probation on the possession charges. He had resisted arrest during the public intoxication arrest and was injured while being restrained by the police. He had stated that the police always hurt people.

Application of principles: In the case of the scenario above, using *empathy*, the negotiator might recognize that the actor was trying to avoid a confrontation with the police, suggesting fear as the *core emotion*. This emotion is suggested by the actor's initial demand that the police stay away, the fact that he had the resident deal with the initial responders rather than confronting the police himself, and his injury while being arrested.

During the Recognition step, negotiators reported the following about the incident in a Negotiation Position Paper (NPP) (Critical Incident Response Group, FBI, 2007):

NPP# 0001	Date: Time:
Status	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. It is a spontaneous siege, a spinoff of an attempted crime. Emotions are likely to be running high and some crisis intervention work will be necessary before problem-solving can be employed. 2. The people in the house with the actor are true hostages; therefore, they have value to the actor, reducing the risk to them. 3. The actor's original intent was to commit a crime, not take hostages. He may be a career criminal. Possible character and behavior disorder that would raise risk level some and raise the issue of impulse control.
Assessment	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Risk is moderate. Though there were initial shots fired, they were more threats than efforts to harm anybody and they were fired in the actor's escape from the savings and loan, not when he broke into the house and took hostages. There was no injury to officers or hostages. Containment has been established; the actor is in the home and a perimeter is in place. Communication has not yet been established. 5. Actor is likely to feel trapped by overwhelming force—we can expect anger and/or fear. 6. The actor has no reason to know whether or not the negotiator is trustworthy or helpful. Trust is a likely issue. 7. We have no insight into suicide potential. Need more intelligence. 8. Reassurance and the BLS are likely to defuse the emotional arousal. 9. No communication established yet. 10. Expect resistance and an attitude toward authority.
Recommendations	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 11. Establish communications with the actor as soon as possible. Expected outcome: probable resistance in the form of threats, increased anger, etc. 12. Use the BLS until clear definition of issues is achieved. Expected outcome: Reduction of emotion and clarification of actor's issues. 13. "Roll with Resistance"—utilize OARS or BLS, initially to deal with anger, threats, etc. Expected outcome: Build trust and reduce emotion. 14. Have detectives interview wife about current stresses in their life, how he has handled them, prior criminal activity, suicidal ideation or action, prior aggression in or out of the home, his family background, mental health history or treatment, school history, and experiences with police, to help develop more in-depth risk assessment and management plan, including an estimate of the degree to which the actor's problem-solving ability is intact. Expected outcome: develop a risk assessment, suicide and aggression assessment, identify actor's issues, and develop tactics/management plan.

Engagement

Engagement means connecting and communicating with the actor on a personal level. It means using the skills appropriate to the task. It means attending to whether the negotiator is developing the communications that McGowan has found essential in mitigating violence.



PHOTO 3.1 Crisis negotiations can be low-tech, unlike other special operations units. The only required equipment for negotiators is a way to communicate with the actor. That may be a dedicated phone system, such as the one being used by this team, or one's voice in a voice-to-voice scenario.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

Issues

Engaging the actor raises significant issues for the negotiator, including how to best connect with him, how to defuse the incident, and how to start understanding his issues (his script and what brought the action to a head, today).

The negotiator's starting place is with one's own attitude. Negotiators have to project an attitude of acceptance, understanding, and patience to the actor. Easy to say, yet hard to do, these attitudes are the polar opposite of the attitudes officers develop while doing patrol work or enforcing the rules of the correctional institution in which they work. Survival is a major part of the training of patrol and corrections officers and controlling the situation, taking quick action, minimizing feelings and making quick and accurate tactical assessments are an integral part of surviving. Officers expect their usual approach of taking charge to work in resolving crises. However, a negotiable incident requires that the situation is under control and that there is no immediate threat to life, so negotiators can adopt attitudes that are more likely to lead to a peaceful resolution: acceptance, understanding, caring, and patience. The negotiator needs to check his or her attitudes. Can I project acceptance of this person? Can I be patient with the situation and person? Can I understand the feelings this person may be having in his or her current life circumstance? If the answers to these questions are no, then the negotiator may need to transfer responsibility to another officer.

Goals

Establishing rapport and reassurance – Crisis intervention theory suggests that the negotiator's initial tasks are to build rapport and to reassure the actor. The need for rapport is assumed to be a necessary condition, because without it, the negotiator will never be trusted enough to get a clear idea of the actor's issues and will not have enough influence with the

actor to control the incident. Reassurance is important because crisis intervention assumes that the actor must feel safe to work toward a peaceful solution.

As Call (1999) has pointed out, people whose emotions are running high are sensitive to threat, suspicious of others, concerned about face, and likely to be rigid in their initial reaction to stress. Therefore, the SAFE frames of Attunement, Face, and Emotion are likely starting points in most crisis negotiations. The negotiator's tasks are to recognize which issues the HT is concerned about initially and to deal with that issue appropriately. Establishing trust, defusing feelings, and establishing a sense of safety are essential tasks that negotiators need to be prepared to deal with from the start. Building rapport and reassuring the actor are the initial tasks that address the attunement issue.

Emotions are likely to be the first issue the negotiator needs to think about in planning his or her opening statement to the actor. The most common emotions on initial engagement with the police are fear and/or anger. The actor is likely to see the police/corrections officer as having more power than he or she does and sees that the police/correction officers block him or her from obtaining a desired goal, freedom, control, etc.

The SAFE Model suggests that negotiators deal with emotions by:

1. Identifying the core emotions;
2. Encouraging the actor to tell his or her story;
3. Responding to action tendency.

In planning the initial engagement, the negotiator might recognize the fear and respond to the action tendency by using *reassurance*. The opening might be something like, "Hello, I am Officer Smith with the XXPD. We got a call from this address, the Johnson residence. The caller said that there was a man with a gun in the house. It can be pretty scary having to deal with a lot of weapons. We are here to be sure that everybody stays safe. Tell me a little about what is going on in there." An opening like this identifies the negotiator as the police, suggesting that there is the power of the police behind him. It explains the reason for the call, *legitimizing* the police presence. It recognizes the fear involved in dealing with overwhelming power. It addresses that fear by *reassuring* and sets the *goals* during the first encounter, "everybody stays safe." Finally, it invites the actor to tell his story. *Expected* outcome: Initial rise in fear and anger because this is not likely to be the opening the actor expects. Long-term reduction in fear and anger as the actor learns to trust the negotiator.

Case Study: In the case above, the negotiator called the house number and a man identifying himself as the resident answered, stating that the actor did not want to talk. He needed time to think. Working on the assumption that fear was the driving emotion and knowing that he needed to deal with the decision maker, the negotiator told the homeowner that he was concerned about everybody's safety and that he needed to talk to the actor to be sure everybody stayed safe. He asked the homeowner to see if the actor had seen the recent peaceful resolution of a domestic violence incident in their city that made the news, stating "That is the kind of finish I want for us today; everybody stays safe," hoping to focus the actor on the positive side of his ambivalence about police. When the actor got on the phone, the negotiator thanked him for having the courage to work with him and repeated his opening.

Application of principles: The negotiator started by assuming that the actor was experiencing fear, primarily. This interaction was designed with the *expectation* that it would

reduce fear, get the decision maker on the phone, and start building *attunement*. It was meant to give the actor a concrete example, *a model*, of an incident in which the police facilitated a peaceful resolution. It was expected to start building the case for the actor changing his mind about the chances of coming out of the incident uninjured. Negotiators can keep a file of incidents that were reported in the press and for which the public were made aware of peaceful, positive actions by the police to ask actors about when they are *ambivalent* about the police.

Attunement is expected to be an issue at the beginning of an incident, regardless of the type of incident. Negotiators and actors do not know each other, there is a significant power differential, and often the actor either has prior experience with the authorities that have shown him or her that they are untrustworthy or they have no experience with authorities other than through the media, which shows them that the authorities are dangerous. Additionally, the actor may be frustrated by the police. He or she may have been interrupted in accomplishing his or her goal. He or she may be experiencing anger or fear of the police/corrections officer. Both the attunement and the emotional issues will need attention before negotiations can progress.

Hammer (2007) has suggested that attunement is built on trust, which in turn is built by:

1. Cooperative behavior on the part of the negotiator
2. Communication of liking

Most models of negotiations emphasize active listening as a method of building *rapport* (McMains and Lanceley, 1995, Webster and Noesner, 1998; Lanceley, 1999; Vetchi et. al., 2005). Using the Trans-theoretical model, Kelln and McMurtry (2007) recommend active listening, finding commonalities, etc. to build a relationship before trying to influence the actor. The Intentional Interviewing model (Ivey & Ivey, 2008) tells negotiators that active listening skills can be expected to build the relationship between people. The Motivational Interviewing model suggests using the BLS to establish a relationship. Similarly, the FBI (2003) has suggested that ALS is basic to empathy. Overall, it is safe to conclude that trust and liking, attunement, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for resolving conflict and needs to be nurtured. Thus, engaging in the *BLS without judgment* is expected to start the rapport-building process. In addition, using messages during engagement that *reinforce* the actor's willingness to work with the negotiators is likely to start building attunement during the first engagement. They suggest a positive regard for the actor and his or her cooperativeness.

Hammer (2008) suggests that Face is another issue that is likely to surface when negotiators engage the actor. He defines Face as "projected self-image or reputation held by an individual, and it is grounded in interaction (Hammer, 2008)." It includes two parts: individual Face and group Face. Individual Face is the way the actor sees and presents himself as an individual. Group Face is the way the actor presents his affiliation with groups to which he belongs—family, occupations, terrorist organizations, etc. The individual will see his or her actions as reflecting on both himself as an individual and on the groups to which he or she belongs. The negotiator needs to be sensitive to this issue in dealing with actors who have strong group identification.

Hammer (2008) points out that people engage in three kinds of Face communications: they defend the Face of themselves or others, they attack the Face of themselves or others, and they

restore Face in themselves and others. In dealing with Face issues, Hammer suggests that negotiators listen for and track Face statements. Research has found that actors who use self-attacking statements and cannot be refocused are at a higher risk for suicide than others. Self-attack statements should trigger careful assessment of suicide potential, even when there is no obvious depression.

Though there is no research on the issue, it may be that actors who use Face attack language toward the “victim in the making” and do not change or increase during the incident pose a greater risk of acting out aggressively than others. It is important for negotiators to recognize the Face statements from the outset and track their frequency during the incident, noting whether attack messages increase or decrease.

Increasing attack statements directed toward the negotiator suggest that the negotiator and the actor are out of synch. It is a sign, along with the signs of resistance from the MI model above, that the negotiator needs to examine his or her tactics, evaluate what frame/issue the actor is in, and change his or her approach.

Another Face issue of which negotiators need to be aware is verbal qualifiers—statements that the actor uses or the negotiator can provide the actor to “save face.” Face-saving statements can be reflected back to the actor, validating the reasons for the action, if not the actions themselves. For instance, the actor above might say something like, “I know I pulled a bonehead stunt, but I had to show my wife that I could provide for her.” The negotiator might say, “You wanted to be a good provider,” expecting that reflecting the face-saving statement would help build rapport.

Motivational Interviewing suggests that people are frequently ambivalent about themselves. When they are self-attacking, there is likely to be another side to their story about which they are not thinking. A tactic for the negotiator when actors are self-attacking is to reflect what they have said about themselves and shift their focus to face-saving statements.

Negotiations: When the actor got on the phone, the following interchange occurred:

Actor 1: “I told you guys to stay back and leave me alone. What part of ‘leave me alone’ don’t you understand? Keep screwing round with me and somebody will get hurt.”

Negotiator 1: “It’s pretty frustrating when you don’t think people hear you, isn’t it? I’d be mad at me, too. I hope we can use that energy to work things out, so nobody gets hurt. I am officer Smith with the XXPD. We got a call from this address, the Englehart residence. I guess it was Mr. Englehart who answered the phone. Right? The caller said that there was a man with a gun in the house. It can be pretty scary having to deal with weapons and people you don’t know. We are here to be sure that everybody stays safe. I can’t leave until I am absolutely sure that everybody is safe. Tell me a little about what is going on in there or how you got into this.”

Actor 2: “You don’t need to know. All you need to know is that I need a way out of here. Get me a car and let me leave.”

Negotiator 2: “So, you want to get away from the stress here. You would like my help getting transportation, right?”

Actor 3: “Right. I can’t stand cops. They are always a pain in the butt. Every time. Get me that car.”

Negotiator 3: “So, you don’t like police and you want my help getting transportation. That’s a little mixed up. Must be hard to trust me, when you don’t like me.”

Actor 4: “Of course I don’t trust you. I don’t trust any cops, but, I guess I have to take a chance on you. You are my only way out. Of course, I always have the old guys.”

Negotiator 4: “You mean Mr. and Mrs. Englehart? That is their names, isn’t it? As I understand it from the neighbors, they are pretty old, in their 80s. I hope they handle the stress OK.”

“Have you and I ever dealt with each other before? On the streets or anything?”

Actor 5: “No, but I’ve been arrested before. I know what cops are like.”

Negotiator 5: “What are cops like? Tell me what has happened to you.”

Actor 6: “The last time I went to jail, it was for a piss ant, Public Intoxication charge, but the cops downtown broke my wrist, I had to go to the hospital and was in a cast for six weeks. It’s still not right. I was off work and it made it hard for me to handle the welder. I think it’s the reason I got fired.”

Negotiator 6: “Let me see if I have this straight. The officer who arrested you injured you. You lost time at work and had

trouble doing the job, you were let go, and you are angry at the officers. Right?’

Actor 7: “That’s about it.”

Negotiator 7: “No wonder the police stress you. I’d be stressed too.”

Actor 8: “Then get me that car and get me out of here.”

Negotiator 8: “About the car: There are several things that we will need to do to make that happen. We have to figure out what kind of car you want, get my bosses’ approval, figure out where the money is coming from, find the right car at a dealer, pay for it, gas it up and get it down here, which means finding a driver. You will need to be patient and put up with the stress for a while. In the meantime, I will keep things under control out here, if you control your things in there. How can you do that?”

Actor 9: “These old folks are not a problem. They fixed me a sandwich and want to know how they can help me. I don’t have to worry about them. All I have to worry about is you guys.”

Negotiator 9: “Like I said, I will keep things cool here. We have been here an hour. Have we tried anything—tried to come in or anything?”

Actor: “Well, no. Can you get my wife here? And, the Engleharts are afraid that their son will see this stuff on the news and come over. Can you get a message to him for them—that they are OK?”

Application of principles

1. The negotiator’s first engagement used *empathy* to recognize the actor’s frustration and anger and his fear of police. *Emotional labeling* showed a depth of understanding, from the first encounter, which was expected to start building *rappport*. It dealt with the fear by reassuring the actor. It *reframed* the anger, as a positive energy, that could be focused on solving the problems the actor faced, expecting it to take the focus of anger away from the people and on what could be done to solve the problem. It left the *choice* of how to use the anger up to the actor, rather than impose it. The introduction began to put an identity to “the old folks”—*personalizing* them in the expectation that they would be seen as individuals, not as “old folks.” Using an open-ended statement, it offered the actor the opportunity to “tell his story,” as suggested by MI, expecting a little better relationship because of the negotiator’s willingness to listen.
2. The next interaction highlighted a *substantive issue* that was driven by an emotional one. The demand for a car had its roots in the *action tendency* of fear, to escape or avoid the threat. The negotiator used the interaction, with the *expectation* that it start *developing discrepancy* in the actor’s thinking about police and to lay the groundwork for developing trust. He pointed out that the actor needed him to get the car.
3. The third exchange defined and *focused* on the trust issue, making it an attunement issue the negotiator and the actor could deal with. It recognized the actor’s unwillingness to consider other options, yet. It was done, expecting a reduction in mistrust as a result of a clear recognition of that lack of trust.
4. The fourth interaction temporarily put the focus on the homeowners, again, in an attempt to *personalize* them and build a relationship between the actor and the homeowners. By pointing out the stress that the situation was likely to put on the homeowners, the negotiator was *expecting* that the actor would draw the connection between his fear and theirs and minimize theirs. It returned to the *attunement* issue by suggesting that the negotiator was different from other officers with whom the actor had dealt.
5. The fifth interaction was designed with the *expectation* that it would lead to a better

definition of the actor's problems with police. It used an *open-ended* invitation to tell his story.

6. The sixth interaction confirmed the expectation of the fifth—the actor was more open with his story, relating his view of it, expressing his anger and beginning to *save face* by attributing the loss of his job to the encounter with the police, rather than his drug use. The negotiator chose to summarize what he had heard, rather than challenge the validity of the story, which would have led to a conflict that would undermine trust this early in the negotiations.
7. The seventh interaction *validates* the actor's feelings.
8. In the eighth interaction, the actor returned to his solution to his fear of police—being by car. The negotiator uses the demand to show how complicated the request was, expecting it to make *stalling* more understandable and laying the groundwork for being able to give the actor progress reports in the future that will show that his demands are being taken seriously—a necessary part of *attunement*. He uses the interaction to shift the actor's focus to keeping himself and others under control, *expecting* it to reduce the risk level.
9. The ninth interaction *reinforces* the safety plan and asks the actor to generate an evaluation of the police action to this point, expecting it to increase the actor's ambivalence about the police.

Initial Focus

Although the SAFE model underlines the importance of Attunement, Emotion, and Face early in the incident, it is not clear which issue is likely to be the starting point for the actor. If the negotiator does not listen closely, it is easy for negotiations to be out of sync. A general rule in intentional interviewing is to start where the person is. The SAFE model tells us that we need to listen for four issues and respond to the one in which the actor starts. If we do not do that, we are likely to get resistance, a clue that we need to change.

After the above interaction, the negotiators might fill out a position paper like the following:

NPP# 0002	Date: Time:
Status	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Actor identified as Robert Johnson, 35 years old, Caucasian, male with record of arrests for drug charges and substance abuse. This is his first violent crime. 2. Contact has been made with actor. 3. Communication is focused on reducing his fear of the police and developing a relationship that will help us influence him later. 4. He is asking for his wife and that the Engleharts' son is assured that his parents are OK.
Assessment	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Risk of aggression appears to remain moderate. He has responded to Reassurance and the BLS. He seems to have developed a good relationship with the hostages.

	6. Actor is feeling trapped and fearful—due to prior experiences with police, but is engaged in communications.
	7. Trust is an issue and will take a while to develop.
	8. We have no insight into suicide potential but he is using the police as a face-restoring technique, blaming us for losing his job, so immediate suicidal potential appears low. It is not clear how he will REACCT if he has to admit his drinking was the major problem and we don't know how his wife sees it.
Recommendations	9. Get more information from wife about nature of their relationship and how he takes it when he is wrong.
	10. Contact Engleharts' son and reassure, so he will not have to worry and we can monitor and control his reaction and can demonstrate follow-through on a peripheral demand, building trust.

Assessment

The goal of the assessment step is to evaluate risk of suicide or aggression and to assess the actor's resources, including his sense of self-efficacy.

As discussed above, in addition to the risk assessments discussed in [Chapter 4](#) and the signs of depression that are frequently associated with suicide, a SAFE theme that needs particular attention to assist in assessment is the Face issue. Listen for self-attacking and other attacking themes in the actor's communications. They are clues that an in-depth threat assessment needs to be done.

Not all information can or will come from the subject. Good intelligence gathering and analysis is essential. Many indicators of risk come from collateral resources. Intelligence officers need to be constantly checking resources for information about the subject's potential for aggression and suicide.

Though the initial assessment may be that there is a low threat level, the situation changes as the subject's story unfolds and negotiations progress. New issues come up and new tactics are tried. A careful reassessment is needed when strategies do not work or when sensitive issues are introduced. Intelligence officers need to gather information on what situation stresses the actor the most and how he typically REACCTs to the stress. For instance, in this scenario, a reasonable question would be, "When does he tend to drink and use drugs? Does any particularly stressful situation get him drinking/using drugs?" Assessment is an ongoing process.

Case Study: Negotiators had the wife brought to the scene. The intelligence officer interviewed her to get more information on which to base risk assessments. She reported that she and the actor had been together since high school. He had not shared his plan to rob the savings and loan with her but she was aware of his worry about their finances and he was depressed about losing the house and job. He was not actively looking for a job, having given up after the first four applications did not get him an interview. He tended to blame others for their predicament. The savings and loan he tried to rob was the one that had repossessed their house and he told her that if they weren't so greedy, they could have given them more time. She reported that he had been placed on medication for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) while in grade school and was in resource programs for math problems. She did not know of any behavior problems associated with his learning problems. She reported that he

had an uncle who committed suicide and was considered the black sheep of his family. He defended his uncle, saying that he wasn't thinking straight when he killed himself. He had not been treated for depression. She reported that he had successfully completed probation and substance abuse rehabilitation after his last arrest for PI and resisting arrest. She denied abuse in their home and reported their relationship as close and loving. She was worried and stated, "I don't know how he got into this. He has never been violent in his life."

On the basis of the intelligence from the wife, the Risk Assessment Summary (see [Chapters 4 and 7](#)) looked like:

Suicide risk				
Current plan				
Present	No	Yes		
Location of incident	Public	Private		
Lethality of plan	None	Pills	Gun	
Time	Imminent	Delayed		
Prior attempts				
Self	Yes	No		
Significant other	Yes	No		
Resources				
Lifestyle	Stable	Unstable		
Alcohol/Drug abuse	No	Yes		
During Incident	No	Yes		
Hostility toward negotiator	No	Yes		
Current Personality	Mentally ill	Normal		
Past Psychiatric HX	Yes	No		
Past Coping Abilities	Poor	Good		
Daily Activities	Active	Passive		
Daily Functioning	Passive	Active		
Family Life	Chaotic	Intimate		
Social Life	Withdrawn	Active		
Ongoing Depression	Severe	Moderate	Mild	
Ongoing Anxiety	Severe	Moderate	Mild	
Violence risk				
Intact Home	Yes	No		
Elementary school problems	None	Mild	Moderate	Severe
Alcohol problems	Current,	Past crimes,	Parents,	Teen, Adult
Marital status	Current,	Past,	Never	
Criminal history	Non-violent	Weapons involved	Destruction of Property	Robbery
Failure of probation or parole	Yes	No		
Age at time of incident	13-26,	above 27		
Injuries to victim, police	Yes	No		
Female victim	Yes	No		
Personality disorder	No	Yes		
Schizophrenia	No	Yes		
Psychopathy	Yes	No		
Superficiality				
Grandiosity				
Deceitful				
Lacks empathy				
Does not accept responsibility				

The negotiation team sent the commander the following NPP:

NPP# 0003	Date: Time:
Status	1. Interview with wife provided information for a more in-depth review of risk.
Assessment	<p>2. Risk of aggression appears low. There was no history of violence. His arrest record was for drug offenses and alcohol-related charges, but never involved violence. Impulse control may have been a problem in school but his ability to live on probation, his age, the lack of alcohol involved in the current situation, his concern for his wife and family, as well as the good relationship he seems to have developed with the homeowners suggest an ability to control himself and to empathize with others, which reduces risk of aggression.</p> <p>3. Suicide risk is considered low at this time with potential of becoming crisis as negotiations play out. He had no active plan for suicide, but had concern about his ability to provide for family. As he realizes that he is probably going to jail and will be even less able to provide, suicide may be a consideration. He had not attempted suicide in the past but had an uncle who committed suicide and he seemed to find the behavior acceptable. There are indicators of helplessness—his lack of persistence in looking for a job, withdrawal from daily activities and social activities.</p> <p>4. Relationship with wife is good. She is supportive and says that she will stay with him through the incident and after.</p>
Recommendations	<p>5. Continue to monitor risk levels, paying attention to change in mood and face attacking statements. If indicators arise, explore suicide risk with actor: (1) Ask about suicidal intent, about plan and about resources; (2) Explore issues of hopelessness—what does he expect in the future? How much is his current situation really affecting him? How much is his fault? Before it becomes an issue: Use affirmations to build influence and self-efficacy. Help actor explore past successes.</p> <p>6. Explore his agenda for wife's presence.</p> <p>7. If he is concerned about her getting by and what she is going to do if he goes to jail, let him know that she is here and that they can talk when he comes out.</p> <p>8. If he wants to tell her goodbye, use suicide intervention strategies.</p>

Control and Contracting

During the adaptation stage, the negotiator focuses on obtaining an agreed-upon solution to the incident, overcoming resistance, helping the actor resolve ambivalence, planning the resolution of the incident, and controlling the surrender. The actor will move into and through the contemplation stage of change—considering options, weighing advantages and disadvantages of options, trying to find a solution to the problems he or she faces (Kelln and McMurtry, 2007). If successfully facilitated by the negotiator, the actor will move through problem-solving to planning the solution, which may include surrender.

Control

Negotiators need to maintain control of the problem-solving process, normally in an indirect way. Motivational Interviewing tells us that when people are pushed, they push back. Resistance is the result of being pressured. Negotiators' control is like the practice of Aikido in that it uses the aggressor's force against them, or it is like dancing in that it leads by gentle pressure, moving the partner one direction or another without a lot of resistance. It is like "Stepping to Their Side," discussed in [Chapter 5](#). Negotiators control the flow of contracting by skillfully focusing the actor on aspects of the issues he or she has neglected. Negotiators control the focus by using the influence techniques, using appropriate active listening skills,

using indirect questioning, reinforcing the actor's discussions of appropriate issues, and selectively attending to issues.

Influence techniques

Several of the influence techniques discussed in [Chapter 5](#) are expected to be useful in focusing the negotiations: binds; double binds; covering a class of responses; encouraging a new frame of reference; future projection; embedded questions; embedded statements; implied directive; induced imagery; not knowing, not doing; open-ended suggestion; and truisms. Negotiators are encouraged to become familiar with these techniques before reading on.

Active-listening skills

The following active-listening skills are of value in controlling the focus of the process:

"I-messages"—messages that personalize the negotiator without it becoming a personal attack (Noesner & Webster, 1998) and they allow negotiators to introduce new ideas without raising excessive resistance (McMains & Mullins, 1996). They let the negotiator send a message about how things affect him or her without blaming the subject. It takes the form of "When ____ happens I feel ____, because ____." (Bolton, 1984; McMains & Lanceley, 1995). They can be used to show the subject different ideas about the situation in an indirect way that does not threaten the subject or arouse his or her tendency to resist being told what to do.

Expect: Subject to consider new information

Use: *"I-messages" can be used toward the end of the crisis stage or during the negotiation or resolution stage, when the negotiator judges that the subject is calm enough to hear alternatives that are presented in a nonthreatening way.*

Example: A man broke into his own home after having agreed to stay at his mother's house because of the strained relationship between him and his wife. He had been drinking and he had a rifle. He fired two rounds into the ceiling of the home. After negotiators made contact and he began to settle down, he said, "If you will just bring my wife over, I know we can work this out. We have done it before when things got rough."

A good "I-message" would be "When there is alcohol involved, I get worried, because it makes people do funny things, sometimes hurting people without meaning to." It suggests that as long as the man is drinking, he will not be able to see his wife because the negotiator is uncomfortable, not because of something the man has done. It is nonthreatening and the man does not have to defend himself.

A poor response would be "As long as you are drinking, I am not going to let you see your wife because you are more likely to hurt her." It is a poor response because it puts the responsibility on the man and makes it more likely that he will feel as though he has to defend his position. It is likely to lead to an argument.

Reflecting meaning—the ability to show the subject that the negotiator understands the content, emotion, and implications (expectations) of his or her situation. It is used to summarize understanding, to give the subject a chance to clarify any issue the negotiator does not understand, and to build rapport (McMains & Lanceley, 1995). It takes the form of

“When____happens, you feel____, because____.” It looks to what the subject expects to happen as a result of whatever followed “When.”

Expect: More in-depth discussion of story, issues, needs, etc.; expectations of future events.

Use: Reflecting meaning can be used whenever the negotiator thinks that he or she understands the subject’s problems well enough to help solve them and to check on the accuracy of his or her understanding. It is generally used during the adaptation stage to help define the problem. It is effective after the subject has calmed down and is ready to focus on the issues. It can be used with any personality type.

Example: The 28-year-old subject who is angry and suicidal because his mother threw him out of the house says, “I’ve had it with the whole deal. I lose my job and my truck because I can’t make the payments. Now, she’s evicting me. I’ve got nowhere to go. I’ll show her, she’ll be sorry when I’m gone.”

A good reflection of meaning would be “When you think about being out there by yourself, it’s pretty scary; because you’re afraid you can’t make it by yourself, especially with no job and no way to get around. And, when you think about your mother wanting you to leave, you get angry and want to get back at her, because you don’t think she has a right to do that.” It shows attention and a depth of understanding. It clearly defines the problem for both the subject and the negotiator.

A poor response would be “Why would you want to do that? You can handle it like a man. It’s time you were on your own, anyway.” This response challenges the subject, is judgmental, and seems to side with the mother, with whom the subject is angry. It is not likely to build rapport.

Reinforce movement toward resolution

Learning theory shows us that behavior that is rewarded tends to increase. Behavior that is ignored tends to decrease. Any movement in the direction of a peaceful resolution, cooperative behavior, or resolution of ambivalence can be reinforced by the negotiator. Any change talk can be recognized and reinforced. The use of active listening to reinforce movement is one way. Making clear comments about how much you appreciate the subject’s actions is another. In reinforcing movement in the right direction, it is generally a good idea to be specific about what behavior is being reinforced. For instance, when the actor in the scenario asked the negotiator to notify the residents’ son that they were all right and not to worry about them, the negotiator could simply say, “Thanks for being so considerate. Reassuring the Engleharts’ son will be very helpful.”

Another way of reinforcing appropriate actions that will increase the chances of the actor continuing to move in the right direction is to turn them into permanent qualities of the actor. By changing the verb that describes the action to an adjective that describes the actor, it implies a character trait that is permanent. For instance, an actor who calmed down after the initial contact can be told, “I appreciate how careful a person you are. You are a calm person who thinks things through,” suggesting that carefully thinking things through is a characteristic of the person that can be expected all during the incident. Elgin (1980) calls this tactic *nominalizing*.

Selective attention

To a great degree, the negotiator can control the flow of the incident by simply focusing on specific topics. For instance, the actor who is in a rant about his unfair employer and says, “He was a great boss at first, but as time went on he got more demanding and unreasonable,” can be focused when the negotiator attends to the first half of the statement, saying, “Tell me what he was like when you first came to work,” taking the focus off the reasons for his anger and putting it on the positives in the boss.

A caveat: The SAFE model suggests that we need to stay with the actor’s current frame until it is sufficiently resolved or the negotiator will be out of synch, which may be interpreted as lack of interest and minimization of the actor, reducing attunement. Again, the principles are: *start where the actor is* and *stay with his or her issue until it is resolved*.

Symbolic modeling

“People’s minds are changed through observation and not through argument.”

—Will Rogers

Social Learning Theory (Bandura, 1965, 1974, 1975) has suggested that symbolic modeling (similar to social proofs discussed in [Chapter 5](#))—stories that communicate behavioral rules—are effective ways of influencing behavior, communicating rules in social situations, and illustrating complex solutions. The research has suggested that there are characteristics that enhance the power of a model and that might help negotiators select and develop powerful stories, including:

1. **Consistency**—models that are consistent across situations are more likely to be imitated than people who are not.
2. **Relevance**—the model’s behavior should have something to say about how people should act in the situation in which the subject finds him-or herself.
3. **Appropriateness**—model’s behavior has to be seen as appropriate to their roles in society. Male aggression is generally seen as more appropriate than female aggression in Western society.
4. **Powerful**—models that are seen as in control and powerful are more likely to be imitated than weaker, less powerful models.
5. **Similarity**—models have to be similar to the person whose behavior they are expected to change.
6. **Reward**—behavior that is rewarded is more likely to be imitated than behavior that is not rewarded.
7. **Friendliness**—warm, friendly models are more likely to be imitated than cold, aloof models.
8. **Multiple**—more than one model of desired behavior in a situation increases the effectiveness of the modeling and leads to more learning.

In dealing with the actor above, negotiators might say something like, “This deal reminds me of one we had last year. A couple of guys robbed the Pick-a-Pack, down on 5th. They were

really good guys, told us that they didn't want to hurt anybody but didn't want to go to jail. One of them needed money for his kids. He had a gun, too. After he realized that we were going to settle things peacefully, he told us about his sick kids and we were able to get medication. We talked about five hours and they decided that it was better to give it up, so we could tell the judge how cooperative they were, how they did not hurt anybody and how they kept the incident short." Note that the story presents the models as consistent, relevant, appropriate, powerful, and similar to the actor. These elements increase the chances that the model's surrender will be acceptable as appropriate behavior in this incident. It does not insist on surrender, just suggests it. It also suggests several other things. It suggests that the negotiator was willing to spend time talking (five hours). It suggests that negotiators were willing to help solve a problem that was not directly related to the incident (peripheral demands or the problem within the problem— getting medication), and what the actor would have to do to get the negotiator's cooperation after a peaceful solution to the immediate problem (cooperate, don't hurt anybody, and keep it short—under five hours).

Stories, Analogy, and Metaphor are powerful ways of sending messages in cultures that have strong aural traditions. Negotiators are well served by developing a library of stories that illustrate points they are likely to need to make during negotiations. They should understand and get input from cultural experts if they anticipate dealing with cultures other than their own.

Stories provide suggestions and reinforce prior messages from the negotiator without the "should" and "ought to's" that tend to elicit resistance. Negotiators can get stories about successful negotiation from the news, if they do not have enough of their own.

Contracting

By the contracting step in the REACCT model, the subject and the negotiator should have developed a relationship and the subject is open about his situation with the police, any people with whom he is barricaded, and with his life. He may still be in the contemplation stage, i.e., he may begin to see a need to come out and may be ambivalent, resisting any suggestion that he come out. The negotiator's job is to help him explore his resistance and resolve the ambivalence.

A basic strategy in this step is *Developing Discrepancies* and focusing the actor on the positives of surrender and the negatives of not surrendering. Developing discrepancy between what the actor needs and what he or she is doing is accomplished by using the tactics from MI discussed above. The reality therapy questions will help.

Goals

Primary goals at this point of negotiations are facilitating Prediction and Planning. It depends on the actor's readiness to change and his or her problem-solving skills. The negotiator is responsible for facilitating change and facilitating problem-solving without raising resistance.

Miller and Rollnick (2002) point out that change has to come from within the person and that it cannot be imposed from without. This is one of the reasons negotiators get stuck, going over and over suggestions they have made, but that the actor rejects. The subject has not been asked to find reasons for changing him-or herself. Rather, he or she has been put in the position of defending themselves. The more often a suggestion is made and rejected, the less likely it is to be accepted in the future. Motivational interviewing shows us that the negotiator's job at the contracting and control step is to help the actor evaluate his or her situation and options without raising undue resistance.

Negotiators need to be aware of anything that interferes with the actor's ability to resolve ambivalence, or develop new solutions to his or her problems. Personality factors, level of intelligence, education level, coping skills, neurological insult, developmental disorders, and substance abuse all influence the actor's ability to solve problems. The more interference the actor has, the more actively involved the negotiator will need to be in developing alternatives, considering the possible outcomes of the actor's choices, and the planning of the solutions. Additionally, the negotiator will need to allow more time when dealing with people who have issues that interfere with their problem-solving ability.

Though motivational interviewing suggests that the subject can solve his or her own problems, negotiators need to recognize that all of the factors above can influence the actor's ability to work out a solution to the incident. Central to this issue is the actor's sense of self-efficacy, the actor's belief that he or she has the skill to solve his or her problems. Some actors will have an exaggerated sense of their own abilities, which may interfere with negotiations, while others will have a low estimate of their abilities. For instance, narcissistic people generally have an inflated sense of their own worth and act aggressively when their sense of efficacy is threatened. Dependent people have a deflated sense of their own abilities and tend to act out of their fear of not being able to make it alone. The sense of self-efficacy influences emotions experienced by the actor, leads to different action tendencies, and requires different tactics. Negotiators need to track self-statements to get an estimate of the person's sense of self-efficacy and to plan appropriate interventions.

Ivey and Ivey (2008) have outlined the problem-solving sequence (PSS), the basic steps in problem-solving:

1. Define the problem clearly
2. Brainstorm alternatives
3. Assess probable outcomes of each alternative (the point at which ambivalence may become a major issue)
4. Choose the best option—the one with the best outcome for the actor and the negotiators
5. Plan implementation
6. Implement planning

Defining the problem is not as easy as it sounds. It has to take into account both the actor's and the negotiator's goals. It has to be seen from the perspective of both partners in the negotiating dance and both sides' legitimate needs have to be addressed. Negotiators tend to see the problem as immediate: how to gain surrender with the least possible loss. The actor's problems are frequently the immediate problem of dealing with the police, surviving the

incident with as little hurt/loss as possible, and what Ricketts (1995) called the “problem within a problem”—the issue that started the incident for the actor. For instance, the actor in the scenario above has to figure out how to deal with the police and he has to deal with what motivated him to try to rob the savings and loan—his need to provide for his family. Negotiators will have to be prepared to help him deal with the realization that going to jail will significantly impair his ability to take care of his family, working out an acceptable plan, before he is likely to consider surrender. Thus, the definition of the problem becomes how to gain surrender with minimum loss and help the actor provide for his family while in jail.

Brainstorming and assessment are ongoing processes that occur regardless of whether or not the actor is engaged.

Of course, the ideal way of defining the problem is to engage in the problem-solving process with the actor as a partner. However, it is also helpful to assign a team member to always think like the actor, to track the actor’s SAFE issues, his or her expectations, his needs as well as his demands. In teams with MHCs, he or she is the likely choice for being the expert on the actor. In departments with a crisis intervention team (CIT) officer, he or she can be a significant resource and fill this role. In departments without MHC or CIT officers, the intelligence officer can assume this role.

The SAFE model reminds us that the actor will tell us what is important to him or her and when negotiators move to dealing with substantive issues. Negotiations get stuck when the negotiator and the actor are addressing different issues. Negotiators take their cue from what the actor is discussing rather than what the negotiator thinks they should be discussing.

The second step in problem-solving is brainstorming alternatives. Brainstorming is the process of uncritically generating multiple solutions to a problem. Teams can brainstorm the next step in the process, anticipating issues and preparing the primary. Brainstorming needs to be done with both the actor’s and the negotiator’s needs in mind, after a clear definition of the current problem is achieved. Brainstorming has four general rules (McMains & Pollock, 2009):

1. Generating as many ideas as possible.
2. No criticizing any idea when generating them.
3. Having a goal of: “The more ideas, the better.”
4. Letting team members play off each other’s ideas.

The brainstorming process involves three steps (McMains & Pollock, 2009): (1) generating ideas, (2) distilling ideas, and (3) elaborating on ideas. *Generating* is asking for as many ideas as possible to deal with the issue, using the guidelines above. *Distilling* is reviewing the ideas and selecting the ones that meet the needs of both negotiators and the actor. *Elaboration* is filling out the best ideas, assessing what is needed to make an idea work and planning the steps in their implementation.



PHOTO 3.2 Brainstorming is critical to negotiator success. Everyone must have input into the process for the team to reach a successful resolution.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

Table 3.3 Model Sheet for Analyzing Actor's Ambivalence about an Alternative

Alternative	Reasons Change to Option is Positive	Reasons Not Changing Negative	Reasons Not Changing to Option is Positive	Reason Changing to Option is Negative

Using a sheet like [Table 3.3](#) to assess alternatives is a helpful way of focusing on all sides of what an actor may be feeling and thinking about an alternative.

Case Study: One of the actor's demands was that his wife be brought to the scene. For most negotiating teams this demand immediately raises the question of why? Is he suicidal? Did they have words before he tried to rob the S&L? Other teams might ask: Does he need her advice about his situation? Does he have instructions for her? Does he want an audience to assure his safety? How does bringing his wife to the scene improve his situation? How does it improve our situation? It is a substantive issue, and fraught with ambivalence, for us and perhaps for him.

Application of brainstorming

Using [Table 3.3](#), the negotiators made a quick assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the actor's demands.

The following box shows how the different sides of an idea can be structured and examined when applied to a tactical decision during negotiations.

Alternative	Reasons Change to Option is Positive	Reasons Not Changing is	Reasons Not Changing to	Reason Changing to Option is
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		Negative	Option is Positive	Negative
Let wife talk with him	Increase trust, if relationship is good between the two	Shows lack of interest in the actors needs/wants	Maintain current level of control of incident	Introduces a wild card—Unknown relationship

Definition of the problem—In addition to [Table 3.3](#), the negotiating team took a few minutes to *brainstorm* their next move. They got a flip chart and had a quick discussion about this question: How are we going to get a better idea of why he wants his wife here without looking like we are stalling him? Ideas included:

- a. Be straightforward—ask him why he wants his wife.
- b. Call his wife and ask her what their relationship is like.
- c. Ask neighbors about their relationship.
- d. Ask about suicide.
- e. Explain to him that we are working on getting his wife down here and ask why he wants her.
- f. Use I-messages to express concern about him and bringing her down.
- g. Ignore the demand unless he brings it up again.
- h. Keep focused on getting him out.
- i. Tell him that he can speak to her when he comes out.

Distilling—each alternative is assessed on the basis of the original definition. The following comments were made by team members about the ideas above:

- a. Can come across as an interrogation and put him on the defensive. Might be seen as stalling and uncooperative, taking away from trust.
- b. Might get us intelligence but might undermine trust because he could see it as the negotiator not trusting and honoring him.
- c. Same as above. In addition, it might threaten face by advertising the incident.
- d. Is a little leap. We do not have other indicators of suicide, but it would show concern
- e. Might be a short-term response but could backfire, if we decide not to get her down here or we use it for too long as a stall.
- f. Could be used to set the stage for a. would show care and concern.
- g. Was the last thing he asked for. Ignoring it is likely to communicate a lack of interest and diminish attunement.
- h. That is our agenda. He is not ready for that. We need to still be concerned about increasing trust and his reducing his fear.
- i. Sounds like a power play to me. It is bargaining and even though it is true, it is too early.

Elaboration—As a result of the distillation process, negotiators developed a plan that called for a combination of g, f, and a. Responding to the last demand, the negotiator planned a message: “Joe, when I hear people ask for their spouses in situations like this, I get nervous because sometimes I have found that they are thinking about killing themselves. I’m wondering if something like that is going through your head.” They elaborated on the issue by reviewing the suicide assessment process, if they get a yes, and planning how they proceed, if the answer

was no. For instance, if the answer was no, the negotiator was prepared to reaffirm his or her concern for the actor's safety and ask the actor, "What do we tell your wife when we get hold of her? It's probably a good idea to give her time to think about what is happening." It would be available if the actor returns to the demand when the negotiator gets him on the phone the next time.

Scenario: The negotiator got the actor back on the phone and the following interaction took place:

Negotiator 1: Robert, we got a hold of the Engleharts' son for you. He was really relieved to hear that his folks were OK. He said that his Dad had a heart condition and had to take medicine. He was glad to hear that he was doing all right. You are a very considerate person. Thanks for being so thoughtful.

Actor 1: So, what about my wife? Have you gotten her down here, yet?

Negotiator 2: "Robert, when I hear people ask for their spouses in situations like this, I get nervous because sometimes I have found that they are thinking about killing themselves. I'm wondering if something like that is going through your head."

Actor 2: Killing myself? No. Not killing myself. I need her.

Negotiator 3: Need her?

Actor 3: Yes. I want to explain why I did what I did today. I want her to understand. Things have been rough on her lately and I want her to know it was for her.

Negotiator 4: So, it sounds like you want to do the right thing by your wife. Things have been stressful on her and you want her to understand why you did this, today? You wanted to make things better, not to increase her stress.

Actor 4: Right. You will let me talk to her, right?

Negotiator 5: I have to check with the boss, but I think we can let you talk to her, if we are sure everybody will be safe.

Actor 5: All you have to do is put her on the phone.

Negotiator 6: Or, you could put down the gun and come out and talk to her.

Actor 6: I'm not coming out there. Don't you get that? Are you crazy or what? Just get her down here. (HANG UP).

Application of principles

1. In trying to build rapport (attunement), the negotiator used *nominalizing* and *reinforced* the actor for his consideration. He described Robert as a considerate person, *expecting* that it would suggest an unchanging trait that they could count on the rest of the negotiations. He used *affirmation* while showing a willingness to meet a peripheral demand to show cooperation and liking, two elements of attunement.
2. The negotiator used an "I-message" to focus on the subject's suicidal intent, as the team had brainstormed above. The negotiator *expected* the "I-message" to say, "This is my concern, it may not be yours," so it is not as challenging as a straight question.
3. The negotiator used *mirroring*, *expecting* to keep the actor talking and to get a better idea of what the actor means. It was a brief response that says, "I am still listening, tell me more."
4. This interaction *summarized* the negotiator's understanding of what the actor said about his goals with his wife. The positive response shows that the actor believes that the negotiator has understood and the BLS is complete for this topic.
5. The negotiator used an *embedded statement* to show a willingness to cooperate and to suggest that safety will have to be guaranteed before she can talk with him. It was *expected* to remind the actor that safety is a core issue for all.
6. In this statement, the negotiator raises surrender, his core issue, too early. The actor is not yet feeling safe, and angrily resists. He uses face attack statements toward the negotiator, suggesting that he is focusing his frustration on the police, not the

residents or his wife.

The NPP after the above interaction looked like:

NPP# 0008	Date: Time:
Status	1. Robert hung up after we suggested that he come out and talk to his wife. 2. Wife is on the scene and secured. 3. His attack was directed toward us — “Are you crazy?” — not toward the residents.
Assessment	4. He was communicating well, until the suggestion that he come out. 5. Risk of suicide may be increasing. 6. Risk of aggression toward hostage continues to be low. 7. Actor is frustrated by not being able to talk to wife and fearful of police, but his frustration is with us, not the residents or his wife. 8. Wife is important. Their relationship seems close and her opinion appears important to him. He seems to depend on her when he gets depressed.
Recommendations	9. Recognize ambivalence about coming out. 10. Explore ambivalence thoroughly, using MI and focusing him on change talk. 11. Explore using wife as TPI. Letting her talk to him will show good faith on our part and we can use her relationship to increase our credibility. She will have to stay focused on our goals. 12. Get more details about what he wants to discuss with wife. Ask him to explain it so the “Boss will understand.”

Negotiations: Negotiator re-established contact.

Negotiator 1: Robert, I didn’t understand how strongly you felt about not coming out. If I were in your shoes, I’d be pretty frustrated since I would have been doing everything I could to be sure everything turned out OK and the cops didn’t seem to understand.

Actor 1: Yeah, how come you guys don’t get it? I am trying to make this thing work and you guys just want me to come out.

Negotiator 2: I can only imagine what you think might happen if you come out. What is the worst that could happen if you come out?

Actor 2: You guys will arrest me and I will go to jail without talking to my wife. You guys will beat me up, like the guys did last time. You’ve already messed up my life and gotten me fired.

Negotiator 3: And what if you can’t talk to her?

Actor 3: We cannot decide what to do when I am in jail. We don’t have money and she won’t have bail or anything. Then, how will she get by? We already used all of our savings.

Negotiator 4: So, you are worried about her making it, when you go to jail. What is the best that could happen if you came out?

Actor 4: You guys would let me talk to her. We could figure out what she is going to do. I don’t know if she wants to live with her parents or what. Maybe, but she and her parents don’t always get along. They didn’t want us to get married to begin with. They will probably give her the “I told you so” routine.

Negotiator 5: You think that her parents will work against you?

Actor 5: Yep. They help us out and all, but I know they never thought I was good enough.

Negotiator 6: They are helpful but not always approving and you are afraid they will undermine you while you are in jail.

Actor 6: Right.

Negotiator 7: Tell me how they have been helpful.

Actor 7: Well, they babysit while Martha works. They have offered to pay our rent. They bring food by. My father-in-law has tried to get me on at his job.

Negotiator 8: What about staying in there. What is the best and the worst that could happen, if you stay in there?

Actor 8: The best is that you guys would put her on the phone and we could work things out. The worst would be that you guys get tired and kick in the door, kick my ass, and take me to jail. Been there before.

Negotiator 9: I guess it was pretty painful when the officers broke your wrist.

Actor 9: Yeah, and the hospital didn’t help. They twisted my wrist directions it wasn’t supposed to go. I would have punched them, if I could.

Negotiator 10: So, it may be really painful to stay in there.

Actor 10: Yeah, I guess so. But, remember, I have the old folks, so you guys won't be coming in.

Negotiator 11: Robert, we aren't coming in. I think I understand. You want to be sure that your wife and kids are going to be OK and you don't trust your in-laws to be helpful. They have done a lot for you and they have criticized you some. You want to talk to your wife about these things.

Actor 11: That is about it.

Negotiator 12: Let me talk to the boss about this and see what I can do for you. I will get back to you in a little while.

Actor 12: OK—OK.

Application of principles

1. The negotiator *rolled with the resistance* by reflecting emotions, agreeing with the actor about frustration and putting a *twist* on it. By emphasizing how hard the actor was working to get things worked out, the negotiator *reinforced* the actor's cooperation.
2. Negotiator uses an *open-ended question* to get the actor to elaborate on what he expects to happen if he comes out too early. It *elicits* a response from the actor rather than imposing one on him.
3. Negotiator chooses to sidestep the attack on the police and using another open-ended question to explore the other side of the actor's reservations about surrendering.
4. The negotiator reflects the actor's concern about the wife not making it and refocuses the actor on the reasons that coming out would be a good idea.
5. The negotiator focuses the actor on the concern about the wife's parents, using reflection to guide the conversation. It focuses on Robert's "*problem within a problem.*"
6. The negotiator used *mirroring* to get more information and to show interest, since it had worked well before.
7. The negotiator gets the actor to *elaborate* more on the in-laws' helpfulness, expecting him to see more reasons that they are likely to work for him than against him.
8. The negotiator invites the actor to explore the advantages and disadvantages of staying where he is by using an open-ended question.
9. The negotiator recognizes the fact that the actor's wrist was broken without buying into the actor's interpretation of following events.
10. The negotiator states for the actor that it is likely to be painful, if the police come in.
11. Recognizing that Robert was getting upset by the idea that the police may assault, the negotiator *reassures* the actor and *summarizes* what he has heard so far, both as a distraction and as a foundation for working out an agreement.
12. The negotiator states that he will talk to the boss about putting the wife on the phone, both as a way of *focusing* the actor on the reasons his in-laws have been helpful and the advantages of coming out and to build the negotiator's reputation as a helper (*attunement*).

Negotiations: After 15 minutes, the negotiator re-established contact:

Negotiator 1: My boss is considering your wife's getting on the phone and he wants to know more about how you and Martha get along before he OKs letting her on the phone. What has it been like at home since you lost your job?

Actor 1: Well, it hasn't been the best, but it's been OK.

Negotiator 2: Been OK?

Actor 2: Sure. I haven't had much luck getting a job. That gets me down sometimes, but she gets me going again. We don't have enough money to pay the bills, which stresses us out. But we have figured out how to get by, so far. The thing is, we are about out of savings. I really let her down this time. Nothing has gone right and we need to decide what to do now.

Negotiator 3: Sounds like you're getting down, now. I know, when I get down, it helps to talk it out with people. I am here to help.

Actor 3: How can you help? You're not the one who will feed my kids when I am in jail. You're not out of your house, in a two bedroom apartment that is too small. You don't see the look on my kids face when I have to tell them they can't go to the movies because we can't afford it.

Negotiator 4: You've lost a lot in the last few months and your wife helps you out sometimes and you would like help now. What would you like to tell her, when you get the chance?

Actor 4: That I was doing this because I love her and wanted to make it easier for her. We need to talk about what we are going to do now. I will probably go to jail and I don't know what she is going to do. I really screwed the pooch. I don't know what I was thinking. You probably seen a lot of stupid people. Have you ever seen anybody as stupid as I am?

Negotiator 5: Robert, you sound like you are getting down on yourself. You probably don't trust yourself right now and want to check things out with your wife; just to be sure you don't make anything worse. Sounds like you would like some reassurance.

Actor 5: Well wouldn't you? Look at what I did? Lost my job, spent up our savings and pulled a stupid stunt trying to fix it. I should have talked with her before I went off half-cocked.

Negotiator 6: Robert, it's been my experience that even the smartest people do stupid things when they are stressed out. Last year, we had a doctor barricade himself in his house, threatening to commit suicide when he was diagnosed with cancer. When he realized how many people cared about him and how many people he would hurt, he decided that the smart thing was to come out and be with his wife. Doing stupid things is not the same as being stupid.

Application of principles

1. The negotiator uses an *open-ended question* to invite actor to tell more of his story, *focusing* him on his relationship with his wife.
2. Returning to the BLS, the negotiator uses *mirroring* to invite more details
3. The negotiator chooses to *focus* on the core of depression and its action tendency, the need for help. He offers to help. The actor does not see the negotiator as a helper yet, suggesting that he does not yet trust the negotiator, so the negotiator goes back to the wife as a helper, using an open-ended question to explore the relationship.
4. The negotiator *reflects* the loss and the action potential of depression again, and then he focuses on the wife as helper, using another *open-ended question* to get more details about the relationship.
5. The negotiator chooses to sidestep the jail issue and *focuses on the face issue*. It was the last thing the actor said.
6. The negotiator uses a *face-restoring message* to try to help Robert "save face" and restore a sense of *self-efficacy*. The actor is going to have to believe he can solve the problems, even from jail. Helping him save face here starts to lay the foundation.

Other principles?

NPP# 0009	Date: Time:
Status	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Robert is communicating again. 2. Wife is on the scene and secured. 3. He is calmer and talking about his mixed feelings about surrender. 4. He has in-laws as a resource but is ambivalent about them.
Assessment	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Risk of suicide appears continuing to be a possibility, if he feels trapped and helpless. He seems a little depressed, but not to the point of being suicidal. He still has options and he feels the need for help. 6. Risk of aggression toward hostages continues to be low. The only time he brings them up is when he feels threatened. He is not angry with them. 7. Wife has more credibility than we do.
Recommendations	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 8. Use wife as a TPI. Letting her talk to him will show good faith on our part and we can use her relationship to increase our credibility. She can address his ambivalence about his in-laws by reassuring him. We will script her to reassure him that she will stay with him, no matter what; that she will not let her parents' attitude affect her commitment and that having him back with her when he gets out of jail is the most important thing for her. 9. Negotiator needs to separate himself from the generic "the police," becoming an individual to actor. He can do that by selective self-disclosure of time the negotiator needed help or continue to be reassuring.

Third-Party Intermediary (TPI)—an issue in many negotiations is how and when to use a third-party intermediary. In dealing with this issue, the negotiators interviewed Robert's wife, Martha:

Negotiator 1: Martha, here is what we know, so far: Robert does not want to hurt anybody but he has gotten himself into a jam. He tried robbing the S&L in part to get money, in part to get some payback for the way they treated you guys on that loan foreclosure. Now, he is stuck. He is in the house with a couple of retired people and he is worried about what will happen to you and the kids, when he has to go to jail. He knows that you have spent most of the savings and cannot afford a lawyer. He is not sure how you and the kids will get along without him. He wants to be sure you know that he loves you and he wants to talk to you about what you and the kids are going to do. He wants to be sure that your parents don't poison you against him while he is in jail. He is afraid of us, blaming us for his losing his job and the pain of his broken wrist. We think that it would be a good idea if you got on the phone and reassured him that you will stick with him, that there are public defenders that can defend him, which you will be here to make sure the police treat him right.

We believe that he wants reassurance from you and help planning what he needs to do.

He trusts you a lot more than he trusts us, given his experience with the police. We are considering letting you get on the phone with him, but before we do, we need to figure out if this is a move that would be helpful, would help end this thing with everybody safe.

Wife 1: What do you need? I don't want anything to happen to him or to the old people. I couldn't make it without him. We've been together since high school.

Negotiator 2: We need to know what you think about what Robert has done today.

Wife 2: I think he should have talked to me. What was he thinking? He could be killed and what would we do? I didn't know he was so desperate. He has done some impulsive things before but this takes the cake.

Negotiator 3: You sound pretty frustrated by what he has done. Even though he meant well, what he has done has made it worse. At the same time, you sound worried about what will happen to Robert, you, and the kids, if things get any worse.

Wife 3: Yes and he is right. I can hear my parents now. But, I can handle that. What frustrates me is that he did this without talking it over with me. He knows better than that. When he has come home with some wild ideas about how to get rich, I've been the one who showed him how unrealistic they were.

Negotiator 4: You've been the brake on some of his impulsive ideas in the past; slowing him down before he got out of control. It is that brake we need now.

Wife 4: What do you want me to do?

Negotiator 5: He seems to be worried about two major things: what you think of him and what you and the kids will do when he is in jail. To a lesser degree, he seems to be worried about how you guys will afford a lawyer. We need you to reassure him that you will stay with him through this whole thing and he needs to hear that you and the kids will be all right. Do you think you can reassure him these ways?

Wife 5: Sure. I'm not going anywhere and in spite of my folks nagging about him, they really have been helpful. They will probably still help us out. I'm not sure what to do about the lawyer. We've never needed one before. How expensive are they?

Negotiator 6: They are pretty expensive and I have an idea about that, if you want to hear it.

Wife 6: Sure. What is it?

Negotiator 7: There is a Public Defenders program that you guys might qualify for. Attorneys provide a certain amount of free representation to people who cannot afford an attorney. Would you guys be interested in that?

Wife 7: Sure. How do we do that?

Negotiator 8: An attorney will be assigned to his case after he goes before the judge. He has to come out first and the sooner he does, the better it will look for him.

Wife 8: He will have to go to jail, though, right?

Negotiator 9: Yes he will. He seems to know that and his problem with that is what will happen to you and the kids while he is there. That is why we need to reassure him.

Wife 9: Oh, OK. What do I do?

Negotiator 10: First, it has been my experience that if you are able to tell people in details what you plan; they are more reassured than if you just say, "We will be all right." So, specifically what would you say that might convince him that you will stay with him and that you and the kids will be all right?

Wife 10: Well, I could remind him of the times we did not have enough money before and how I went to work for a while to help support us.

Negotiator 11: And, it turned out all right? Good. Are you working now?

Wife 11: No, but I can.

Negotiator 12: What did you do before?

Wife 12: Secretarial stuff.

Negotiator 13: Always a job for secretaries. Now, it is important that he not feel like you are in his face about today. I think he is feeling foolish enough about what he has done.

He doesn't need to hear it from us. Do you think you can stay away from that?

Wife 13: Yes. I know timing is everything.

After this interview, the negotiators help Martha craft a script that emphasized how she understood that he was trying to help (Face restoring), that she and the kids would be there for him and that they could survive financially, citing times that they had gotten through tough times together before (reassurance). In addition, she was prepped to reassure Robert about the trustworthiness of the negotiators (attunement) and to suggest to Robert that he needed to cooperate with the negotiators when he came out (indirect suggestion).

NPP# 0012	Date: Time:
Status	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Wife is on the scene, has been screened and is willing to act as a TPI.2. He is calmer and talking about his mixed feelings about surrender.3. He has in-laws as a resource but is ambivalent about them.
Assessment	<ol style="list-style-type: none">4. Risk appears of suicide continuing to be a possibility, if he feels trapped and helpless. He seems a little depressed, but not to the point of being suicidal. He still has options and he feels the need for help. He has relied on his wife to help him when he got depressed in the past.5. Risk of aggression toward Hostages continues to be low. The only time he brings them up is when he feels threatened. He is not angry with them.6. Wife has more credibility than we do. Using her as TPI will probably shorten negotiations without raising risk.
Recommendations	<ol style="list-style-type: none">7. Use wife as a TPI. We have scripted her to reassure him that she will stay with him, no matter what; that she will not let her parents attitude affect her commitment and that having him back with her when he gets out of jail is the most important thing for her, that they can use the public defender, if needed and that they have been through tough times before. She has agreed not to be critical. We will control the phone line and cut her off, if she strays from the script.8. Negotiator needs to separate himself from the generic "the police," becoming an individual to actor. He can do that by selective self-disclosure of time the negotiator needed help or continue to be reassuring.

In this incident, the commander approved the use of the wife as a TPI. She was able to reassure the actor and he agreed to surrender. The next step was planning the surrender and

being sure everybody was on the same page.

As Kelln and McMurtry (2007) have pointed out, the plans have to be specific, discreet, understandable, and manageable. Surrender brings a recurrence of feelings that have to be managed. Negotiators are asking actors to put themselves in harm's way, to trust that the police/corrections officers will treat them well, to give up cherished goals (freedom and control, for instance) and to swallow some pride. A mixture of fear, anger, and shame may surface. Negotiators need to be prepared to recognize and manage what may look like regression in the progress that has been made to this point, after the actor agrees to surrender. Reflecting the actor's ambivalence about coming out, recapping how much progress the actor and the negotiator have made together, getting the actor to review the reasons that change is in his or her benefit, and reassurance are all tactics to be used during the surrender.

Communications is complicated and may be garbled at this stage. Not only do the actor and the negotiators need to be clear on how the surrender will take place, but command and tactical need to be using the same script. Ideally, the surrender plan should be worked out before it is needed. Then it becomes a matter of the negotiators communicating the specific plan to the actor and alerting command and tactical that the surrender is happening.

The surrender plan should include specific instructions for releasing hostages, disposal of the weapons, exiting the building, the surrender ritual and conditions the actor is likely to face when he is taken into custody. In addition, the actor needs to have a chance to review the plan, to resolve any ambivalence he or she feels about it, commit to it and practice it in his or her head.

One way of getting the details across to the actor is to ask him or her to visualize it as clearly as possible while the negotiator describes the surrender in as much detail as possible. Visualizing the steps not only gets the plan into the actor's script verbally, it lays down a visual script that reinforces the verbal instructions. In addition, it gives the actor a chance to talk about any ambivalence he feels at any step in the surrender. Without a detailed, specific, and agreed-upon plan for how this last scene is to be played out, there is significant room for disaster. Asking the actor to repeat the plan allows the negotiator to see if the actor is understanding.

Negotiations:

Negotiator 1: Robert. Thanks for working with us on this. It shows again how much of a caring person you are. Let's talk about how it's going to happen that you come out. We need to be sure everybody understands the plan, so nobody gets hurt. We want to keep everybody safe. Are you ready to do that?

Actor 1: Yeah—sure.

Negotiator 2: Robert, I have been through this before and have some suggestions about how best to keep things cool. Do you want to hear them?

Actor 2: Yeah.

Negotiator 3: First, it is good to let the Engleharts come out before you do. They are likely to take a little time, and to be a little nervous, so if we can get them out, none of us have to worry about them.

Actor 3: But, what will keep you guys from kicking my ass or wasting me without them?

Negotiator 4: Robert, this part is always nerve-wracking for everybody. That is why we need a clear plan. You are probably wondering if you can trust me again. Remember the things I have done for you: I did not bust into the house, I got a hold of the Engleharts' son, I got your wife down here, and I put her on the phone, so you could work things out with her. What did she tell you about me? That you could trust me, right?

Actor 4: Right.

Negotiator 5: So, are you OK with letting them out first? I know it is a big step, a really brave thing to do, and my experience is that it really makes things easier.

Actor 5: Yes.

Negotiator 6: Send them to the front door. You stay back, away from the door. They will be met by officers dressed in

black on either side of the door. They need to open the door slowly, keep their hands in plain sight and follow the officer's instructions step by step. Can you explain that to them?

Actor 6: Yeah—sure.

Negotiator 7: What are you going to tell them?

Actor 7: That they need to go to the front door. They need to open the door slowly and keep their hands up. There will be cops there, dressed in black on either side of the door and follow the officer's orders.

Negotiator 8: Good, Robert. Where are you going to be, while they are going out?

Actor 8: At the end of the hall, in the kitchen door.

Negotiator 9: Good. Stay back and be sure you don't threaten anybody. After you explain the instruction, get back on the phone and let me know that they're ready to come out. We don't want any surprises when we are doing this good. OK?

Actor 9: OK.

(Conversation off line)

Actor 10: OK, they are ready.

Negotiator 10: Are you back away from the door? We don't want anybody hurt now that we are so close to getting this settled.

Actor 11: I am at the kitchen door.

Negotiator 11: Go ahead and send them out.

(As hostages exit: Pause)

Negotiator 12: OK, Robert, that went very well. Good work. Now let's talk about how you will come out. Your wife is here waiting and we have a place for you two to talk for a little bit.

Actor 12: Ok, what do you want me to do?

Negotiator 13: First, do not do anything until we are all clear about what is going to happen. OK?

Actor 13: OK

Negotiator 14: We need you to put the gun down in the middle of the hall, kick it toward the front door where the officers out there can see it. Then, put your hands on your head and walk slowly toward the door, like the Engleharts did. When you get to the front door, there will be officers in black carrying a shotgun and a rifle. So, don't be surprised. Nobody's getting hurt. Follow their directions. They will have you get down on your knees and one of them will handcuff you, so everybody stays safe.

Application of principles

1. The negotiator's goals were to *reinforce* the actor's *cooperation*, *affirm* him as a caring person, *reassure* the actor, and *control the focus* of the negotiations and gain a verbal *commitment* to safety by asking if Robert was ready.
2. The negotiator offers his expertise and asks if the actor wants to hear it. He is saying that he has been through it before, but he does not want to *overplay the "expert"* role for fear of generating *resistance*. He gives the actor *control* by asking if he wants to hear what has worked before.
3. The negotiator gives a reason for the Engleharts coming out first, again, *avoiding the "expert"* who gives orders. He is trying to maintain a *cooperative* atmosphere.
4. The negotiator recognizes the *core emotion*, fear, normalizes it by saying "it is always nerve-racking" and recaps reasons actor can trust him —*focusing* on one side of the ambivalence and the wife's advice to reinforce his trustworthiness.
5. Negotiator tries to *gain agreement* and reiterates his experience. He is not so worried about being the "expert" at this point because the actor has bought into listening to his experience.
6. Instructions are almost the same as the negotiator will give the actor later, so when it is his time to come out he will be *familiar* with them and will have seen that *they work*, reducing fear and ambivalence about surrendering.
7. The negotiator has the actor repeat what he is going to tell the Engleharts; to be sure he has them clear and accurate. It also *reinforces* them in his mind.

8. The negotiator reinforces the actor and gets actor back, again reinforcing the message about *safety*.
9. The negotiator wants the actor on the phone to *control* his location.
10. The negotiator underlines safety again.
11. Negotiator controls situation.
12. The negotiator *supports self-efficacy*, takes *control* of the incident, and *focuses* the actor on the strongest reason he needs to come out (change talk).
13. The negotiator slows things down and *focuses* the actor on the directions.
14. The negotiator gives *detailed instructions*, many of which are repeats of what the actor told the hostages, so he is familiar with them. The negotiator *explains* reason for the actor putting the gun down and for handcuffing, rather than just ordering the actor to do it, showing the actor the *respect of colleagues—attunement*. He wants no surprises.

After a few more interchanges to be sure that everything was clear to the actor and that he was comfortable with the plan, the negotiator asked him to exit the house. He did.

Transfer

Before the surrender, negotiators need to consider what comes after the incident. Though not frequent, some actors are repeaters. It is helpful to think about and arrange resources that may reduce the chances of repeat incidents. For instance, when the incident involves mentally ill offenders, arranging follow-up care by mental health resources may prevent a recurrence. One of the authors supervised a program for his department that was referred to as the “frequent flier” program. It focused on actors who made frequent calls to the dispatcher for police services. The majority of the actors were mentally ill. When appropriate mental health care was arranged, most quit abusing the system. One schizophrenic female called the police 400 times in the year before intervention. Some of the calls involved paranoid delusions and weapons. Her psychiatrist had died and she had no psychiatric care. When care was arranged for her, the calls for service dropped to zero for the next 18 months. Departments like Albuquerque, New Mexico, Police Department, Houston Police Department and the Weber County Sheriff’s Office in Ogden, Utah, recognize the need for follow-up planning in mental health cases and work closely with their CIT officers to assure coordinated follow-up in incidents in which the actor is mentally ill. Weber County requires that their negotiators all be cross-trained as CIT officers.

A domestic violence incident should have some follow-up planning and referrals plan. There are multiple reasons abusers and victims stay together, but the fact is that many victims prefer to stay with their significant other; they just want the abuser to quit abusing. Being sure that the actor and/or the victim are referred to appropriate services, including anger management and self-help groups may well reduce the chances of a repeat incident. Negotiators can keep a list of domestic violence intervention programs in their kit and provide referrals to the victims on the spot, if they do not have access to crime victim’s services.

Others at the scene may need follow-up. Children who are left parentless in suicide-murder

incidents, or victims who were threatened, raped or assaulted during the incident need victims' services. Officers who were injured or had to shoot an actor need follow-up to reduce the impact of the trauma. Corrections integrates victims' services personnel into their planning to be sure these post-incident issues are addressed. Keeping a referral list will allow negotiators to provide all these people with the names and numbers of appropriate service providers.

Negotiators need to identify the relevant social services in their community and have a prearranged mechanism for connecting actors with the appropriate services. MOUs need to be worked out ahead of time, policies and procedures written for how to manage the transfer of information and responsibility, and contacts need to be developed that will facilitate the transfer.

Even at the scene, the responsibility for transporting the actor to jail, the hospital, or the mental health authority needs to be clear. Who is responsible for what? Some negotiators have been given the responsibility for booking offenders or taking them to the mental health center for evaluation. It is suggested that policies and procedures specify that negotiators, along with the rest of the crisis management team, not be assigned these responsibilities. The teams have enough to do to write their own reports about the incident and to debrief. Memory research shows us that the amount of detail remembered after an event decreases by 80 percent within 72 hours of the event. Debriefing as soon after the event as possible is likely to capture details that are forgotten quickly.

NPP# 0024	Date: Time:
Status	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Situation resolved. 2. Actor is in custody. 3. Hostages screened by victim's service.
Assessment	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Building a working relationship and using the wife as a TPI were effective tactics in resolving the incident. 5. Spending time addressing the actor's concerns about what was going to happen to his wife and family was a key in gaining a peaceful resolution. 6. Focusing actor on previous successes helped raise his confidence in his family's ability to survive. 7. Addressing his ambivalence about his in-laws as a source of support led to reassurance by wife that she would not be swayed by possible criticism and recognition by actor that in-laws were a resource. 8. Hostages did not appear to be traumatized at this time. Often, trauma does not appear right away. 9. Victim's Rights were explained. 10. Actor's wife was given list of resources, including the public defender's office, to help with emergency support and to provide family counseling as needed.
Recommendations	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 11. Follow-up on hostages by Victims' Services in a week. 12. Follow up with actor's wife in a week to see if she has had any trouble gaining services. 13. Debriefing with crisis management team.

Summary

The application of selected behavioral science principles and skills have been found, through

both research and experience, to facilitate change and lead to peaceful resolutions of critical incidents. Their skillful application results in a greater chance of saving lives in all types of sieges. Negotiators can improve their effectiveness by learning and applying these principles and skills, both during incidents and in their daily job as officers on the street. They can improve their effectiveness as crisis managers by being able to explain clearly what is expected when certain skills are used and when the skills are not working, what can be done next.

Discussion Questions/Exercises

1. Divide the class/group into five-person groups. Have each group consider the following scenarios:
 - A. A Caucasian female shot five children in a local grade school, killing two, after having tried to poison several people in town and setting fires at another grade school and a daycare. After the shooting at the elementary school, she escaped and barricaded herself in the home of a local couple whose son was home from college. She told the family that she was sexually assaulted and had shot the aggressor. The hostages agreed to call her mother for her and to get her mother to help her. The mother refused, hung up and called the police, giving them the address of the hostage scene. Responding officers found the son wounded on the driveway and were met by gunfire from inside the house. Have each group:
 1. Fill out the first NPP on the incident, focusing on anticipated risk, and present it to the class. Explain what principles from behavioral science influence the NPP.
 2. Write an opening statement that addresses the core emotion experienced by the actor in the scenario above. Have the groups explain how they would use the core emotion to facilitate negotiations.
 3. Identify some of the ambivalence that the actor might be expected to have been experiencing, listing both sides of the issues she might be expected to be thinking about.
 4. Discuss the sources of intelligence that might be helpful in assessing the continuing risk the actor poses to the hostages and to herself.
 5. Write a script illustrating a dialogue between the actor and the negotiator that deals with subject's ambivalence about going to jail, focusing on the face issues that might be involved.
 - B. The dispatch received a call from a resident of an apartment complex, stating that her boyfriend was locked in their apartment with their 15-month-old daughter. He had a rifle and handgun in the apartment. He

hadn't been employed for more than a year, was addicted to pain medications after an accident and had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder with schizophrenic tendencies and depression. A records check revealed that he had a criminal history of possession of a controlled substance, aggravated assault, family violence and a weapons violation. Negotiators were deployed: one in the armored vehicle, working the PA, and two at the CP. The team closest to the apartment was able to make contact and talk to the actor for about an hour. He threatened to kill himself and the baby. He broke off contact. After several minutes offline, he called the girlfriend's cell phone and negotiators talked to him. He was emotionally labile. He stated that he was the only one who could care for the baby and that he would rather they both die than to go back to prison. His only demand was that negotiators "go away."

When negotiators told him that they were afraid that he was going to kill his daughter, he went into a tirade. He shouted that he would never hurt his daughter and told negotiators to F—off. He hung up, again. The commander ordered the tactical team to throw two flash bangs onto the actor's patio. The actor called back frantically. A new negotiator answered the phone and confronted the actor, telling him that his only option was to come out. Every time the actor waved at officers through the window, tactical threw two more flash bangs. The baby started crying and the actor tried to calm her down. As he focused on the baby more, the actor made fewer threats and seemed to become more rational. After eight flash bangs and a lot of yelling to him about how he was a bad father, he decided to give up. The call out lasted about nine hours from setting the perimeter to debrief.

Critique the negotiator's tactics, focusing on:

1. What was the initial risk? Fill in an initial NPP showing your risk assessment.
2. What was the initial suicide risk? Explain your assessment.
3. The command staff decided to take a "hard line" with the actor. The judgment was made that increasing the pressure was not expected to pose a significant risk of escalating the actor's violence. Discuss the factors in the scenario that supported that decision.
4. How could the negotiators reframe the flash bangs being thrown on to the patio, to facilitate negotiations?
5. How would you deal with the actor if, instead of coming out, he had taken the baby to the bathroom and barricaded them both in?
6. Do a change talk analysis for dealing with the police's escalation of the incident. Use the following table.

The principles discussed in this chapter were used in the case study in the chapter when the negotiator interviewed the wife to assess whether to use her as a TPI. Explain which principles were applied and what the negotiator expected to gain in each interaction with the wife. Use the following table:

Alternative	Reasons Change to Option is Postive	Reasons Not Changing is Negative	Reasons Not Changing to Option is Positive	Reason Changing to Option is Negative
Employ flash bangs				
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				

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Chapter 4

Crisis Management: Risk Assessment

Chapter Outline

Risk assessment and negotiations

Current knowledge

Violent offenders

Domestic violence

The mentally ill

Research specific to negotiations

Imminent risk

Estimating risk: A process

Information versus intelligence

Intelligence and threat assessment

Purposes of intelligence

Intelligence: The process

Types of analysis

Understanding motivation

Definition of intelligence

Process of intelligence management

Intelligence gathering

Pre-crisis phase

At the scene: The Chaos phase

Stabilization phase

Post-incident phase

Intelligence sources

Interviewing intelligence sources

Assessing the credibility of the source

References

Learning Objectives

1. Understand the three issues important in risk assessment in negotiations.
2. Explain the general elements of risk assessment, according to Mount.
3. Understand the best researched predictors of violence among offenders.
4. Explain the unique factors associated with risk of violence in domestic incidents.
5. Understand the relationship between mental illness and violence.

6. Be able to utilize the modified brainstorming technique to estimate risk of violence.
7. Be able to define intelligence and explain the importance of it in negotiations.
8. Understand the difference between information and intelligence.
9. Know and understand the intelligence fusion process and how to employ that process during an incident to gather, analyze, and disseminate intelligence.
10. Know what a negotiator can do to facilitate intelligence work during the pre-incident phase.
11. Know the various sources that can be used for gathering intelligence and how to use those sources.
12. Understand the importance of cross validating information gained from intelligence.
13. Understand how to use the structured cognitive Interview.
14. Know the importance of analyzing and disseminating information in a timely way.

The State Police Crisis Response Unit (tactical and negotiators) responded to Midville, a small city in the western part of the state, which did not have a tactical or negotiation team. Two Midville police officers responded to a residence in a suburb for a man with a gun. The caller stated their neighbor, an elderly man ("in his late eighties") was walking around his yard with a pistol. The officers asked for a criminal background check on their way to the residence and discovered the subject, John Doe, had no arrest record (not even a parking citation in his past). The officers parked their car and walked up to the driveway gate, whereupon someone in Doe's house fired at them. They backed off, radioed in "shots fired," and the chief called the state police. Their Crisis Response Team (CRT) arrived, established a perimeter and had negotiators attempt to establish contact. After getting no response from repeated phone calls, negotiators and tactical officers approached the house in the armored vehicle and tried hailing into the house. The individual fired numerous rounds at the armored vehicle. The tactical commander was preparing for an assault on the house (using the armored vehicle's ram to break in the door, followed by an assault team). As the armored vehicle was approaching the front door, the man inside walked out on the porch with his hands in the air. He was immediately taken into custody.

The incident commander was discussing the arrest with the Midville police chief, when the chief said, "Yeah, we've seen this coming for a long time." When questioned, the chief indicated John Doe had been a pest to the police for about the past year. The chief reported his officers had "written off" his rants as being due to his advanced age, living alone, onset of dementia, and other illnesses related to aging. The chief also reported that over the past year, his "rants" had progressively become more emotional and more violent-oriented, but they just attributed this to advancing dementia. John Doe had initially flagged down officers on patrol, talking about disagreements with property assessment taxes. He then started calling the department's non-emergency number and made verbal threats directed to the "a_____" at the tax assessment office and telling what actions he would take if they came on his property (physical assaults against them and lawsuits over trespassing). Next, he escalated and would come into the police department lobby, rambling about what he was going to do about the "government" interfering in his affairs and life. Last week he came in and told the desk officer that anyone who showed up and tried to take his guns would be "turned into Swiss cheese" and generally threatened action with any other government interference in his life. Officers also noted that over time his dress became more slovenly and he seemed to take less care in personal grooming. During many of these conversations, he would make reference to "the way we used to treat the enemy in WWII."

Police officers and crisis response teams make risk assessments every day with every call. The incident above illustrates the importance of making accurate risk assessments and what might happen when officers make faulty assessments. Every officer that responded made assessments. The patrol officers made an assessment that (1) this was an older man, (2) with no criminal record. Included in their assessment was the assumption that elderly people and people with no criminal record do not pose a threat to police. The CRT made assessments based upon police officers having been fired upon. Tactical formed a perimeter, and negotiators tried to call the actor. When they received no answer, they moved forward in an armored vehicle and tried to loud-hail. When gunfire was directed at them, the tactical commander prepared for a measured assault. When later informed about the chief's comments, everyone on the Midville Crisis Response Team said that information would have drastically altered their plans from the outset and went on to specifically state what they

would have done differently.

The patrol officers said that had they known about the past actions of John Doe, they would have responded quite differently; would not have approached the gate on foot but would have remained with their vehicle, would have requested a backup officer approach from the rear, would have used a bull-horn to call to the homeowner, and would have had their long rifles with them. Like the Centerville CRT, they were able to articulate their assessment based upon the information available. Neither the officers nor the CRT was wrong or right; they make assessments based upon the information available. When they received further information, they were able to articulate what they would do differently.

In looking at professional responsibility in suicide and violence management by mental health professionals, the courts have held that the accuracy of the assessment is not the issue in liability cases. Rather, it is failure to make a good faith effort that exposes the professional to liability. Such is the case for negotiators.

Risk Assessment and Negotiations

One of the most critical questions the negotiator needs to address is the hostage taker's potential for violence toward the people they are holding, toward police, and toward others. Commanders are called on to decide if tactical action is required or if negotiation is the appropriate choice. Criteria the FBI (Noesner, 1999; Lanceley, 2003) suggest for testing such a decision are the:

- Risk effectiveness of the action—Is the action likely to lead to less loss than other options?
- Necessity of the action—Is the action needed now to reduce loss?
- Acceptability of the action—Will the community we are policing accept the action as necessary and appropriate?

Risk assessment deals with the necessity for action; a high or changing risk may necessitate action. A systematic and explainable way of estimating risk is needed to advise command on this point. In assessing risk, there are several issues negotiators need to consider, including the current state of the art and science of violence prediction, the factors that can be managed or changed in the risk equation that may reduce risk and the process for estimating risk. This chapter will look at these issues.

The approach to predicting violence in negotiations has been a checklist approach. That is, a list of violence “predictors,” things that have correlated with violence from other areas of the criminal justice system, have been developed and negotiators have been advised to look for these risk factors when they gather intelligence. Advice on the use of these factors has generally been conservative in the sense that negotiators have been told, “If any of the factors are identified, SWAT and command should be notified of the risk and the potential need for tactical intervention in order to resolve the situation (Greenstone, 2005, p. 95). Hare (in press) has pointed out that the checklist approach is good if all the contingencies controlling an incident are known and there are recognized and tested ways of dealing with the incident.

This is not usually the case in negotiations. Are all the contingencies, factors that control the outcome of the incident, known in deliberate, anticipated, or spontaneous sieges? Probably not. If they were, we would have a 100% success rate. So how do we deal with the issue of assessing risk?

The authors suggest that the answer to that question at this point in the development of criminal justice negotiations is multifaceted. It includes a knowledge of what is known about risk assessment from prior research, an understanding of principles developed within other areas of the criminal justice system that have a stake in predicting risk, a continuing study of low probability – high risk incidents to develop and refine risk assessment in situations that are not the “normal” incident and the use of brainstorming to assess risk in any specific incident.

Risk assessment in negotiations is really about three issues:

1. The probability of violence.
2. The imminence of violence.
3. The degree of violence anticipated.

The probability of violence is what negotiators are concerned about when they assess the initial risk using McGowen’s criteria of *context*, *containment*, and *communications*. It is what negotiators have traditionally done by using risk factors to say whether or not the subject’s probability of violence is greater than the average person’s and to a great degree, it depends on “static risk factors,” those that are permanent and cannot be changed. Negotiators have relatively little control over these factors.

The imminence of risk is more situationally determined and changes as the nature of the negotiation changes. It has to do with the nature of the relationship between the subject and the negotiators or the person being held. The negotiators have the ability to change the imminence of the risk by managing the incident well or poorly.

The degree of violence has to do with the subject’s use of violence in the past and the recent pattern of violence he or she may have shown.

[Current knowledge](#)

Since the early 1980s there has been a waxing and waning in interest in predicting violence. Several areas have contributed to this research and it is helpful for negotiators to familiarize themselves with these areas. They include criminal justice research, domestic violence research, research on violence among the mentally ill, and a limited amount of research from the negotiations field itself.

In corrections, the issues of who may be repeat offenders, who can be rehabilitated, and who is likely to act out violently in prison have been key issues. Much of the violence prediction research has come out of these efforts (John Howard Society of Alberta, 2000).

Generally, the results of the research in corrections have shown that actuarial, statistically based models have been better than clinical models of prediction (Howe, 1994, although he warns that the predictors have not been adequately standardized; Gottfredson & Gottfredson, 1994), that there is a need to focus intervention on risk factors that intervention can change,

and the notion that risk is, to a large extent, situation-based rather than personality-based.

Actuarially based assessment is the effort to find predictable statistically significant relationships between risk factors and the chances of future violence. For instance, the statement that males commit significantly more violence than females is a demographic, statistically based statement. The risk factor is observable and countable and the relationship to future violence can be verified statistically. In corrections, actuarial models are preferred because they are more accurate. In negotiations, there is not enough research to validate an actuarial model of prediction and though there have been a few efforts to apply actuarial prediction—Greenstone’s research mentioned in [Chapter 6](#), for instance—there are actually no studies validating the different risk factors’ applicability.

A second issue brought to light in the corrections research is the difference between risk factors that can be changed and those that cannot— *static* predictors, such as an offender’s criminal history, and *dynamic* predictors, such as antisocial values. Most risk assessment scales include both changeable and unchangeable risk factors.

Mount (1995) suggested that the following were factors associated with the risk of violence in negotiations:

1. Personality factors included: male; Age 15 – 24; history of violence; paranoid ideation, especially ideas of persecution that lead the person to believe that people are an immediate threat; below-average intelligence; psychopathic or borderline personality.
2. Situational indicators are: Families that teach violence as a way of solving problems and dealing with frustrations; a peer group that endorses the use of violence; job instability, loss, or threatened loss; availability of deadly weapons; availability of target; alcohol or stimulant use.
3. Biological factors: History of central nervous system trauma, infection, or disease, including seizures; major mental disorders.

Miller (2005) reported the one critical risk variable is whether the actor knows the hostage and/or deliberately selects the hostage. The actor who does is usually on a mission to make a statement or “teach a lesson” to the hostage or world. Many instances of domestic violence and workplace violence fit this paradigm. Hillbrand (2001) points out that this type of incident is even more dire when the actor intends to commit a murder-suicide, and often become hostage events when the police arrive.



PHOTO 4.1 Critical components of successfully resolving a crisis situation are good intelligence work and proper risk

Norko and Baranoski (2008) reviewed the research on nonmental illness variables that are correlated with an increased risk of violence and concluded that violence rates correlate with gender (male), age (late adolescence to young adulthood), low socioeconomic status, and low education levels. Clinical studies support the significance of youth, anger, suspiciousness, and lack of impulse control in prediction of violence. Finally, studies of situational variables have supported the risk of violence in people living in poorer neighborhoods, those who were homeless, those who had violence in their environment, those who abused substances, and those who had been victimized.

Note that a number of the risk factors are ones that are historically based and cannot be changed. A person cannot change his or her sex, criminal history, or history of abuse. On the other hand, he or she may change his or her thinking about the reasons and situations that justify their use of violence or their substance abuse. The use of risk scales that are heavily loaded with unchanging historical risk factors will not be as sensitive to changes in the risk levels over the course of an incident, but they can serve as an in-depth initial assessment of risk. Research has shown that static factors are relatively good predictors of violence, but do not lead to effective intervention-management strategies. [Table 4.1](#) shows the breakdown in static and dynamic risk factors from Mount's review.

[Table 4.1](#) Fixed versus Dynamic Risk Factors

Fixed Risk Factors	Dynamic Risk Factor
Male	Paranoid ideation
History of violence	Peer group that endorses the use of violence
Below-average intelligence	Rationalizes use of violence
Family teaches violence	Job instability
Significant loss	Availability of deadly weapons
Central nervous system (CNS) trauma	Availability of target
CNS infection, or disease	Alcohol or stimulant use
Seizures	Threatened loss
Age: 15–24	Major mental disorders
Psychopathic or borderline personality	

Rueve and Welton (2008) have pointed to an example of the importance of distinguishing between static and dynamic factors in risk assessment. They point out that psychosis and schizophrenia are static factors: once diagnosed, a person has the diagnosis. However, the presence of command hallucinations or delusions of persecution is a dynamic factor that changes with treatment. They list dynamic factors as:

- substance abuse or dependence
- persecutory delusions
- command hallucinations
- nonadherence to treatment
- impulsivity

- homicidality
- depression
- hopelessness
- suicidality
- feasibility of homicidal plan
- access to weapons
- recent move of a weapon out of storage

Negotiators need to keep dynamic factors in mind when doing an assessment because they are the factors negotiators can influence during the incident. For instance, whether or not the subject is drinking or taking drugs during the incident can be influenced by the negotiator. Distracting the subject when he or she is starting to become delusional by changing the topic is something that gives negotiators control over a risk factor. Persuading the subject to put a weapon in a drawer while talking to the negotiator reduces the risk. Developing hope in a suicidal person reduces the risk of suicide. Asking the subject to take his or her psychotropic medication when he or she has not been taking it may help defuse the situation. Negotiators need to constantly assess when they can or cannot influence a risk factor.

In doing an initial assessment, the inclusion of all risk factors may make sense for the negotiator, but as the incident progresses, the relationship is built or deteriorates, and the risk level is likely to change. One of the goals of negotiations is to decrease the risk. Negotiators track “signs of progress,” hoping to see change. This cannot be done through a risk assessment that focuses exclusively on static factors that do not change. However, there are factors that change as the incident progresses that negotiators need to track, to decide whether they are defusing the incident or not.

A third issue from corrections that helps negotiators is a recognition of the situational nature of some violence. One of the findings from corrections research is that risk factors that predict violence in the institution are not always the same as risk factors that predict violence after the subject returns to the community. The need to defend self in the institution is frequently greater than the need to defend self in the community. The situational demands need to be taken into account in predicting violence. McGowan’s (2007) research showed that the situational factors of containment and communications were significantly correlated with outcome. Other situational factors that need to be monitored to adequately assess the risk of violence might include the attunement issues, adequate management of the emotional content of the incident, and the degree to which resistance is recognized and managed—all issues under the control of the negotiator. Basically, ongoing monitoring of the situational variables gives negotiators a way of tracking changes during the incident and should be a conscious part of an ongoing risk assessment.

Intelligence-Led Negotiations

By Sgt. Dan Oblinger, Wichita (KS) Police Department

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field operations. He has provided intelligence analysis and exploitation training to law enforcement personnel all over the United States. He holds a bachelor's degree in philosophy and criminal justice from Wichita State University. He is a member in good standing of the International Association of Crime Analysts.

The Iceberg

The average iceberg only maintains one-ninth of its true size above the waterline. Roughly 89% of these monstrous floating ice mountains lie out of sight. Many a ship's captain has fallen victim to what he could not see or know.

What makes negotiations with barricaded suspects so difficult? Is it the emotionally charged, high profile nature of such incidents? Or perhaps the often irrational or drug-impaired states of mind of those with whom we negotiate? A strong argument can be made that the true difficulty of speaking with complete strangers who are intent on violence is the lack of information about their history, capabilities, motivations, and desires. These knowledge voids represent the hidden portion of the iceberg for a negotiations team. The modern, professional crisis negotiator takes great pains to mitigate the risk of the unknown through the use of intelligence.

Basic concepts

Intelligence is widely recognized as a part of the negotiations process. Many teams use the role of Intel Officer in their formal structure. By taking the time to study and practice the intelligence cycle, a negotiator creates more options for a successful resolution to a hostage or barricade situation.

A word of caution regarding the use of intelligence is found in a quotation by Alexander Pope: "A little learning is a dangerous thing." When undertaking the task of generating intelligence, the negotiations team should make it a continuous, comprehensive process. Finding one or two items of useful information may create a misleading picture of the barricaded suspect. Only by using a standardized system to verify and analyze information can the intelligence products be trusted in the high-stakes environment of a negotiation for lives. Dig deeper.

Information rich, knowledge poor

The challenge in making this commitment lies in the nature of modern law enforcement. Even with all of the advances in records managements systems (RMS), methods of accessing electronic databases and social media sources, we still operate in an environment that is information rich but knowledge poor. We are drowning in information. Information is data—numbers, statistics, names, dates, and places. It lacks coherency.

When in its raw form, information might be:

- True and correct – the information is an accurate representation of reality.

- Incorrect – the information is wrong, perhaps through human error as in a typo.
- False – the information was falsified with evil intention.
- Misleading – the information is correct, but lacks context. Without context, the user misapplies the information to their problem.
- Any combination of the above – when dealing with multiple data sources, one source could contradict another. How can the user resolve this conflict?

Intelligence means a collection of information that is refined. It is a product that is verified and arranged to form a greater understanding of the subject at hand. Intelligence mitigates risk. It offers the end user an explanation, instead of data. Intelligence seeks the big picture. If information is thought of as being pieces of a puzzle, intelligence is the completed puzzle.

A successful integration of intelligence into negotiations means efficiently managing the sea of information. Best practices for intelligence creation means approaching this process with a system that respects the law.

The square of intelligence awareness

“[T]here are known knowns; there are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns; that is to say there are things that we know we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns—there are things we do not know, we don’t know.”

—Donald Rumsfeld

Donald Rumsfeld’s reference to “known knowns” and “unknown unknowns” is an excellent primer for expanding a negotiations team’s ability to gather and exploit intelligence. The relationship of whether a team possesses critical information and their awareness of their possession can be visually represented using the Square of Intelligence Awareness ([Fig. 1](#)).

Many negotiators speak to their suspects with only the “known knowns” in mind. They have been briefed about what information is available. A better method involves making a better analysis of the information that is already available to discover these hidden nuggets of information that can guide the direction of the negotiation. On the chart, this would be described as the “unknown known.”




FIGURE 1 The square of intelligence awareness

(copyright Dan Oblinger)

Similarly, it is instructive to think about what holes in the intelligence picture are obvious. These things we know we don't know can often be linchpins in the rapport-building process. These "known unknowns" are simple to deduce when the intelligence process is running efficiently. Intelligence officers should be prepared to seek out these desirable pieces of knowledge.

The last and largest area of the square is the potentially limitless area of "unknown unknown." This terra incognita on the negotiations map represents all the facts the negotiator does not know about the subject, their motivations, and the underlying stressors that have led to this crisis. When at their best, seasoned intelligence officers cast a wide net for sources, make broad inquiries, and think globally about their craft to uncover the truth. This body of knowledge represents the other 89% of the iceberg.

Legal considerations

The word intelligence gained some notoriety in the previous half century. Several larger police departments dealt with scandals surrounding their use of surveillance and intelligence files targeting citizens and groups. Intelligence is often associated with espionage and intrigue. In reality, intelligence is a sound method to apply the use of governmental authority more precisely.

28 CFR, Part 23

One product of these old scandals is 28 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR), Part 23. It governs law enforcement intelligence collection systems by restricting what can be collected about whom, and for how long. For instance, 28 CFR, Part 23 requires a "criminal predicate" for initiating an intelligence file on a particular group of citizens. This is designed to prevent government interference in political action, religion, and free speech. This law also guides agencies when they disseminate intelligence products to other agencies. In general, it does not apply to negotiators or the negotiations process, since it really deals with long-term collection and storage related to criminal activity.

Negotiators typically operate under the exigent circumstance of endangered life. Once the negotiations are successfully resolved, there is a big change legally. Once the threat is over, the actions of the law enforcement officers on the scene reverts to supporting the criminal case. Should a team decide to compile and retain information on potential barricaded subjects, 28 CFR, Part 23 might apply.

HIPAA

Medical professionals sometimes cite the Health Information Privacy and Availability Act of 1996, often shortened to "HIPAA", when refusing to aid law enforcement. This can frustrate a negotiation team. When the negotiation is with a subject experiencing substance abuse issues or severe and persistent mental illness, medical records can be a

great source of intelligence. Teams should familiarize themselves with what HIPAA states about law enforcement. There are multiple exemptions for police, including an exigency clause. Medical providers can report protected health information, “[W]hen consistent with applicable law and ethical standards ... to a law enforcement official reasonably able to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of an individual or the public” (45 CFR 164.512(j)(1)(i)).

The intelligence cycle

Armed with a basic understanding of intelligence concepts and legal requirements, the student of intelligence-led negotiations must devote time and energy to the intelligence cycle. This term refers to the actual process of turning information into intelligence. In the negotiations world, it begins when the first officers respond to the scene, and only ends when the situation is resolved and documented well.

The term “cycle” is not used lightly. To maximize potential, every member of the negotiations team should be well versed in the cycle and its constituent tasks. These tasks are performed continuously and in concert to produce superior intelligence products during the incident. The cycle does not run its course once and then end. It runs continuously, with new information being fed into the process just as soon as it becomes known. When the primary negotiator picks up the phone, there is a tendency for the intelligence process to slow or even stop. For best results, the intelligence process should increase its intensity when the subject is providing information to the primary negotiator.

Gathering

The first task of the intelligence cycle is gathering information. The key here is to cast a wide net. The more sources the team can touch, the more chances they have to use multiple sources to confirm information. When more sources are used, the chances are lessened for an inaccurate or malicious piece of data spoiling the picture.

Sources of information that can be used to compose intelligence are only limited by the imagination of the gatherer. Sources tend to come from two broad categories. The first is human intelligence sources, or HUMINT. These are real, live, breathing sources that can provide a lot of information about the subject or incident. HUMINT is problematic when the human in question is not motivated to assist the team, or provides false information. Even so, people close to the subject often provide intimate insight into the subject and their motivations. Such intimate insight is rarely available in a database.

The second broad category of intelligence sources are electronic intelligence sources, or ELINT. Using a whole host of electronic databases and online records, the negotiations team can amass a huge volume of information in a short amount of time, all from a single internet capable device. The danger with relying upon an electronic source is a natural tendency in a technology-driven world to trust the computer too much. Everything in a computer database was put there by a human being. The data

that looks so pristine on your screen was collected at some point by a human, entered into the database by a human, and has been maintained on software designed and maintained by humans.

Human error and malice applies to ELINT just as much as to HUMINT. It is a good practice to verify information that comes from a computer just like information from a human source. An example of potential sources for information gathering is shown below (Fig. 2).

In addition to considering their source, another way to divide information is by its intended audience. Information can be thought of as being “soft” or “hard.” Soft information informs the negotiations team about mood, emotion, likes and dislikes, mindset, and motivation. Hard information deals in capabilities, weapons, attire, geographic layout, and other actionable intelligence desirable to the tactical team.

Thinking of information in this fashion can aid an intelligence officer for the negotiation team by encouraging them to ask different questions when gathering information. Instead of name, date of birth, and address, they will begin to routinely ask predicate questions that are used to shape themes for negotiation “hooks”—safe topics for building rapport and influence (Fig. 3).

HUMINT	ELINT
<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Dispatchers▪ Witnesses▪ Patrol Officers▪ Operators▪ Family▪ Subject	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Police Records▪ DMV▪ County Recorder Info.▪ Court Records▪ Utilities▪ Business Licensing▪ Mental Health Records▪ Open Source*

FIGURE 2 Potential sources for information gathering

<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Name/Pref. Nickname▪ Vitals (DOB, SSN, DL)▪ Physical▪ Mental Health HX▪ Medical HX▪ Substance Abuse HX▪ Military Service▪ Weapons▪ Special Abilities▪ Address(es)▪ Phones▪ Employment	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Hobbies▪ Family▪ Domestic Partners▪ Children▪ Social Media Accounts▪ Mood/Temperment▪ “Hooks”▪ “Barbs”▪ Pets▪ Religious Affiliation
--	--

FIGURE 3 Predicate questions for “soft” information

Open source exploitation

The term “open source” is an adopted term from the field of software development.

Open sources of intelligence are those that are freely available on the internet. Open sources include search engines like Google or Bing, social media sites like Facebook and Twitter, and a variety of public domain databases.

Open source searches are invaluable for discovering the “unknown unknown” about the barricaded subject. They might be a published author, a recent widower, a marathon runner, or bankrupt. But until you found their ISBN listing on Amazon. com, the obituary from the local online newspaper, race results, or publication of filing through the Federal Court, the negotiator would not know.

Social media

Social media, or any website designated as “Web 2.0”, describes a category of online forum that allows people to interact in a way remarkably similar to real life. Members of these online services can communicate, share their interests and beliefs, and advertise their affiliations through posted writings, videos, and pictures. Savvy negotiators understand that this is an incredible source of “soft intelligence” on the subject. Consistently, hostage takers and barricaded persons show a propensity to publish volumes of intimate detail on their social media sites. In many cases, this low-hanging intelligence fruit dangles unprotected in cyberspace, just waiting to be plucked.

Social media exploitation has the added benefits of being “real-time” and even “over-the-horizon.” The typical user will post their thoughts, feelings, plans, current happenings, and future plans for all to see. This represents a sea change in tactical intelligence analysis for negotiations. You might learn your subject is planning on surrendering when they “tweet” their intention on Twitter!

Social media presents another tool to police negotiators. Many subjects regularly use these sites to communicate with friends. Negotiators might very well find themselves negotiating by social media using their proprietary instant messaging, chat, or wall posting features. Much like negotiations via text messaging, these methods challenge the negotiations team as there is no nonverbal or para-verbal communication to aid building rapport and interpreting emotions.

Negotiations teams have a few options when accessing information on a social media site. One method is a simple open source query directly on the site in question or through an aggregator site. Websites exist that allow anyone to search many social media sites for keywords or people. If the subject has not set a restrictive privacy setting for their account, the information is available to anyone who looks.

Another method of social media exploitation is using a third party intermediary to look at the site in question. All sites allow users to “friend”, “follow”, or associate with other users. If a friend or family member known to the team has such an online relationship, the third party’s account can be used to look directly at the subject’s profile. If the team elects this option, care must be given that the third party does not reveal that the team is exploiting the information on the subject’s account. His revelation could harm trust and result in the account being taken down with a resulting loss of great information.

Spoofing

Lastly, the team can establish its own account for popular social media sites. This can be done with an official and high-profile team account or a fake name and profile. The faked entity method is called “spoofing.” By using a spoofed account, the team can peruse the subject’s site as a prospective “friend” and access information from within the online community that might not be available to a general query from a search engine. Some sites allow users to see who has searched their profile, and the anonymity of the spoofing account can pay dividends. Spoofing involves some level of deception and usually violates the Terms of Use for these sites. Teams should consider these ramifications when using this technique.

Filtering

Once the wide net is cast, and all available information has been gathered, the team must filter this information to ensure it can be used reliably. The source itself should be recorded, along with the information that might inform the team. The reliability and credibility of the source is paramount to establish validity for the information it provides.

Good questions to ask are: does the source have the capability to know the information provided? If a person is claiming to have knowledge they could not possibly know, then he or she is discredited. Another equally important question is: why is the source providing this information? If they are offering information that is unsolicited, beware of a biased source. Some “helpful” witnesses, family members, or friends might have a vested interest in a failed negotiation! Electronic sources are not immune from a filtering process. Verification of electronic data is vital.

Freshness of information is important. How recently can the data be confirmed? As a general rule, the older the data the less reliable it is. Electronic sources are advantageous as they typically are time stamped. If information is outdated or the sources are suspect, the prudent negotiator excludes the associated information from the analysis. Until the information can be verified, it is not reliable.

Collating

After reliable data is identified, the negotiation team should arrange these pieces into the puzzle image. Collation refers to the process of seeking relationships between the gathered information. Collating can be done visually by compiling data points in a written or typed format. Collating is ideal for detecting confliction between sources as the pieces are arranged. This task is also an opportunity to see where the gaps are in the intelligence picture. These are the “known unknowns” of The Square.

Analyzing

The most undervalued task in the intelligence cycle is analyzing the information. This is where the information becomes intelligence. Analysis attempts to find patterns, tendencies, or opportunities for the team in the actual negotiation process. With the picture generated through collation, the team will identify themes they can use to open lines of communication, rapport, and influence. If they can understand why the barricade or hostage situation is occurring, they can now analyze likely obstacles to a successful surrender sequence.

Analysis is also the time to identify a wish list for further information gathering. This includes the “known unknowns” and “unknown unknowns” of The Square. As the negotiations get underway, this process should not cease or abate. The intelligence element should always seek out new avenues of verification and gathering of information through analysis of what is known.

The confirmation bias

If the gathering phase was successful, the team possesses a large amount of information. It is common for analysts to commit the logical fallacy of emphasizing the information that confirms their theory of who the subject is, what they are like, and why they are here. As a coherent picture of the suspect and the situation develops, it is crucial for the team to remain unbiased, so that no actionable intelligence is excluded from consideration.

Disseminating

The most undervalued task in the intelligence cycle could be disseminating the intelligence. Once there is actionable intelligence, it must be sent to whoever needs it most. Visual formats are the best. The intelligence product should be in a simple, concise, but complete package. Templates can be created before an incident that can be populated with the intelligence as it is known. Common formats like presentation slides, word processor files, spreadsheets, or publishing formats can be used to organize the intelligence and make it visually appealing.

Dissemination is a balance of rashness and paralysis. A good team does not rush to send out intelligence without completing all the tasks of the intelligence cycle, and vetting their sources. They also do not sit on actionable intelligence on a wild chase for more sources. At some point, the team will have a grasp of the intelligence at hand, brief the appropriate personnel for the command, negotiation, and tactical elements, and begin the negotiations.

The three stages of intelligence cycle

Sound intelligence creation occurs when the intelligence cycle exists in three stages. It begins when the team prepares for their next call-out by assembling the hardware,

software, and skills necessary to complete all five tasks of the cycle. Train as a team to exploit intelligence! Every member of the team should be comfortable in all aspects of the process, from gathering to dissemination.

Armed with properly constructed intelligence products, the negotiations team should continue to apply the cycle while they perform during the actual negotiation. The subject will often provide multiple and new possibilities for gathering information as they speak to the primary negotiator. Everything they say should be verified by independent sources so the primary can gauge their truthfulness. Information gained through social media should be protected in this stage. Redacting the source of the information gained from the suspect's social media site ensures the suspect will not become suspicious and lock out their account.

Once the situation is resolved, a thorough negotiations team gathers information by documenting the scene and debriefing the suspect. It is entirely possible the team will have dealings with this person again, and any effort in this "follow through" stage could be beneficial in a repeat performance.

Conclusion

Negotiators that understand the value of the intelligence cycle will maximize the benefit of intelligence as a reliable insight into the hostage taker or barricaded subject's intentions. By consistently gathering, filtering, collating, analyzing information and then disseminating the resulting intelligence, negotiation teams can conquer the unknown and minimize their liability. Applied knowledge is power, especially in the high-stakes world of crisis negotiations.

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Violent offenders

Perhaps the best research on prediction of violence among violent offenders is the research done at the Oak Ridge Division of the Penetanguishene Mental Health Care Center in Ontario, Canada. Based on 25 years of research, the mental health professionals there have developed the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG) for assessing the chances of violent offenders acting out violently in the future. Though it has not been validated in the negotiations arena, it is important for negotiators to know what risk factors have been validated because it will keep them focused on the most empirically based risk factors, some of which may not be obvious to negotiators and can help them structure the intelligence they gather about the actor. The VRAG includes the following risk factors:

1. Did the subject live with both his or her biological parents until age 16? Research has shown that violent offenders who did not live in a two-parent family until 16 have a

higher risk of acting out violently.

2. How well adjusted was the subject in elementary school and middle school? Generally, the more serious problems the subject had in elementary school (up to grade eight), the higher the risk of future violence. Those who were truant a lot, disruptive in the classroom, and were expelled were at greater risk than those who did not get into trouble or who got into minor trouble.
3. Does the subject or his or her biological parents have a history of abuse or dependence on alcohol? Subjects who have biological parents who abused alcohol, or who had problems with alcohol as adolescents or as adults, and/or who have used alcohol during prior or the current incident are at greater risk than those who have not had alcohol-related problems.
4. Has the subject been married? Unless it is a domestic violence incident, it appears that being married is a protection from acting out violently. Subjects who have never been married are a greater risk than those who have been married. If it is a domestic incident, see the risk factors below in thinking through the risk.
5. Has the subject been arrested, charged, and/or convicted of nonviolent criminal offenses?
6. Has the subject been placed on probation or parole and had to be returned to confinement for violation of his or her probation?
7. How old is the subject?
8. Is the victim female?
9. Does the subject meet the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM) criteria for any personality disorder?
10. Does the subject meet the DSM criteria for schizophrenia?
11. Does the subject show signs of a psychopathic personality as described by the Hare Psychopathy Checklist?

Domestic violence

HOBAS (2008) data reveals that in 46 percent of 1,479 incidents, spouses/ex-spouses, family members, or “significant others” were being held against their will. Because a significant number of incidents involve intimate partner relationships, a review of significant risk factors in domestic violence might be helpful to negotiators. In reviewing the research on violence prediction over a 20-year period, one of the authors found nine factors to be common to all research on indicators of violence. They were used by the domestic violence intervention program in his department to assess risk. They included:

1. Prior violence in current home
2. Prior violence in public
3. Substance abuse
4. Availability of a deadly weapon
5. Prior chaotic relationship with potential victim
6. Violence in home of origin
7. Neurological impairment

8. Increasing pattern of violence
9. Recent loss of a relationship or job
10. Leaving the relationship

Teams that intervened in domestic violence cases used these factors to estimate initial risk and to focus their resources on the ones with the highest risk. Substance abuse, an increasing pattern of violence over the prior six months, the victim leaving the relationship, and the availability of a weapon were factors that were weighted more heavily than the others. Substance abuse included both alcohol and stimulants, such as crack cocaine, amphetamines, or the abuse of prescription stimulants like Ritalin. Deadly weapons included firearms, knives, clubs and choking. Increasing patterns of violence assessed the increase in frequency of police calls over the previous six weeks, a progression in the intensity of the violence from arguments and threats, to pushing, to slapping, to hitting with a fist, to using a weapon.

There was no validation research on these factors because to conduct an adequate study would be an ethical problem. It would require that some case be evaluated using the risk factors and intervention either be delayed or not delivered. This is a huge issue in field research in life-threatening events and is one of the reasons there is no validity research in risk assessment for negotiations.

There is research in the domestic violence field that relates to the risk of violence of being killed by a significant other. Campbell et al. (2003) looked at the issue of risk factors that separated victims who were killed in domestic violence cases from victims who were injured. She identified the following factors that discriminate between the two groups:

1. Choking of victim
2. Forced sex with victim
3. Threats to kill victim
4. Excessive controls over victim
5. Child abuse
6. Abuse of victim while she was pregnant
7. Victim believes abuser is capable of killing her
8. Violent jealousy

[The mentally ill](#)

HOBAS (2008) shows that 18.6 percent of 5,701 incidents involved subjects who had a past mental health diagnosis, were currently in counseling or were in a residential treatment facility. It would seem reasonable that mental health professionals would have significant input on this issue, because one of the purposes of mental health research is to predict and control behavior. However, the research on the dangerousness of mentally ill individuals is mixed. Norko and Baranoski (2008) reported that there was a positive correlation between major mental illness and violence, particularly when the psychotic individuals were actively psychotic and had threat/control-override delusions. Threat/control override are fixed beliefs held by people that they are at risk and that they need to act aggressively to defend themselves. Negotiators need to be aware of these delusions in psychotics when they are doing

their risk assessment. There are three sources of information on which negotiators can draw: (1) The actor's communications with the negotiators; (2) The actor's history of mental illness, (3) The actor's treatment providers (psychiatrists, psychologists, clinical social workers, etc.).

Some research does not support the relationship between mental illness and violence. Norko and Baranoski (2008) suggested an interaction between the sex of the subject and the delusion. Specifically, they state that threat delusions increase violence risk for males, whereas control/override delusions decrease risk for males, and all threat control/override delusions decrease violence risk for females.

Substance abuse and medication noncompliance have been found to be significantly correlated with violence among patients subject to outpatient commitment in North Carolina (Swartz et al., 1998; Swanson et al., 2006). Substance abuse and violence have been found to predict continued substance abuse and violence over the course of one-to two-day periods (Steadman et al., 2006).

In summarizing their finding, Norko and Baranoski (2008) determined that three conclusions seem justified:

1. Substance abuse, alone and in combination with mental disorders, has consistently correlated with violence.
2. Sociodemographic factors contribute significantly more than mental health factors to violence.
3. Research findings are inconsistent and conflicting on the relationship between psychosis (and other symptoms of mental illness) and violence.

On the other hand, Singh (2007) stated that: "Current thinking can be summarized in McNeil and colleague's observation that clinical factors (like intent, positive psychotic symptoms) are more important predictors of violence in acutely ill patients and history of violence with certain sociodemographic factors more relevant in predicting long term risk."

Research Specific to Negotiations

McGowan (2007) is the only research on risk assessment in police negotiations. Looking at the NYPD's cases over years, he concluded that context, communications, and containment were significant factors in whether an incident was resolved peacefully or not.

Vecchi et al. (2005) listed the following as risk factors specific to negotiation incidents (these are in addition to those given by McGowan):

1. Is the incident a hostage or a nonhostage incident? Nonhostage incidents mean increased risk.
2. Precipitating event: Incidental versus expressive—Is it emotion driven? If so, increased risk.
3. Initiation of the call: Did the subject initiate the call, suggesting that he is inviting a confrontation, or did someone else (family member, stranger, neighbor)?
4. Location of incident: Was the call to a residence? If so, it may mean a relationship-

- based, emotionally driven incident, and increased risk.
5. Relationship of subject and victim: Intimate partners are at risk.
 6. Timing of violence: Was there violence at the beginning of the incident and/or did it continue through the episode? If so, increased risk.
 7. General demeanor of subject.
 8. Recent and multiple losses increase the risk.
 9. Prior impulsive violence increases the risk.
 10. Substance abuse.
 11. Demands: No demands suggest increased risk.
 12. Threats: Offensive, defensive, unconditional.
 13. Suicide is always possible: If threats and depression are present, it increases the risk of violence.

[Table 4.2](#) is a summary sheet that may help negotiators identify and track relevant risk factors when assessing the probability of violence among different groups of subjects.

[Table 4.2](#) Summary Sheet for Probability Assessment

Risk Factor—Probability	Date	
	Present	Absent
Initial Assessment		
Context		
Containment		
Communications		
General indicators		
Age		
Sex		
Low socioeconomic status		
Low education		
Violent family		
Alcohol use		
Stimulant use		
Violent offenders		
Did not live with both parents		
Serious adjustment problems in elementary school		
Alcohol abuse/dependence		
Never married		
History of nonviolent crimes		
History of violent crimes		
Violation of probation or parole		
Age		
Personality disorder		
Psychopath		
Domestic violence		
Prior violence in same household		
Prior violence in public		

Violence in home of origin	
Chaotic relationship with current victim	
Recent loss	
Increasing pattern of violence	
Neurological Impairment	
Victim trying to leave	
Indicators of femicide	
Choking of victim	
Forced sex with victim	
Threats to kill victim	
Excessive controls over victim	
Child abuse	
Abuse of victim while she was pregnant	
Victims believes abuser is capable of killing her	
Violent jealousy	
Subject:	Case #

Imminent risk

Risk assessment is not all the negotiator needs to do. The negotiator needs to focus on risk management as well. Management may start with an assessment, but the ongoing process has to take into account the impact that any negotiations tactic has on the actor. Assessment needs to be ongoing and it needs to focus on risk factors that can show the impact of the negotiations—that is, the factors that are capable of being monitored and can change as the crisis team intervenes. Authors have described this approach as risk analysis. Risk assessment is only one part of the process, based on the researched factors discussed above. A risk appraisal should change with data derived from negotiator progress.

Management, on the other hand, has to do with responding to the risk. Negotiators can increase the risk by attending to different “frames” than the subject, by failing to develop a positive relationship, by ignoring the subject’s face issues, or by not effectively dealing with the subject’s emotions or substantive issues. They can decrease risk by responding appropriately. It is up to negotiators to monitor the impact of their interventions on the negotiation’s risk levels and to choose the tactics that have the best chance of reducing risk. They must ask themselves, “Is what we are doing reducing risk and making the incident more negotiable?” Negotiators can do an initial assessment of the probability of violence using the factors associated with violence identified above: demographics, personality, and situational variables. Then they need to focus on the imminence of the risk of violence, which changes over time as a result of intervention.

Historically, negotiators have identified risk factors they traced during the incident: they focused on the imminence of the risk of violence by focusing on factors that suggest they are making progress in “defusing” the incident. Current handbooks (Lanceley, 2003; Greenstone, 2005; Goergen, 2010) provide indicators of progress, as well as high-risk indicators. The purpose is to track the progress in defusing the intensity of the emotions and the subject’s movement toward rational decisionmaking. Goergen (2007), following the FBI’s guidelines, suggests the following indicators:

1. Shift from threatening, violent language to nonthreatening language
2. Subject discloses personal information

3. Shift from emotional to rational content
4. Willingness to discuss topics unrelated to the incident
5. Lower level of voice
6. Slower voice pattern
7. Longer conversations
8. Increased desire to speak with the negotiator or decision makers and a willingness to bargain
9. Reduced violent behavior
10. Positive statements about hostage or victim welfare
11. Releasing hostages
12. Lowering of demands
13. Deadlines passing without incident
14. Rapport develop between subject and negotiator
15. Increase in subject's willingness to follow negotiator's suggestions
16. Discussion of surrender

Generally, the assumption is made that if these things are happening, then progress is being made, risk is coming down and negotiations should continue. One caveat: negotiation is not necessarily a consistent process. There is rarely continuous, smooth progress. New personal issues come up during negotiations that raise emotions, there are missteps by the negotiators that frustrate the subject, and other members of the crisis management team initiate actions that elicit anger or fear from the subject. The imminence risk will change over time. Negotiators need to make imminence risk an ongoing process, switching tactics as needed to deal with the ever-changing risk level. One of the author's negotiating teams had contacted an agitated, depressed and angry 26-year-old male who had broken up with his girlfriend two days before the incident. He had been drinking and called a family member, threatening suicide. The family called the police. Responding officers found him alone in his house with the weapon, refusing to put it down and come out. Initial contact was made. Two hours into the incident, he was settling down, had agreed to quit drinking and was telling the negotiator when he suddenly yelled, "You guys are going to kill me." And hung up. When we got him back on the line, 15 minutes later, he was furious, shouting, "Stay away from me. I don't want to hear from you. Leave me alone." It took 15 more minutes of the Basic Listening Sequence (see [Chapter 3](#)) to calm him. We asked him what happened, and he said that "The little red lights suddenly showed up on my chest." Things happen.

Strentz (1991) has identified 13 indicators that negotiations are not progressing or could become violent. The first four indicate that the hostage taker could commit suicide. They include:

1. The hostage taker setting a deadline for his own death;
2. The subject insisting on face-to-face negotiations (i.e., provoking the police into killing him);
3. A depressed hostage taker denying thoughts of suicide (he is lying to the negotiator and setting-up "suicide by cop." As Strentz says, "A homicide looking for a victim."); and
4. The hostage taker talking about the disposition of his or her belongings.

The next five indicators deal with negotiations possibly becoming volatile, and include:

1. A weapon tied to the hostage taker or to the hostage taker and hostage;
2. A history of violence of the hostage taker;
3. The hostage taker becoming angry and emotional during negotiations or negotiations becoming emotional in content;
4. The hostage taker insisting that a particular person be brought to the scene; and
5. No social outlet for the hostage taker to express his anxiety, fear, and frustration (i.e., life is him against the world).

Strentz identified two indicators related to lack of cooperation and rapport in negotiations. These are:

1. No rapport between the hostage taker and negotiator; and
2. After hours of negotiation, the hostage taker has no clear demands or his demands are outrageous.

Finally, two factors were identified related to the hostage taker's life situation:

1. Use of alcohol or drugs by the hostage taker during negotiations; and
2. Multiple stressors in the hostage taker's life.

Changes in the process, relationship, and interaction during negotiations can increase or decrease the immediate risk. Negotiators have recognized this dynamic quality of risk for years and have developed a list of indicators that the incident is being de-escalated. [Chapter 5](#) has a summary of eight more indicators that negotiations are going well and a set of 13 factors that they are not going well. In addition to those factors, the authors suggest that negotiators pay attention to the face issues presented by the subjects. [Chapter 3](#) presents the SAFE model. Face is the subject's view of him-or herself and his or her view of others and can include *Face attacks* or *face honoring* behavior by the subject that is directed toward him-or herself and/or toward others.

- *Face attack* behavior engaged in by the subject that is directed toward others
- *Face honoring* behavior engaged in by the subject that is directed toward him-or herself
- *Face honoring* behavior engaged in by the subject that is directed toward others

In addition, negotiators need to track the face statements of the subject. Research on communications patterns in negotiations (Hogewood, 2005; Hammer, 2007) has shown that when subjects continually attack their own face that the probability of suicide goes up. The authors suggest that when the face-attack statements directed toward the negotiator or the potential victim increase, the risk is increasing and the negotiator needs to change tactics to defuse the anger and potential for violence. If the face attack statements continue, regardless of what the negotiator does, it is probable that the risk is rising and that a tactical option needs to be considered.

Using the above discussion, the authors developed the summary sheet in [Table 4.3](#) to help

negotiators focus on relevant factors in the continuing estimation of imminent risk.

Estimating risk: A process

The way the risk assessment is done may increase its accuracy. Research has shown that in situations in which there is no clear expert, decisions made by a group are usually better than decisions made by a single person. Most negotiating teams do not have experts in violence assessment and management. Other research (Quinsey and Ambtman, 1979) suggests that the teacher is as good or better than the

Table 4.3 Summary Sheet for Imminence Assessment

Risk Assessment—Imminence		Date	
FBI guidelines		Present	Absent
Continued use of or escalation of threats			
Does not disclose personal information			
Failure to defuse			
Refusal to discuss peripheral topics/demands			
High fast voice			
Short conversations/one way conversations			
No desire to talk to negotiator or boss			
Continued violence			
Negative statements about the victim/hostage-face attacks			
Not releasing hostages			
Insistence on demands			
Hurts victim			
No rapport between subject and negotiator			
Resistance to suggestions from negotiator			
Refusal to discuss/consider surrender			
Situational factors—Strentz			
Weapon tied to the hostage taker or to the hostage taker and hostage			
Subject becomes angry during negotiations			
Subject insists that a particular person be brought to the scene			
Hours of negotiation, no clear demands/outrageous demands			
Current use of alcohol/drugs			
SAFE			
Increasing anger			
Increasing face attack statements			
Increasing focus on or hardening of central demands			
Other			
Subject:		Case #	

experts in predicting violence and that the most accurate results are obtained by a group of people independently rating the risk in a given situation and then combining their estimates into one overall assessment. It is suggested that negotiating teams employ *structured brainstorming* (Heuer & Pherson, 2012) as one of the first steps in doing a risk assessment. It is a powerful and recognized analytic technique that can help negotiators assess risk and plan tactics. It should be used early and continuously by the team. According to Heuer and Pherson, the general rules when using structured brainstorming are:

1. Be specific about the topic and issue.
2. Encourage new and different ideas. Never criticize an idea during the creative phase.
3. One conversation at a time so everyone can have input.

4. They recommend using an hour or more for the brainstorming session. This is just not feasible during a crisis situation. It is recommended the team practice the technique prior to an incident, so many of the rules can be set prior to an actual incident.
5. Avoid “groupthink” by allowing outsiders (i.e., tactical, commander personnel, EMTs, patrol, etc.) to participate. In a crisis incident, that can be a critical component of structured brainstorming. Negotiators tend to bring their training, experience and other biases to the table. Getting outside perspectives and ideas can lead to entirely new and unique ways of thinking about an incident, negotiation strategies, demand issues, etc.
6. Write it down! Keep a record on a board for everyone to constantly refer to.
7. Summarize key issues and outcomes.


As developed for the CIA’s Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis, structured brainstorming has two phases: *divergent thinking* and *convergent thinking*. The first phase is for creative thought, while the second phase is for evaluation. Most formally (and teams in the field may have to adapt these steps to maximize efficiency), the steps to conduct structured brainstorming are:

1. Pass out materials to write on (such as “sticky” notes).
2. Present a “focus question” in one sentence and write it where all can view. An example might be, “What demand issue will get a hostage released?”
3. Ask everyone to take a couple of minutes to write responses using a few key words. Let each person verbally read their response. Post the responses.
4. Treat all responses equally and allow no evaluation of them at this point.
5. After the initial spurt of ideas, allow for pauses while the team considers other options. Allow silence – do not speak. The team will develop many new ideas and insights.
6. After 2 – 3 pause periods, conclude divergent thinking.
7. Ask the team to list ideas in any organization that makes sense to them. Do not let them discuss ideas. Some may group ideas by express demands, some by instrumental demands, some by negotiator comments, etc. Ideas can be grouped into more than one category.
8. Ask each team member to pick a word or phrase to describe a group.
9. See if any ideas do not fit into a group. Is that item an outlier that should be examined or just useless noise?
10. Has the team assessed the entire range of possibilities or are there any areas that need further thought?
11. To identify the most useful ideas, judge the value or importance of each idea or category. Heuer and Pherson suggest a formal Likert scale to complete this step. During a crisis situation, however, there may not be time to accomplish that.
12. Pass on the results to appropriate personnel.

If one team member is a very strong personality or if a member of the brainstorming team is a ranking officer, then the *nominal group technique* can be used. This technique is very similar


to structured brainstorming, the major difference being ideas are generated and presented in a round-robin format. If the problem is very complex (i.e., multiple hostage takers, multiple hostages, siege in prison, terrorist incident, etc.), then structured brainstorming can be combined with the analytic technique of *cross-impact matrix* (Heuer & Pherson, 2011). While the specifics are beyond the scope of this text, in short, this technique involves team members examining interrelationships among a complex set of situational variables and then quantitatively evaluating those variables in combination with each other in a matrix format. Users are able to identify dominant forces and potential future events that influence various possible outcomes. Cross-impact matrices are a powerful and useful tool for negotiators and readers are encouraged to research the technique.

One way to help negotiators evaluate and assess risk is to consider violence as a combination of examining the probability of an actor committing an act by the actor's perceived consequences of that action. For example, in a hostage situation, what prevents most actors from hurting a hostage? It is their belief that the outcome (or consequence) of that action will lead to police tactical options (i.e., sniper, assault, etc.), even in the most threatening of situations (i.e., the actor saying something along the lines of, "If I don't get that vehicle in 30 minutes I'm going to start killing hostages!"). While the threat is real, what is the likelihood of the actor carrying out the threat? It is his perception of the consequences. Will this action force the delivery of a vehicle? Will it press a tactical resolution? Will it buy more time? Likewise, a high-risk suicidal actor makes the same determination. That is, "If I jump off this bridge, does the pain stop?" In a domestic situation, "If I threaten to hurt the kids, will I get to see them more often or even get partial custody?" Negotiators have to compute all possible permutations of an actor's actions and the likelihood of those actions in terms of potential perceived consequences. One of the things that makes negotiating difficult with mentally ill actors is they often do not tie consequences to actions. Similarly, people who are very emotional have the same difficulty. That is why it is critical that negotiators employ active listening skills to reduce an actor's emotions.



[FIGURE 4.1](#) Matrix that can be used to assist negotiators in helping predict violence potential by examining consequences and likelihood of an act.

Negotiators should make [Figure 4.1](#) part of their intelligence boards and constantly assess likelihood and consequences. Intelligence, communications with the actor, emotions of the actor, etc., all help negotiators make more accurate risk assessments, and the graph makes it easy to track progress.



[FIGURE 4.2](#) A method for examining progress during an incident as a function of time. A graph such as this can be an extremely valuable tool when the IC asks, “Are you making progress?” as it provides the IC with a clear visual representation of progress. In the case of a lack of progress, this timeline can suggest strategies for negotiators.

[Figure 4.2](#) displays a tactic for negotiators the authors were given by a team at the annual Hostage Negotiation competition in San Marcos several years ago (it is not remembered who first used it, but now several teams regularly employ this graph as part of their intelligence work). At the most basic level, teams can chart and track emotions by time. The vertical axis can be labeled many different ways: “emotional state,” “threats,” “shouting communications,” and so on. All of those labels, however, indicate a threatening state by the actor. The authors prefer “threat level” as it most clearly identifies the risk level from the actor. [Figure 4.2](#) breaks the horizontal axis into one-hour increments. That axis can be altered to any time period a team feels comfortable with. The time period should not be too short because it will present a compressed visual of the risk, while a time period too great will minimize the risk. Depending on the type of incident, 30-minute or one-hour levels of measurement are most appropriate. Thirty minutes may be used if the incident is a true hostage incident or if hostages are at risk (including victims being held—i.e., family violence situations); one-hour levels may be most appropriate for a barricade subject who is not a high risk for suicide. The regular assessments should be made by the brainstorming techniques mentioned previously.

[Information Versus Intelligence](#)

In approximately 30 years of being a part of negotiating teams, observing negotiating teams, hosting an annual hostage negotiator competition since 1990, and assisting with other practical training scenarios and competitions, the authors have observed that negotiating

teams tend to be excellent information gatherers, but not all are excellent intelligence gatherers. Intelligence comes from information, and not all negotiators recognize that difference. A negotiator can learn all there is to know about the background of an actor, but then has to be able to take that information and distill out the important pieces that will help the team successfully resolve the incident. The information that is left after the distillation process is intelligence.

We are not arguing against the collection, display, and sharing of information, because often information will later become intelligence. For example, knowing that the actor is 68 years old is initially information. Later in the incident, it may become intelligence. If the purpose of the team is to wear down the actor, or keep him engaged for a long period of time, age can become a factor in the use of time, at which point it becomes intelligence.

It is important that members of the negotiation team who are gathering intelligence gather information first and foremost. Then, they have to be able to determine which of that information is in fact intelligence and pass that on to elements of the response team that need to know that information. Tactical officers must know what types of weapons the actor has; negotiators only really need to know that the actor has weapons. Incident command needs to know fluctuations in the actor's emotional state in the most general sense (i.e., becoming really angry, for example). Negotiators need to be able to label the specific emotion (i.e., anger, frustration, rage, etc.) because that determines communication tactics. Intelligence officers need to avoid giving response elements unnecessary information because that interferes with their ability to process and use intelligence.

Intelligence and threat assessment

Intelligence helps the negotiator assess the risk the subject poses to others and also helps the negotiator make decisions about how much force may be needed to manage the incident. The assessment of the potential for violence depends on knowing the subject's history as well as his recent behavior. Knowing how to access and understand this information is essential to effective management of the incident. For instance, the fact that a paranoid subject has had a prior violent confrontation with police suggests that he could be expected to have preconceived attitudes about police that would elevate his risk level. Negotiators would have to take this history into consideration in approaching him. They might describe themselves as merely negotiators and play down the police department connection. At the very least, they would have to work at separating themselves from other police with whom the subject had contact. They would expect that negotiations would take longer because building rapport would be more difficult than if the subject had not had confrontations with police in the past.

A second part of threat assessment is evaluating the threat the subject poses to himself—the threat of suicide. An adequate suicide risk assessment requires that the negotiators know whether there have been suicide attempts by the subject or by significant others in the subject's life. It requires that the negotiator have a sense of the subject's current plan, the subject's social resources, and the subject's usual method of coping with stress, i.e., does he usually see stressors as a challenge or something to be avoided. The answer to these and other questions related to suicide risk and intervention requires information to be gathered, analyzed, and utilized by negotiators. In short, negotiators must be able to manage and make

sense of large amounts of information.

Purposes of intelligence

The purpose of intelligence in negotiations is to know ahead of time what you need to know later (Slatkin, 2002). It is prediction of behavior, thoughts, and feelings that will be helpful in accomplishing the crisis response team's mission of saving lives. By gathering, analyzing, and disseminating useful information, negotiators may be able to anticipate and plan for events before they occur. They can facilitate command decisions and decrease the stress of the situation. There are three main uses of intelligence in negotiations: (1) to understand the subject's motivation, (2) to predict the risk he poses to others, and (3) to predict the risk he poses to himself.

Intelligence: The process

Intelligence gathering needs to be coordinated: a specific officer needs to be in charge of consulting with command, SWAT, and the negotiators in order to decide what questions need to be answered. Then she needs to gather the information needed to answer those questions, document the information, assess its implications for the questions asked, and disseminate the intelligence to all parties who need it. Like the negotiating process itself, the intelligence process is fluid; the questions change as the incident changes. Thus, intelligence work starts before the incident and progresses through the whole negotiation.

To collect and disseminate intelligence most efficiently and accurately, negotiators need to understand the intelligence process. Federal intelligence agencies and analysts, military intelligence units and their analysts, and intelligence Fusion Centers and analysts have been largely responsible for developing the intelligence process models common today. There are several models that have been developed and are in use. For example, Slatkin (2002) suggests there are eight phases in the process: (1) collecting information, (2) recording information, (3) evaluating reliability and credibility of the source of information, (4) determining relevance of information, (5) assessing information by a sifting process, (6) selecting the remaining relevant items and integrating into other information, (7) making deductions about future events, and (8) dissemination to key players.

David Carter (2009) at Michigan State University has developed a six-phase model that includes (1) planning and direction, (2) collection, (3) processing/collation, (4) analysis, (5) dissemination, and (6) reevaluation. Likewise, Clark (2013) proposes a six-phase model of (1) requirements and needs, (2) planning and direction, (3) collection, (4) processing, (5) analysis and production, and (6) dissemination. Oblinger (2011, see sidebar in this chapter) has proposed a five-phase model that includes (1) information gathering, (2) filtering, (3) collating, (4) analyzing, and (5) disseminating. All of those models are good and have utility, and all cover the important points in gathering information and turning it into intelligence.

The authors recommend negotiators adopt the five-phase process used by the Department of Home-land Security (DHS) and many other federal agencies, military intelligence units, and law enforcement fusion and intelligence centers. In fact, it is the model taught in the DHS

Basic Intelligence and Threat Analysis Course (BITAC), one of the most shared intelligence training courses of the federal government. We recommend this model not because it is necessarily that much better than other models, but because it is a model in widespread use among the law enforcement community and thus establishes a common vernacular. Mullins et al. (2012a, b) recommended this model as part of the Intelligence Analysis Professional Development Program that Mullins helped develop for the Texas Department of Public Safety Intelligence/Counter-Terrorism Division and for the Texas Intelligence Enterprise project. The five phases of this intelligence fusion process are:

1. Planning and Direction – Involves identifying the information and intelligence needed, the right questions to ask to identify intelligence needs, how to collect the data, what sources to use, and how to formulate questions to maximize the information/intelligence each source provides. For example, at this phase, the negotiator wants to find out as much information as possible about the actor (anything and everything), what precipitated this particular event (intelligence), what weapons the actor has (intelligence), and other information acquaintances may have (information). Negotiators may decide that only neighbors within a five-house radius need to be interviewed and then develop a list of standardized questions to ask each neighbor. A list of co-workers or relatives will be developed and questions to ask each of those formulated. The actor may have a relative living in a distant part of the country and initially decide to speak to that relative. In the first interview with another relative, they relate that the distant relative has not had any contact with the actor in the last 25 years. At that point, negotiators might decide to eliminate that relative as a source of information. A different negotiator may decide it is necessary to talk with that distant relative and find out what caused a schism between the two (as that information might become intelligence later). There are hundreds of incidents where seemingly useless information later became critical intelligence.
2. Collection – How negotiators go about obtaining the data decided upon in Phase One. This may involve everything from computer searches, records checks, in-person interviews, telephone interviews, and so on. Negotiators have to determine which collection methodology will provide the most complete and accurate information. In one particular incident of the author's team, for example, negotiators were sent miles away to interview a relative *in person* instead of via a telephone call. It was believed that an in-person interview would provide much more information, more accurate information, and provide a look at the actor's house, which could possibly provide more information.
3. Processing/Collation – It is in this phase that information collected becomes intelligence. Information has to be evaluated for reliability and validity (how trustworthy is the source, is there confirmation from other sources, etc.). The author's team responded to an incident several years ago and negotiated with an actor locked in a bathroom. The actor lived with his mother, who had called dispatch and stated that her son had threatened to kill her with his gun. Once on scene, negotiators who interviewed the mother received information from her about the gun and how the actor threatened her with it. During negotiations with the actor (voice-to-voice) he stated he *also* had a military claymore mine (also he indicated to negotiators he had a

gun). When the actor finally surrendered, it was discovered he had neither. Further, the mother knew the actor did not have a gun; she wanted him out of her residence and wanted the police to do it for her. The CRT response was predicated on bad information and then bad intelligence. During a negotiated situation, it is critical that negotiators continually integrate new information and intelligence with existing data. Information and intelligence gathering is a dynamic process and continues for the length of (and even after) an incident. It never ends.

4. Analysis and Production – In this phase, intelligence gatherers synthesize the intelligence, use that intelligence to make strategic and tactical decisions, make decisions on who gets the intelligence (other team members, tactical, incident command, PIO, investigators, etc.), and make predictions based upon that data. Predictions can include the development of negotiating strategies, tactical movements and actions, and incident decision-making strategies.
5. Dissemination, Utilization, and Reevaluation – Intelligence gatherers pass intelligence to the correct users and others who have a need or right to know that intelligence. For example, a PIO may not necessarily have a need to know that intelligence, but has a right to know because that officer will have to integrate parts into press briefings. Finally, the intelligence gatherers have to follow up with intelligence users to see if what they provided was useful, complete, accurate, assisted in working or resolving the incident, and what else might be needed.

Regardless of which model of the fusion process negotiators subscribe to, they need to realize that the process is not linear, nor entirely cyclical. As Clark (2013) points out, the process should be thought of as being interactive, with all participants having input. The intelligence cycle is “complex, interactive, collaborative, and (a) social process (that) results in faster production of higher quality, more market-oriented products.” He further argues that intelligence should be target-centric, with all stakeholders a part of the process and all participants focused on the objective. It is a social process, with stakeholders building a collaborative, shared picture of the objective or target.

Types of analysis

Though geared for intelligence analysts and professionals, Pherson and Pherson (2012) make an especially valuable contribution for negotiators and the intelligence gathering done by negotiators. Pherson and Pherson illustrate that there are different types of intelligence analysis that have different collection and analysis requirements. Collected intelligence has to be used in terms of the type of analysis required. In the Intelligence Spectrum developed by the Phersons, they identify four types of analysis: Descriptive, Explanatory, Evaluative, and Estimative. These progress from reactive to proactive, from addressing the most basic of questions of deciphering an event to the ability to fully understand an event and forecast future actions and occurrences. For the negotiator collecting intelligence at an incident (or negotiators combining intelligence from many different sources), the Intelligence Spectrum provides a valuable framework for collecting, processing, and disseminating intelligence. For example, negotiators are often asked to make risk or violence assessments concerning the

actor, and often do before collecting basic intelligence. These predictions (estimative analysis) will be flawed and potentially inaccurate in the absence of descriptive, explanatory, and evaluative analysis.

The initial (or first) level of analysis is descriptive analysis, which attempts to answer the questions of who, what, when, where, why, and how. For crisis responders, these questions are ones that must be immediately answered and addressed and are time-critical. Often, responders learn the answer to most of these questions during the initial call-out and while responding. At worst, they discover the answers shortly after arriving on-scene. Descriptive analysis is the most data-driven type of analysis.

Next is explanatory analysis, which addresses why. Once negotiators know the answers from the descriptive analysis, they can then address why the actor is doing what he or she is doing and start trying to assess cause and effect.

The third type of analysis Pherson and Pherson (2012) identify is evaluative analysis, which answers the question, what does it mean? For negotiators, this is the level of analysis where they will start sorting out and dealing with demand issues, plan tactics for getting hostages released, and do risk assessments. This level of analysis requires in-depth intelligence gathering.

At the most conceptual level of analysis (versus data-driven analysis) is the fourth type of analysis, estimative analysis, which answers; what happens next? For negotiators, this level means making predictions about what the actor may do in the future. It may mean making forecasts about how alcohol or other drugs may affect future behavior, how physical states may affect the actor, how negotiator communications and statements may influence the actor's behavior or emotions, and so on.

At the scene of an incident, the Intelligence Spectrum is ongoing and fluid. Estimative analyses are constantly being re-evaluated as new data is collected (descriptive) and added to the body of knowledge used by negotiators. New information is constantly being obtained, collated, and disseminated. Even after an incident ends, as the opening case study illustrates, intelligence can be discovered that would have impacted decisions (but which can be used in debriefings for future events).

Understanding motivation

Understanding the subject's motivation helps negotiators understand the problem the subject is trying to solve and suggests solutions that may be acceptable to him. For instance, the subject's problem in the scenario above was not that he was paranoid, although that influenced the negotiations. It was that he knew he was facing life in prison if he returned to Mexico. The stress of that was driving his psychosis and it was the issue negotiators had to deal with before a peaceful resolution could be achieved. The ability to collect information from Mexico was essential in identifying the subject's motivation and to moving the negotiations along more quickly than if negotiators had to wait on the subject to volunteer the information.

Definition of intelligence

The *American Heritage Dictionary* (1980) defines *intelligence* as: “The capacity to acquire and apply knowledge.” In negotiations, there are several issues that need to be addressed in acquiring and applying the knowledge that negotiators, tactical team members, and commanders need in order to successfully manage an incident. The capacity to acquire suggests that negotiators have the ability to obtain the information they need in an efficient and effective way. There are potentially multiple sources of information available, some of which will be readily available at the scene—such as friends, neighbors, and family members of the subject or the victims. Being aware of the value of these resources and asking them to remain at the scene while negotiators are on the way helps guarantee access to these sources. Other sources, such as medical records, probation records, and police department records, will be more difficult to obtain. Acquiring this information may require agreements to be worked out with the sources prior to the incident. It is a good idea to have a designated contact person at each intelligence source the negotiator anticipates using during an incident.

A second issue is what information is needed. Law enforcement agencies have or can gain access to an overwhelming amount of information. Crisis management teams need to have specific kinds of information. Having a clear idea of what information is needed will help make intelligence more efficient because it focuses the gathering and analyzing of information.

Third, there needs to be a process for managing the information. Clear procedures for gathering information, collating and analyzing it, and disseminating the results of the analysis need to be developed and practiced before an incident occurs. This will keep negotiators from being overwhelmed by large amounts of information and will alleviate the problems of communicating the information that routinely seem to plague incidents.

[Process of intelligence management](#)

Managing intelligence starts before the time of the call and flows through the entire incident. It is fluid in the sense that the amount of time and energy devoted to the process changes as the situation changes. For instance, in the early stage of the incident, the majority of the negotiator’s time and energy will generally go into the intelligence process. As a clearer picture of the situation emerges, a plan is developed and intervention is started, less time and energy will be devoted to intelligence work. However, intelligence work is not abandoned, and new information received later in the process can change the tactics dramatically (Boltz, 2001). For instance, a man was barricaded for eight hours in his home. He had pulled a gun and shot into the ceiling when his girlfriend refused to move in with him. On the basis of the girlfriend’s information, the plan was to convince him to go to the local hospital for a mental health evaluation. The scene commander was concerned about the threat the man posed to himself and to others. Later, a negotiator interviewed the man’s ex-wife and found that the subject had never been suicidal, that this was the first time he had done anything aggressive, and that he had been a deputy sheriff in New York. He knew the law and negotiator tactics. It became clear that he was not going to come out to meet the deputies. The scene commander ordered the emergency response team to disengage, because the risk levels had changed due to new intelligence. Managing intelligence involves four phases (Solis, 1997):

1. Pre-incident planning and preparation
2. At the scene: the Chaos phase
3. At the scene: the Stability phase
4. Post-incident phase

Intelligence Gathering

Pre-crisis phase

Intelligence on some issues can be gathered and stored well before an incident occurs. Boltz (2001) has pointed out that preplanning will facilitate intelligence gathering. Discussing bank robberies, he notes that it is helpful to have floor plans available at another bank, so negotiators and tactical personnel can have ready access to them. Similarly, information about schools, public buildings, hospitals, and other locations that are likely targets can be gathered before an incident and a plan can be developed to have information about floor plans, employees who normally work at the location, and their hours of employment on file.

The San Antonio Police Department and the Northeast Independent School District Police developed a CD-based information file as part of their critical incident response plan that includes floor plans and utility schematics of every school in the district (Solis, 1999). Negotiators can access a wealth of tactically important information almost immediately upon being notified of an incident at a school. Such computer-based files can be kept at the dispatch office or at another location where they are readily available to the crisis response team. They need to be updated annually. Smaller departments that do not have the technical resources to use computer-based files can achieve the same result by using hard copies of plans that are readily accessible.

Another essential precrisis activity is the working out of agreements to access records with the custodians of a variety of records. Although there are legal limitations placed on accessibility to databases, most states allow access under exigent circumstances. Precrisis meetings and memorandums of understanding need to be worked out ahead of time. It is much more difficult to gain access to protected records during an incident if the custodian of the record is hearing from the negotiator for the first time.

Lt. Jeri Skrocki

Lt. Jeri Skrocki has been employed with the Hays County Sheriff's Office (San Marcos, Texas) since 1989. From 1995 – 2012, she was a Child Abuse/Sex Crimes Detective. She is a graduate of Texas State University. Jeri holds a Master Peace Officer License, Master Corrections Officer License, TCLEOSE Instructor Certification, Special Investigator Course Instructor, Mental Health Peace Officer Certification, and is a Certified Crisis Negotiator. Lt. Skrocki joined the combined Hays County/San Marcos Crisis Negotiation Team in 1997. In 2000, she took over as Commander of the team, a position she still holds. The team is comprised of members of the Hays County Sheriff's Office, San Marcos Police Department, and Texas State University.

Our agency was requested to assist with SWAT and Negotiation during a critical

incident by an adjoining jurisdiction that does not have this resource. The incident involved an elderly male subject that had fired gunshots at officers responding to his residence, actually striking their marked patrol unit with rounds. The officers had been dispatched to the home due to the discharge of a firearm during night hours.

Upon arrival, we met with officers from the agency of jurisdiction. They briefed us about what they knew. They were able to paint a picture of the subject's mind-set, which included anti-government rhetoric including extreme dissatisfaction with the Second Amendment rights debate occurring in our country. This subject had come to their department headquarters numerous times and expressed extreme distrust of law enforcement and probable consequences if anyone came to his residence to take his guns. He displayed disturbing behavior to his neighbors, including wandering his property with a firearm regularly. This was reported to law enforcement.

It was immediately evident how important the pre-intelligence gathering of his behavior played a role in telegraphing his future behavior. Unfortunately, his mental deterioration, verbal statements and questionable behavior went unchecked. The agency that responded to calls involving this subject has few resources and no mental health unit that could follow up with this volatile subject and monitor his behavior.

Ultimately, we learned information about this subject that illustrated the need for law enforcement to recognize "troubled" individuals and attempt to be more proactive to their threats when it can be detrimental to the safety of the community and officers. Take heed when a person makes violent and threatening comments that are not directed at anyone specific but seem to have a very firm, established place in their thought process. Make note of preparations and erratic behavior. Every effort should be made to properly evaluate a person's mental capacity and their capacity to act out their threats.

It was the belief of our team that this man gave law enforcement several opportunities to question his mental health, but we failed to recognize the urgency of his activities. No one was hurt during this incident but that could easily have not been the case. Remember, inform your fellow officers about the importance of documenting the potential mental health erosion that they witness when taking calls. It might not be the first or second call when something happens but it might be the third or fourth. A documentation trail can assist mental health professionals in making the right call to get this person the appropriate help. Do not discount the activities as "just an old man raving, he won't ever do anything." Be vigilant, take notice, document and report these activities. You may just save a life.

Negotiators need to systematically train for the management of intelligence as part of any scenario they design. Just like active listening skills and crisis intervention techniques, intelligence management is a perishable skill. It is subject to the same interference by stress as other negotiator skills. Therefore, it needs to be overlearned and renewed periodically. Training is the best way to keep intelligence management skills fresh.

The initial call will give negotiators preliminary information about what, where, when, and how. Negotiators can begin thinking about whether the incident is a hostage or nonhostage incident; whether it is a spontaneous, planned, or anticipated siege; and whether it can be negotiated when he or she gets the call-up. They can ask for a check of the calls for service at

the location of the incident, to see whether there have been recent situations that may have some relationship to the current one. If the subject is identified, the negotiator can ask for a records check as a quick way to get an idea about the subject's propensity for violence, his or her mental health problems, involvement with people at the scene, and his or her previous suicide attempts/threats.

Boltz (2001) suggests that negotiators need to do a thorough analysis of the following questions:

1. *Who* is involved? Both the identity of the subject and the hostage/victims, as well as the nature of the relationship between them helps negotiators decide the type of incident they are dealing with and the best approach to the incident.
2. *What* has happened? This includes the nature of the incident as well as the means used to carry out the incident. The means includes information about weapons and/or explosives that may be available to the subject (Boltz, 2001).
3. *When* did the incident occur? Information about when the incident began is valuable in cases in which time limits have been imposed (Boltz, 2001). If negotiators become involved after a time limit has been given and they are not aware of it, it places them at a tactical disadvantage. Additionally, information about "when" is valuable in combination with "where" in determining what kind of incident the negotiator is dealing with. An incident at a residence or apartment at 2:30 A.M. is likely to be a domestic, involving people who have had a conflict after the bars closed at 2:00 A.M.
4. *Where* did it happen? The location would allow the negotiator to ask about prior calls at the same address that might help identify what was going on. For instance, if the call is an incident between spouses at a residence, the chances of it being a spontaneous incident requiring crisis intervention are fairly great. On the other hand, if it is at a work site, it may be a crime that was interrupted or a conflict between a supervisor and an employee, in which case more information would be needed to decide on what approach to use.
5. *How* did it happen and how did the police become aware of the incident? This includes not only how the incident occurred, but also how it came to the attention of the police (Boltz, 2001). It gives negotiators an idea of what kind of person they are dealing with, how violent he or she might be, and what his or her motives are.
6. *Why* did the incident happen? This is about the motivation of the people involved and is the key to deciding how to handle the incident. If the subject is a person who is down and out and is creating an incident to bring attention to himself and his plight, it is one thing. If he is simply expressing his rage at the machine, it is another kind of motivation and needs to be managed differently.

[At the scene: The Chaos phase](#)

Arriving at the scene, negotiators have to deal with the increased stress, activity, confusion, and chaos that goes with the crisis stage of an incident. Their goal in the first hour to two hours is to bring order to the chaos. They need to set up their negotiating area, the command post, and the equipment. They need to quickly develop intelligence that allows them to

identify for command the type of incident, the risk to the subject and others, and the recommended tactics. They need to identify the subject, if he or she has not already been identified. They need to gather tactical intelligence and set up a clear channel of communication with tactical as well as command.

Negotiators need to talk with all available sources early in the incident. Witnesses, associates, family members, and neighbors can be valuable resources in gathering intelligence.

The first responding officer is a source of intelligence that needs to be contacted and debriefed. Mullins (1995) has pointed out that the first responder can be a valuable source of information on the location, floor plan, location of obstacles, etc. He or she can provide information about weapons. He or she may have intelligence on the subject's mental state, including intellectual level, apparent depression or agitation, whether or not the subject is intoxicated, whether he talks logically or rambles, etc.

Witnesses need to be identified and interviewed. It is important to try to reduce the effects of the chaos on witnesses. Taking them to a relatively quiet location, even the front seat of a patrol car that is off to the side of the incident will help reduce distraction and increase their concentration. They may provide descriptions and/or identifications of subjects, information about victims/hostages, history of incidents at that location, information about weapons they may have observed, and intelligence about relationships. If they work at the location, they can provide information about floor plans, obstacles, and utilities.

At a location close to both the negotiating arena and the command center, designated negotiators need to establish a status board to track relevant information. It can be organized around topics such as who, what, where, when, how, and why. It is best done in color so the different types of information are easily recognizable.

The importance of continual and instant dissemination of intelligence cannot be overemphasized. During the chaos phase, clear channels of communication among negotiators, tactical, and command need to be established so intelligence can be available in real time. Setting up monitors that allow commanders and tactical personnel to monitor negotiations is one way of facilitating communication. Another is to have both a negotiator and a tactical officer assigned to the intelligence arena. Each is responsible for monitoring the activities and information from their respective teams and making sure it is immediately posted and disseminated to the other elements of the operation.

In departments that do not have MHCs on staff, a decision that needs to be made early about "Who is this person?" "What is their mental condition?" and "Do we need MHC input?" Negotiators need to be alert for signs of emotional disturbance. Anger alone is not likely to be very helpful, because almost everyone who encounters the police may show anger. However, the exception is worthy of note. People who show clear signs of depression, slowed thinking, slow talking, or distractibility should raise the depression/suicide possibility and alert negotiators to the need for professional MHC consultation. The use of alcohol or drugs is another indicator that MHC input would be helpful. Information about current functioning is important in the assessment of the personality type, motivation, and risk level. Recent changes in the person's life are frequently the precipitating factors in a hostage incident. The subject's way of reacting and coping with the changes will be reflected in his or her recent behavior and may be clues that the MHC needs to be called. Important recent changes are:

1. Recent dramatic changes in any behavior.

2. Recent changes in activity level—withdrawal or agitation.
3. Increases in drinking or drug use.
4. Changes in sleep patterns—increases or decreases.
5. Changes in eating habits.
6. Changes in feelings, especially an increase in the frequency, duration, or intensity of the feelings.
7. Disorganized or confused thinking.
8. Self-critical remarks.
9. Suicidal ideation.
10. Hypercritical of others.
11. Thoughts of others being “out to get me.”
12. Thoughts of special privilege drove him (i.e., he is somehow a special person, different from everyone else).
13. Hallucinations, seeing or hearing things that others do not see; especially if the voices tell them to do things.

Stabilization phase

After the Crisis Stage passes, the situation has stabilized. Emotions have been defused on both sides and reason and problem solving are becoming the focus. If drugs or alcohol were involved in the incident, the effects begin to wear off. Threats have diminished. The negotiator has more time to do in-depth intelligence gathering and analysis. He or she can reach out to collateral sources of information, confirming or discounting information received earlier. He can review the chronology of events, contact sources that have not yet been contacted to see whether they can add anything to the analysis of the incident. A more in-depth risk assessment can be made at this point, because the immediate threat has passed. Tactics can be reviewed and revised as needed.

Post-incident phase

The intelligence work is not complete when the incident ends. Negotiators need to document the incident, and record and store the records where they are accessible for future reference, but where they are afforded appropriate privacy. Documentation is important for several reasons.

Noesner (1999) has pointed out that police management of hostage/crisis incidents is coming under increasing scrutiny. To protect themselves from charges of mismanagement and negligence, negotiators need to document their actions.

Solis (1997) has pointed out that properly documented incidents are valuable training resources for negotiators. Without the case studies cited in this book and hundreds of others not cited, the field of crisis negotiations would not be nearly so advanced.

Documentation is important when negotiators have to deal with the same subject on more than one occasion. It is important for negotiators to know how the subject was handled previously, because it will set the subject's expectations about how he or she is going to be

handled this time. Negotiators need to know what worked and what did not work with the subject on prior occasions so they do not spend time on tactics that were ineffective. They can benefit from the site intelligence information gained from prior incidents, if the subject is in the same location. They can use the personality assessment as a starting point for risk assessment and the development of strategies and tactics. Negotiators do not need to reinvent the wheel.

Risk assessment should be part of every brainstorming session.

Intelligence sources

An intelligence source is anyone or anything with information that is relevant to the management of the incident. They are the people and records that have relevant information about the incident, person, or tactical needs of the police. The sources include, but are not limited to, data banks, human informants, and records. It is frequently necessary to obtain this information from a number of sources, because in high-risk incidents, everyone's perceptions tend to be distorted.

Data banks are good sources of information about a person's history. Arrest records, for instance, can provide information about the person's history of rule violations, attitudes toward authority, and prior use of violence. Data banks can be good sources of tactical intelligence as well. They might provide floor plans, information on power sources, data on obstacles to an assault, and the location of telephones. Relevant data banks are:

1. Police/jail records
2. Computerized criminal history (CCH)
3. State CIC/NCIC/LIDR/MVD records
4. Medical/mental health records
5. Military records
6. Public/personal files
7. Financial records
8. Newspaper
9. Probation/parole records
10. Personnel records
11. School records
12. Building maintenance records

Today, the computer can be one of the most valuable intelligence-gathering tools a negotiator can use. Several types of computer searches can be used to acquire intelligence information (Skrocki, 2011). The authors recommend negotiators attend a law enforcement-oriented class on OpenSource searching. The Internet and useful sites are always evolving and changing. An open-source intelligence (OSINT) course can save hours of valuable time and give the negotiator insights into general intelligence searching, as well as teach valuable "Deep Web" search skills.

Social network sites should be searched. Some commonly used sites include Twitter, Facebook, Friendster, MySpace, Match. com, LiveJournal, Tagged, Xanga, Meetup. com,

Perfectmatch. com, and Tribe. net, among others. These types of sites can be extremely valuable in producing intelligence about an actor. Maybe more importantly, they can provide insights into the actor's personality, self-perception, and other socio/emotional/behavioral characteristics. They can further be used to identify other intelligence sources. For example, who the actor's "friends" are on Facebook, who has their picture with the actor, who Tweets the actor, etc. Don't forget that these types of sites can also provide critical intelligence on hostages or other victims.

There are numerous computer databases that can provide intelligence on the actor. Some of those that are free (at the time of this writing) might include state law enforcement data bases (in Texas, the Texas Department of Public Safety maintains the Driver License Image Retrieval System—NOTE: this is for official law enforcement use only and not open to the public) and state government databases that law enforcement can access with approval. In addition, most states have databases for law enforcement specific uses and needs.

Many databases provide public record data on people. Some of those include All4one. com, Dogpile. com, Intelius. com, Kartoo. com, Pipl. com, Publicrecords. Netonline. com, and Zabasearch. com. Other databases charge a subscription fee and include Accurint.com (a LexisNexis subscription service) and Emailfinder. com. Finally, simple Internet searches using the standard search engines such as AOL. com, Bing. com, Google. com, MSN. com, Netscape.com, etc. can provide sites that contain valuable intelligence.

Other data banks the police might need to review are available as computer files. Not only is criminal justice data available, but also available are business records, educational records, financial records, and government data. While the police cannot routinely access many of these data banks, a telephone call to the appropriate person and an e-mail address might provide instant access to the information. An example might be the hostage taker in a prison situation whom negotiators discover has served in the military. A question of interest would be what specialized training the hostage taker received in the military. The team could contact the U.S. Government Records office in St. Louis, Missouri and, if the team had an e-mail address, could receive the hostage taker's military records.



PHOTO 4.2 Good intelligence work involves all of the resources available to a team: interteam communication, brainstorming, clear and well-defined intelligence boards, computers, law enforcement databases, and interviewing witnesses/victims/persons who know the actor.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

The point, however, needs re-emphasizing. While there are many computerized data banks that hostage negotiators can rely upon for information (if the appropriate data bank manager is contacted), it is illegal for negotiators to arbitrarily access computer data banks to obtain information.

Human sources of intelligence are varied, ranging from people who know the hostage taker well to those who have only a passing acquaintance with him or her. People are good sources of both recent and historical information. However, their reliability must be assessed. Human sources of intelligence include (TCLEOSE, 1990):

- Family members
- Friends
- Co-workers
- Bosses/supervisors
- Neighbors
- Police officers
- Probation or parole officers
- Mental health workers and counselors

Interviewing intelligence sources

Through their own skill in interviewing, negotiators can maximize or minimize the information they obtain from their sources. The structured cognitive interview (Fisher & Geiselman, 1988, 1992) is an interview process that has been effective in gaining a great deal of accurate information in a relatively short time. It is based on principles of cognitive psychology and memory research, and uses a six-step process designed to guide the source into the most complete information in his or her memory. The steps are:

1. Motivate the person.
2. Use multisensory memories.
3. Ask open-ended questions.
4. Maintain silence.
5. Use repetition to focus attention.
6. Use follow-up questions to focus on specific details following the fl

Basic to the structured cognitive interview is the idea that the source has the information that the interviewer wants stored in memory. Therefore, it is important for the source to be motivated to do the work necessary to retrieve the memories. The negotiator cannot do the work for the source. If the negotiator talks more than the source, the wrong person is doing the work.

The negotiator/intelligence officer needs to “prime the pump” by telling the source something like, “You know we have a life-threatening situation here. You can help us settle it without anyone getting hurt or killed by sharing with us what you know about the situation and the people involved. In fact, you are the only one that can help us in some ways, because you have a unique perspective and memory of things. We need you to work hard at

remembering everything you can about the situation, the incident, and the people involved. Only you can get at what you know. Therefore, I am going to ask you one question at a time and remain quiet so you will have plenty of time to search all your memories and give me everything you remember.” These instructions place the responsibility for the work of searching memory squarely on the source’s shoulders. It relieves the negotiator/intelligence officer of the responsibility of searching the source’s memory—an impossible mission.

The second step in the structured cognitive interview is to ask open-ended questions (Bolton, 1984; Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). These questions focus the source on his or her task, rather than on the agenda of the negotiator/intelligence officer. Open-ended questions give the source the space and time to explore his or her own memories, and if they reinforce the earlier message, the source is responsible for the work of exploring his or her own memory.

After the motivating speech above, the negotiator/intelligence officer might say something like: “Now, I want you to start early in the day, before this incident began, and tell me everything you remember, no matter how important or unimportant it may seem. Most people try to edit their memories by deciding what’s important enough to tell us. I’d like you not to do this kind of editing. Tell us everything that comes to mind. Everything you saw, heard, felt, smelled, thought, and did. Now start with what was happening at about 8:00 and tell me everything you remember up to the time you met me.”

The sentence about everything the source “saw, heard, felt, smelled, thought, and did” is the third step in the structured interview. It capitalizes on the fact that there are multiple sensory modes with which the person experiences the world. Consequently, there are multiple memories of any given event. By asking the source to focus on all sensory modes, rather than just one or two (what he saw or heard), the negotiator can cross-stimulate memories, increasing the number of memories available to the source (Fisher, 1990; Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). In addition, there is evidence suggesting that people have sensory preferences. Some people are verbalizers, some are visualizers, some are more feeling-oriented. By asking them to focus on all modes, it is more likely that the source will use their preferred mode—leading to more detail.

The fourth step in the structured interview is to maintain silence after giving the motivating and multisensory instructions (Fisher, 1990). Bolton (1984) has pointed out that “Silence on the part of the listener gives the speaker time to think about what he is going to say and thus enables him to go deeper into himself. Silence also allows the speaker to proceed at his own pace and serves a gentle nudge to go further into a conversation.” Additionally, silence makes many people uncomfortable and motivates them to work at filling the silence. By being quiet and waiting for the source to work, the negotiator lets the source’s discomfort work for him. To fill the silence and to reduce the discomfort, the source has to do his job—search his memory and report what he finds.

The negotiator/intelligence officer can use the quiet time to:

1. *Attend to the source.* A negotiator demonstrates his interest in the source’s communications by sitting forward, by making appropriate eye contact, and facing the source in an open posture. He focuses his attention on the source and lets the source know that he is listening.
2. *Observe the source.* Noting the source’s facial expression, posture, and gestures to judge the consistency between the source’s body language and message. This helps

evaluate the source's credibility (Ekman, 1992).

3. *Think about the source's message.* The negotiator formulates follow-up questions to focus the source on overlooked details, to explore areas of inconsistency, and to check the accuracy of his understanding of what has been said (Bolton, 1984).

The fifth step is to have the source go through memories a second time, with the negotiator/intelligence officer guiding the source's attention to details left out during the initial report (Fisher, 1990). After asking the source to go back through the memories in the same kind of detail, the negotiator might say things like, "Now that you are thinking about the person's face, please focus in on his forehead, now eyebrows and eyes. Tell me what you see." Even though the source has been asked not to edit, they may do so inadvertently. Sometimes it is necessary to focus the person on details that were overlooked due to inattention. Gentle guidance is necessary.

Finally, specific fact-oriented questions can be asked. If, after having gone over his or her memories several times and if after having been focused on specific areas, the source has not described important details, the negotiator can ask directly about those details. For instance, if the source has not described a hostage taker's eye color after several attempts at open-ended recall, the negotiator might say "Now I'd like to go back and see if we can pick up some details. Focus your attention on the man's face. Get it clearly in mind. Now focus in on his eyes. Just like one of those close-up lenses on TV, zoom in on his eyes. What color do you recall them being?"

[Assessing the credibility of the source](#)

In gathering intelligence from human sources, it is important to remember that not all of them are of equal credibility. Some, like police officers, are better trained as observers and generally have less personal involvement in an incident. Their information is likely to be less distorted than the hostage taker's family or friends, who may need to protect the hostage taker. In assessing the accuracy and reliability of an intelligence source, negotiators need to consider:

1. The source's physical condition. Does the source have good eyesight, hearing, sense of smell, memory, and intelligence?
2. The source's psychological condition. Does the source have a permanent or temporary emotional/psychological condition that might distort perception, memory, or recall of significant events?
3. The nature of the source's relationship to the hostage taker. Does the source have a prior history with the hostage taker that would bias his or her report for or against the hostage taker?
4. The proximity of the source to the threat. Is the source directly threatened by the hostage taker?
5. The proximity of the source's "significant others" to the threat posed by the hostage taker. Does the source have friends or family who are still in danger or who are seen as being in danger in the future?
6. The consistency of this source with other sources.

Negotiators need to make a conscious assessment of both the credibility and the accuracy of the source. Include a place on the intelligence summary (see [Figure 11.1](#)), because such an estimate will help remind negotiators of the importance of this issue.

Summary

The saying goes, “The more you know, the more you can protect your—.” It points to the importance of an ongoing risk assessment. Hopefully, the initial chances of violence will change as more intelligence is gathered and as the interaction between the negotiators and the actors unfolds. What negotiators learn from others and from the subjects in a crisis is fluid. The negotiator’s choice of tactics depends in large part on whether or not what they are doing increases or decreases the probability of violence, as well as what they learn about the subject’s history of violence, substance abuse, impulsiveness, and other risk factors. An ongoing assessment based on good information is essential in minimizing the loss of life and maximizing the chances of a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

Discussion Questions

Gotebo, Arkansas: At 7:45 A. M., the 42-year-old father of an Army veteran held the principal of the local high school hostage. Students were herded into the cafeteria’s kitchen or huddled under desks. The man ordered the principal at gunpoint into an inner office, where he restrained him and threatened to kill him. He demanded that school officials and police arrange for him to talk to media about his message “concerning the wrongful treatment of United States military personnel.”

The man, wearing black jeans and a black T-shirt with an image of a pirate ship on the back, told a negotiator that he was depressed and needed psychiatric care: “Jail is not the place I need to be.”

The man said that he had two sons who had attended the school, but school officials said neither was currently enrolled. The Department of Defense confirmed that his elder son, also named Earl, was a motor transportation operator in the Army from December 2006 through June 2009.

Police reported that one student said he was in the counselor’s office in the next room when the man walked in and began arguing with administrators. He began cursing and talked about being frustrated and confused, the student said. “I could hear him in the next room,” he said. “I was frozen with fear.” He hid under a desk for two hours. He jumped out a window after getting the attention of the SWAT team by waving his arm. He said, “One guy with gun and four people inside.”

The superintendent said that the principal was the psychologist at the school before becoming principal. “He has a great way of handling people, thank God,” he said.

Parents were told to gather in a parking lot at a restaurant a couple of blocks from the school. Hundreds of people, including parents and other townspeople, were milling around an

intersection near the school.

Police said the man had a prior misdemeanor conviction for public intoxication.

He was also shot in the shoulder in 2000 during a dispute over stolen property.

1. Discuss the initial risk of aggression posed by the man in the above scenario. What would you think was his initial risk to the principal and to the students? Give your reasons.
2. What risk factors discussed in this chapter are you going to use to do a more in-depth assessment and why choose those factors (general factors, factors related to domestic violence, factors related to violent offenders or factors related to the mentally ill)? What else do you want to know about the man?
3. If, after an hour of negotiations, you suddenly heard the man say, "This no-good draft-dodger never served in the Army and he thinks he knows what I ought to say to the media. He is some kind of yellow-belly shrink." How would you assess the imminence of the risk? What else would you want to know? How would you defuse it?
4. You are the negotiator team commander and your team is called to the next county to negotiate an incident at a county jail. When you arrive, you are told that a deputy arrested the hostage taker several hours ago for robbery and failure to identify (the deputy, in fact, has not even finished completing the paperwork). All you know about the subject is that he is about 35 years old, Hispanic, apparently has no family in the area, a tattoo on his forearm that says "Death From Above," and is from out-of-state. What could you do to gather intelligence on this person?
5. Your pager goes off at 1030 hours. The dispatcher tells you that there is a callout at a trailer park involving a man with a gun. What would the location of the call tell you about the potential risk involved and where would you go to gather additional information on risk level?
6. Interview two people who experienced the same event (i.e., a television show, a minor traffic accident, a sporting event, etc.). Interview one using the Structured Cognitive Interview and interview the other by just asking a lot of "yes-no" questions. Who provides the most information? Who has the easiest time recalling information?
7. Think of two friends of yours who know each other. Try to find out seven facts about the background of each (that you do not already know) by interviewing the other. Verify the information by going to the person and getting them to verify the information.
8. Get on the Internet and do a search of your name. How many sources are there and what types of sources are they? How could a negotiation team use the Internet to help resolve an incident?

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Chapter 5

Crisis Management: Communication in Crisis Negotiations

Chapter Outline

Principles of basic communication

Principles of effective communication

Components of the communication process

Barriers to effective communication

Crisis communication

Basic patrol officer communications

Verbal tactics in crisis communications

Active listening

Active listening: types

Getting Past No

Go to the balcony

Step to their side

Change the game

Build a 'golden bridge'

Make it hard to say no

Social media and negotiations

Advanced communication topics for the negotiator

Influence and compliance

Perceptual contrast principle

Rule of reciprocity

Consistency

Social proofs

Liking

Scarcity principle

Behavioral theories of persuasion

Suggestion techniques

Note

References

Learning Objectives

1. Understand the three principles of effective communication and how communications are interactive.
2. Know the seven components of the communication process.
3. Know the four barriers to effective communication.
4. Know what can be done to improve communication.
5. Understand the three patrol attitudes hostage negotiators must overcome.
6. Learn specific verbal tactics to be used in crisis communication:

Concerned attitude
Reasonable problem-solver
Buddy – Fellow traveler
Columbo – Dumb but trying
Nonjudgmental and directing

7. Understand the guidelines for determining the progress of negotiations.
8. Know the seven techniques used in active listening.
9. Understand William Ury's five-step system for *Getting Past No*:

Go to the balcony
Step to their side
Change the game
Build a golden bridge
Make it hard to say no

10. Understand the issues involved in alternative forms of communication with an actor, such as e-mail, social media, text messaging, etc.
11. Know the techniques of influence and compliance as researched by Cialdini.
12. Know the theories of persuasion and how to use them in a negotiated situation.
13. Know the techniques of suggestion.

Negotiators and SWAT were paged-out to Bob's house. About an hour previously, Bob had come out into the backyard, screamed at the neighbors to "quick making so much f-----noise," pulled out a rifle and killed their dog. Bob went back inside his house, slamming the door and then pulling all the drapes and blinds shut. The neighbors called the police. Patrol responded, but did not see any activity inside the house, and since Bob had already killed an animal, called the CRT. In interviewing the neighbors, negotiators discovered Bob was a "techno-geek" who spent the majority of his waking hours on the computer. Neighbors reported he had "every electronic device known to man." They further stated that no one in the neighborhood had much interaction with Bob as he was always on the computer, or if outside, on a cell phone or PDA, texting, online, etc. Anytime someone tried to talk with Bob, he basically told them to leave him alone or tweet him.

Negotiators attempted for about 30 minutes to call Bob on the phone but he refused to answer. Finally, upon the team's recommendation, the primary texted Bob: "Hey Bob, this is police. Answer your phone."

Bob replied: "NFW" (no f-----way).

Negotiator: "Bob, we need talk."

Bob: "GTFOOH" (get the f-----out of here)

Negotiator: "No Bob. We talk on phone."

Bob: "No."

This exchange continued for about 20 minutes, with the negotiator continuing to press for talking on the phone. Finally, Bob texted; "E-mail me at Bob @_____. com.

The negotiator got the laptop and sent an e-mail to Bob; "Bob, we need to talk on the phone. Let me call you."

Bob replied: "No – go away and LEAVE ME ALONE!"

Negotiator: "Bob, we can't leave. You killed an animal and we need to talk about that."

Bob: "**The dog deserved it. The neighbor taped a pinhole camera to its head and it was looking into my window trying to steal my passwords.**"

Negotiator: "OK, Bob. Let me call you and let's talk about it and see what we can do to get the neighbor to stop."

Bob: "**I made them stop!**"

Negotiator: I know Bob, but what if someone else tries the same thing. Let's talk and see if we can come up with a strategy to make sure others don't do it."

Bob continued to resist for a few minutes, but with repeated requests to talk about ways to protect Bob's security, the negotiator finally got Bob to agree to answer his cell phone.

The negotiator called Bob and when Bob answered, Bob began screaming and shouting about how all the neighbors were out to get him and he was going to protect his online presence and take care of all of them. The negotiator listened (active listening skill – ALS) without saying anything. When Bob finally wound down (finished venting emotions), the negotiator asked, "So if I understand what you told me, you believe the neighbors are jealous of your computer knowledge and skills" (ALS, Paraphrasing). Finally, Bob calmed down and began speaking in a low voice about how his only friends were online, and all the neighbors wouldn't invite him to parties, or take walks with him, or even ask him to sit on the front porch with them in the evening. Whenever Bob did this, the negotiator would reflect on the emotional meanings in Bob's statements (ALS – reflecting Feelings). The negotiator was able to let Bob know he understood the emotions Bob was experiencing. The negotiator realized that Bob's anger was really about loneliness and rejection. The negotiator entered into discussions with Bob about what could be done to physically connect with people. The negotiator suggested Bob start small by just smiling and saying hi when a neighbor passed, then after a few days of this, ask them a general question, such as "Nice day, isn't it." Initially, Bob rejected these ideas and would get angry. When that happened, the negotiator would be silent, let Bob vent, and then counter Bob's rejection.

The negotiator then gave Bob suggestions on how he could take all of his online contacts (Twitter, e-mail, Facebook friends, etc.) and slowly set up ways to meet in person and develop real contacts and friendships. Initially, Bob got angry at these suggestions and yelled at the negotiator. The negotiator sat silently, realizing Bob's outbursts were fear, not anger. The negotiator would then slowly tell Bob how he could set up person-to-person meetings that wouldn't be stressful and fearful. The negotiator used examples from his life about how he met new people and made new friends (the negotiator also told Bob how he was terrified when he met his wife-to-be and what he did to overcome that fear and introduce himself to his future wife).

After that story, Bob asked, "Would you meet me if I came out?" The negotiator assured Bob he would and told Bob how to exit the house. The team leader told the SWAT team leader in IC what the negotiator said, and SWAT agreed that if Bob came out with no weapon and his hands in plain view, the negotiator could meet Bob. Negotiators developed a plan where the primary would wait at the end of the sidewalk while Bob came out on the porch. When SWAT determined Bob did not have a weapon, the negotiator would initiate communication and slowly advance up the sidewalk.

When Bob came out, the negotiator introduced himself as Ted. Ted talked to Bob for about 2 minutes from the end of the sidewalk, reiterating some of the communications from telephone calls. Ted then asked, "Bob, is it OK if I move forward a couple of steps?" When Bob agreed, Ted moved forward and talked some more. Bob finally began responding in kind. Ted slowly moved forward until he reached the porch steps, whereupon he asked, "Bob, is it OK if I come up onto the porch and meet you in person?" Bob agreed. Ted stepped onto the porch, introduced himself to Bob, and then led Bob down to waiting officers who took Bob into custody.

Hostage negotiations can be summarized in one word— *communication*. The hostage negotiator is a communicator, a talker, a conveyer of ideas, a persuader (Taylor, 1983; Anderson & Narus, 1990; Alexander et al., 1991). Without communication, there are no negotiations. Whether by voice over a telephone or bullhorn, or from around a wall or face-to-face, the negotiator must be able to communicate. If the negotiator does not understand the basics of communications, crisis communications, and the ability to actively listen, he or she can have all the tools and equipment in the world and still not be effective. Communications resolve the incident (Rogan & Hammer, 1995). As Voss (2004) so aptly stated, "Crisis negotiation is a highly specialized set of communication skills designed to reduce risks and increase options in a crisis situation."

Principles of Basic Communication

The ability to communicate is not something people are born with. It is not a genetic trait passed down from generation to generation, nor is it something that “magically” appears when we reach a certain age. The ability to communicate is a skill that must be learned and practiced, just as is the ability to use a pistol or play a musical instrument. Police negotiators are not successful because they have the Midas touch. They are successful because they understand the principles of communication, practice those principles, and then apply what they have practiced to the hostage situation.

Being able to effectively communicate does not guarantee success as a negotiator. A good communicator may have other issues that prevent them from being a good negotiator. Not being able to communicate effectively does, however, guarantee failure as a negotiator.

Principles of effective communication

Effective communication involves a great deal more than merely picking up a telephone and initiating a conversation. Effective communication involves three principles. First, effective communication involves the ability to understand. Many police officers get into difficult situations because of misunderstandings between them and a citizen. For example, the police officer may tell a crime suspect to “stop and spread’ em.” To the police officer, this communication is very clear and concise. To the suspect, who may have had no prior police contact, the communication may mean several different things. Does this mean to finish what he is doing and then stop, to sit on his buttocks, to lie face down, to kneel, or to squat? When the suspect does what he may believe is appropriate, it sometimes is not what the police officer meant. The communications from the officer then escalate, tone and inflection increase, and the officer becomes angry and hostile. The suspect responds to this hostility in kind and a scuffle ensues. While this example is simplistic, it illustrates the basic problem in understanding communications. The sender and receiver both must understand the communication. Misunderstandings can occur for numerous reasons, including differences in religion, culture, ethnic background, geographic location, age, education, and life experiences. Words and phrases commonly used by the police are not always understood by citizens. Telling a citizen who is afraid to enter her apartment that it is “code four” means absolutely nothing to her. The negotiator, then, must communicate from the reference point of the hostage taker (Kahneman, 1992). This reference point may be cultural, religious, educational, or motivational.

Effective communication also has to achieve the desired effect. Communication has a goal that must be achieved. In hostage negotiations, the goals include reducing the emotional level of the hostage taker, keeping hostages alive and unharmed, and talking the hostage taker into surrendering. To be effective, the negotiator must begin with clearly defined goals and always be ready to change these goals and establish new ones. This means the effective negotiator must anticipate the direction the conversation will take and be ready to respond. Communications are fluid and dynamic. They change direction constantly and the unexpected often occurs. A negotiator may, for example, be discussing how the police are going to get food to the hostage taker when suddenly, out of the blue, the hostage taker demands a vehicle. If the negotiator is not prepared for this sudden change in direction, the negotiator’s communications will not achieve the intended effect nor progress toward goals.

Finally, effective communication is ethical. It involves a degree of trust and respect between the communicator and receiver. This, in fact, is the first goal of the negotiator (Dolan & Fuselier, 1989). The communicator has to be sincere in what he or she is sending, and the receiver has to believe in what is being sent. If the negotiator is caught in a lie, the hostage taker will no longer communicate with that negotiator, and may in fact not communicate with any police officer (Sen, 1989). A lie may result in a depressed hostage taker committing suicide (DiVasto et al., 1992). One disturbing trend in hostage situations is repeat hostage takers. These are difficult situations for the negotiator because more often than not the hostage taker has been lied to in the past. For example, a hostage taker questions what is going to happen if he surrenders. The negotiator tells the hostage taker: "Nothing. Let the hostages go and come out and nothing will happen to you. You will be free to go on your way." If the hostage taker is a repeat offender, he knows full well that the police are going to arrest him, he is going to trial, and he may very well serve time in prison. If the negotiator were to use this fabrication, negotiations would immediately break down. Instead, if the negotiator were to say, "Provided nobody in there has been injured, you will be arrested, be able to bond out of jail as soon as you can arrange bail, and if found guilty at trial, most likely be given three months in the county jail," the hostage taker will be more likely to believe the negotiator.




PHOTO 5.1 It is always a good idea to place communication reminders where negotiators can easily see them. Visual reminders reinforce learning and make it easier for negotiators to use proper communication skills.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

Communication is a fluid, dynamic process. It is ongoing, irreversible, and unrepeatable. Once said, a communication is permanent. We have all experienced a time when we said something to someone that we instantly regretted. From experience, we know the statement cannot be taken back or undone. Should this happen in a negotiation situation, the results

could be disastrous. Imagine the frustrated, tired, and irritable negotiator who says, “Listen, I’ve done everything I can and you’re acting like a little punk by fighting... ah, I mean you need to work with me on this point.” Chances are the hostage taker has slammed down the telephone before the negotiator has finished talking.

These points illustrate the principle that communication in negotiations is an interactive process. Research on corporate negotiations (which in many ways are similar to hostage negotiations) has shown that the largest single predictor of success in these negotiations is the parties’ interaction (Rubin & Brown, 1975; Clopton, 1984; Campbell et al., 1988; Alexander et al., 1991). Communications allow the negotiator and hostage taker to exchange information, identify behavioral tendencies, determine strategy, and coordinate outcomes (Putnam & Jones, 1982).

Components of the communication process

Seven components make up the communication process. The first component is the source of the communication. The sender must first encode the message to be sent. The sender must decide how to convey what he or she wants to send so it can be understood and acted upon. The second component is the message itself. The message is what the receiver assigns a meaning to. Third is the channel used to convey the message. Is the message verbal or written, is it delivered over the telephone, bullhorn, or in person? The fourth component is the receiver, the person to whom the message is intended. Once received, the receiver must be able to decode the message. The fifth component is noise. Noise is anything that interferes with the message. Noise can be environmental, such as background, static in a telephone line, other people talking, or voice level. Noise can also be perceptual. That is, the sender or receiver can assign unintended meaning to a communication based upon what he or she believes the communication means, not what is actually sent. Perceptions of communication are influenced by many factors, including age, education, ethnic background, etc. The sixth component of the communication process is feedback on the communication. What is the receiver’s response to the communication? The seventh component is context. What is the environment of the communication? Is the receiver ready for the communication? The negotiator who picks up the telephone and says, “Hi, my name is Joe, why don’t you release those people and come out?” is not going to be very successful because the context is not appropriate for that communication.

Barriers to effective communication

The very act of communicating by the negotiator or hostage taker can create barriers to effective communication. The power to resolve a hostage situation depends upon language. For many reasons, language itself can be a barrier to effective communications. Many words have more than one meaning or can be interpreted to have more than one meaning. The negotiator could say to the hostage taker, “We would like to take care of you,” meaning the police want to try to peacefully resolve the situation. The hostage taker, however, could interpret that statement to mean the police would like to use force to resolve the situation. To

ensure that these misunderstandings do not occur, the communicator should explain and clarify meanings. The negotiator should have said, "We would like to ensure that neither you nor anyone else gets hurt and resolve this peacefully."

A second communication barrier is polarization, in which extremes are used to describe something. In the old Hollywood westerns, the good guys wore white hats and the bad guys wore black hats. The screen character had all good attributes or all bad attributes; there was no in-between. Often, people view communications the same way. This barrier may be one that influences the entire early course of negotiations and one that the negotiator has a great deal of difficulty overcoming. The hostage taker may perceive his situation to be polarized in that the only resolutions are death from the tactical team or life imprisonment (or a death sentence). Likewise, the negotiator may see the concessions from the hostage taker as all or none. No demands are met unless a hostage is released, and no other concessions are agreeable. If the negotiator talks to the hostage taker in extreme terms, no progress will be made in the negotiations.

A third communication barrier is "allness," or simplistic generalizations. "All police abuse suspects" and "all hostage takers are criminals" are two such generalizations. This cognition can defeat negotiations before they even begin. If both or even one party attempts to communicate with these perceptions dominating communications, the incident will not be resolved successfully. The negotiator has two important roles in overcoming this communications barrier. First, the negotiator must put aside his or her perceptions of the hostage taker before beginning negotiations, and second, the negotiator must overcome the hostage taker's perceptions of the police. Progress will not be made until these two tasks are accomplished.

A fourth barrier to communication is static evaluation, or communications that do not reflect the changing dynamics of the hostage situation. Initially, communications are somewhat formal. Neither the negotiator nor the hostage taker knows the other. As negotiations progress, they become more familiar with each other, know each other better as people, and become more relaxed. With time, communications become less formalized and more familiarized. This is analogous to when a person makes new friends. If your communications with that person do not grow increasingly informal you will not become friends. Likewise, if communications do not become informal in the hostage situation, the negotiator cannot make progress.

Given that communication is often imprecise, confusing, and laden with barriers that worsen communication, can anything be done to improve communication? The answer is yes. More than anything else, feedback can be used to improve communication. Feedback is the response given concerning a communication. The negotiator must constantly provide feedback to make sure that communications are accurate, negotiations are progressing, and communications are being acted upon (Rangarajan, 1985). Feedback should be given immediately. The negotiator should immediately respond to the communication, not wait until a later time to clarify the communication. When giving feedback, the negotiator should not focus on all the details of the communication, but should summarize the general gist of the communication. Also, when summarizing the communication, the negotiator should be specific, not general. If the hostage taker wants a car, \$50,000, and plans to take two hostages as security, the negotiator should summarize the conversation as: "So you want transportation,

money, and you plan to take some hostages.” The negotiator should not summarize by saying; “So there are some things you want.” Finally, when providing feedback, the negotiator should not be evaluative, but descriptive. Instead of saying, “You mean you’re trying to tell me you’re not going to release any people,” the negotiator should say, “I understand you to be saying that you are reluctant to release any people.”

Crisis Communication

The negotiator attempts to communicate in a highly emotional situation. Stress levels are high and rationality is decreased. The crisis is caused by unpredictability and loss of control. The role of the negotiator is to defuse emotions and establish rapport, convince the hostage taker to yield his demands, release the hostages, and surrender (Nielson & Shea, 1982).

One of the most difficult tasks for the negotiator is to control his or her attitude. The negotiator must be accepting and caring, attitudes contrary to most patrol attitudes. There are three patrol attitudes the negotiator must overcome (McMains & Lanceley, 1994; Ware, 2007). The first is either/or thinking. This attitude defines people as either allies or enemies. Most police have heard the expression “there are only two kinds of people in the world, bad guys and cops.” Most police have had this attitude on more than one occasion. This attitude leads to judgment and rejection. That is, “Everybody but me and my partner are bad guys and there are times I am not sure about my partner.” The second patrol attitude is minimization of feelings. If an officer expresses emotions or shows any feelings, this is taken as an unprofessional and irrelevant weakness. The refusal to display emotions interferes with the ability to understand other people and leads to an attitude of “Just the facts; nothing but the facts.” The third patrol attitude is that of “right or wrong, just do something.” Police believe that whenever they respond to a situation, they must take immediate action. Taking immediate action leads to behavior that is not carefully planned and thought out. This behavior tends to intensify a crisis.

These attitudes may be warranted and necessary for most patrol situations. They can help the patrol officer survive many street situations and help remove the officer psychologically from situations he or she confronts on a daily basis. By viewing suspects as enemies rather than allies, the officer does not allow suspects to gain the upper hand or engage in combative behavior. By suppressing emotions, the officer not only insulates him-or herself from the surrounding world, the officer helps give strength to citizen contacts. To a crime victim, for example, the officer is not only repressing pain at seeing someone else victimized, he or she is giving strength to that victim. By taking immediate action on a patrol call, the officer can defuse a situation before it becomes a crisis. It is similar to the old military axiom, “Kill ‘em all and let God sort ‘em out.” To the police it becomes, “Arrest them all and let the courts decide.”

These attitudes, however, are dysfunctional to the negotiator. The negotiator must develop attitudes opposite those normally developed and used by the police officer. The negotiator must be accepting of the hostage taker, must refrain from judging the hostage taker, second-guessing the hostage taker, and must not reject the feelings, emotions, and concerns of the hostage taker. The negotiator must be caring and must communicate concern for the interests, goals, and needs of the hostage taker (Froman & Glorioso, 1984). He or she must be empathetic

to the hostage taker's plight. The negotiator must have patience and must think before acting and be able to use time effectively to defuse emotions and allow the hostage taker to rethink his position. The negotiator is the representative for the response team, law enforcement, the authorities, and the threat to the hostage taker (Cambria, DeFilippo, Loudon & McGowan, 2002). He has become the psychological link that, to the hostage taker, can get him help or get him hurt.

When approaching a hostage situation and before beginning negotiations, the negotiator must ask him-or herself several questions and be able to respond in the affirmative to each question. Can I accept what this person is doing? Can I show this person I care about him even though I do not agree with what he is doing? Can I wait and listen long enough to help this person calm down and resolve this situation? If the negotiator answers no to any of these questions, he or she should not open negotiations because he or she will not be able to empathize with the hostage taker and work toward a successful conclusion.

The negotiator has to be nonthreatening, reassuring, and facilitate ventilation and validation. By being reassuring, the negotiator can defuse anger, hostility, and control emotions. The negotiator will return some control and predictability to the situation. He will reassure the hostage taker that the situation can be brought under control and resolved satisfactorily. Consequently, the hostage taker will begin thinking and will quit acting impulsively. The hostage taker will think about his predicament and begin to rationally attempt to resolve the dilemma. The negotiator who is concerned and cares allows the hostage taker to ventilate his emotions. The hostage taker will defuse his anger and hostility by being able to tell someone his troubles. When these emotions are being discussed, the negotiator can validate these emotions ("I understand. I remember one time I was put in a similar bind and reacted the same way"). This further reduces the emotional content of the situation.

Basic patrol officer communications

Many police and correctional officer academies now emphasize communications for entry-level officers (patrol, correctional, etc.). We understand the importance of communications in dealing with people in stressful situations and know that good communications skills can, in almost all cases, prevent physical aggression. These same communication skills are critical for the negotiator. Cooper (1999) has identified the basic communication skills necessary for patrol officers (and correctional staff) and it is worth reviewing those basic skills prior to moving to crisis communications.

The conflict/dispute resolution skills Cooper (1999) has identified are: (1) listening actively; (2) being able to identify the key or relevant issues; (3) articulating the issues; (4) making the dispute manageable, or removing the emotions and framing the issues; (5) avoiding favoritism to any party in the dispute; (6) identifying and articulating areas of agreement; (7) using "I" rather than "you" to avoid an accusatory tone; (8) being aware of body language signals; (9) avoiding stereotypes; (10) not making statements that back people into corners; and (11) recognizing that people are emotional and allowing them to vent.

Negotiators should be flexible in using these basic skills and not have to actively think about them. The effective use of the above skills, from the first telephone conversation, makes the situation infinitely more manageable, shorter, and increases the probability of a nonviolent

and successful resolution. People want to talk about their problem, have someone listen to them and understand their problem, and finally, to show them a way to resolve their problem. These communication skills do that. In the crisis situation, it often takes more active kinds of communication skills.

Verbal tactics in crisis communications ¹

The negotiator can use specific verbal tactics in a hostage situation to accomplish the above objectives. First, the negotiator should display a concerned, caring, and interested attitude (Taylor, 1983). The negotiator should communicate an attitude that shows he or she has a genuine interest in the hostage taker. Examples of communications indicating these attitudes include: "Tell me what happened"; "That must have been hard/sad/frightening"; and "I'd really like to help you." These types of phrases work especially well with depressed, inadequate, and disoriented people.

The negotiator can also assume the role of a reasonable problem solver. When using these types of communications, the negotiator should assume the role of the leader. Examples include: "Let's work together to be sure everyone is safe"; "What would you like to do about this?"; and "Let's see what other solutions are possible." The negotiator should not use the reasonable problem-solver role until he or she is sure that negotiations are in the Accommodation/negotiation Stage.

The negotiator can use the role of the buddy – fellow traveler. This role is one of commiseration with the hostage taker and works well with trapped felons, impulsive people, and antisocial personalities. Examples include: "Man, I hear you. Bosses never understand." "You know how they are about ____." "That shouldn't happen to a dog."

Another tactic that produces results is the Columbo/dumb-but-trying persona. The negotiator does not have all of the answers but is trying to do the best he or she can. In a sense, the negotiator should appear somewhat inept at what he or she is doing. Examples include: "I know it's taking a long time, but we are trying." "Let me see what my boss says about that." "I hate it that I can't help any faster, but ____" and "What else do you think we can do?" This tactic works well with antisocials or any highly emotional hostage taker.

A final tactic the negotiator can use is that of being firm, accepting-directing, nonjudgmental, and helpful. The negotiator should be compassionate but competent. This tactic is particularly good with depressed persons, disoriented or dependent people, and during the Crisis and Resolution Stages. Examples include: "You sound pretty excited. Take a couple of slow, deep breaths and relax." "Let's take this next step real slow so nobody gets hurt." "Check on your people for me, to be sure everyone is all right. I want everyone to be okay."

Like a successful business manager, the successful negotiator should use praise and reinforcement to build the hostage taker's self-esteem (Blanchard, 1991). The negotiator can elevate self-esteem in several ways. He or she should avoid minor criticism. Even an innocuous phrase like, "Don't talk so fast" may be interpreted as criticism. The negotiator should listen actively. Active listening is positive feedback and builds self-esteem, because it shows that someone is listening and cares. Finally, specific reinforcement should be given at every opportunity. The negotiator will give general reinforcement on many occasions (i.e., saying, "Yes" or "Uh-huh" when the hostage taker moves in a direction the negotiator wants).

Specific reinforcement would be directed praise for specific actions or communications from the hostage taker. An example would be if the hostage taker said, "Okay, forget about ____." The negotiator might respond, "I really appreciate that. You're really working to help me out."

Like a good actor or actress, the negotiator must be able to switch between tactics, at times being concerned and caring, and at other times being firm and directing. No single tactic works during the entire situation or for a continued period of time. The negotiator must be flexible and willing to predict and change roles as the situation evolves (Abbott, 1986).

The negotiator may employ tactics that will hinder communications and sabotage flexibility and success. First, the negotiator who attempts to persuade with argument is doomed to failure. Argument will only serve to cement the resolve of the hostage taker to get his way and strengthen his resolve to maintain his position. Remember a time when someone argued with you. What was your reaction? It was likely one of entrenching yourself in your belief (even though you knew at the time your belief was wrong). You were determined not to lose because you were in a competitive situation. The same is true in a hostage situation. The hostage taker, who is on an emotional high already, will become even more emotional if the negotiator attempts to argue.

If the negotiator threatens the hostage taker or engages in a power play, negotiations will cease. Most hostage takers do not respond well to authority figures. This hostility is exacerbated in a hostage situation. The hostage taker will not only "tune out" this negotiator, he is likely to cease negotiations or even harm a hostage to show who is really controlling the situation. Along these same lines, the negotiator should avoid moralizing, diagnosing, and advising the hostage taker.

Neither will the successful negotiator be a police interrogator. As power plays alienate the hostage taker, so does "twenty questions." In patrol situations, the police interrogator role is valuable. This role gets the officer a great deal of information in a short time, puts the citizen on the defensive, and asserts the officer's position of power. This same attitude is guaranteed to doom negotiations. To the hostage taker, a police interrogator is an authority figure trying to take control away from him. In addition, the hostage taker wants solutions for his problems, not more questions and more problems. In an interrogation, the hostage taker cannot ventilate and communications are not two-way.

Negotiators have to be confident in their ability to resolve the situation. They have to appear confident to the hostage taker. This confidence is one of the key factors in gaining the hostage taker's trust. There is a fine line, however, between being confident and being overbearing and coming across like the "expert." The negotiator has to be careful to demonstrate confidence in his or her abilities, while at the same time not appearing to be cocky. The negotiator who says something like, "Don't worry about a thing, we're going to get this worked out and get you out safe," will only make the hostage taker resistant to any solutions.

An unsuccessful negotiator fails to listen to the hostage taker. Active listening is just as important as talking. Active listening is one component of effective communications and is covered in detail elsewhere.

Although there are no absolute predictors of how negotiations are or are not progressing, Soskis and Van Zandt (1986) have provided some useful guidelines that can measure the progress of negotiations. Almost all of these guidelines involve the general tone of

communications between the negotiator and hostage taker. Positive signs of progress include:

1. There is less violent content in the hostage taker's conversations;
2. The hostage taker talks more often and longer to the negotiator;
3. The hostage taker speaks at a slower rate and his speech pitch and volume are lower;
4. The hostage taker talks about personal issues;
5. A deadline is talked past and there is no incident;
6. Threats from the hostage taker decrease;
7. Hostages are released; and
8. No one has been killed or injured since the onset of negotiations.

In a comprehensive study of the communication patterns at a high-profile prison incident (Cuban detainee siege at the Talladega, Alabama, Federal Correctional Institution) Hammer and Rogan (2004) found that when the inmates were under elevated stress levels, their communications with negotiators increased rather than decreased. They attributed this increase to the inmates wanting to make sure negotiators were not making incorrect inferences about hostage taker behavior. When stress levels were low and inmates perceived they had situational control, communications decreased. So, the amount of communications made or maintained by the hostage taker may be a clue to negotiators as to hostage taker stress levels, hostage taker perceptions, or actions that may be occurring inside the situation.

Victor Bazan retired from the FBI after a 29-year career. He was an active member of the Critical Incident Response Group's (CIRG) Critical Incident Negotiation Team (CINT) that travels with the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team (HRT). He was the FBI's San Antonio Division's Crisis Negotiation Team's Coordinator and the principal Crisis/Hostage Negotiation instructor. He was deployed to critical incidents throughout South America and Mexico, the Middle East, Haiti, and Asia. After his retirement he continues to respond to kidnapping for ransom matters for London-based risk companies and continues to provide crisis/hostage negotiations instruction to local police departments as well as to the United States Department of State's Anti-Terrorist Assistance (ATA) program, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. In 2010, he was one of five instructors working with Chris Voss and the Black Swan Group that provided negotiation training to the very first Crisis/Hostage Negotiation Team in the Middle East, i.e., the United Arab Emirates Team.

Victor Bazan is owner and founder of TPI International, Inc., a private crisis/hostage negotiations business headquartered at Austin, Texas. He continues to respond to international kidnappings throughout the world for private individuals or for businesses that carry kidnap for ransom and extortion insurance as part of their business.

In June 2004, Paul Johnson, a U.S. citizen, was kidnapped in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The individuals claiming responsibility for this act reported they were members of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. On the same day, the same group claimed responsibility for the murder of another Westerner, Robert Jacobs, also a U.S. citizen. It was later determined that the murder victim was friends with the kidnap victim.

As I listened to the CNN report regarding this incident, I began to formulate the level of threat (Threat Assessment) based solely upon the information coming from the media. It's a habit. It was 10 A.M. on a Saturday morning and I knew I'd be getting a call. The call came before noon instructing me to stop off in Washington, DC before heading out to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Thereafter, Chris Voss of the Crisis Negotiation Unit, FBI HQ at Quantico, Virginia and I started our trek across the globe with the reality of believing

our efforts might not meet our hopeful expectations. This would be a most difficult negotiation, especially in the aftermath of the Daniel Pearl execution at the hands of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed on February 21, 2002, in Karachi, Pakistan.

In my preliminary assessment of the news events being reported on CNN, I felt that even though a violent act had been perpetrated, the victim had not been reported as harmed. Therefore, I believed there was a moderate threat to the victim. Upon arrival at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, we learned that on the same day, a friend of the kidnap victim had been murdered. Therefore, the threat level shifted from moderate to somewhere between moderate and high risk. The group perpetrating the action had not made any threats. As negotiators, we utilize the definition of threat as: statements that set out the conditions for violence. And, to date, we were not aware there had been any demands or threats made. The victim had been taken from his vehicle at an unofficial roadblock set up along the route normally taken by the victim. This was a clear indication that the victim had been targeted and had been previously under surveillance. The location of the abduction had been preselected. The CNN reports neglected to mention any known demands made by the perpetrators.

On the day subsequent to our arrival in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the major news networks including CNN, Al Jazeera, and Al-Arabia were reporting that the hostage takers were demanding that all Westerners and Western businesses leave the Saudi Arabian Peninsula by Friday (four days from the announcement of the demands) or the victim would be killed. I mentally reassessed the threat based on the following:

1. An unrealistic demand had been made, coupled with
2. A short and unrealistic deadline (four days to comply)

The unreasonableness of the demand and the short deadline led me to believe that items one and two above would be used as a justification for committing murder. Things did not look good for our victim. Knowing that it would be virtually impossible for every Westerner to leave the Saudi Arabia Peninsula in four days as well as the dissolution or departure of every Western business from this venue was also impossible. The only logical conclusion was that the victim would be killed. Political demands are mostly impossible to meet, as opposed to ransom demands that are easier to negotiate once a ransom amount is agreed upon.

Chris Voss and I knew we were in a volatile situation. The hostage takers had made no attempt to contact anyone for a dialogue. Rather, they were going directly to the media to get their message across; we would have to do the same. The Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula was also utilizing the Internet to get their message across; we would have to do the same.

We met with our on-scene commander, the United States Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, James C. Oberwetter, and made the following recommendations:

1. A press release should be conducted
2. A media strategy would be developed by the negotiators

3. United States ambassador to Saudi Arabia would be our spokesman

Negotiation strategy

In developing a negotiation strategy, Chris Voss and I considered many influencing factors.

Among them were:

- Negotiating a high risk situation
- Developing a negotiation strategy after violence has occurred
- Dealing with unrealistic demands
- Dealing with short deadlines
- Negotiating in a no-dialogue situation
- Negotiating in a nonnegotiable situation

Negotiating the nonnegotiable

In most crisis negotiations, the negotiation process plays a large role in nonnegotiable situations. Often, the negotiation process helps support an anticipated tactical resolution. Additionally, the negotiation process makes intelligence gathering a great deal easier. We have come to the realization that just because there is no dialogue with the hostage takers doesn't mean we cannot INFLUENCE them.

We set goals in nonnegotiable situations to reduce risks to the victim and increase the chances for release or escape, as well as:

- Reduce risks to law enforcement agents during rescues, assaults, and arrests
- Increase the likelihood of catching the "bad guys"
- Gathering evidence to indict and arrest
- Finding the right third-party intermediary (TPI)

Media strategies

We suggested to the United States Ambassador at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia that he should conduct a press conference concerning the kidnapping of Paul Johnson, a United States citizen, and to refer to the hostage takers as criminals and *not* terrorists. The public should view the hostage taking not as a terrorist act but as a criminal act, demonstrating the Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula are a bunch of thugs/criminals and not freedom fighters. The result of this first press conference was successful in gaining the appeal of the same group that the Al Qaeda kidnappers were trying to influence, i.e., the moderates within Saudi Arabia. Internet responses, newspaper editorials, and letters to

the editor were 10 to 1 against the kidnappers and some letters of apology were written by Saudi citizens indicating the Saudi people should not be judged by the actions of a few radicals.

Another consideration in dealing with noncommunicative subjects is finding the right Third Party Intermediary (TPI). Having success with the first press conference, we decided it might be worthwhile to interview the victim's wife to do a television interview. But first, she would need to be prepped and made camera worthy. We would also have to find the proper media outlet to convey our message to the Arab moderates. We chose Al Arabiya communications as the news outlet that would be granted an "EXCLUSIVE" interview of Mrs. Paul Johnson. Al Jazeera seemed to be pro-Islamist, although that may not have been the case. Al Arabiya seemed to be a bit more level in their reporting and so that news outlet seemed to be what the negotiators needed to get their message across. Our time would be limited and it was essential that we craft our responses to anticipated questions by reporters. Reporters are basically the same throughout the world. They either ask good questions or they ask the most inane. In anticipation of both types we wrote out approximately one hundred good and bad questions that American reporters would ask. Additionally, we contacted FBI negotiators in the victim's U.S. hometown to have a simultaneous interview with the victim's son and have it broadcast in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia as part of the same news story containing the interview of the victim's wife. We asked the FBI negotiators in the victim's hometown to prepare the victim's son by role-playing with him and by preparing similar type questions in anticipation of the reporters' questions.

Terrorism is all about "public relations." Al Qaeda uses the media and Internet effectively and don't speak with negotiators. An addendum to the Al Qaeda training manual indicates not to speak with Western negotiators, as they are devils (shaitan) and not to be trusted. They will snare you with their quick tongues and mind games. This mandate was in effect at the time of this kidnapping, i.e., 2004. Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula was in its second generation and was led by Abd-al-Aziz Al-Muqrin or Al-Muqrin for short.

Al-Muqrin was the same individual who had ordered the attack on Khobar Towers in Khobar, Saudi Arabia, May 29, 2004. His band of attackers known as the Jerusalem Squadron simultaneously attacked three venues having a high concentration of Westerners:

1. Al Khobar Petroleum Centre
2. Arab Investments Corporation Building
3. Oasis 3 Residential Compound

In all, forty-one (41) hostages were freed because they were Muslim but twenty-two (22) Westerners including one Japanese man were killed and had their throats slit.

Per Al Qaeda, the goal was to shake up Saudi Arabia's stability and economy.

In the aftermath, fourteen (14) hostage takers were captured or killed but three escaped, including Al-Muqrin, whose escape became legendary. The story is told that the military and the police had him and two of his companions cornered and they were facing certain death. Al-Muqrin used a grenade launcher to punch a hole through one of

the walls and then jumped three stories over a wall and landed without serious injury; the trio carjacked a vehicle and escaped. Al-Muqrin believed he was immortal and blessed by Allah. He ordered the death of Robert Jacobs and the kidnapping of Paul Johnson.

In his efforts to continue to destabilize the Royal Family and the economy of Saudi Arabia he demanded that all Western businesses depart the Arabian Peninsula within four days of the kidnapping: an impossible task. Thus, failure to comply with this demand became justification for killing another Westerner.

Ambassador Oberwetter conducted a press release, per the negotiators' request, urging all American businesses and residents of Saudi Arabia to depart the Arabian Peninsula at their first opportunity. This ploy had a major effect on the Saudi leadership and the Crown Prince responded with his own appeal for U.S. citizens and businesses to remain in Saudi Arabia while adding that all Westerners could be armed if they would feel safer. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was feeling the pressure of doubting Americans and Al Qaeda's pressure to destabilize the Kingdom.

Meanwhile, the negotiators were preparing Mrs. Paul Johnson, Tgabin Saenkhrot, also known as Noom, for her television debut. Mrs. Johnson, a native of Thailand, had been married to Paul Johnson for a few years. She told negotiators that her husband loved Saudi Arabia, the culture, and the people. He would often wear traditional Arab attire to work. Later, we learned that some of the Al Qaeda sympathizers who worked with Paul Johnson actually resented him for trying to be like an Arab.

During a break in her preparation for her televised interview, I asked Mrs. Johnson what she thought would eventually happen to her husband. She candidly admitted that she had seen her husband for the last time when he had left for work that morning and she knew he would be killed. She based her belief on previous assaults by Al Qaeda including the Khobar Towers massacre and the murder of Robert Jacobs. She realistically stated she was planning to return to her family in Thailand. Nevertheless, she was appreciative of the work that the negotiators were doing to have her husband released and was happy to keep busy and do her part to help.

The negotiators continued to strategize with the following concepts:

- Personalize Paul Johnson in terms that reflect and resonate Arab culture and attitudes, i.e., indicate his lineage and namesakes through his father, grandfather, and grandson each named Paul Mathew Johnson.
- Demonstrate Johnson's good deeds and honorable attitudes towards the Arab culture and Saudi Arabia.
- Media statements should refer to the hostage takers as KIDNAPPERS and *not terrorists*.
- Public statements made by government officials regarding this *kidnapping* should highlight the words, "We would remind the world that the *KIDNAPPERS* are responsible for Mr. Paul Johnson's welfare."

After eight hours with a camera in her face to prepare her for the actual televised interview, Mrs. Paul Johnson was as prepared as she could be. Because she did not speak Arabic and her English was limited it was decided that her girlfriend would translate the

interviewer's question from English to Thai and she would respond in English. This was so she could have time to think of her response. Remember, as a negotiator, time is our friend and we do not want to rush into a response that would undoubtedly INFLUENCE the feelings of the moderate Arab thinking man and woman.

The hour of the interview was upon us and we left Mrs. Johnson to the mercy of the interviewer and the cameraman. We were surprised that many of the questions we, as negotiators, had prepared were asked by the news reporter and Mrs. Johnson thoughtfully and credibly gave her prepared response that seemed impromptu and unrehearsed.

Subsequent Internet responses were dramatically in favor of and sympathetic with Mrs. Johnson's plight and more heartfelt and seemingly genuine sympathetic responses were offered by both men and women responders to the news release.

Although the media battle was a victory for Mrs. Johnson, Mr. Paul Johnson's decapitated and dismembered body was found on the night of June 18, 2004: the night of the deadline. In an attempt to dispose of Paul Johnson's body, the kidnappers had been followed by the Saudi secret police from a suspected slaughterhouse to a garbage bin where the body bags were being thrown. A gun battle ensued and Al-Muqrin was killed along with his righthand man and compatriot, Rakan Alsaykhan, who had also escaped from the Khobar Towers massacre. A subsequent crime scene investigation by the FBI and Saudi authorities determined that the location that had been suspected by the Saudis of being the location where Paul Johnson was held was indeed the location where he had been held and killed. The taped blindfold covering his eyes was found and contained a positive DNA match to the body recovered in the garbage bin and to Mr. Johnson's head that was recovered from a home's freezer approximately two months later.

Conclusion

Despite the unfortunate outcome of this case it is important to note that the strategies developed and employed by the negotiators in this matter were successful. You can indeed have INFLUENCE in nonnegotiable and noncommunicative instances. Utilizing the appropriate TPI that can be controlled and directed to affect the desired outcome in the most difficult of circumstances is essential. Preparation and role-playing had a positive influence on the goals established by the negotiation team in developing and implementing the negotiation and media strategies employed.

The loss of life in any case is devastating and despite the noble efforts of all who participated in this event, perhaps the following words uttered by Chris Voss at the end of this case ring most true, "The most dangerous negotiation is the one you don't know you're in."

** The title of this presentation is derived from a meeting between FBI negotiators Victor Bazan and Chris Voss and a Saudi colonel and his attendants. The colonel was questioning why negotiators had traveled from the United States to Saudi Arabia to negotiate with "No one ... you can't negotiate with ghosts."*

Active Listening

A final component of communication is the ability to listen. Most of us are constantly listening to our environment. There are sounds around us practically 24 hours a day. At work, there are computers, typewriters, copy machines, engine noises, other conversations, and radios. At home, we read while the television is on or the kids are playing. At night, there are ambient sounds in the background. Most of these sounds do not actively register in our consciousness. They are received by our ears and ignored by our brain. We are hearing our world, but we are not listening to it. We are passively listening, not actively listening. We spend so much of our time (more than 90%) being passive listeners that we have no skill at being active listeners. When we need to be active listeners, we do not know how.

Listening is a learned skill. It must be understood and practiced for us to be able to actively listen. Listening is nothing more than the ability to make sense of what is heard. Four components are involved in listening. First, we must be able to select the relevant stimuli in the environment. Second, we must *attend* to that stimuli, or focus on the one sound and tune all other sounds out. Third, we must understand, or assign meaning to the stimuli we are attending to. Fourth, we must be able to remember what we have heard.

There are several goals of listening. We listen to enjoy. Watching a play, a concert, a movie, or television, we are entertaining ourselves by listening. We listen to evaluate. Is the communication reliable, valid, and believable? An example presented by Masterson et al. (1989) is that of listening to a speech about beliefs radically different from ours. We listen to the speech and we do not evaluate because we are busy criticizing those views. This is an important point for the hostage negotiator. The hostage taker is going to hold beliefs and ideas that are radically different from those of the negotiator. If the negotiator mentally criticizes those beliefs, the negotiator will not be able to actively listen to what the hostage taker is saying. We also listen to empathize. We listen so other people can talk out their problems. We listen to gain information. We want to learn, so we take notes and attempt to remember the communication.

As with communicating, there are barriers to effective listening, such as the problem of information overload. There can be so much information being received that we cannot attend to it all. Also, we can be fatigued, ill, or under other stressors that interfere with our ability to concentrate. The topic or conversation can be uninteresting. Many things a hostage taker will say will not be interesting to the negotiator. The negotiator will have to make an active effort to continue to listen during these periods. Also, we sometimes become involved in personal concerns. We plan what to say next, what we are going to have for dinner, our own troubles, forgetting to turn off the stove, etc. Listening requires that we put aside these concerns. Additionally, we can become distracted by outside interruptions. Other concentrations, noise, or a commander wanting to know what is happening can all interrupt our listening concentration. Another factor is that we speak and hear at different rates. According to Masterson et al. (1989), we speak at about 100 – 125 words per minute. We listen at about 700 words per minute. We can listen much faster than necessary, so our mind tends to daydream

and wander during the listening gaps. Finally, if the sender is presenting ideas or communications with which we do not agree, we tend to focus our attention on the messenger rather than the message. This is analogous to speaking with an attractive member of the opposite sex. Our attention is focused on him or her as a person rather than on what they are saying.

There are some strategies that can be used to improve the ability to listen, such as looking for useful ideas during a conversation. Every speaker will include useful information in the most mundane of conversations. While ranting and raving, the hostage taker will include some information that the negotiator can ultimately use. The negotiator should listen to these diatribes with the intent of uncovering that tidbit of information.

Negotiations are about communicating with the hostage taker. Communicating means much more than talking—it means actively listening to the subject.

Another effective strategy is to listen for ideas, not facts. We have all heard a television newscaster say something similar to: “The Dow Jones closed today at 11,257.896, up 2.8 points from the previous day. Shares trades were at 7.4 million and climbing by day’s end. This trend is expected to continue tomorrow, with analysts predicting a rise of 1.3 points on the Dow index, 3.4 points on the S & P, and share trading to increase by 0.36 million.” Very few of us pay any attention to the data. We pay attention to the idea that the stock market is healthy and expected to stay healthy. When the hostage taker presents a long list of demands (especially if political), attempt to gather the ideas behind the specific demands. Let the secondary negotiator focus on and write down the specific demands. Later, when the conversation is over, you can memorize the specific demands.

Negotiators should not be distracted by emotions, arousing words or phrases, or inflammatory statements. Realize that the sender is in an emotional situation and this will be reflected in their communications. Ignore these statements as part of the communication process. You can use these emotional communications as an index of how negotiations are progressing and whether the hostage taker is becoming less emotional and more rational.

Adapt to the speaker. The negotiator should make sure that his or her listening behavior reflects the sender’s speech patterns and habits. Force concentration on the message, not the messenger.

Adapt also to the environment of the speaking situation. If the speaker is speaking too softly or too loudly, ask that the speaker modulate his or her voice. Ask the speaker to slow the speech rate if necessary. Try to negotiate from a quiet place. Many negotiation teams isolate the primary and secondary negotiator so they will not be distracted by the confusions inherent in a teamwork situation. It is difficult to listen to a hostage taker if several people are in your ear asking questions.

Determine what your objective is in listening. What are your goals from the conversation? Each conversation with the hostage taker might have different goals. Determine what the goals for that particular conversation are and listen with those goals in mind.

Anticipate the sender’s next point. If the hostage taker presents a list of demands, you might anticipate that the next point to be presented will be the deadlines. This anticipation helps you remember the communication and helps you concentrate more by filling in the listening gaps.

Identify how the main ideas are presented. Some people will “beat around the bush” before getting to the main point. Others will present the main point up front and then fill in with idle

conversation. Still other people will use different styles. Determine which communicating style the hostage taker is using and adjust your listening behavior to match that style. If the hostage taker rambles before presenting demands, then the negotiator should plan to achieve maximum listening several minutes into the conversation.

Mentally summarize the key ideas in the communication. Which demands are most important to the hostage taker? Which part of the oratory is most relevant?

Most importantly, practice active listening skills. Negotiators practice sending communications— they rarely practice receiving communications. Listen to boring speeches, practice summarizing main points, practice gathering ideas, practice remaining focused in the face of distractions.

One good exercise for both sending and receiving communications is to pair negotiators up and have them engage in an extemporaneous debate on unpopular issues. For example, have them debate the issue of legalizing drugs to making drug use a medical rather than a criminal justice problem. After 10 minutes, make them switch sides. Rebuttals have to focus on points made by the other person, not on new points. While the negotiators are debating, play a movie or radio in the background. Force them to concentrate, whether they are sending or receiving.

Active listening: types

As discussed in [Chapter 3](#), active listening is fundamental to negotiations. It is important enough that we will review the skills and add some additional comments here. Bolton described four types of active listening that negotiators can use during negotiations. Each has its own set of advantages and each is used for different purposes. Bolton (1984) has described them as:

1. *Paraphrasing*—a response in which the negotiator gives the hostage taker the essence of his message in the negotiator's words;
2. *reflecting feelings (or mirroring)*—a response in which the negotiator mirrors back to the hostage taker the emotions the hostage taker is communicating;
3. *reflecting meaning (or emotional labeling with emotions)*—a response in which negotiators let the hostage taker know they understand the facts and the feelings the hostage taker is communicating; and
4. *Summative reflections*—a response in which the negotiator summarizes the main facts and feelings that the hostage taker has expressed over a relatively long period.

Ware (2003; 2004; 2007) and others have also included:

1. *Minimal encouragement*—Saying “yes,” “OK,” or other verbal indicators that the negotiator is actually listening to the hostage taker.
2. *Open-ended questions*—Questions directed at the hostage taker designed to get him to open up and give a long, verbal answer.
3. *I-messages*—The negotiator expressing his or her emotions in response to the hostage taker.
4. *Effective pauses or extended pauses*—Not saying anything when the hostage taker

finishes talking, encouraging him to fill the empty or blank space with additional communications or information.

Paraphrasing is helpful when the negotiator needs to respond to the hostage taker, but does not know what to say. It demonstrates that the negotiator has been listening and it helps keep the conversation going. A good paraphrase does not “parrot back” to the hostage taker. Rather, it puts the hostage taker’s meaning in the negotiator’s words. Otherwise it will seem artificial and forced. A good paraphrase has the following characteristics: it is concise, it summarizes the essence of the meaning, the main point is the focus, and it is focused on facts. The hostage negotiator’s feelings are not the point.

Reflecting feelings helps develop the rapport between negotiators and hostage takers. It moves the discussion off the factual level to the emotional level. It helps validate the hostage taker as a person and lets them know their concern is being heard (Gray, 2003). However, it is usually difficult for negotiators to do. Most negotiators need to work to develop their ability to talk about and reflect feelings. The authors have asked officers in several basic negotiation schools to brainstorm the words they know that describe meanings. The average response from a class of 25 police officers is about 12 emotional words. Compared to Bolton’s list, this is not a wide range of descriptors. Most negotiators need to develop their ability to describe the hostage taker’s feelings. However, at the same time, the negotiator should not become overly sympathetic to the hostage taker’s plight. It is appropriate to be empathetic (Misino & DeFelice, 2004). As Regini (2004) points out, empathy is the cornerstone of crisis negotiations and involves the demonstration of listening to and understanding the hostage taker.

Bolton (1984) has described three ways of becoming more aware of feelings. They are: (1) listen for feeling words and use the list referenced above to help recognize feeling words; (2) infer feelings from the context and think about the feelings that are appropriate to the situation; (3) ask yourself what you would be feeling by using your humanness to guide you in understanding what the hostage taker is feeling.



PHOTO 5.2 Most people think communication means “talking” to someone else. For negotiators, the most important component of communication is the ability to actively listen to someone else, and to let them know that you are listening by using the full range of active listening skills.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

Reflection of meaning is used to help identify the hostage taker’s needs and to strengthen

the relationship. It helps validate the hostage taker, and reflects the implications of a situation for the hostage taker. It involves the formula, “When ____, you feel ____, because ____.” For instance, if a hostage taker says, “Get those patrol cars back, man, or somebody is going to die. It really ____ me that you guys are so close.” The negotiator might say, “When the patrol cars are that close, you feel threatened, because you are not sure what’s going to happen; they might attack you?” This gives the hostage taker a chance to confirm the statement. If the negotiator is right, it shows the negotiator is aware of the hostage taker’s need for safety and security.

Summative reflection is used to confirm information and to solidify the relationship. It reminds the hostage taker of how far the negotiations have come and how much more under control things are now than they were at first. It is helpful in conflict, because it clarifies the issues in a concise way that serves to focus negotiators and hostage takers on the relevant issues. For instance, after a rambling dialogue by a paranoid schizophrenic that included a conversation with the President, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and a Secret Service agent, all people the hostage taker “trusted” (in his delusion—and none of whom were present), the negotiator summarized by saying, “If I understand what you are saying, it is, ‘You need to talk to someone you trust, because you are afraid we are going to harm you.’” “The response focused directly on the issue the hostage taker was concerned about.

Minimal encouragers are used simply to indicate that the negotiator is listening to the story or emotions behind the verbal statements, that the negotiator is engaged in listening, and that the speaker’s story is being understood. Minimal encouragers can be used at any time and should be used in every conversation.

Open-ended questions encourage the hostage taker to continue talking and telling their story. Open-ended questions can be used to defuse emotions; for example, if the hostage taker is being emotional, the negotiator could ask something like; “Joe, what do you think you can do to make her move back in with you?” or “What do you anticipate will happen when you do ____?” If the hostage taker is thinking, he cannot be very emotional.

I-messages tell the hostage taker why his actions may not be leading to a solution to the situation. The negotiator may be listening to a verbal attack on him, and say to the hostage taker, “You know, I get frustrated when you yell at me.” The negotiator is subtly letting the hostage taker know that the present course of verbal behavior is not helping to resolve the situation.

Extended pauses can be used for a variety of purposes. First, pauses can help reduce the hostage taker’s emotions. If the hostage taker begins a tirade, when there is a break in his communications, the negotiator can remain silent. This will serve to reduce emotions and move the communications into a more rational direction. Second, the negotiator can use pauses to get the hostage taker to continue providing information or intelligence. People are uncomfortable in a conversation when a person does not respond, and they feel an obligation to fill the silence. Mostly, they will continue in the direction they have been going. Third, the negotiator can use pauses to help determine if the hostage taker is being truthful. As the hostage taker continues the communication, discrepancies will arise (in many cases).

[Getting Past No](#)

William Ury, in his book *Getting Past No* (1991), provides a model for negotiating that sums up and incorporates many of the communication themes presented in this chapter. Ury's negotiation model includes five steps the negotiator should be aware of and focus on during the negotiating process.




FIGURE 5.1 Active listening skills.

If a negotiator learns, practices, and adheres to Ury's model, the negotiator will handle the most difficult situations with confidence and success.

[Go to the balcony](#)

Step one is "Don't react—go to the balcony." That is, the negotiator should view negotiations as if he or she were a third party observing what was happening. Ury (1991) uses the analogy of the negotiator being a patron at a play and standing on a balcony overlooking the stage and watching the action. Very often, the hostage taker will (whether intentionally or unintentionally) say or do things to produce an emotional reaction from the negotiator. He may refuse to budge on a position (put up a stone wall), threaten some harsh consequences if the negotiator does not do what he wants (attack), or attempt to trick the negotiator into giving in to some demand. The negotiator should recognize these tactics and expect them to occur.

The natural reaction to these tactics is to strike back, give in, or break off negotiations. That is, there is a tendency to make an emotional response to these tactics. The negotiator who recognizes the tactics will be able to counter them and continue negotiating in a reasonable manner. The negotiator who does react will become emotional and lose sight of the objective. This negotiator will become engaged in a personal "war" with the hostage taker and will not negotiate objectively for incident resolution.

Ury (1991) suggests that when these tactics are used, the negotiator should "keep his or her eyes on the prize." The negotiator should focus on why he or she is negotiating, stay focused on the goal, and identify his or her BATNA (Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement). The BATNA is the maximum trade a negotiator can get at any one point in negotiations. The BATNA will change as the situation and circumstances change, and the negotiator should constantly assess the BATNA in light of the situation's changing dynamics.

When the hostage taker uses emotional tactics, the negotiator can do several things to

reduce his or her emotional response and reduce the emotions of the hostage taker. The negotiator should buy time to think. The negotiator can do this by utilizing pauses, rewinding the tape, and taking a time-out. Rewinding the tape refers to acts such as rephrasing what the hostage taker said in nonemotional terms or writing down the conversation to slow emotions (“Excuse me, I am writing down what you said so I won’t forget it”). Also, the negotiator should not make important decisions hastily. The negotiator should say, “I will need to check with my commander and get back to you.” This does three things for the negotiator. First, points of information can be checked for accuracy. Second, the negotiator and command personnel can think through the decision. Third, the negotiator can reflect and make sure perspective on the situation has not been lost (Fisher et al., 1991).

The negotiator should not get mad, not get even, but instead get what he or she wants. The negotiator must control his or her behavior and emotions, and dispassionately listen and converse with the hostage taker. Nothing can be taken at a personal level or the hostage taker has gained the upper hand in negotiations.

[Step to their side](#)

Step two of the Ury (1991) system is to disarm the hostage taker and step to his side. When hostage negotiations open, the negotiator is rational and calm. The hostage taker, however, is distraught, frightened, and angry. Before negotiating, the negotiator must help the hostage taker regain his emotional balance. Just as important, the negotiator must make the hostage taker an ally. The hostage taker must realize that the negotiator is in the situation with him, not against him. Ury suggests five strategies to reduce emotions in the hostage taker and make the hostage taker an ally.

The negotiator must listen actively to the hostage taker. The negotiator must listen to his point of view and must understand that point of view. The good negotiator does more listening than talking. The negotiator not only must listen actively, but also must demonstrate to the hostage taker that he or she is listening actively by paraphrasing and asking for corrections. The negotiator should “acknowledge the point” and recognize the hostage taker as a person (one way is to acknowledge the hostage taker’s feelings, such as “I appreciate how you feel”). This does not mean or imply that the negotiator has to agree with what the hostage taker has done. The negotiator should work on finding opportunities to agree with the hostage taker and find common ground to lead into more difficult subject areas. Sports, weather, anything at all that can be shared by the two parties will set the stage for later agreements. This does not mean the negotiator has to concede to the hostage taker or agree with what the hostage taker is doing. The negotiator should accumulate yeses. Put the hostage taker in an agreeable mood and a “yes-saying” frame of mind. One good way to accomplish this is to frequently rephrase the hostage taker’s statements and then ask, “Is this what you meant?” The negotiator should match the communication patterns and sensory language of the hostage taker. If the hostage taker speaks slowly, or uses local idioms, or uses “street slang” often, the negotiator should follow suit and use similar language. If the hostage taker uses “Do you SEE what I mean,” the negotiator should reply in the same sensory modality (“Yes, I SEE what you mean”).

The negotiator should acknowledge the person not as an adversary, but as a colleague. The

negotiator can do this by first building a working relationship. The negotiator should not open negotiations by attempting to resolve issues or obtain lists of demands, but by making small talk to establish common ground and show the hostage taker that he matters as a person. The negotiator should flatter the hostage taker's ego and competence ("You seem like you are really capable of taking good care of the children.").

The negotiator should express his or her views without provoking the hostage taker. Most people negotiate with an either/or mentality. The best negotiator will use a both/and mentality. As Ury (1991) says, "don't say 'but,' say 'yes... and'" The negotiator should not say, "I know you are getting thirsty, but we need a show of faith on your part." The negotiator should instead say, "Yes, I understand you are getting thirsty, and I want to work with you to satisfy our needs." What the negotiator should do is add to his statement. The negotiator should use "I" statements, not "you" statements. They should place a different perspective on the problem. The negotiator should recognize the differences between his or her position and that of the hostage taker (because they do have different positions), but he or she should do so optimistically ("I know this is difficult, and I know we can work it out").

Change the game

The third step in Ury's (1991) model of negotiations is to change the game; don't reject, reframe. In hostage negotiation situations, the hostage taker often will spend a lot of time berating, belittling, or attacking the negotiator and the police. The negotiator's objective is to get past this point and have the hostage taker present the real issues and work on solutions. The negotiator must get the hostage taker to talk about the problems, not the police.

The negotiator must direct the hostage taker's focus back to the problems of resolving the hostage incident. One way for the negotiator to do this is to ask problem-solving questions: "Why?" "Why not?" and "What if?" The negotiator must determine what motivates the hostage taker and present opportunities for the hostage taker to solve the problem ("Why will taking the kids to Canada solve the problems with your ex-wife?"). If the hostage taker is reluctant to answer "why?" questions, the negotiator could rephrase the question in a "why not?" format ("What would be the problem with discussing your visitation rights with another lawyer who may be more experienced in family matters than your first lawyer?"). The negotiator could even assist the hostage taker in exploring all possible solutions to the problem ("Well, moving to Canada is certainly one option. What if, however, you were to do..."). The negotiator should ask open-ended questions. This makes the hostage taker think and formulate options on his own.

What if the hostage taker builds a stone wall? That is, the hostage taker makes his demands and says, "take it or leave it." The negotiator could ignore the stone wall and keep negotiating as if the ultimatum were never presented, reframe the stone wall as a positive ("We would hate to see that happen so we better quit worrying about the tactical team and get to work on solving your problem"), or test the stone wall and simply let the deadline expire, either by ignoring the deadline or talking through it.

When being attacked, the negotiator should reframe the attack into a future solution or a common problem. The hostage taker may be talking about past "injustices" suffered at the hands of the police. Rather than dwell on those, the negotiator could say, "I am terribly sorry

you had experiences with a few bad apples. What can we do so that it never happens again?" The negotiator should also insert him or herself into the problem and the solution. Change from "you" and "me" and use "we." Fisher et al. (1991) refer to deflecting personal attacks as "negotiation jujitsu." Personal attacks must be retranslated into issue problem-solving. If the hostage taker says, "I get the food before hostages are released. What's the matter? You don't think I'll live up to my word?" The negotiator might respond with the following deflection; "I appreciate your working with me on this. The issue is not about trust. The issue is the principle: Can we make the swap so both of us are satisfied? What if both happen at the same time? You have the person step to the door, pass the food in, and then leave." The negotiator has retranslated, offered a workable solution to the dilemma, and given the hostage taker the decision.

If the hostage taker attempts to use tricks, the negotiator should respond as if negotiations were progressing in good faith. The negotiator could ask clarifying questions to expose the tricks. Do not challenge the hostage taker, but rather act confused ("I'm confused. I thought I understood you to say earlier that if we provided you some food you would let one of those people go.").

Build a "golden bridge"

The fourth step in Ury's (1991) model of negotiating is to build the hostage taker a "golden bridge," or make it easy for him to say yes. The hostage taker may say no for many reasons. Decisions are not his idea, all his needs have not been fulfilled, he will lose face, and negotiations move too fast. The negotiator must remove these obstacles and replace them with a "bridge" of yeses.

Ury (1991) claims that too many negotiators force the hostage taker to agree, rather than getting the hostage taker on their side and then working with him to reach agreements that ultimately lead to a safe resolution. The negotiator should involve the hostage taker in the decision making and make negotiations seem like a partnership. The negotiator should solicit the ideas of the hostage taker, select the most constructive of these ideas, and build upon them. The negotiator should also work with the hostage taker in criticizing those ideas and getting the hostage taker to realize the problems inherent in those ideas. ("Let's explore the idea of driving to Canada. What are the problems you see in taking that course of action?"). If the hostage taker is resistant to the negotiator's suggestions, the negotiator should ask, "Well, what problems do you see with that idea?" Finally, the negotiator could present alternatives from which the hostage taker can select.

One of the major issues at the Oakdale, Louisiana, prison siege was that the negotiators rapidly met the material demands of the hostage takers, yet the incident worsened. The negotiators did not satisfy the internal needs of the hostage takers (Fuselier et al., 1989). The negotiators moved too fast and did not recognize the emotional needs of the hostage takers. In addition to the demands the hostage taker makes, that hostage taker also has unstated needs of security, recognition, saving face, and control over his own fate. On some occasions, what the negotiator perceives to be an emotional outburst is merely the hostage taker crying out for recognition. The negotiator should view the situation from the hostage taker's perspective. If the negotiator can do this, he or she can make high-benefit, low-cost trades ("I'll back the

tactical team off if you release one of those people”—low cost because the tactical team will still be in position, high benefit because a hostage is released).

The negotiator should “go slow to go fast.” Negotiations are a process of small steps and frequent pauses. The negotiator cannot make one big leap and dash to the end zone. One common mistake that novice negotiators make is to open negotiations by arguing for the release of hostages (notice argue, not ask for—an important distinction). The negotiator should begin accumulating yeses by getting agreement on areas of common interest and small requests and working up to major concessions (Brett, 1991). Another common mistake that negotiators make is that they tend to rush when they sense a resolution is close. When the end is in sight, the negotiator should slow down even more, review agreements, and explain exactly what will happen during the resolution phase.

One area negotiators often do not recognize or completely ignore (and an area that can forestall or prevent resolution) is the hostage taker saving face. The hostage taker is a person who has ego needs, dignity, and a need to be respected. The resolution of the incident is where the hostage taker loses face. If a crowd of civilians is watching, or if relatives are present, or if the incident is a media event, the hostage taker may refuse to resolve the incident only because he fears losing face. The negotiator must satisfy this ego need to get resolution. Many hostage takers have surrendered, in fact, simply for a promise to not release their name to the media. Conversely, the negotiator can help the hostage taker write a “victory speech.” The hostage taker may make a demand or request the negotiator cannot fulfill (and this demand or request will resolve the incident). The negotiator may tell the hostage taker: “I can’t do that, but you can tell everyone I did and you refused.”

[Make it hard to say no](#)

The fifth negotiating principle advanced by Ury (1991) is making it hard to say no, or “bring them to their senses, not their knees.” When the hostage taker refuses to concede or surrender, the negotiator becomes frustrated. There is a natural tendency for the negotiator to assert authority and rely on his or her position of power (after all, this works on the street). This is when the negotiator “orders” the hostage taker to do something. In many negotiating situations, it will be necessary to negotiate from a position of power. This is acceptable, but only when power is used correctly.

The negotiator should use power sparingly, not unilaterally, and should use his or her power to educate the hostage taker. The negotiator should focus the hostage taker on the negative consequences of not agreeing or negotiating. The negotiator should do this by getting the hostage taker to realize the consequences of his lack of agreement. The negotiator can ask reality-based questions such as, “What do you think might happen if we don’t work out a resolution?” “What do you think the tactical team will do if you hurt one of those people?” “What will happen to you if the tactical team assaults?” Questions of this nature are not a threat to the hostage taker; they serve to warn the hostage taker of possible consequences. The hostage taker is given the impression that he is making decisions and controlling his own fate. The negotiator may even demonstrate his or her BATNA by allowing the hostage taker to observe the tactical team preparing for an assault.

Using the negotiator’s BATNA may force the hostage taker to negotiate and begin to agree

on issues. The negotiator should be careful to not abuse his or her power, however. The purpose of using the BATNA is simply to show what could occur. The negotiator should use the minimum power necessary to reach agreement. This situation is analogous to a sports team “running up the score” on their opponents. They not only defeat the opposition, they embarrass, humiliate, and make enemies of the opposition. At some point, the opposing team will get revenge. The purpose of negotiation is to resolve the incident safely, not to humiliate the hostage taker.

When a hostage taker refuses to negotiate, the negotiator should continue to offer the hostage taker a way out. That is, the negotiator should leave the “bridge” open for the hostage taker to cross. The hostage taker may not realize he has a way out of his predicament (and that is why he refuses to negotiate). He may believe, for example, that the act of taking his estranged children hostage may completely ruin all visitation rights. The job of the negotiator now becomes that of convincing the hostage taker that visitation rights can be regained, but only if the hostage taker works with the negotiator. Let the hostage taker decide upon the terms of visitation (“If nobody gets hurt, you probably won’t lose any visitation rights. The choice is yours, however.”).

Once the hostage taker agrees to negotiate concessions, the negotiator should continue to make it hard to say no. The hostage taker, for example, could agree to surrender and at the last second get scared and refuse to come out. The negotiator should structure the agreement so any risk is minimized. Hostages should be released before the hostage taker surrenders. The negotiator can also make it difficult for the hostage taker to renege on any concessions by making it difficult to back out. One way to accomplish this is to tell others about the agreement, or have the hostage taker tell others (i.e., hostages).

At the conclusion of negotiations, the hostage taker should be as satisfied as possible. He should feel he made the choice, he is a person, his dignity is restored, and he can save face. The negotiator can accomplish this by leaving flexibility in the surrender ritual. Let the hostage taker decide how to surrender, who drives him to jail, etc. Remember, the purpose of negotiation is not to win, but to leave everyone satisfied.

[Social Media and Negotiations](#)

A couple of years ago, the author’s daughter sent him a text message: “Call me.” The author responded, “No,” whereupon he received another text, “Why?” Wanting to see how far this might be carried, he answered, “Because.” And the next text from the daughter, “Because why?” The author’s response, “Because I said.” Within about 30 seconds, the author’s phone rang. While the author has often been accused of being an “old fogey” (for a variety of reasons), he prefers direct voice-to-voice communication versus the impersonality of text message. The reality, however, is that social media is the wave of the future and a preferred method of communicating. In 2008, as reported by Reardon (2008), Americans sent more text messages than made phone calls. For instance, in the second quarter of 2008, a Nielson poll found mobile users sent and received an average of 357 text messages per month and made or received 204 calls per month (in 2006, first-quarter data showed the text rate averaged 65 per month). In 2000, in the United States, 14 billion texts were sent. In 2010, 188 billion were sent

(Kluger, 2012 reporting on a Pew Institute survey). In 2009, text/e-mail/streaming video and similar data surpassed voice data in cellphone calls (Wortham, 2010). Reardon reported that much of the texting increase was driven by teens (13 – 17 years of age), who averaged 1,742 texts per month versus only 231 calls per month. Even preteens (under 12 years of age) made on average 428 texts per month. Kluger reported that even among Americans 65 and older, daily texting rates averaged 4.7 messages, while phone calls averaged only 3.8 per day. Not only do all of us have a cell phone, 25% check it every 30 minutes, 33% get anxious when without it, and 75% of 25 – 29 year olds sleep with it (Gibbs, 2012). Twitter messages (tweets) surpassed half a billion per day in 2012 (Terdiman, 2012).

Pingdom.com (2011, 2012) published other interesting Internet and social media numbers. Some of their more interesting findings and comparisons include:

	2011	2012
E-mail users (world)	3.146 billion (accounts)	2.2 billion (clients)
Websites	555 million	634 million
Websites added during year	300 million	51 million
Internet users worldwide	2.1 billion	2.4 billion
Internet users, North America	271.1 million	274 million
Facebook users	800+ million	1 billion
Facebook users on mobile phones	350 million	Not reported
Average # of tweets sent per day	250 million	175 million
# of Tumblr blogs (end of 2011)	39 million	not reported
# of members on LinkedIn (Sep)	Not reported	187 million
Google searches	Not reported	1.2 <u>Trillion</u>
Mobile subscriptions worldwide	5.9 billion (estimated)	6.7 billion
# of video playbacks on YouTube	1 <u>Trillion</u>	Not reported
# of hours of video watched on YouTube per month	Not reported	4 billion

As clearly seen in the above, nonverbal, technological patterns of communication are becoming more of the norm in person and social interactions, and they present special challenges for the negotiator. Negotiators have to adapt, train, prepare for, and have the equipment necessary to communicate via social media, smartphones, e-mail, and other technological systems. One of the most important recommendations that can be given to negotiators is to train in communicating via technological methods. First, learn the technology. What are the devices people are using to communicate? Laptops are being replaced by PDAs (i.e., iPads and similar devices), cell phones are being replaced by smartphones (which may soon replace PDAs), Windows 7 has become Windows 8 (maybe the most radical change in operating systems since Windows replaced DOS), keyboards are being replaced by touch screens, and so on. Learn the devices and how they are used by operators.

Second, learn the systems people are using to communicate and how they change with time. A couple of years ago, everyone used MySpace. Today, virtually no one uses MySpace. Everyone is on Facebook. Group communications are maintained and nurtured via Facebook and LinkedIn. There is a real probability that by the time this book is in print, some new software system will begin replacing Facebook. Some other system may supplant Twitter as the preferred method of instant messaging (IM). Associated with learning the systems is learning the capabilities of those systems. Can a system send text only, send text plus photos, send video (small, large file sizes), how many characters per message, accommodate single

versus multiple users, etc.? For example, a system may allow a user to send and receive messages to up to 50 persons at a time. Negotiators may believe they have isolated the user, when in reality there are multiple users trying to advise the actor on countering police actions.

Third, never assume you have the ability to isolate the actor and limit communication with others. Negotiators attempt to isolate the actor by cutting power, disconnecting the phone, even getting a cell phone provider to disconnect the phone number. The reality is that in many instances, actors cannot be isolated. For example, at the author's house, the power could be disconnected, the hard line phone cable cut, the cell phone number changed or isolated, the Internet modem disabled, and a virtual "electronic" blanket placed over the residence. The author would still be able to communicate with the outside world.

Fourth, learn the lingo. Technology has its own language, which can vary depending upon the system used. Twitter has abbreviations to help transmit words, thoughts, idea, and emotions. Facebook has a different language, as does e-mail and other communication systems. For example, in the Twitter universe, MRL means "meet in real life" (Hanlin, 2012). In an e-mail, it may be just "RL" for real life. In an e-mail exchange the negotiator may read FOAD or TRDMC or TINWIS (Gil, 2012). Each conveys a different emotion and can indicate negotiations are progressing (TRDMC = tears are running down my cheeks) or regressing (FOAD = F-----and die) or the negotiator is not building rapport (TINWIS = That is not what I said). At a training session, identify various Internet sites that give abbreviations for different social media. The two examples in this paragraph came from <http://socialmediatoday.com/node/512987> and http://netforbeginners.about.com/od/internetglossary/a/glossary-of-internet-jargon-and-abbreviations_3.htm. Other useful sites include <http://www.netlingo.com/>, http://www.chatslang.com/terms/social_media, http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/social-media-acronym-glossary_b34247, http://www.infobarrel.com/Texting_and_Social_Network_Abbreviations_Part_1_A__E, and http://www.webopedia.com/quick_ref/textmessageabbreviations.asp. One useful recommendation is to have a team member prepare a test of abbreviations ahead of time and then have a team training day on which team members look up and find the abbreviation. This exercise helps negotiators become familiar with the abbreviations and practice how to rapidly find sites to use in an incident. For a brief introduction for the reader, "182," "10x," "2m2h," mean-----? (182 = I hate you, 10x = thanks, and 2m2h = too much to handle). For readers who are parents, they may have verbally heard their children say, "511" which means "too much to handle" (more than 411) or "9," "parent is watching" (Beal, 2012).

Related to the above, learn the language and slang used in everyday conversations. The authors fondly remember "hip," "cool," right on, man," and "peace." Those slang terms are as "old fogey" as the authors, and slang is constantly changing. One good site to bookmark and keep available is <http://www.urbandictionary.com/>. Similar to Wikipedia, urbandictionary.com is a user-updated dictionary of common street lingo and slang. For example, the terms "Nintendo pilot," "double rainbow, all the way across the sky (or DRATWATS)," "Hollywood historian," "big in Japan," "check your totem," and "police" mean---in order, (1) a pilot that controls drone aircraft (as in "I bet you have your Nintendo pilots watching me right now"), (2) totally ecstatic, joyfully amazing, blissful (as in, "your ideas about me surrendering are DRATWATS, dude"), (3) person who uses movies or movie scripts

for facts in arguments and debates (as in, “you really think I’m going to put my gun down and come out. What are you, a Hollywood historian.”), (4) to pretend or say you are someone of stature somewhere else and not verifiable (as in, “dude, you must really think you’re big in Japan, but what you are saying don’t mean anything to me”), (5) suggesting that a person should assess whether they are being real or are delusional (a negotiator may ask the actor to surrender and hear, “dude, you better check your totem.”) and (6) the biggest gang in the world (and this is not a positive term for police officers). The point is that negotiators should not take any statements for granted and assume they know the meaning of what the actor is saying.

Negotiating through Technology

Brenda Dillard is assigned to the Dallas Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. SA Dillard has been a Special Agent (SA) with the FBI for over 16 years. Previously SA Dillard was assigned to the Los Angeles Field Office working Crimes against Children, Violent Crime, White Collar Crime, and Organized Crime including being a member of the Eurasian organized crime task force which investigated groups committing extortion, kidnapping, theft and murder for hire. SA Dillard has been a member of the FBI Crisis Negotiation Team since 1998. Currently, SA Dillard is the Team Leader for the Dallas Division Crisis Negotiation Team. SA Dillard trains federal, state and local officers in crisis negotiation matters. SA Dillard is an advanced Instructor for the FBI and has taught at conferences both here and abroad. She has twice traveled to Yerevan, Armenia to teach classes on organized crime to police officers and prosecutors from Armenia and Georgia. SA Dillard is also a certified mediator for the FBI. SA Dillard holds a Juris Doctor and is a member of the California Bar. Before joining the FBI, SA Dillard was a Deputy District Attorney with the Ventura County District Attorney’s Office where she prosecuted sexual assault, domestic violence, narcotics, and theft offenses.

The possibility of having to negotiate through technology is very real for crisis negotiators everywhere. We need to be asking ourselves: are our crisis negotiation teams aware of the emerging trend, equipped with necessary technology to respond, and adequately trained?

When I joined the Federal Bureau of Investigation Crisis Negotiation Team in 1998, we did not have to contend with social media sites, text messaging, or blog sites. Our options for communicating with those in crisis were more limited. As you think about all the changes technology has brought to law enforcement in the last 15 years, remember that those same advances affect negotiators and those individuals in crisis they talk to as well.

Smart phones, laptops, and all other devices that can access the internet make information and communication faster and easier. The communication through technology also becomes less personal and more distant. Negotiators handed a phone in the field and told to text with the subject inside the house will be faced with applying their verbal skills of negotiation to the written word. How does one build rapport through text message? Or express concern for the individual in crisis through Instant Messaging? To truly connect with an individual in crisis through technology is challenging. As negotiators, our goal is to communicate, connect, and ultimately change the behavior of the individual that we are communicating with. As negotiators, we need to adapt our fundamental skills in order to connect with others through technology.

The negotiator will no longer be able to rely on their most effective tool—their voice. Of course, the negotiator will continually request and attempt to transition to talking

voice to voice with the individual in crisis, but if that is rejected, we must be prepared to negotiate effectively through the technology available to us. The struggle will be to effectively use text messaging, email or social media sites to build rapport and convey empathy for another, while convincing an individual in crisis to change their behavior.

Active Listening Skills (ALS) are the skills we rely on most to build rapport, show empathy and ultimately change the behavior of others. ALS can be used in the written word whether in text or email. Like any other skill to be mastered, negotiators will need to practice and train using ALS through technology. Abbreviations and characters can still be used to convey emotion or to make a point. Like that email or text you receive which confuses you either in content or tone, our negotiation through the written word will be subject to misinterpretation as well. A friend's 72-year-old mother wanted to send a text message to her good friend whose son had just gotten in a car accident. She sent, "I'm so sorry for your son. I'll be praying for him. LOL". Unfortunately, she thought LOL meant "lots of love" instead of "laugh out loud." See how easy it would be for a turn of phrase or the wrong word to damage rapport or communication.

When we push send or enter, it's out of our hands—literally. So let's practice, role-play, and perfect our skills using technology. So that when it matters most, we're able to communicate, connect and change lives.

Fifth, understand that the communication skills of negotiators are affected by negotiating via social media. Patterns of communication from the negotiator are different and more difficult. In a verbal conversation, the negotiator can give a suggestion to the actor and then spend time explaining that suggestion. The negotiator may say; "If you come out, no one will hurt you. I have talked to SWAT and our commanders and they have assured me that no one will hurt you if you just step out the door. Make sure you turn the light on first, then put your hands in the air," etc., etc., etc. The negotiator would not be able to give that direction and explanation when using social media. It is extremely difficult to convey empathy, understanding, and caring in written communications. The tone of voice, pacing, softness of voice, tempo, and modulation are lost when using social media.

From the actor's side, the same difficulties are present. How does the actor convey anger, fear, or other emotions? What if negotiation tactics are working? How does the negotiator know the actor is calming down, accepting negotiator suggestions, thinking about issues raised by the negotiator, and responding positively to what the negotiator says?

Most significantly, the active listening skills are virtually impossible to use when negotiating via social media. For example, the negotiator can easily ask an open-ended question, but it is doubtful the actor will answer. Extended pauses are not possible to use. Emotional labeling is difficult to use, as emotions do not come across when the actor uses social media. There are some indicators, such as using all caps or exclamation points. Even if an emotional response is recognized, how easy is it to label the emotion? If I were to text, "this chapter is REALLY long!," am I angry, frustrated, exasperated, happy (maybe I love reading), or sad (because it is keeping me from spending time with my family)? It is impossible to know and label my emotion. The negotiator can paraphrase and use minimal encouragers (use smiley faces or!!!). By and large, a critical tool used by negotiators to resolve crisis incidents is lost when negotiating via social media (Dillard, 2012).

Advanced Communication Topics for the Negotiator

Influence and compliance

Imagine if you had to consciously think about every behavior you performed. Breathing, for example, would become a full-time mental activity, if, for every breath you took, you had to consciously think “inhale,” then “exhale.” Fortunately, many responses in life are automatic and we do not have to spend time thinking about them. This is true not only for autonomic responses like breathing, blinking our eyes, etc., but also for social behaviors. When you are introduced to someone new, for example, you do not think, “extend my arm, put my fingers together with thumb apart, look the person in the eye, grasp their hand, move my arm up and down, open mouth to speak the word hello.” We use shortcuts to go through life and avoid having to think about every act we perform. We perform many social functions in life in a mechanical manner that does not require active participation on our part. We are trained from birth to perform these functions without hesitation and without thinking. These automatic responses to certain trigger stimuli produce behavior of which we are barely conscious.

These automatic responses make us particularly vulnerable to people who know how to use them. Is there anyone who has never purchased something he or she did not need or want? If you did not need or want it, why did you purchase the item? Because you encountered someone who knew about our fixed pattern of responding and was able to exploit it to take some of your money. We are all vulnerable to those who know of these fixed patterns of behavior and know how to exploit them.

Perceptual contrast principle

One example of how these automatic patterns of behavior work is provided by the perceptual contrast principle. If two objects are presented to us that are different from one another, they will seem more different than they really are. If we lift a light weight followed by a heavy weight, the heavy weight will seem heavier than if we had just lifted the heavy weight. A 70-degree day feels much warmer in March than it does in September. In March, our recent frame of reference is cold winter weather, while in September, our frame of reference are the hot days of August. The perceptual contrast principle works in numerous situations. If you go into a store to buy a new suit and a sweater, the salesperson will first sell you the suit and then sell you a sweater costing more than you initially wanted to pay. In fact, Whitney et al. (1965) found that buyers who purchased the suit first almost always spent more for accessories than those who purchased accessories first. If the salesperson attempted to sell you the sweater first, the contrast principle would work in your favor. You would spend less for the suit.

Perceptual contrast is not the only principle that triggers our automatic, stereotypical behavior. There are many others and, like the salesperson, the negotiator who is skilled in the use of the techniques of compliance and influence will be at an extreme advantage over his or her adversary, the hostage taker. Much of the following discussion on the techniques of influence and compliance come from Cialdini (1984; 1993), one of the leading researchers on how influence techniques guide our behavior. All are tools the negotiator can use frequently

and effectively, and by knowing these techniques, can also prevent their use by the hostage taker. These are subtle techniques that are used on us without our knowledge. As Cialdini says, “the weapons of automatic influence lend their force to those who use them. It is not that the weapons, like a set of heavy clubs, provide a conspicuous arsenal to be used by one man to bludgeon another into submission. The process is much more sophisticated and subtle. With proper execution, the exploiter need hardly strain a muscle to get his way.”

Rule of reciprocity

One overwhelming principle that guides human behavior is the rule of reciprocity, which states that if a favor is done for us, we feel obligated to repay that favor in the future. The negotiator might, without forewarning or prior discussion, tell the hostage taker, “I talked to my boss and got the lights left on for you.” The negotiator has just done a favor for the hostage taker that the hostage taker will feel obligated to repay at a future time. It is unnecessary (and preferable) to mention that a favor has been done. Neither is it necessary that the negotiator actually do a favor—it must only be perceived by the hostage taker that a favor has been done.



PHOTO 5.3 Successful communications also means good and constant interteam communications. To be fully functional, the team must continually maintain communications with each other, with the tactical team, and with incident command.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

The negotiator should also grant a perceived favor before the hostage taker does a favor for the negotiator. If the hostage taker has the opportunity to perform the first favor (i.e., “I won’t hurt anybody unless my demands are not met”), then the negotiator is indebted. It is important that the negotiator perform the first favor, and grant favors early and often. Do not go overboard, however, and grant too many favors. Subtlety is the key.

There are three corollaries to the rule of reciprocity. First, the rule is overpowering. It does not depend upon the hostage taker liking the negotiator. The rule of reciprocity, in fact, often works better when the parties are strangers or do not like each other. The Hare Krishna Society is an example. While they are the subject of numerous jokes, ridicule, and scorn, they have managed to build a multimillion dollar empire by passing out flowers in airports and other public places (“Please take this as our gift to you.”). After the recipient has accepted the

“gift,” a donation to the Society is requested and, more often than not, is given.

A second corollary to the rule of reciprocity is that it attracts uninvited debts. Reciprocity, in fact, usually works better if the favor is uninvited. Many magazines use this principle to increase subscriptions. The magazine sends you a free issue as a “gift” with no obligation on your part. Many people, however, subscribe to the magazine because they now owe the company because of the “gift.” For the negotiator, uninvited favors are a powerful tool.

Communications between team members are just as critical as communications with the hostage taker. It is next to impossible to be successful as negotiators without interteam communications. Some would argue that these communications are as important as communications with the hostage taker.

Third, the rule of reciprocity does not suggest that favors be of equal value. Research shows that little favors generate big returns. In certain societies, saving someone’s life leaves the person saved indebted for the rest of his or her life. Leaving the power or other utilities on can be used to generate the release of hostages later. Failure to return the favor produces frustration and social ostracism. Even in a hostage situation, the hostage taker will feel pressure from the hostages to return any favors done for him. Gentle reminding by the negotiator to the hostage taker that a favor is owed can generate large concessions from the hostage taker.

Another part of the rule of reciprocity is the influence technique of reject-then-retreat. You make the recipient of the technique refuse a larger-than-wanted request and then make your true request. For example, the negotiator may ask for the release of all hostages. When this is refused, the negotiator may ask for some other concession. Not only does this technique increase compliance, it puts the hostage taker in a “yes-saying” frame of mind. The hostage taker is put in the position of perceiving himself as agreeable and willing to work with the negotiator to resolve the incident. Once this attitude develops, it will remain for the duration of the incident (unless the negotiator does something unreasonable and makes the hostage taker angry and resentful). Cialdini et al. (1975) referred to the reject-then-retreat procedure as the door-in-the-face technique.

Consistency

An example will serve to illustrate the second compliance technique discussed by Cialdini (1984). While on patrol, how many times have you vacillated regarding whether to arrest a suspect? After pondering the situation briefly, you decide to make the arrest. Just after handcuffing the suspect and placing him or her in the rear of your patrol vehicle, your sergeant drives up and asks if an arrest was really necessary. With no hesitation and no doubt in your voice, you answer, “Yes, there is no question about it.” What could have changed in such a short time? Nothing in the situation changed to make you change from doubt to resolve. In fact, the only thing that happened was that the suspect was placed under arrest.

What occurred in the arrest situation is another of the automatic, fixed patterns of behavior we employ. Prior to the arrest, you were unsure of whether to make an arrest. When you decided to make the arrest, your indecision changed to confidence so your attitudes and beliefs were consistent with your behavior. You, like everyone else, do not want to appear weak-willed and indecisive. Once you decide on a course of action, even if you are unsure

whether you took the correct action, you become confident of your decision and stand firmly behind that decision.

The influence technique of consistency is a powerful tool for the negotiator. The negotiator need merely get the hostage taker to make a decision or agree to do something. Consistency in the hostage situation is easy to obtain once the negotiator is able to get a commitment from the hostage taker. The negotiator should direct efforts toward getting the hostage taker to make a commitment, even if the payment for this commitment is several hours away. For example, an early promise on the part of the hostage taker to later release hostages will ensure that hostages will later be released safely. The negotiator can use several techniques to get a commitment from the hostage taker.

First, the negotiator can have the hostage taker write down any commitment. Once written, the commitment becomes more than an agreement—it becomes a promise. Putting an agreement in writing increases consistency of behavior, attitudes, and commitment to uphold the agreement. If at a later time the hostage taker is reluctant to release hostages, the negotiator can ask the hostage taker to read the agreement over the phone. The hostage taker will feel an obligation to honor his written commitment. As an even better strategy, the negotiator can write it down. Then later the negotiator can use that written agreement to change behavior. For example, the negotiator could take time to write down an agreement to talk in the future about releasing hostages. Hours later, the negotiator could refer back to the agreement, “Joe, I wrote it down so we wouldn’t forget. You said you would let someone out.”

Second, any promise of concessions by the hostage taker can be made public (so the hostage taker knows it is public). The public being aware of the agreement increases commitment. All that need be done is for the negotiator to say something like, “Hey guys, Joe promised to release a hostage by 4:00 P.M.,” and then return talking to the hostage taker regarding other matters. The hostage taker realizes he made a commitment and that the commitment has been made public. This will increase consistency and commitment and increase compliance. In a classic study, Deutsch and Gerard (1955) found that when subjects in their experiment made a decision and made the decision public, even when their decision was shown to be incorrect, the vast majority of subjects refused to change their decision. Any compliance on the part of the hostage taker should be made public (to others on the negotiating team), and the hostage taker should be made aware that his or her compliance was made public. Not only does public disclosure make compliance more consistent, the hostage taker will feel compelled to follow through.

Freedman and Fraser (1966) introduced a technique to increase compliance that is referred to as the foot-in-the-door technique. The foot-in-the-door technique relies upon commitment to increase compliance by getting the person to agree to a small, inconsequential request before being hit with the real request. For example, if a negotiator wants a hostage to be released, he or she should first get the hostage taker to agree to a small request (i.e., “Would you mind staying at this telephone number while we talk?”). Further, the small request does not have to be related to the large request. Compliance with the small request changes the person’s self-image. As Cialdini (1984) stated, “You can use small commitments to manipulate a person’s self-image; you can use them to turn citizens into ‘public servants,’ prospects into ‘customers,’ prisoners into ‘collaborators.’ And once you’ve got a man’s self image where you want it, he should comply naturally with a whole range of your requests that are consistent

with this view of himself.”



PHOTO 5.4 Some newer negotiator throw phone systems, such as this one, the Global Reach Wireless™ Throw Phone/Communicator from ETGI, are wireless, full duplex communications devices that allow for listening and talking to a subject simultaneously, with a virtually unlimited operating distance. Most wireless systems are interoperable with cell phones, landlines, and existing throw phone systems. Many will also allow for conference calling so a TPI can be introduced.

(Photo courtesy of Enforcement Technology Group, Inc.)

Further, the negotiator should try to make the hostage taker believe the compliance came from his inner self. The negotiator should make it seem like the hostage taker complied because the hostage taker is basically a good person. The negotiator might say, “You did good.” Let the reinforcement for compliance be internal. That will increase compliance in the future. The hostage taker will come to see himself as someone who wants to resolve the situation in a positive manner.

Social proofs

A third compliance technique discussed by Cialdini (1984) is that of social proofs. What others do and think guides our behavior. Behavior is correct when we see other people do it. Imagine that your department sends you to a training seminar. At each seat in the training room is a jumble of metal, screws, screwdrivers, and wrenches. You walk into the room at 8:00 and a sign on the wall says, “Class will start at 8:30 sharp. Please prepare your material for class.” As you stand in front of your seat wondering what to do with the scrap metal and tools, four other people walk in, go to their seats, and begin assembling the metal into an object. What would you do? If you are like most other people, you will watch what your neighbors do with

the metal and begin assembling your pile in a similar manner. You have become an example of the social proofs technique.

Further, the more similar you are to the other people, the more likely you will emulate their behavior. In the situation above, if the other students were police officers, you would be much more likely to do what they did than if the others in the class were prison inmates.

What makes the use of social proofs especially compelling to the negotiator, however, is the uncertainty principle. Social proofs are most powerful when we are unsure of ourselves and when the situation is ambiguous or unclear. How many hostage takers know how to behave in a hostage situation? The hostage taker is probably more confused and uncertain of what he should do than even the hostages. In most instances, the hostage taker is probably asking himself, "Okay, I've got hostages, the police are outside with their guns pointed at me. What do I do now?" The negotiator is in an ideal position to offer social proofs by dropping subtle hints as to how other hostage takers have acted. These hints, of course, may have little bearing on reality, but are based upon what the negotiator wants the hostage taker to do. The hostage taker may threaten to kill some hostages because a demand is not met by a deadline. The negotiator could say something similar to the following: "I understand you are upset. Most people who have been in your position have gotten upset when things did not go according to their schedule, but I really cannot remember any threatening to kill people because they were upset."

Two other aspects of social proofs are instructive in explaining why hostages act as they do and why hostage situations occur in groups. The concept of pluralistic ignorance can explain why hostages (who usually outnumber their captors) do not attempt to overpower their captors, even when given the opportunity. Pluralistic ignorance is when people wait for others to act before they act. The 1964 murder of Kitty Genovese in New York City best exemplifies pluralistic ignorance. Genovese was returning to her apartment one evening when she was attacked and killed. Her attacker actually attacked her three times during a 30-minute period. During this time, Genovese called out for help numerous times. Thirty-eight citizens witnessed the assaults and murder, yet none called for help. All were waiting to see what others would do. In a series of studies attempting to explain pluralistic ignorance, Latane and Darley (1968a; 1968b) found that in a group facing uncertainty, members of the group will wait to see what others do before taking any action. Thus, each hostage waits for another hostage to take action. Latane and Darley found that one person alone in a potential crisis situation was more likely to take action than if several people were present.

Pluralistic ignorance has implications for the tactical team if they must assault the hostage location. If tactical team members enter and shout, "Everybody down!" chances are good that no hostage will move. Each hostage will wait to see what the other hostages do. The tactical team should instead try to individually instruct each hostage as to what action to take. They may point to a hostage and say, "You—fall to your stomach." for example.

The second aspect of social proofs, known as the Werther effect, concerns why hostage situations tend to occur in clusters. Simply stated, research has shown that suicides and fatal accidents increase significantly following a well-publicized suicide. Likewise, homicide rates rise following highly publicized homicides. People are engaging in "monkey see, monkey do." Following a publicized hostage incident, other people may perceive that the same activity may resolve their problems, so they copycat.

Liking

Another influence technique the negotiator can use is *liking*. People who like each other are more likely to be compliant. In addition to helping develop the Stockholm Syndrome, liking can lead to increased compliance. Similarity can also increase compliance. The negotiator should attempt to make him or herself appear as much like the hostage taker (attitude, beliefs, etc.) as possible. Finding out about interests and hobbies can go a long way toward resolving the situation. Cooperation can increase compliance. The negotiator should work toward making the hostage taker feel that it is the two of them against the police. By cooperating with the hostage taker, the negotiator will increase compliance. This is similar to the “good cop/bad cop” interrogation technique often used on criminal suspects.

Scarcity principle

A final technique of influence described by Cialdini (1984) is the scarcity principle, which states that opportunities are more valuable to us when they are limited. All of us have fallen prey to the sales pitch that begins, “I don’t want to influence your decision, but after these are sold we will not be getting any more ...” Some automobile manufacturers make use of the scarcity principle by limiting the production of the model and raising the price. The Corvette ZR-1 is an example. Chevrolet announced the vehicle and that only a very limited number would be made each year. Models are sold out before they go into production. How many times have you interrupted an important conversation to answer a ringing telephone? If you do not answer the telephone, the call becomes unavailable forever.

The negotiator can use the scarcity principle to his or her advantage. The negotiator might purposely limit the time allowed for a decision or the time frame for a hostage release. “I talked to my boss and he said we can deliver some food if you release one of the people. He said he needs to know your decision within five minutes or the deal is off. I had a lot of trouble getting him to agree and I don’t think he’ll make the offer again.” Limiting the availability in this manner may increase compliance.

Not only are these compliance techniques powerful shapers of behavior, knowing what they are and how they work can prevent the hostage taker from using them on the negotiator. Whether we are formally aware of the techniques or not, we often use them unknowingly and have them used on us. Whether in sales situations, social settings, or relationships, we constantly attempt to influence others’ behavior as they constantly attempt to influence ours. Regardless of what we might want to believe, hostage takers are not stupid individuals. While they may not know the scientific names and basis of these techniques, they do use them. Our defense against these techniques is to understand how and why they work. By knowing the hows and whys, we can counter their use as well as effectively use them to our advantage.




FIGURE 5.2 Summary of communication techniques of Influence and compliance.

Source: Mullins, W.C.

Behavioral theories of persuasion

In addition to communications, it is important that negotiators understand how behavior and attitudes are related and how one influences the other. By knowing these relationships and how they influence our actions, the negotiator can add another powerful tool to his or her arsenal. One of the oldest and most straightforward theories of persuasion is the Stimulus-Response Theory. The negotiator (who is the persuader for this discussion) wants the hostage taker to associate particular emotions with certain communications (for example, lack of fear with talk of surrendering). The negotiator must condition this new emotion and remove the old associations. The negotiator could, for example, mention surrender whenever the hostage taker is calm and then actively calm the hostage taker in the same sentence.

Attribution theory suggests that communications are understood in the perception of their intent (Woodward & Denton, 1996). How does the hostage taker see the message from the negotiator? Here it is crucial that the negotiator not appear self-serving or in a hurry, but as truly wanting to help. Communications must be perceived as sincere or they will not be effective.

Consistency theories of persuasion make the assumption that thought serves an intermediary function between stimulus and response. Balance theories, for instance, focus on how people try to reduce discrepancies between attitudes and information. How do you feel

when a family member lies to you? Cognitive dissonance theory says that this situation produces discomfort and that people will change either their feelings or behavior toward the family member, depending upon which is easier to change. If one really loves the family member, it may be easiest to move farther away so you do not have to visit with that family member. On the other hand, if the relative is not close, it is probably easier to change your attitude. For the negotiator, he or she can first produce dissonance between attitudes and actions, and then offer suggestions on how to remove the dissonance (“You are a good father, but good fathers do not threaten their children, so why don’t you surrender?”).

Social judgment theory is based upon the idea that the persuasiveness of communications is based upon how closely the communications relate to current beliefs (Woodward & Denton, 1996). The closer the communication to our current belief, the more likely it is to result in behavior change. According to this theory, communications need to be in line with current attitudes in order to produce behavior change. This is why telling a hostage taker that tactical officers really do not like assaulting a position often meets with derision. This statement is not consistent with the hostage taker’s attitudes. The negotiator should instead introduce the idea that tactical officers want to minimize violence and then move toward the idea of not liking to assault. The negotiator should attempt to change attitudes with communications, and should attempt change one step at a time.

Suggestion techniques

An earlier section of this chapter discussed communication techniques that rely on persuasion to get the hostage taker to comply with requests. Those techniques rely on logic and reason in getting a person to comply. The foot-in-the-door technique, for example, makes the hostage taker change his attitude about the type of person he is in order to increase compliance.

The negotiator can use another set of compliance tools that are even more subtle and pervasive than the influence techniques discussed by Cialdini (1984). These are the tools of suggestibility. Suggestibility techniques embed subtle hints in statements to the hostage taker so that beliefs and/or perceptions are altered without the hostage taker being consciously aware of the alterations (Mullins, 1988).

Using persuasion, the negotiator would convince the hostage taker to surrender because the tactical team is preparing to assault the location and the hostage taker could die during the assault. Using suggestion, the negotiator would provide subtle cues as to what might happen when the tactical team assaults and let the hostage taker subconsciously determine that he might be killed during this assault.

During a hostage situation, hostage takers undergo many changes in behavior, cognitions, and emotions. They will experience sensory distortions, cognitive dissonance, and perceptual narrowing (Reiser & Sloane, 1983). Their entire focus of existence will be geared toward surviving their situation. They will be confused, emotionally and physically stressed, and their mental ability will be impaired. Emotions and perceptual distortions will interfere with the hostage taker’s ability to think clearly and rationally.

This confusion and cognitive impairment can make the hostage taker more susceptible to the techniques of suggestion than might normally be the case. Suggestion can be used to force the hostage taker to concentrate all his mental energies on escape, at the expense of

concentrating on demands or harming hostages. Suggestion can be used to reduce stress and emotions and get the hostage taker to think more rationally and face the predicament he is in. Suggestion can also be used to stabilize the hostage taker emotionally and physically and reduce or eliminate mood swings, settle emotions, and calm behavior.

The negotiator can use the techniques of suggestion in several ways. First, the hostage taker will try to satisfy basic need states: safety, physical, and ego (Maslow, 1970). The negotiator can identify these needs and offer suggestions that force the hostage taker to focus on those needs. With time, as the needs are not met, they become more noticeable to the hostage taker and his desire to fulfill the need becomes overwhelming. Repetitive suggestion can be used to reduce demands, gain the release of hostages, control emotion and stress levels, and even get the hostage taker to surrender. If a negotiator wants to increase or decrease a particular emotion, he or she can repeatedly use suggestion techniques geared toward that emotion. Suggestion can also be used to reinforce the hostage taker. Every time the hostage taker makes a statement that moves negotiations forward or toward resolution, the negotiator could say, "Uh huh," "Right," or "I agree." When the hostage taker says something inflammatory, the negotiator could remain silent.

Reiser and Sloane (1983; first identified by Erickson & Rossi, 1979) identify 13 techniques of suggestion that a negotiator can effectively use with a hostage taker.

1. *Binds*. Binds can be used to focus a decision by presenting the hostage taker with only one direction of behavior or action. "When would you like to release the first person?" There are no decisions to be made on the direction of the behavior, only when it will occur.
2. *Double Binds*. Double binds are similar to binds in that they provide only one direction of behavior. The difference is that double binds give the hostage taker a perception of more control. "Would you like to release a person now or wait 15 minutes?" This either/or situation, while giving no choice in the direction of behavior, does leave the hostage taker with the perception of having control and making decisions.
3. *Covering a class of responses*. This technique covers all directions of needs, emotions, or behaviors that a hostage taker may take, while at the same time forcing the hostage taker to focus on his needs. "Sooner or later you may or may not get thirsty. The important thing is that we take care of your needs."
4. *Encourage a new frame of reference*. This suggestion technique gets the hostage taker to view the situation from someone else's perspective, usually one of the hostages. By using this suggestion, the negotiator can help the hostage taker calm down, settle emotions, and most importantly, begin developing the Stockholm Syndrome between hostage taker and hostages. "The child must be really scared without her mother. If you were her, I wonder what you might be thinking?"
5. *Future projection*. This technique can be used effectively when attempting to resolve issues or make decisions with the hostage taker. It forces the hostage taker to think about an issue and keep the hostage taker's thoughts focused on that issue. "Why don't we let this issue lie and come back to it in a few minutes?"
6. *Embedded questions*. This technique mentally and emotionally removes the hostage taker from the stress of the situation and gets him to concentrate on more positive

times in his life. “Take a moment. Can you think back to a time when you were not under so much stress?”

7. *Embedded statements.* This technique forces the hostage taker to make a decision, while seemingly giving the hostage taker a choice. It will focus the hostage taker’s thoughts on one issue until a decision is reached, and can be effectively used to stop the hostage taker from bouncing around from topic to topic without bringing closure to any. “You may want to find a solution to this issue so later we can move on to other issues and not waste time.”
8. *Implied directive.* An implied directive is a command given to the hostage taker, but done in such a way that the hostage taker believes he is controlling the decision-making process. “When you are ready to discuss this, we’ll work on it and see if we can resolve the issue.”
9. *Induced imagery.* This technique focuses the hostage taker on the future consequences, either positive or negative, of his actions. “Imagine how relaxing it would be if you didn’t have to worry about that sick person.”
10. *Interpersonal focusing.* This technique allows the negotiator to build trust with the hostage taker and lay the foundation for the development of the Stockholm Syndrome. “Let me tell you about another situation I was able to successfully resolve.”
11. *Not knowing, not doing.* This technique can be used to introduce a new idea, thought, issue, or concept to the hostage taker. “My dinner just arrived. Let me hang up and eat it before it gets cold. I’ll call you back in ten minutes.” This suggestion technique is very effective with any type of basic needs, whether hunger, thirst, temperature, or addiction (such as nicotine).
12. *Open-ended suggestion.* This technique allows the hostage to form a conclusion without forcing a decision. “I will take all the time necessary to resolve this issue, but you know how SWAT teams are.” The negotiator has presented an idea the hostage taker will, with time, fully develop. One reason this type of suggestion is so effective is that the hostage taker will arrive at the most negative conclusion possible.
13. *Truisms.* This suggestion technique forces the hostage taker to accept the inevitable. “Sooner or later you are going to fall asleep.” Not only is the hostage taker forced to confront the future, he is also forced to accept the hopelessness of his situation. The negotiator must be careful in using truisms, because the hostage taker may become angry, violent, or suicidal when he realizes the futility and ultimate outcome of his situation.

The negotiator can use all of these techniques on an ongoing basis. If one technique does not prove fruitful, leave it, go on to another, and later retry the technique. As with the techniques of influence and compliance, these techniques are to be used with care. Even more so than compliance techniques, techniques of suggestion require careful placement into the subconscious as well as room to grow. If the hostage taker is aware of what you are doing, he will become resentful, angry, and distrustful of the negotiator.

Summary

The science of communication is difficult and much more complex than most people realize. Effective communication takes rehearsal and practice, just as any other skill does. Communication involves sending and receiving. Many people learn to be effective senders, and give no effort to becoming active listeners. Unless a person is able to do both, he or she will not be an effective communicator.

A negotiator can use numerous techniques to increase compliance by the hostage taker. These techniques are subtle, and when used judiciously by the negotiator, can bring the hostage situation to a timely and safe resolution.

Note

- ¹ The authors are indebted to Dr. Rick Bradstreet for much of the information in this section. Through years of serving as a psychologist for hostage negotiators and his efforts in training hostage negotiators, crisis responders, and police officers, Dr. Bradstreet developed, refined, and assessed the effectiveness of the techniques discussed here. His work and experience have proven the effectiveness of these techniques.

Discussion Questions

1. This is an exercise that can be done in class to illustrate the various components of the communication process. Have someone whisper a sentence to the person next to them. A good sentence for this exercise is “The large brown cow took a flying leap and jumped over the round, silvery moon.” That person whispers the sentence to a third person, who whispers it to a fourth person, etc., until all students have received the message. The only rule is that the sentence can be whispered only one time. Compare the beginning message with the ending message. Is there any relation between the two messages? Have everyone write the message they received and sent and then sequentially compare the written messages. Where did communications break down and why?
2. List five everyday phrases you use that have multiple meanings. How can each of these phrases be misconstrued?
3. List five everyday polarizations you use. What can you do to avoid polarizing in those areas? Do other people polarize you (your attitudes, politics, etc.)? What can you do from a communication standpoint to stop other people from polarizing?
4. What barriers to effective communications lead to racism, sexism, and gender differences? In what situations do you believe police use each and how does it hurt their effectiveness as police?
5. Engage in a debate with a friend over an emotionally charged topic (i.e., women as combat soldiers, politics, etc.). During the debate, use the patrol communication tactics of Cooper (1999). Do these tactics add to the strength of your arguments?

How?

6. Negotiate with your landlord for a reduction in your rent, or with your boss for a raise in pay, or with a friend to go to a certain restaurant they do not like. Use the tactics suggested by Ury in *Getting Past No*. Compared with negotiation situations in the past, did this negotiation go more smoothly? Did you enhance your chances of getting what you wanted? Did negotiations end on a friendly note? Did you get what you wanted?
7. Pair up with a friend. One should assume the role of actor and the other negotiator. The actor should role-play the following scenario: You and your roommate got into an argument over you not paying rent (you spent the rent money on alcohol—for the third time in the last 5 months). The argument turned into a shouting match and you punched your roommate, breaking his/her nose. The roommate ran out of the apartment and called the police. When the negotiator showed up, you were still angry and would not talk to them on the phone. Instead, they chose to text you. The first text from the negotiator was, “This is Police. Answer phone!” You then text back, “...” All negotiations should be done via text messaging.
8. Spend a Saturday afternoon at a shopping mall. Go into a clothing store and unobtrusively watch a salesperson interact with customers. Watch to see whether they use the influence and compliance techniques presented in this chapter. Especially note whether they use the techniques of reciprocity, consistency, social proofs, and liking (develop a checklist and make a check each time a technique is used). Does the salesperson use the reject-then-retreat or the foot-in-the-door technique?
9. While completing question 8, when you find a salesperson who frequently uses the influence and compliance techniques, track their sales as compared to a salesperson who does not use those techniques. Who makes the most sales? What technique seems to work the best?
10. As part of question 8, compare big-ticket salespeople (appliances, stereos, televisions, automobiles) to small-ticket salespeople (clothes, books, shoes, etc.). Which salespeople most often use the influence and compliance techniques? Why do you think that is the case?
11. Volunteer your time to sell something for a charity or local organization (such as a PTA candy sale, United Fund drive, etc.). Half the time, do not use any of the influence and compliance techniques. For the other half of the time, use as many influence and compliance techniques as possible (use more than one on a hesitant customer). For which half did you make the most sales?
12. List five nonsales situations in which influence and compliance techniques would be beneficial. For each situation, describe the technique to be used and the way in which it would be used.
13. For each of the 13 suggestibility techniques, give an example (other than the ones in the book) of what a negotiator could say to a hostage taker.
14. You are probably required to take a class that is not very interesting to you. Practice the techniques of active listening for one week and then apply those techniques in that class. Wait for one week. Have a friend quiz you over material from before the

active listening period and during the active listening period. Which material do you remember better?

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Chapter 6

Crisis Management: Negotiating with Emotionally Disturbed and Mentally Ill Individuals: Recognition and Guidelines

Chapter Outline

Emotionally disturbed people and negotiations

Mental illness defined

Defining the problem versus diagnosing the person

A continuum

Domestic violence and negotiations

A brief course in abnormal psychology for negotiators

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Managing borderlines

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Managing narcissism

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Recognize serious mental illness: Dealing with their special issues

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Managing paranoia

Cognitively impaired persons

Developmental disorders

Alcohol dependence and abuse

Substance dependence/abuse

References

Learning Objectives

1. Understand the increase in the types of personality/issues negotiators are asked to deal with.
2. Know the common types of abusive personalities that are involved in criminal justice negotiations incidents.
3. Be able to explain how negotiators and CIT officers complement each other.
4. Explain the difference between a normal person in crisis, a person with a personality disorder, and a mentally ill person.
5. Explain the value of understanding the unique issues involved in negotiating with the mentally ill and the emotionally disturbed person.
6. Understand what a delusion is and how to deal with it in a crisis/hostage incident.
7. Understand what constitutes a borderline/dependent personality type.
8. Know how to negotiate with borderline/dependent hostage takers.
9. Understand what constitutes an antisocial personality.
10. Know how to negotiate with an antisocial hostage taker.
11. Know the guidelines for negotiating with a narcissistic personality.
12. Know the negotiating techniques for dealing with paranoid hostage takers.
13. Know the impact of substance abuse/dependence on negotiations.
14. Be able to explain the issues involved in negotiating with cognitively impaired subjects.

A mentally ill resident of a boarding home called police shortly before 4 A.M., saying he was holding two residents who were trying to kill him captive with a knife, a gun, and 50 pounds of C4 plastic explosives strapped to his chest. He threatened to blow up the building if anyone approached or tried to rescue them. He stated that he knew the police paid the two to “keep me in line or to get rid of me.”

The man had been convicted the year before of threatening to set off a bomb at the television studio of NBC. He had moved into the residential-care facility as a condition of his probation.

The Crisis Response Team was activated and took over the scene, setting a perimeter, establishing a command post, and setting up a negotiation area. Police shut down utilities, including telephone, electricity, and water, which irritated the actor because he thought it was a prelude to an assault.

Hostage negotiators described their conversations with the actor as “disjointed.” He spoke of conversations he’d had with space aliens and at one point asked for food—breakfast burritos—to be sent in.

Intelligence from the house manager and residents: His mood apparently changed late Wednesday night. He told workers and residents that his family had forsaken him, and that “no one cares about him.” Other residents of the house were interviewed and they considered him “well-liked.” “He was taking his meds. I just talked to him last night. He was fine,” the director of the home said. “I just can’t believe this. He’s the coolest guy. I mean, I’ve taken him to my home and I wouldn’t take anyone to my own home unless they’re stable.” One resident reported that the man had smuggled alcohol into the facility and had gotten depressed after drinking earlier in the night.

Intelligence from his psychiatric records: He was described as more than 6 feet tall and weighs about 350 pounds. He had been diagnosed as having a bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. His mother abandoned him when he was 16 years old; his grandmother raised him after that. He was abused physically and sexually from 5 to 16 years old. He was hospitalized when he was 16 for a personality disorder and refused treatment. Recently, he has had difficulty staying asleep, sleeps two to four hours a night, and complains of dreams of being locked away and being tied to a chair. Current suicidal ideation was acknowledged, and he kept telling police that they would have to kill him because he was not going to let them torture him. He had been treated as an outpatient since 2010, after hospitalization for one week for depression and suicidal thoughts. No head injury resulting in loss of consciousness, concussion, and seizures was reported.

***CURRENT MEDICATIONS:** Lamictal, 200 mg. for bipolar disorder; Klonopin, Remeron, 30 mg. for depression; Prazosin, 2 mg for recurring nightmares. His mother and maternal grandmother had been diagnosed with manic/depressive disorder.*

***ALCOHOL AND/OR OTHER DRUG ABUSE:** He reported abusing alcohol beginning at age 25, smoking marijuana heavily since age 16 years. He denied abusing prescription medication.*

Negotiators assessed the incident as planned siege, in that the man sought out the confrontation with the police. However, they recognized it as having special features driven by the man’s paranoia, high emotional state, and alcohol

abuse. Based on his past history of threatening explosive attacks without really having explosives, the low probability of the man's actually having 50 pounds of explosives strapped to him, no violence at the outset, adequate containment, sporadic communications and the sniper/observer's observation that he could be seen holding a knife but there was no evidence of anything being strapped to him, the risk level was considered moderate. Negotiators' initial plan was to use crisis intervention skills, active listening, reassurance, and the tactic of separating themselves from his delusions about the police to develop rapport and to give the alcohol time to get out of his system. They provided him with a breakfast burrito to help establish trust and to give the SWAT team an opportunity to assess his dangerousness. After seven hours, he was convinced to open the door to release a hostage, at which time the SWAT team rushed him, overpowering him, and taking him into custody. No one was injured and no explosives were found.

This incident is an example of ones frequently encountered by the police: incidents involving mentally ill and emotionally disturbed people who have more than a crisis going on. This actor is mentally ill and is likely to respond with more intensity than others. Experienced negotiators know that a large number of incidents involve emotionally disturbed individuals: people who come from chaotic backgrounds and who have not learned to manage themselves or their lives. The nature and extent of involvement with emotionally disturbed individuals has changed since the founding of police negotiations in 1972 and it is essential that negotiators understand issues involving negotiating with a wide range of emotionally disturbed and mentally ill individuals.

Emotionally Disturbed People and Negotiations

Since the inception of negotiations in policing, there has been recognition that many of the people negotiators deal with are emotionally disturbed. Schlossberg (1979) emphasized the importance of understanding emotionally disturbed people as one of the foundational principles in the development of the NYPD's Hostage Negotiations program. In 1986, Fuselier asserted that four groups of emotionally disturbed people are most frequently involved in hostage incidents. They were:

1. Paranoid Schizophrenics
2. Manic-Depressed Psychotics, Depressed Type
3. Inadequate (Dependent) Personality Disorders
4. Antisocial Personality Disorders

Research (Strentz, 1985; Head, 1990; Butler et al., 1993) has shown that the majority of incidents with which large city police departments deal are emotionally disturbed individuals. Estimates are that between 52 percent (Fuselier, 1986) and 85 percent (Austin Police Department, 1991) of hostage incidents involve emotionally disturbed individuals as hostage takers. Feldman (2001) found that 94 percent of 120 incidents he reviewed involved people who were emotionally disturbed.

Hammer (2007) has pointed out that emotionally disturbed is not the same as mentally ill. Confrontations with the police can be expected to get an emotional response, but an emotional response does not necessarily mean that the person is mentally ill. Recent statistics from HOBAS (2008) suggest that only 28 percent of incidents handled by negotiators involve people who have a mental health diagnosis or are in treatment. Almost every spontaneous siege can be expected to have an emotional component; however, not every actor in a spontaneous siege

is mentally ill. Actors in planned sieges are rarely mentally ill or emotionally upset. Studies of terrorists from a variety of venues have almost universally concluded that the most consistent thing about terrorists is their lack of psychopathology. Dolnik & Fitzgerald (2008) pointed out that the terrorists at the Beslan school siege were in control of their emotions. Actors in an anticipated siege may have high emotions at first but shift into a survival mode quickly. They may or may not have some mental illness. For instance, there is good reason to believe that David Koresh had a mental illness although it was never diagnosed, while it is less clear that the individuals engaged in the Freeman standoff were mentally ill. It is important for negotiators to be able to recognize the difference between mental illness and emotional disturbance because mental illness creates some unique issues with which both the negotiator and the subject have to deal effectively to resolve the incident peacefully. It affects the risk levels in an incident and it influences the negotiator's choice of tactics.

Mental Illness Defined

Mental Illness—mental illness is a brain disorder that creates problems with thinking, feeling, and perception that lead to behavior that is considered bizarre and/or inappropriate. It can be short or long term and can occur any time in a person's life (McMains, 2004).

The first point to recognize is that mental illness is a brain disorder. This means that it is based in the person's biology or biochemistry and that there is usually a biological treatment available. Mental illness includes mood disorders, affective disorders, dementias, mood disorders associated with medical problems, medication-or drug-induced disorders, and psychoses.

These disorders do not include what the mental health professionals call character and behavior disorders or developmental disorders. Character and behavior disorders are disorders that are thought to be a result of the person's experiences in life and the ways they have learned to deal with the world. They are the "bad actors" police deal with daily.

A second issue in mental illness is the fact that it can affect thinking, feelings, and perceptions. The most seriously disturbed people, psychotics, are generally impaired in all three areas. For instance, a paranoid schizophrenic may dress in a costume that emphasizes his power, may gather materials he thinks he will need to defend himself from an anticipated siege by the police because he believes that he is the focus of a conspiracy by people who want to kill him, may hear voices telling him to defend himself and may be hypervigilant and aroused (fearful).

The problem with these disturbances is that they interfere with the person's functioning. People who are mentally ill are not able to care for themselves, feel comfortable with life, and/or get along with others. For instance, severely depressed people may lose the will to feed themselves, a basic self-care task. Or the paranoid who thinks that others are a threat and stays away from normal interpersonal activities may attack others with little provocation; he or she has a loss in the ability to get along with others.

The degree to which the person's problem interferes determines the seriousness of their illness. Their thinking, feelings, and perceptions may occur with enough frequency, intensity or duration to debilitate them, or it may occur to a lesser degree. This fact allows us to think

of mental illness as a matter of degree and not kind. In psychosis, behavior, feelings, and perceptions occur with a high enough intensity, frequency, and/or intensity to severely impair the person's functioning. Consequently, mental health professionals will rate the severity of the illness as severe, moderate, or mild.

Hostage takers who are mentally ill have recognizable signs of emotional disturbance and each requires a modification of the usual negotiating principles or special focus to fit their issues. They have their own particular sensitivities that negotiators will want to keep in mind so that they do not inadvertently threaten them. For instance, in the scenario at the beginning of this chapter, the paranoid person's intense need for security and safety made the violation of his personal space a predictable problem. The sudden emotional outburst could have been avoided had the importance of the boundaries of the subject's safety and the intense threat that paranoid individuals experience when people get too close emotionally been understood.

A significant change since the beginning of negotiation is the recognition of the variety of types of individuals negotiators deal with. It may be that negotiator's success has led to their being de facto mental health officers in many departments. Feldman's data (2007) illustrates that when diagnoses are available, the most common types of mental problems experienced by people involved in crisis/hostage incidents were depression, antisocial or borderline personality disorders, poly-substance abuse/dependence, alcohol intoxication, or a variety of kinds of paranoia. These results show that negotiators are dealing with more than the original four groups of emotionally disturbed individuals described by Fuselier. As one experienced negotiator put it, "You don't have to be a psychologist but you have to think like one."

Issues that are important for negotiators to understand are the ways in which mentally ill/emotionally disturbed people relate to authority, the issues they have with relationships, sensitive areas that can elicit aggressive responses and the motivation (needs) they have that can be effective leverage if understood and utilized by negotiators. Negotiators need to know that they are generally motivated by expressive needs, have a history of difficulty with authority and will respond in sometimes unique ways to even the most well-intentioned negotiators. Understanding will reduce uncertainty and surprise, helping the negotiator to function more effectively when dealing with the emotionally disturbed.

Defining the Problem Versus Diagnosing the Person

An issue that is being debated by negotiators is whether it is helpful to spend time deciding on the type of personality involved in the incident or to simply deal with the behavior at hand. On the one hand, the argument is that thinking in terms of personality types is time-consuming and can be misleading. On the other side, the argument is that taking the time to understand the personality they are dealing with will allow them to predict and control the person better than just dealing with the behavior at hand. A way to conceptualize the utility of personality profiling is to think in terms of the process of understanding abnormal behavior. This process involves gathering intelligence on the person's behavior, thoughts, and feelings; analyzing and anticipating the issues that these behaviors, thoughts, and feelings suggest; and developing strategies and tactics to deal with the issues before they occur. Using personality issues in negotiations is about gathering, analyzing, and planning interventions,

using person intelligence to predict and control the other person. It focuses on what the person's behavior, feelings, and thoughts tell you about his or her motivations, sensitivities, and interpersonal styles. It should inform the negotiating team about which strategies and tactics are likely to work and which are risky to use. [Table 6.1](#) shows some of the issues that can be anticipated and planned for on the basis of the personality type. A productive training exercise is for negotiating teams to choose a mental illness or personality type from DSM-IV and do an analysis using [Table 6.1](#) as a model. After reading the summary of the mental illness/personality type in DSM-IV, the team identifies the key issues involved in negotiating with that kind of person and lists the skills needed to address each issue.



PHOTO 6.1 Negotiators should focus in training on conducting scenarios that present actors with a range of mental illnesses, from mild depression to serious schizophrenia, as well as a wide range of character and behavioral disorders.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

There are two other issues implied by the debate over the usefulness of a mental health perspective in negotiations: (1) it is risky to think in terms of one type of person or another; and (2) it is risky to assume that because negotiators have had trouble using personality information that it cannot be done. The first issue is based on the fact that people are rarely pure personality types. Rather, they are frequently mixtures of types with multiple issues. People are like the DNA helix, intertwined strands of behavior, feelings and thoughts that predispose them to respond to situations in some predictable ways. It is that predictability the negotiator wants to use in planning. For instance, a person may be primarily paranoid, suspicious, and mistrusting, yet they can also have compulsive features. In fact, it is not unusual for the compulsive personality to develop significant paranoia when overly stressed.

The second point above is a reminder of one of the values of a team approach to crisis/hostage intervention. Mental health professionals have a working knowledge of a wide variety of personality types and the issues associated with them. It only makes sense to include the professionals in personality types with the professionals in public safety. Butler et al. (1993) have shown that it is this combination that is the most effective in managing crises. A second resource developing within some police departments are the CIT officers who are specially trained to respond to calls involving the mentally ill.

[Table 6.1](#) Examples of the Relationship between Personality Style, Mental Illness and Anticipated Issues and Intervention Issues

Personality	Expected Issues	Action Steps
Normal person in crisis	High emotion/low reasoning Adequate internal resources	Basic REACCT Model: defuse, move to problem-solving after defusing, lower expectations, ask guiding questions to focus on the side of ambivalence that support release and surrender.
Personality types		
Antisocial personality– Likely involved in crime or domestic incidents	Increased risk of violence Sensitivity to face issues Hostility toward authority Power and control issues Attunement issues Self-centered Lack of empathy	Careful risk assessment Attitude: Always show respect; reinforce self-efficacy Defuse with BLS, using paraphrasing instead of emotion labeling. Roll with resistance Keep track of promises Maximize gain, minimize losses–use bargaining Shorten relationship building, no Stockholm
Dependent personality– May be involved in crime, domestic incident, suicide attempt	Poor planning Initial aggression Difficulty making decisions Needing guidance Ambivalence–authority Face issues	Negotiator takes lead in problem-solving Defuse with BLS Help resolve ambivalence–MI skills Establish rapport and trust, and then gently take control. Resolve ambivalence Support self-efficacy
Obsessive personality– Domestic incidents and workplace violence	Cognitive focus Respect for authority Shame issues are major Alcohol abuse Potential for suicide as incident unfolds.	Use BLS and minimize emotional labeling Use experience to establish authority Always show respect–reinforce self-efficacy Assess and manage alcohol use during incident Careful suicide assessment and intervention
Narcissistic personality– Domestic and workplace	Expects special favors Grandiose Face issues Anger when privilege is frustrated	Emphasize what you have done for them–Enlist their expertise about themselves. Respect–reinforce self-efficacy when it is focused on a peaceful resolution–BLS–Careful risk assessment
Psychosis		
Paranoid schizophrenic	Issues: Safety and face Contact with reality–hallucinations Delusions–grandiose and paranoid Suicide potential Medication Experience with mental health	Reassurance, and reinforce self-efficacy Refocus Side-step and refocus Careful suicide assessment Evaluate medication use Assess during assessment of resource–Use MI on ambivalence
Bipolar disorder	Intense affect Lack of focus Suicide potential when depressed Rapid cycling Self-medication	Basic BLS but is aware of the need for negotiator to lead. Patience, Refocus Careful suicide assessment and appropriate intervention Stay alert for sudden mood changes Assess current drug use
Mood disorder		
Major depressive disorder	Slow responding Slow problem-solving Suicide potential Self medication–substance abuse Mental health experience	Attitude: Patience Pacing: Start slow and increase pace gradually. Assessment: Careful assessment–Suicide intervention protocol Current use–adjust time frame, get non-use agreement Assess prior experience and motivation, MI for ambivalence
Anxiety disorders		
PTSD	Mixed emotions Flashbacks Self medication–substance abuse Mental health experience	Assessment: ID depression and/or anxiety Current use–adjust time frame, get non-use agreement Assess prior experience and motivation, MI for ambivalence
Dementia, Developmental Disorders, Organic Brain Syndrome	Impaired cognitive functioning Reactive depression to loss	Attitude: Patience, Patience, Patience Suicide assessment

A Continuum

One way of thinking about emotional disturbances and mental illness is as a continuum. At one end of the continuum are the people considered “normal,” and who are in crisis. At the other end is the population of people considered “abnormal or mentally ill,” who are “out of touch with reality.” Abnormal, for our purposes can be defined as any behavior, thought, perception, or feeling that occurs with enough intensity, frequency, or duration to interfere with a people’s ability to care for themselves, live comfortably with themselves, or get along with others (McMains, 1982). On the continuum, there are gradations of interference. For

instance, most people who lose a significant other feel sad for a period of time. They will show signs of depression for a while. They may feel significantly depressed, to the point where they do not eat; sit and stare at the ceiling for three days; do not see a reason to go to work; and so forth. They can experience intense depression for a relatively short period. However, if the depression lasts too long and is too intense, to the point that the person does not eat for several days and their health and well-being are at risk, we consider them abnormal. Their ability to care for themselves is compromised by their depression. Thoughts, perceptions, and behavior can occur with similar gradations in intensity, frequency, and duration.

Table 6.2 Continuum of Mental Illness

Normal	Character Structure: Tendencies to See and Act on the World in Predictable Ways	Mentally Ill:	Abnormal: Out of Touch
Adjustment disorders	Character-behavior disorders	Mood disorders Anxiety disorders	Psychosis
Reactive depression	Terrorists	Major depression	Paranoid schizophrenia
Normal people in Crisis	Criminals	PTSD	Bipolar disorder
Suicidal people	Domestic violence		

Table 6.2 shows one way of thinking about the continuum. On the left side are the normal people who function well. They care for themselves, are comfortable with their life, and get along with others. It is only when they are overwhelmed, in crisis, that their thinking, feelings, and perceptions are intense and frequent and long enough to interfere with their functioning. At the other end are the psychotics who are “out of touch” because of major interference. In between are people who have gradations of problems that interfere with their lives. The character-behavior disorders usually have bad habits that interfere with others but are not out of touch. They generally function, which is frequently a problem for criminal justice because they are the ones who are able to plan and execute crime. They are also the ones who engage in terrorist activities. As we go to the right side of the figure, we are getting to the mentally ill. They are people who have the biologically based problems that interfere with their functioning. Mood disorders and affective disorders are two major, nonpsychotic mental illnesses.

An assumption that underlies this continuum is that people are motivated by the same things: the need for survival, safety and security, affiliation and belonging, control and creativity. It is their biology and life experiences that create the beliefs, feelings, and perceptions that lead to their place on the continuum. This assumption helps negotiators by eliminating the assumption that the mentally ill are different from them, are unpredictable, and that we cannot understand them. By focusing on motive rather than behaviors, thoughts, feelings, or perceptions, it is easier for the negotiator to be accepting, caring, and understanding of the mentally ill.

Domestic Violence and Negotiations

Over the last 20 years, there has been a nationwide increase in awareness of the problem of domestic violence. Along with this increase in general awareness, there has been an increased recognition of the frequency with which negotiators must deal with domestic incidents that become crisis incidents. It is important for the negotiator to have a working knowledge of domestic violence in order to predict, control, and intervene effectively in incidents that are rooted in violent domestic relationships. They tend to be among the most volatile and potentially violent incidents negotiators must deal with.

The prevalence of domestic violence in the United States is reported to be about 12 percent of reporting couples on national surveys (Porier, 1999). Twenty-eight percent of women will be abused sometime during their life (Wilson & Daly, 1993). Feldman (in press) found that almost 31 percent of the 120 hostage/barricaded incidents on which he collected data were personal/domestic in nature. Call (1999) reported research by Head on 137 hostage incidents managed by the NYPD's Hostage Recovery Program from 1973 to 1982, in which 20 percent took place in the home of the hostage or the hostage taker, suggesting that a prior relationship existed. A recent summary of 4,988 cases reported to the HOBAS database maintained by the FBI showed that of 1,324 victims in negotiated incidents, 131 (9.8%) were spouses or ex-spouses, 318 (23.9%) were family members, and 150 (11.3%) were "significant others."

Mohandie (2005) has shown that stalkers who have had an intimate relationship with their victim use the most violence. Therefore, negotiators are well served to understand the kinds of people who engage in domestic violence.

In 1979, Walker described the classic cycle of physical violence in families. From interviewing battered women, she developed a three-stage cycle that included:

1. Tension-building, during which the abuser starts to become jealous, fearing that his spouse is planning on leaving him;
2. Violent acting out, preceded by several antagonistic interchanges in which the batterer is accusatory, engages in name-calling, pushes, and is generally provocative with the abused; and
3. Period of calm and reduced tension, during which the subject is remorseful, apologetic, and contrite, promising never to do it again, and promising to do whatever it takes to keep the relationship together.

Most relationships cycle through these stages several times, with increasing escalation of the violence. In reviewing the research on the prevalence of domestic violence, Bachman (1999) concludes that:

1. Research indicates that women are more likely than men to experience violence committed by an intimate partner.
2. Women of all races and ethnic backgrounds are equally likely to experience violence committed by an intimate partner.
3. The victimization rate of women separated from their husbands is approximately three times that experienced by divorced women and 25 times higher than married women.

4. While homicide rates against men have declined over the past decade, the rates of women killed by intimate partners have stayed the same.

Of particular interest to negotiators and of relevance for this chapter, Dutton (1995) has pointed out that not all batterers are alike. Citing the research and his 25 years of experience, he proposes that there are three distinct types of abusers:

1. The Borderline/Dependent Batterer
2. The Antisocial/Controlling Batterer
3. The Compulsive/Perfectionistic Batterer

Note that these are character-behavior problems, not mental illness as we have been discussing it. Each type has its own motives for battering, and each has differences in the ways in which he relates to people in positions of power and authority. Therefore, it is important for the negotiator to understand each type if he or she is going to predict and control the subject's behavior.

With the results of the domestic violence research and the research from the mental health community on the mental status of subjects involved in negotiation/barricaded incidents, negotiators need to be prepared to deal with: dependent, borderline, narcissistic, antisocial, compulsive, paranoid, and depressive individuals. In addition, issues involving substance abuse will be discussed.

Generally, emotionally disturbed people fall into three groups that concern negotiators. They are personality disorders, mood disorders, and psychotic disorders. Each of these three major groups are broken down into subgroups, many of whom negotiators have had to deal with. Feldman (2001), Mohandie (2005) and the domestic violence research cited above have reported that the character and behavior disorders include antisocial personalities, dependent personalities, borderline personalities, and narcissistic personalities. The mood disorders include depression, dysthymic disorders, and bipolar disorders. Common psychotic disorders include: schizo-affective disorders, schizophrenia, and delusional disorders.

[A Brief Course in Abnormal Psychology for Negotiators](#)

This section is focused on the negotiator in the field. It draws on a variety of sources (Bolton, 1984; Call, 1999; Eddy, 2010; Hammer 2010; Strentz, 2012, 2013) that are relevant to the practicing criminal justice negotiator, and its goal is to make abnormal psychology understandable and usable. Its format is designed to focus attention on the usable conclusions of the material by highlighting the points to apply from the lengthier discussion surrounding the bullet points.

- *Emotional disturbance is not the same as mental illness.* Hammer (2010) has pointed out that every incident involves emotional disturbance to one degree or another but not all incidents involve people who are mentally ill. Mental illness is defined as a neurologically based condition that disrupts a person's thinking, feeling, mood, ability to relate to others and daily functioning. The diagnostic and statistical manual of the

American Psychiatric Association is the official guide to diagnosing mental illness. It divides diagnoses into two major groupings: Axis I and Axis II. The mentally ill are people who have a neurologically based disorder.

- *All negotiation incidents involved emotional disturbance.* Call (1999) has pointed out that police negotiations involve “brinksmanship.” Brinksmanship is characterized by: (1) The use of force by both sides during a confrontation; (2) High-stakes bargaining; (3) Focus on a single option/limited demands; (3) High emotion; (4) Saving face is important; (5) Feeling of pressure/high stress; (6) Limited intelligence, and (7) Incomplete planning.

Though some people who confront the police in high-risk incidents are mentally ill, all are emotionally disturbed in the sense that emotions are running high and stress is high. For negotiators, this means: (1) it is important to reduce the stress before people can see the value in alternatives open to them, and (2) negotiators do well to sort out whether they are dealing with a normal person who is stressed by life and the confrontation with the police or whether there are special issues posed by the limits on the actor’s problem-solving abilities by mental illness.

- *Heightened emotions reduce problem-solving.* Generally, high stress reduces performance and reasoning. For instance, Breversdorf (2004) found that stress improved recall of learned material before tests but reduced the ability to apply a range of solutions to a unique situation. When the average person confronts the police, they need to be able to think about their situation in a reasonable way. Additionally, they generally have not had a lot of experience dealing with people who can kill them. Stress is high. As stress increases, their ability to do anything other than freeze, fight, or flee is reduced.
- *Defuse emotions before trying to solve the problems.*
- *Check yourself – the police style/attitude.* Bolton (2010) has pointed out that about 25% of the population falls into a category he calls Directors. They are people who are emotionally controlled and assertive. They are fast-paced, decisive, result-focused, impatient people whose focus is on getting it done now. They tend not to learn from the past. They are emotionally controlled and communicate in short, to-the-point bullets without much elaboration or background. They tend to be very directive, expecting others to respond with little questioning. They are less concerned about relationships with others than with getting the job done. They want to take care of business and get back into service. They tend not to listen, since they already have the answers. In other words, they are exactly what police officers and correction officers who rely on their authority and power are trained to do. This starts them at a disadvantage in negotiations. They have to set aside their former training and adopt different attitudes. They have to adjust their style to communicate effectively with the emotionally disturbed.

Similarly, the FBI (2003) has suggested that there are three law enforcement attitudes that get in the way of negotiations. They are: (1) emotionality, (2) haste, and (3) rigidity. They suggest that negotiators have to be creative, flexible, and patient to be effective.

- *Define the person's problem first—Focus on the other actor.* Bolton (2010) also describes another 25% of people who he calls Expressives. They tend to be emotionally expressive and assertive. They like being center stage, are dramatic in their presentation, impulsive in their behavior, and have trouble maintaining focus. They prefer working with others and are on an emotional roller-coaster. They rely more on feelings in decision-making than reason, and they bore easily. They tend to be “tell-oriented”: that is, they tend to let you know exactly what they are thinking and feeling. The difference is that they tell you what they are feeling and they are frequently thinking things through as they are talking. So, they may present things more forcefully than they intend, and their decisions are not necessarily final. Many people in crisis are expressive, and most of the high-conflict personalities (see Eddy below) fall into this category.
- *Flex your approach.* To maximize communications and influence between the negotiator and the emotionally expressive personalities, negotiators need to learn to be flexible in their approach. Bolton (2010) suggests that Directors do the following when working with Expressives:
 - Increase personal contact—Stay in contact or get back in contact frequently and quickly.
 - Focus more on emotions—Reflection of emotions is important because this is the Expressives logic: to feel understood; they have to know you are comfortable with emotions
 - Allow conversational spontaneity—Don't worry about asides that are not on point. Expressives generally think out loud and tend to ramble through topics.
 - Allow for “funning”—When appropriate, allow and show humor.
 - Give plenty of recognition—Expressives enjoy being center stage.
 - Allow for personal freedom—Do not insist on controlling the conversation; it is important for expressives to feel in control of things.
- *Recognize High Conflict Personalities.* Eddy (2011) has identified a group of people that he calls high-conflict personalities. They are not necessarily mentally ill, but they have trouble dealing with others and are more likely than the average person to act out aggressively. In the extreme, they are the character and behavior disorders described in DSM-IV. When they are not as intense and rigid, they come to negotiators' attention when they are in crisis.

When high-conflict personalities are in crisis, their right brain recognizes and reacts to threat faster than their left brain. The right brain is the part that sees and responds to danger without “thinking.” Responses mediated by this side of the brain are emotion-driven and action-oriented. Think of a time that you were nearly hit by an oncoming car while driving or reacted to a shoot – don't shoot exercise without thinking about the threat. You recognized the threat and reacted to it without analyzing the options. It was what was necessary for survival at that moment. Later, you may have thought, “What if” and analyzed the risk or assessed your options.

The right side of the brain is the side of the brain that mediates the “flight, fight, freeze response.” At high enough levels of emotion, the thinking side of our brain, the

left side, is shut down and we respond out of the need for survival. High-conflict personalities react to even minor threats as though their very existence is at risk.

According to Eddy (2011), high-conflict personalities have the following characteristics:

- They engage in all or nothing thinking—believing that others are either all good or all bad.
- They are incapable of modulating their emotions, experiencing anger, fear, and sadness that are out of keeping with the seriousness of their life situation.
- They are extreme in their behavior—acting out with aggressive behavior: yelling and screaming, hitting.
- They are preoccupied with blaming others—people close to them and people with authority are frequent targets.

In managing high-conflict personalities, Eddy suggests that we avoid admonishments, giving them advice, and apologizing. Admonishments sound like you are in the position of superiority and are looking down on the other. They are taken as attacks on the person's self and with high-conflict personalities, they are felt as a threat to their very being. For instance, telling the angry ex-spouse who is holding her former husband and new girlfriend hostage, "You don't need to feel like that. They are not worth the energy" is more likely to increase her anger than to calm her because she will feel judged and respond defensively.

Advice-giving tends to have the same effect on high-conflict personalities; it is seen as disrespectful and critical. Comments like, "you need to calm down," while meant to help the high-conflict person move to a more reasonable level of functioning, in fact have just the opposite effect: they are heard as disrespectful and generate attacks. Apologies are not effective because they tend to reinforce the high-conflict person's all-or-nothing thinking. Since it is hard for them to see the world as partially right and partially wrong, any admission of error is taken as evidence of the other person's always being wrong, and it undermines the negotiators' credibility and competence.

Eddy (2011) suggests using the CARS approach when dealing with high-conflict people, which includes:

- Connect with empathy
- Attend with respect
- Analyze their reality
- Respond quickly

In addition, Eddy (2011) suggests that messages to the high-conflict person need to utilize what he calls the BIFF approach, especially when they are angry and attacking. Messages need to be: (1) Brief; (2) Informative; (3) Friendly; and (4) Firm. For instance, in a recent kidnapping-for-ransom case, the actor, who was demanding \$3,000,000, said, "Where is my money? I told you it needed to be here four hours ago. If things don't start happening here, it is going to get a whole lot worse." The negotiator replied, "Al. I hear your frustration (empathy). And, I understand that it is really important to

you to get the money (respecting the demand). I am not sure you are aware that we have approached three banks about your money (informative). None of them have enough reserve to cover what you are asking (informative and brief). I will let you know as we make progress on this (firmly ending the conversation about the demand). Can you tell me what you need the money for?” The actor explained that the money was to provide services that the government did not provide the people in the countryside, like medical care. The negotiator mirrored, “Medical care?” The actor went on to explain that he had a father who had died because he got a severe case of diarrhea and could not get to a clinic.

- *Recognize the extremes and adjust when is it getting crazy.* All of what has been said above applies to normal people who are in crisis. It applies to the mentally ill as well—only more so. One way of thinking about the mentally ill is that they are on a continuum with normal people and it is their extreme and inflexible styles that cause them problems. The more extreme and inflexible people are, the more trouble they have getting along with others, taking care of their own needs, and/or feeling comfortable with their lives.
- *Recognize personality disorders: Their special issues.* Between the normal person in crisis, the high-conflict person and the mentally ill, there is a group of people who Tom Strentz in his recent book, *Hostage/Crisis Negotiations: Lessons learned from the bad, the mad and the sad* (2013) calls the Bad actors and the American Psychiatric Association calls Personality Disorders. The Bad are Axis II—long-term patterns of maladjustment; counter to their culture. They are the people who the criminal justice system manages daily.

Eddy (2011) points out that the majority of high-conflict personalities have characteristics seen in Cluster B of the APA’s DSM-IV. Cluster B are dramatic, emotional or erratic disorders. Other authors support his assertions (American Psychiatric Association, 1994; Dutton, 1995; Feldman, 2007; Miller, 2007; Ireland, 2008). Personality disorders include:

- *Antisocial personality disorder* who have a pervasive disregard for the rights of others, lack of empathy, and (generally) a pattern of regular criminal activity.
- *Borderline personality disorder* who have extreme “black and white” thinking, instability in relationships, self-image, identity and behavior often leading to self-harm and impulsivity.
- *Histrionic personality disorder* who show pervasive *attention-seeking* behavior including inappropriately seductive behavior and shallow or exaggerated emotions.
- *Narcissistic personality disorder* who have a pervasive pattern of *grandiosity*, need for *admiration*, and a lack of empathy. Characterized by self-importance, preoccupations with *fantasies*, belief that they are special, including a sense of *entitlement* and a need for excessive admiration, and extreme levels of jealousy and arrogance.

One way of looking at this group of people is that they engage in behavior designed to meet common needs but do it in an inflexible and excessive way. They all have problems with

people in positions of power and authority that negotiators need to take into account (see [Table 6.3](#)). Negotiators need to learn to manage the ambivalence borderline and histrionic personality disorders show as well as how to stay on the positive side of these personality-disordered people. They need to learn to be careful and avoid the power conflicts that antisocial and narcissistic personality disorders display because of their resistance to any kind of authority.

A caveat: the descriptions in the following sections are based on DSM-IV. At the time of this writing, DSM-V is scheduled to be published shortly. For more up-to-date thinking about personality disorders, negotiators may want to review DSM-V (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) when it comes out.

[Table 6.3](#) Personality Disorders and Their Attitude Towards Authority

Disorder	Threats	Attitude towards authority
Antisocial Personality Disorder	Loss of power and control.	Rebellious
Borderline Personality Disorder	Loss of relationship; loss of dependence on others.	Mixed
Histrionic	Loss of attention from others.	Mixed
Narcissistic Personality Disorder	Loss of self-worth, privilege and admiration from others.	Rebellious
Paranoid Personality Disorder	Danger to survival and disrespect.	Rebellious

[Antisocial \(angry/rebellious\) persons](#)

Antisocial individuals are perhaps the one group of people with whom police officers are the most familiar. They populate most jails. They are the people with whom officers deal most often in their law enforcement role.

Historically, the antisocial personality has been called the psychopathic personality, the sociopathic personality, or the antisocial personality, depending on the emphasis of the author. All three terms refer to the same type of person, who is characterized by “a pervasive pattern of disregard for and the violation of, the rights of others that begins in childhood or early adolescence and continues into adulthood” (DSM-IV, 1994). They are characterized by:

1. Early onset (before age 15 years) of evidence of disregard for others.
2. Deceitfulness—indicated by repeated lying, the use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit or pleasure.
3. Impulsivity and failure to plan ahead.
4. Irritability and aggressiveness as indicated by frequent assaults (especially when he does not get his way).
5. Reckless disregard for the safety of self or others.
6. Consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by a repeated pattern of failure to maintain work or to pay bills.

7. Lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to others or rationalizing having hurt or stolen from others.

Antisocial personalities are very much like two-year-old children. They learned early in life that others are harsh and critical, but unlike inadequate personalities, they have learned to handle their aggressive parents by being rebellious. They are angry, aggressive, and abusive. As children, they learned that temper tantrums got them what they wanted, and they continue to use this as adults to get their way. They assume that if they are powerful enough, or angry enough, others will give in. Their primary motivation is for power and control. They do not take being told “no” well. They are rebellious and angry toward authority, as is demonstrated by their history.

Hare and McPherson (1984) have pointed out that a subgroup of antisocial personalities, psychopaths, account for the majority of repeat crimes and the most planned and purposeful violent crimes. Greenstone et al. (in press) has suggested that distinguishing psychopaths from other antisocial personalities may be helpful in risk assessment in negotiations.

In a significant study related to psychopathy, Cornell et al. (1996) categorized 106 male offenders into three groups: (1) nonviolent offenders, (2) instrumental violent offenders, and (3) reactive violent offenders. Instrumental violence was defined as violence that is goal-directed and purposeful (e.g., robbery). Reactive violence is a hostile response to provocation by others. Results showed that instrumental offenders could be reliably distinguished from reactive offenders on the basis of violent criminal behavior and level of psychopathy. They were generally more violent than the other groups and committed more violent crimes. Group differences could not be attributed to participant age, race, length of incarceration, or extent of prior criminal record.

Further, the incidence of psychopathy in prisons has been estimated to be 85 percent of the population (Gacono, 1997), so an understanding of this subtype is important for both police and prison negotiators. Finally, experience in the area of domestic violence suggests that the most violent abusers are those who are antisocial (Dutton, 1995), perhaps psychopathic.

Psychopaths differ from other antisocial personalities in that they show a cluster of traits that make it easier for them to prey on others. They are more self-centered, experience less affect, are more manipulative of others, and show less empathy or remorse than nonpsychopathic antisocial personalities. At the same time, they share several traits with nonpsychopathic antisocial personalities, including: impulsivity, poor behavior controls, lack of goals, irresponsibility, adolescent antisocial behavior, and disregard for rules and law as an adult.

Greenstone et al. (2000) reports the results of a study using an adaptation of the Hare Problem Checklist by negotiators in the field to assess psychopathic traits. Although the number of incidents in which the checklist was used was small, the results were promising in that they tended to validate the idea that the first cluster of traits listed above can be distinguished from the second by negotiators in the field and that this cluster had value in helping negotiators decide which cases needed to be approached with more cautious tactics.

The number of cases in Greenstone’s study was small (N = 14). However, the results were suggestive of a useful approach to assessing psychopathy in the field. For now, it is important for negotiators to recognize that subjects who show signs of the first cluster pose a more serious threat of violence than others and, when in combination with depression, may raise

the negotiator's concern about suicide by cop (see below). Characteristics to look for include:

1. **Superficiality**, which Greenstone describes as presenting: (1) a story that is shallow and difficult to believe; (2) emotional displays that seem insincere and ingenuine; (3) telling stories that are unconvincing; (4) making statements that are readily changed when challenged; (5) using technical jargon or language inappropriately; and (6) an engaging interpersonal style that the negotiator may tend to like.
2. **Grandiosity**, which involves a number of behaviors, including presenting: (1) self and abilities in an inflated way; (2) self-assured and opinionated; (3) he or she considers the situation the result of bad luck; (4) exaggerates status and reputation; (5) sees self as victim of the system; and (6) shows little concern for the future.
3. **Deceitful**, which shows itself through the subject's attempts to: (1) manipulate without concern for rights of others; (2) distort the truth to make themselves look good; (3) deceive with assurance and little apparent anxiety; (4) come across as a con man. In addition, he or she may appear to enjoy deceiving others and lacks remorse, appearing to experience no guilt or conscience; verbalizing remorse without sincerity; displaying little emotion in regard to actions and appearing more concerned more about his or her own suffering than others.
4. **Lacks empathy**, presenting to negotiators and others as: (1) cold and callous; (2) indifferent to concerns or feelings of others; (3) unable to appreciate the emotional consequences of his or her actions; (4) shallow emotionally; and (5) verbal expressions are not supported by nonverbal expressions.
5. **Does not accept responsibility**, including a number of behaviors the negotiator can observe or gather reports of from others. They include: (1) rationalizing (excusing) the significance or impact of actions; (2) minimizing effects of behavior on others; (3) projecting blame onto others; (4) maintaining own innocence or minimizing own involvement; (5) claiming to be the victim; and claiming amnesia or blackouts for events surrounding the incident.

Managing antisocial individuals

Kolb (1982) has pointed out that the antisocial personality "refers to those chronically antisocial individuals without the capacity to form significant attachments or loyalties to others, to groups, or to codes of living. Thus they are callous and given to immediate pleasures, appear devoid of a sense of responsibility and, in spite of repeated humiliations and punishments, fail to learn to modify their behavior." Antisocial individuals primarily utilize a Rebellious Child attitude in dealings with authorities.

For the negotiator, this means that the usual techniques of establishing rapport, of using his or her credibility as a caring person, and of purposely developing the Stockholm Syndrome between the hostage taker and the hostages will have little effect. The antisocial personality does not form attachments to other people, negotiator or hostage. Rather, he or she tends to use people to meet his or her own needs. Consequently, the negotiator's job becomes one of showing the hostage taker or helping the actor understand that violence to the hostages, a threatening posture, and impulsive outbursts are not in his best interests.

Bradstreet (1992) has suggested that there are three approaches that need to be used when dealing with antisocial personalities:

1. The reasonable, problem-solving approach that can be used in the accommodation (negotiation) stage of an incident and that is characterized by a noncritical, problem-oriented, rational approach to interactions. Questions like “How is hurting others going to help you?” and “What do you think would happen if ____?” are Adult questions that facilitate evaluating and problem-solving without getting into a power struggle.
2. The buddy approach that emphasizes the negotiator and the hostage taker sharing criticism and blaming others. Comments like, “Man, you know how bosses can be. They never understand,” and “You know how THEY are about that s____,” are examples of Critical Parent statements that get the negotiator and the antisocial person on the same wavelength.
3. The Colombo approach, which emphasizes playing dumb, and being caring, but inept, when the other person is angry and upset. Comments like, “I know it’s taking a long time, but we are trying,” and “Let me see what the boss says,” are examples of the inept Nurturing Parent.

These three approaches avoid directly confronting the hostage taker. Antisocial persons generally respond to confrontation with anger. And because in a negotiation incident the negotiator is the only target available to the hostage taker, the negotiator needs to take extra care to avoid arousing the hostage taker’s rage.

In addition to the points discussed above, FBI guidelines suggest the following when negotiating with an antisocial personality (Fuselier, 1981):

1. Remember that he is self-centered and will try to make things easy for him. He will try for what he sees as his best deal.
2. Be careful about trying to trick him. He is streetwise and is used to conning others. Consequently, he is aware of others conning him.
3. Promise only what you can deliver.
4. Keep him stimulated and involved. He is easily bored. Don’t let him have a chance to “create” entertainment.

Although he is rebellious and impulsive, the antisocial individual does have the capacity to think through problems. This means that he can evaluate the probable outcomes of his actions. He is able to decide what is in his best interests. He spends his life conning others, making deals, and figuring the odds. In negotiations, he will be able to utilize that same ability. It is the negotiator’s job to convince him that harming others is not in his best interests, without raising his rebelliousness. The indirect methods of influence and suggestion discussed in [Chapter 2](#) are appropriate for this.

Finally, Strentz (2013) discusses lessons learned in his years as an FBI negotiator in dealing with antisocial personality disorders; they include:

1. Recognize that they project blame on to others. They see themselves as victims in any

incident.

2. Realize that they rationalize their illegal activity. They assume that because they engage in lying, stealing, rape, and murder that everybody does and that nobody is trustworthy.
3. Do not lie to the actor.
4. Make every effort to keep promises.
5. Be sure the tactical team knows that the actor may not follow the surrender plan.
6. Use the team approach to out-think the actor.
7. Use a think tank staffed by people with special expertise in personality disorders (MHP).
8. Do not say “no” to the antisocial personality disordered actor. Say “not now.”
9. Use the actor’s history of violence and current attitudes toward the captives to help estimate risk to the hostages.
10. Look for leverage in the actor’s history.
11. Do not expect released hostages to be cooperative when the actor is an ingratiating antisocial personality disorder.
12. Bosses never negotiate.
13. A careful use of TPIs may be helpful.

Case Study: The Antisocial Individual. The 17-year-old came home drunk with a friend on Friday night. He told a story of robbing and shooting somebody downtown that same night. When his family did not believe him, he grew angry and ran them out of the house at gunpoint. He fired at them as they were going out the door. The father called the police. He was concerned about getting back into his house and wanted officers to go in and arrest his son so he could get some sleep. Not knowing whether the “friend” was being held against his will, the officers decided to call negotiators to help resolve the situation.

One of the negotiators who responded to the call knew the individual from previous calls at the house. The teenager and his family had experienced several disturbances in the past. Frequently, some member of the family shot at houses in the neighborhood. Other times, different family members threatened neighbors for being “disrespectful.” Still other times, family fights required police officers to intervene when they spilled out into the street. During one such fight, the subject had run back into the house after assaulting his sister as the officer arrived on the scene. The officer chased the subject into the house, where he quickly gave up without offering any resistance. The subject had a long history of arrests for assaults, terroristic threats, thefts, and disorderly conduct involving firearms.

Negotiators started trying to communicate with the subject by phone and then by “bullhorn.” He failed to respond to either. For five hours, negotiators rang the telephone every minute for 30 seconds. Every 30 minutes, they tried to get him to pick up the phone by giving him instructions over the bullhorn.

By about 6:00 A.M., traffic along the subject’s street was picking up as people began to go to work. The field commander ordered the tactical team to prepare for an assault. By this time, the subject had been evaluated and his antisocial characteristics were evident. Officers had reported his usual response to being confronted by police. Therefore, the negotiators, after consulting with the commander and the department psychologist, made one more attempt at

getting the individual to respond. They used the bullhorn to say,

“____. Look out the window. See the men in the black Ninja suits? They are the SWAT team. If we do not hear from you in five minutes, they are coming in there and they will take you down.”

The subject responded immediately:

“Are you guys talking to me? I didn’t know you wanted to talk to me. Let’s talk.” He answered the phone on the next ring and he came out of the house two minutes later.

Case Review. The antisocial nature of not only the subject, but also his entire family, was evident in their continual disregard for the rights of their neighbors to live in a safe neighborhood. The family’s frequent fights, as well as their shooting at the neighbors, showed little concern for others. The father’s concern for his sleep over his son’s safety demonstrated antisocial qualities across two generations. Additionally, the son’s poor school record, repeated arrests, and disregard for his family’s safety attested to his antisocial qualities. As with most antisocial individuals, as long as he thought he had the power, he acted out in self-centered ways: he did not care where his family spent the night, nor was he concerned about shooting at them. However, when confronted with a situation in which it was clearly in his best interests to cooperate, when the alternative to communicating was SWAT, he chose the best alternative for himself. He might be rebellious, but he was insightful enough to make his best deal. This is typical of antisocial individuals. The above example is for illustrative purposes—be careful to evaluate responses before using a hard line.

Borderline (ambivalent) personalities

Borderline personalities are characterized by “a pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affect, and marked impulsivity that begins in early adolescence...” (DSM-IV, 1994).

Borderline personalities have a history of being abused, physically or sexually, as children (DSM-IV). Dutton (1995) has found that borderline batterers were shamed by their father as children. Early on, they decided that authority figures in their life were unreliable. At the same time, they decided that they were incapable of acting independently and caring for themselves. This left them in the difficult, if not impossible, position of depending on others who were frightening, unpredictable, and abusive for their very existence. This leads them to an intense fear of abandonment and a chaotic rage at the people on whom they are dependent. They generally come to the attention of the police when they are in a fight or are threatening suicide in response to the threat of abandonment by the person on whom they are dependent.

The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition (DSM IV) lists the following criteria for the Borderline Personality, which are helpful to the negotiator in identifying and understanding the Borderline Personality:

1. Frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment
2. A pattern of unstable and intense relationships, alternating between extremes of over-idealization and devaluation; they are either perfect or worthless
3. Markedly unstable self-image or sense of who they are

4. Self-damaging impulsivity (reckless driving, binge eating or drinking, substance abuse)
5. Recurrent suicidal behavior or self-mutilation
6. Affective instability that includes episodes of dysphoria, irritability, and anxiety
7. Chronic feelings of emptiness
8. Inappropriate, intense anger (temper tantrums, fights)
9. Transient paranoid episodes

Managing borderlines

In dealing with borderline personalities, it is important to remember that they are driven by emotions rather than reason. Millon (1996) has pointed out that one of the strategic goals of therapy with borderlines is to help them gain better control over their feelings and increase their capacity for reasonable problem-solving. The expressive nature of their needs means that the negotiator needs to use crisis intervention techniques to manage them. It is also important to remember that the borderline has intense ambivalence about people in positions of authority, so they may “transfer” their hostility and dependency to the negotiator (Borum & Strentz, 1992). The transference of dependency to the negotiator works to help resolve the incident when managed skillfully. However, the two come together, so the negotiator needs to be able to manage the anger that comes with the dependency. Building a relationship is difficult, because it is hard to keep from being critical in the face of the borderline’s mixed feelings, especially the intense rage.

Several negotiators have suggested guidelines for managing borderline/dependent personalities (FBI, 1985; Borum & Strentz, 1992; McMains & Mullins, 1998; Lanceley, 1999). They include:

1. Use active listening skills, especially emotional labeling, to establish a relationship (McMains, 1998; Lanceley, 1999).
2. Defuse emotionality through understanding, listening, and distraction (McMains, 1998; Lanceley, 1999).
3. Use a reassuring voice (Borum & Strentz, 1992).
4. Be alert to clues of suicide or homicide (Borum & Strentz, 1992; Lanceley, 1999).
5. Stay in contact with the subject as much as possible to prevent impulsive acting out (Lanceley, 1999).
6. Reassure the subject that help is available and that you will help him or her find help.
7. Be prepared for dramatic, intense, and sudden shifts in emotion.
8. Remain alert to the sudden appearance of psychotic symptoms (Borum & Strentz, 1992).
9. Reduce the usual stimulation at the scene as much as possible (Borum & Strentz, 1992).
10. Structure the situation by sharing your experience and describing in detail what normally happens during each stage of the incident (Borum & Strentz, 1992).
11. Monitor your own stress levels or have a second person monitor them (Borum & Strentz, 1992).

12. Expect mixed feelings about males (McMains, 1998).

Lanceley (1999) has made the interesting observation that corrections officers can identify borderlines more easily than street officers, perhaps because they have to deal with borderline personalities on a daily basis. Psychologists with whom the authors have talked in the prison system have reported that antisocial personalities and borderline personalities are the most common mental disorders they encounter.

Case Study: An incident from Las Vegas illustrates many of the issues that arise when negotiating with a borderline personality. Jerry was a borderline person. He had a history of quick attachments and difficulty with abandonment. He and his wife had dated two weeks in high school when he became so attached that he cried for weeks when her mother made them “break up.” Additionally, he became suicidal when they were having marital problems. His style at home was distant but suspicious. He would come home and sit without interacting with the family. He frequently accused his wife of having an affair or being interested in other men. He had been abusive on several occasions, pushing, slapping, and grabbing her. After she left him, he tracked his wife to a beauty parlor with a borrowed rifle. He intended to try to coerce her back home, or to kill himself in front of her. The shooting of the cook in the adjoining business was not intentional. When patrol officers arrived, Jerry’s wife became very concerned about his safety and made a show of trying to protect him from the police. Initially, she was the one doing the talking to the patrol captain who called the shop to find out what was going on. Eventually, the captain got Jerry on the phone and reassured him that everything was going to be all right, that everybody had marital problems and that he was sure that Jerry and his wife could work theirs out with some professional help. He reassured, minimized the seriousness of the incident, and offered hope. The negotiators took over the conversation when they arrived. Jerry kept asking that the captain get back on the phone, probably because of the borderline tendency to “split” or assign people to strict categories of “good” or “bad” with no room for anything in between. The captain had intuitively done the right things to establish a positive relationship with Jerry. The negotiators, who were seen by Jerry as less friendly and caring than the captain, were initially put in the “bad” category by him. They had to continually reassure him that they would help resolve the incident without anyone getting hurt and that they wanted to help him.

Experience has shown that borderline/dependent people become involved in crises in one of two ways: (1) They are either the weaker partner in a criminal team, the other half of which is usually an antisocial personality (see below); or (2) They are involved in a relationship that is going poorly, at which time they may become suicidal or they may take the other person in the relationship hostage. In both situations, they rely heavily on others.

Histrionic personality

Histrionic personalities are characterized by “pervasive and excessive emotionality and attention-seeking behavior.” DSM-IV states that the criteria for this personality are:

1. Discomfort in situations in which he or she is not the center of attention.
2. Interactions that are characterized by inappropriate sexually seductive or provocative

behavior.

3. Rapidly shifting and shallow affect (emotions).
4. Use of physical appearance to draw attention to self.
5. Speech that is excessively expressive, lacking in details, and is overly general.
6. Dramatic, theatrical, and exaggerated emotions.
7. High suggestibility.
8. Assumes more intimacy than exists.

Compulsive/perfectionistic personalities

Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorders are characterized by “a preoccupation with orderliness, perfection and mental and interpersonal control...” (DSM-IV, 1994).

DSM-IV outlines the following characteristics:

1. Preoccupation with details, rules, lists, schedules, and organization to the extent that the main point of the activity is lost.
2. Inability to complete tasks because overly strict standards are never achieved.
3. Overly devoted to work, to the exclusion of leisure time activity (workaholic).
4. Overly conscientious in matters of morality, ethics, and values.
5. A packrat—is unable to discard old, worn-out objects that have no sentimental value.
6. Inability to delegate tasks or work with others because things are not done exactly their way.
7. Miserly in spending, either on self or others.
8. Stubborn and argumentative.

Millon (1996) reports on Schneider’s observations about the anankast (compulsive) personality. Schneider observes that these personality types are “always trying to hide a nagging uncertainty, under compensatory or over compensatory activity, especially where the inferiority feelings are of a physical or social character. Outer correctness covers and imprisons inner insecurity.”

Because this personality type has not often been reported by negotiators as someone they have had to deal with, not many authors have suggested guidelines for managing them. Feldman (2001), for instance, found no compulsive personality disorders among the 144 people involved in hostage/crisis incidents in his study. The reason for this is probably because most compulsives are too constricted and rule-bound to act out. They tend to use withdrawal, ruminations, and alcohol as ways of blunting their feelings and controlling their aggressive impulses. However, one of the authors has had the occasion to deal with three obsessive, barricaded individuals in crisis, all of whom were in law enforcement. Two incidents were resolved peacefully and one ended in the person committing suicide. The following are offered as tentative guidelines for negotiating with compulsive, perfectionistic subjects:

1. Use active listening, especially paraphrasing, minimal encouragers, and to establish initial contact and to build rapport.
2. Be respectful and competent at all times.

3. Stay problem oriented most of the time.
4. Normalize feelings—especially of uncertainty and tension.
5. Be aware of the potential for depression and suicide.
6. Expect contrition and cooperation after anger.
7. Use problem-oriented questions focused on the “big picture.”
8. Provide structure by sharing what is “normally done” in crisis situations.
9. Share prior experience with successful situations to establish “expertise.”
10. Minimize fault/blame.

Case Study: The sergeant was considered the “poster boy” for the department. He was always well groomed, had military creases in his uniforms, kept his shoes spit-shined, and wrote perfect reports. He was promoted early. During his seventh year on the department, he started an affair with a female officer, and left his wife and two children to move in with her. After six months, she got tired of the relationship and made him move out. She started dating another officer. The sergeant had to move into an apartment complex where he worked as a security officer when off duty. He went to the ex-girlfriend’s apartment at 3:00 in the afternoon on the day of the incident, found the boyfriend’s patrol car there and pounded on the door to get the two to come out. Nobody answered the door. He used his service weapon and fired multiple rounds into the patrol car. At the same time, he called the dispatcher reporting shots fired at the location and requested backup. The female officer called the shots in as well, warning officers that it was a police officer doing the shooting. The Crisis Response team responded. The sergeant was found pacing back and forth in front of the house. He challenged responding officers and told them to stay away. He was assessed to be a high-risk individual, primarily for suicide, because he had multiple losses, including his wife, children, career, and face. Negotiators initiated contact from a position of cover. None of them had worked for the sergeant. They used his rank in the initial contact to show respect. Initially, he did not respond to their overtures. They kept calling out to him, until he responded, saying that it was over for him. He reported the losses noted above, was agitated and anxious. Negotiators reflected his anger and stated that it was understandable. They said that they had handled several incidents in which men were “jilted” by a woman and that they were all angry. The reflection seemed to calm him a little, but he continued to pace. The negotiators asked if he had talked to his wife since he had been in the apartment and he said no, that he was too ashamed. Negotiators suggested that it was to be expected that somebody who was as good a police officer as he was would be upset and embarrassed by what he had gone through and that they needed to decide how to help him. They needed his help doing so. They asked what they should tell his wife and children about the incident. They were sure that his family would worry about him. They asked about times in the past that they had been worried about him and how they showed their love for him. As they talked about the family and the times they had been concerned about him in the past, he paced for a few more minutes and then visibly slumped as he sat on the bumper of the patrol car. He let the weapon slide from his hand.

[Narcissistic personality](#)

Narcissistic personalities are people with a sense of entitlement, grandiosity, arrogance, a need for attention, and a lack of empathy or concern for others. They assume that rules do not apply to them because they are special. Frequently, they come to a negotiator's attention because they are involved in family disturbances that deteriorate into family violence or they become involved in conflicts at work because of the expectation that they do not have to live within the rules like everybody else. The mixture of antisocial qualities and narcissistic dynamics make for highly dangerous incidents. Therefore, negotiators should be mindful of these patterns in domestic violence or workplace incidents.

Managing narcissism

Miller (2007) suggested that the narcissistic personality can be disarmed by using his need for attention and privilege against him. He suggested that the negotiator should not be surprised if the subject initiates contact first, because of their need to draw attention to themselves. He may assume more familiarity than is warranted, expecting the officer to treat him as an equal. Miller suggested capitalizing on this assumed equality by making him an ally in the job of defusing the incident and solving the problem. Watch for anger, especially if the person feels slighted. Show respect. Maintain boundaries by referring to written authority.

Paranoid personality

The most outstanding feature of paranoia is the person's sense of threat from others. Early in life, they assume a position that says, "Other people are unreliable, unpredictable, and dangerous." Their Child learns that the adults in their life cannot be trusted; the Child becomes fearful and resentful, expecting danger, and is ready to defend him-or herself at all times. They filter their experiences through this assumption, becoming hypersensitive to potential threats and excluding evidence that the world is safer than they think.

Paranoia usually develops because the child experiences harsh, threatening, and often inconsistent proscriptions from critical parents. They adopt a defensive, hypervigilant posture that allows them to survive. It contaminates their thinking in the sense that it predisposes them to select experiences that reinforce their assumption that the world is a dangerous place, feeding the person's paranoia without being updated by subsequent experience.

When the person's beliefs become unyielding and permanent, they can be said to be a delusion. Delusions are fixed beliefs that a person holds onto in spite of evidence to the contrary (American Heritage Dictionary, 1980). Paranoid individuals have fixed beliefs of being persecuted and about being special or having special knowledge. For example, Carol was a 28-year-old white female who believed she was being hunted by the Mafia. They wanted to kill her because she would not join. It did not matter that the Mafia had no female members. She was going to be the first. Carol was recruited from a ward at the state mental hospital because she was so talented. She had both delusions of persecution and delusions of grandeur.

Frequently, law enforcement agencies become unknowing conspirators in the paranoid person's delusion of persecution. Paranoid individuals see police as being in league with the

people who are plotting against them. Officers are seen as agents of the persecutors. For instance, Harvey believed that the people he knew were behind the assassinations of Robert Kennedy, John F. Kennedy, and Martin Luther King, Jr., and they were directing the police department to assassinate him. When a patrol officer came to his door to investigate a neighborhood disturbance, he barricaded himself in his apartment and fired shots at the officer, trying to defend himself against the imagined threat.

For the negotiator, a paranoid person's delusions mean two things:

1. They need to introduce themselves simply as negotiators rather than as police negotiators. Using titles, rank, or other symbols of authority evoke a paranoid person's life-long ambivalence (fear and anger) toward authority. Ambivalence increases tension, and tension leads to greater reliance on their contaminated functioning.
2. They need to avoid arguing with the paranoid person about the reasonableness of their delusion: by definition, paranoid individuals are not going to change their beliefs through logical argument. Fuselier (1986) has suggested that negotiators accept their delusions as true for them.

Several types of people with emotional problems show signs of paranoia. They range from relatively mild disorders to seriously disabling disorders; from people who have paranoid parts of their personality that do not interfere with their functioning to schizophrenics who are severely impaired.

People with delusional disorders are those whose daily functioning in most areas of life is within normal bounds. It is only in the areas of their delusions that they have problems. For instance, recently, a man negotiators had to deal with was gainfully employed, had been a success in the military, was college educated, and had a family. His conflict was with the pastor of his church. He believed that the minister had convinced the mental health community that he was "crazy" and was trying to get him committed to a mental institution. Consequently, he appeared at the church with a jar of liquid that he claimed was gasoline, threatening to burn the church building and everybody in it.

Their delusions are persistent in nature and they can have content involving persecution, grandiosity, or erotomania.

The persecutory type of delusional disorder is the most common. People with this disorder usually have delusions involving such themes as being conspired against, cheated or spied upon, pursued, poisoned or drugged, harassed, or kept from accomplishing a valued goal. They may exaggerate the smallest slights. They may resort to repeated legal action, seeking redress for what they imagine are injustices. They are often resentful and angry, resorting to violence against people they think are hurting them (DSM-IV, 1994). They are frequently involved in episodes of violence in the workplace, because they often believe that their boss or supervisor is persecuting or cheating them.

An example of the persecutory type was the public transportation employee who took his supervisor hostage after an average performance evaluation. He thought he deserved a higher rating and that his supervisor unjustly marked his performance down. He believed that his supervisor saw him as a threat.

The erotomania type of person holds the unfounded belief that they are loved by another

person— usually a person of higher status—such as a television personality or a superior at work. The disturbed individual usually makes an effort to contact the person who is the object of the delusion. Harassing telephone calls, letters, gifts, and visits are common. Stalking is a frequent occurrence. Males who have this delusion frequently come into conflict with the law. With the growing recognition and criminalization of stalking, it is reasonable to believe that negotiators will have increasing contact with these people.

People with the grandiose type of delusional disorder believe that they possess a special but unrecognized talent, ability, or invention. This person may believe that he or she has a special relationship with a well-known person, like the special assistant to Exxon Oil or the daughter of the President. The delusion may have a religious content, such as the person having a special calling or special relationship with God. These types often become leaders of religious cults.

The hostage standoff involving cult members may well be an example of this kind of personality. FBI negotiators were divided on the type of personality they were dealing with in David Koresh. However, the strong beliefs that he was someone special in God's eyes, that he was called to a special mission, and that the federal government was persecuting him, are suggestive of the delusions seen in the grandiose type.

With proper preparation, the mentally ill should pose no insurmountable problems for negotiators. The issues, emotions, and demands can be discussed and resolved just as with any other person.

[Recognize Serious Mental Illness: Dealing with their Special Issues](#)

Strentz (2013) has suggested that it is easy for negotiators to remember that some people who are involved in hostage incidents are mad. The Mad are the people who fall into the mentally ill category. They are what the APA call Axis I Disorders, which include: depression, anxiety disorders, bipolar disorder, ADHD, autism spectrum disorders, anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, and schizophrenia. Experience has shown that negotiators deal with depression and anxiety disorders frequently and schizophrenia to some degree. Depression is seen in the form of suicidal threats and attempts. Some estimates are that up to 50% of negotiator call-out involves people who are suicidal (depression and suicide will be discussed in [Chapter 7](#)). A growing group that negotiators are encountering are the anxiety disordered individuals, in the form of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). As veterans return from an extended war, the irritability and heightened arousal typical of PTSD leads them into greater conflict with family, friends and society. Negotiating with veterans with post traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain injury (TBI) will be the focus of one of the sections in [Chapter 9](#). The rest of this chapter will focus on the commonly occurring mental illnesses of depression and schizophrenia.

[Guidelines from CIT Training—Mentally Ill](#)

The development of CIT programs in many departments has led to an opportunity and a resource for negotiators. The opportunity is the chance for negotiators to help develop a new set of skills-consultation skills. By helping to develop and train patrol-based CIT officers on team building, active listening, problem solving, and crisis management, skills that fall within negotiators' expertise, they can develop a new role for themselves in policing (McMains, 2010).

The CIT officer is a mental health paraprofessional who can help the team in the absence of a mental health consultant. Although the outcomes are better when mental health professionals are available as consultants to the team (Butler et al., 1993), most departments cannot afford a mental health professional. CIT officers can provide an enhanced level of expertise on mental health issues. For the most part, they are better trained than negotiators on many mental health issues, have daily experience with the mentally ill, and can provide input to the negotiating team. For instance, the Memphis, Tennessee, CIT web site lists the following topics in their 40-hour CIT training, many of which are not covered in traditional negotiator training:

1. Clinical Issues Related to Mental Illnesses
2. Medications and Side Effects
3. Alcohol and Drug Assessment
4. Co-occurring Disorders
5. Developmental Disabilities
6. Family/Consumer Perspective
7. Suicide Prevention and Practicum Aspects
8. Rights/Civil Commitment
9. Mental Health Diversity
10. Equipment Orientation
11. Policies and Procedures
12. Personality Disorders
13. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
14. Legal Aspects of Officer Liability
15. Community Resources

Issues that have arisen since CIT has become a force in policing are what are the boundaries between CIT and negotiators and how they should be used. Conflict in this area can be avoided if it is recognized that both can contribute to the overall mission of saving lives. Some departments have recognized the natural fit between the CIT program and the negotiators. For instance, the Weber County Sheriff's Office in Ogden, Utah has appointed a lieutenant to command both the negotiations team and the CIT program. All negotiators are required to complete a 40-hour basic negotiations course and the 40-hour CIT training (Lowther, personal communication).

Based on CIT training, the San Antonio Police Department (2004) developed the following guidelines for dealing with mentally ill people. Although they apply to people that CIT officers deal with on the streets, many of the issues are relevant and enrich the negotiators' understanding of methods of managing the mentally ill (note the similarity and differences between them and general negotiator guidelines):

Negotiation teams should prepare for negotiating with the mentally ill just as they would

with any other hostage taker/barricade subject. Classroom training and practical exercises should both be utilized.

Expectations

Expect the mentally ill person to be in crisis—high emotion, low reason
Expect the incident to take time

Safety

Always do a tactical assessment first
If the person is an immediate threat to self or others, take the necessary tactical action
Use force, if necessary
If the person is not an immediate threat:

Slow it down
Watch hands
Look for weapons
Maintain cover
Be aware of distance

Adjust attitude:

Understanding—show empathy
Patience—time to respond
Acceptance
Compassion
Show respect and let them maintain dignity
Control self and scene—remain calm

Defuse the incident:

Speak low and slow
Be careful to use a nonthreatening tone of voice
Use active listening skills to establish contact
Control chaos—keep environmental distractions low
Build rapport and trust
Use reassurance

Give feedback on what you hear the person saying:

Paraphrasing
Reflection
Summarizing

Assess problem:

Is an emergency detention needed?

Mental illness—look and listen:

Behavior, Affect, Cognitions
Ask about medication
Ask about seeing a doctor

Ask about hallucinations
Ask about beliefs, delusions, without arguing

Risk to self or others:

Be aware of the subject's location—Is it safe?
Appearance—Does the person look like they have been caring for themselves?
Threats—Do they threaten others because of their illness?
Suicide—Is there a suicide risk?

Resources:

Friends, family, groups

Influencing the person:

After establishing relationship, give firm and clear directions
Give them as many choices as possible
Help them choose options
Decide and guide the person
Stay alert—constantly reassess tactical situation and threat
Transport

Strentz (2013) discusses lessons learned about dealing with the mentally ill from his experience as one of the founders of the FBI's hostage negotiations program. They include:

1. Communicate sincere interest in and concern for the mentally ill actor and his story.
2. In discussing hallucinations and delusions, rather than agree with the actor, the negotiator can assure him or her that the negotiator understands that those things are real to the actor.
3. Gather as much intelligence about the actor as possible.
4. Use time to fatigue the actor and reduce expectations.
5. Utilize MHP as consultants in developing an understanding of the actor and the tactics to deal with him or her.
6. Softening demands help bring down expectations.
7. Educate the actor on the complex nature of his demands and the number of problems that have to be solved to comply,
8. Listen carefully to everything that is said.
9. Communicate with SWAT about the potential need for and emergency assault.
10. Not all incidents are negotiable—the negotiator needs to be prepared to support the SWAT team if an assault is necessary.

[Consulting with a Mental Health Professional](#)

Sometimes negotiators have to consult with mental health professionals who have dealt with the person with whom the negotiator is dealing. Teams may have a mental health professional available to them as a consultant during an incident. Therefore, it is important for negotiators to know how to relate to them. If the MHP is not familiar with police negotiations, they may

have some misconceptions about it and they may need to be educated about the purposes of negotiations. Negotiators should have a brief outline emphasizing the negotiators goal of resolving the incident without injury or death. Goergen (2006) suggests that negotiators: (1) Have opening remarks that include the necessity of asking for the MHP's help; (2) Provide a quick overview of the incident; (3) Remind the MHP that there is an emergency exception to the confidentiality of his or her client under the law; (4) Have a prepared list of questions about the patient, the way he relates to people, and any special issues that might help resolve the incident peacefully; (5) Provide the MHP with a contact number, if he or she needs to verify the officers' status and the legitimacy of the request.



PHOTO 6.2 With training, a mental health consultant on the team, and knowing where to find the appropriate resources, negotiators should be able to successfully deal with and resolve situations involving the mentally ill.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

Paranoid Schizophrenia

Mohandie and Duffy (1999) have reported that incidents of violence among schizophrenics are five times higher than those with no disorder. In particular, individuals with active hallucinations or delusions are more likely to be aggressive than are the general population. One of the hallmarks of paranoid schizophrenics is their hallucinations, which frequently tell them to act out violently, and their delusions that others are out to get them. These characteristics bring paranoid people to negotiators' attention and make it important for negotiators to understand paranoia.

Paranoid schizophrenics are the most seriously disturbed of the group of people suffering from paranoid delusions. They are described by others as being "out of touch with reality" because they see or hear things that others do not see or hear (hallucinations). When actively psychotic, schizophrenics are characterized by:

1. At least two of the following:

- a. delusions
 - b. hallucinations
 - c. disorganized speech
 - d. grossly catatonic behavior
 - e. flat or inappropriate affect
2. Social/Occupational dysfunction—for a significant period of time, since the onset of the illness, the person functions below his prior level of organization at work, in his interpersonal life, or in his ability to care for himself (DSM-IV, 1994).

Managing paranoia

Building rapport and establishing a relationship are generally the first steps in negotiation. The way the negotiator does this varies somewhat with the kind of person the hostage taker is. The paranoid person generally lacks trust and is interpersonally distant. Because of their fear of hurt (Sullivan, 1954; DSMIV, 1994), they are excessively suspicious of people who get emotionally close. Because of their fear of intimacy, building rapport is difficult. Therefore, the following guidelines are helpful in establishing an atmosphere in which to negotiate:

1. Start in a logical, unemotional, factual way. Stay in the Adult ego state. Keeping your voice calm and even, ask for the person's view of their situation.
2. Paraphrase what you have heard without comment or criticism, and without emotional content.
3. Expect rejection and anger—respond in the Adult or Nurturing Parent manner by asking for clarification, by paraphrasing what is heard, or by reassuring the individual that as a negotiator you are different from others and that you want everybody to be safe (Bradstreet, 1992).
4. Stay on your side of the physical and emotional boundaries—getting too close too fast is frightening for them.
5. Allow ventilation, if it reduces anger and fear. If ventilation does not reduce emotional intensity, distract the person by changing the subject.
6. Show respect and interest.
7. Sidestep delusions (Fuselier, 1986). Do not argue, because it tends to elicit a Rebellious Child response; discuss other topics, which are reality based, to build rapport.
8. Build a sense of security and safety by reassuring the person of your desire to help and by gradually shifting from an exclusive language to an inclusive language—"you" to "us."
9. Focus negotiations on "problem solving," being careful not to criticize (Fuselier, 1986). Although paranoid individuals have areas of pathology, as a group they are intelligent and capable of problem-solving. Their Adult is not completely contaminated. They need to be focused on real problems, in the here and now, rather than being allowed to let their imaginations run wild.



PHOTO 6.3 It is important that teams brainstorm and plan their communications prior to each contact with the actor.

Negotiators should have a plan and direction for each contact, while at the same time remaining flexible, as the actor with a mental illness can suddenly shift ideas and thoughts while talking with negotiators.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

Case Study. The call came out as a routine neighborhood disturbance at an apartment complex. The patrol officer responded to the manager's office, where he was informed that one of the tenants was complaining about another residence's music being too loud. The officer went to the complainant's door and knocked. He could hear loud music coming from the apartment next door. The subject peeked through an opening in the drapes. Seeing the police officer, he yelled, "Go away and leave me alone." The officer sensed that something was not right, because the instructions came from the man who had lodged the complaint with the apartment manager. He knocked again. Shots were fired through the front window. The officer withdrew and called for a supervisor. Closer questioning of the apartment manager revealed that the subject was a mental patient who had frequent encounters with his neighbors. He was thought to have a cache of firearms and ammunition along with a supply of water, food, and emergency lighting and bedding in his walk-in closet. The manager said, "It looks like he is prepared for a siege." More shots were fired and some went through the wall of the neighboring apartment. The residents were not injured. They evacuated the residence. The supervisor notified the deputy chief on duty, who in turn mobilized the department's crisis response team. He hoped to settle the incident without injuries.

The tactical team established a perimeter around the apartment, which included observers on all four corners and a bulletproof van immediately in front of the subject's windows. The van began to take fire almost immediately.

Other tactical officers evacuated the apartments above and around the subject's.

Negotiators began gathering intelligence on the subject. This proved to be fairly easy because the department's psychologist had worked at the local state hospital and had encountered this person on his ward. The subject was a paranoid schizophrenic who had been discharged six months previously, stabilized on medication. He had been scheduled for follow-up appointments with the outpatient clinic of the local community mental health center. He had stopped going to his appointments six weeks before. He was believed to have stopped taking his medication at that time. During the last six weeks, he had made calls and visits to the FBI and Secret Service, claiming to have information about the assassination of John F. Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Martin Luther King, Jr. He believed there was a conspiracy

involving powerful, shadowy figures who had paid for the assassinations of all three people and who wanted him killed because of what he knew. He had this information because he was a special messenger from God. His job was to declare the coming of the new messiah to the world. He was rewriting the New Testament to bring it in line with his perception of God's new plan.

When the negotiator called him on the telephone, he identified himself as John Jones, a negotiator with the city. He said that the apartment manager had called and asked for help with a dispute between neighbors and that he was wondering how he could help. The subject responded, "You can take your assassination squad and get out of here. You have no business here. I did not call you and I do not want you. Go away."

In an even tone, the negotiator said, "Nobody's going to leave 'til we're sure everyone is safe. I only want to help. Can you tell me what happened to get this thing started?"

The subject responded, "Are you stupid? I said get out of here. I know why you are really here and I'm not letting you get a shot at me."

Negotiator: "Again, Mr. _____, I am here to help. I came at the request of Ms. _____, the manager. You know her, don't you? (Pause to let subject answer). She said you had been having trouble with your neighbors. I'm here to see what we can work out. Nobody's going to get hurt. Tell me what happened."

Subject: "I checked it out with the President. You know those cops didn't come here to help. They have their truck right up against my window and they are looking right at me. They hate me. I can tell by their look (at which time he fired more rounds at the tactical van)."

Case Review. In the first few interactions, the subject shows his paranoia. He is agitated and aggressive. He refers to his delusions of persecution by suggesting that the police were there to kill him, not to help him. He demonstrated the need for an expanded interpersonal space by shooting at the people who were "staring" at him, invading his space. He hinted at hallucinations by suggesting that the President was in the apartment with him.

Collateral intelligence showed that he had been becoming more and more persistent in his delusions of grandeur: he had special knowledge because of his special calling from God. He had most likely stopped taking his medication at the same time he stopped going to his clinic visits. He had been getting more belligerent with the neighbors.

The negotiator utilized several of the principles discussed above: (1) He avoided identifying himself as a police officer; (2) He utilized the Nurturing Parent by asking how he could help; (3) He recognized the Contaminated Child who believes the police are going to kill him and responded quietly and calmly, using both the reassurance of Nurturing Parent and an Adult request for information; (4) He stayed focused on the immediate, reality-based problem.

In summary, several elements of paranoia were present. The subject seemed so disturbed by his delusions that they took on a reality of their own, independent of the reality of his surroundings. He was "out of touch" with reality, living more in his contaminated views than in the present. He was actively schizophrenic.

Paranoid individuals have been described as having an exaggerated emphasis on their own autonomy and a hypersensitivity about their sexual identity (Kolb, 1982). These lead to struggles about power and control as well as a sense of threat about intimacy with a person of the same sex. They try to distance themselves by threatening others. Their comfort zone, for instance, is three times that of the average person. They do not allow people to get too close, physically or emotionally. It is too threatening. This means that the negotiator cannot expect to use the emotional rapport he would use with others to establish his credibility with a

paranoid person. He would be better served by adopting a dispassionate, analytic attitude. The Adult ego state is the most appropriate mode to take with paranoid individuals, especially in the beginning of a negotiation. It is not a good idea for the negotiator to get too close in a face-to-face negotiation. Finally, because of this need for distance, it would be inadvisable for the negotiator to suggest that anyone else violate the subject's personal space.

Their exaggerated need for autonomy makes paranoid individuals argumentative. They tend not to accept criticism or suggestions well. Therefore, the negotiator needs to be careful about power conflicts, sidestepping them and using indirect suggestions whenever possible.

It is important for the negotiator to remember that paranoid individuals are motivated by: (1) threats to their survival, and (2) threats to their self-esteem. As a result of their belief that people are out to kill them, they should be reassured, the threat of force should be minimized, and critical remarks on the part of the negotiator should be avoided. Some departments have used tightened perimeters, annoying stimuli (like loud music), and high visibility threats (like making the SWAT team's presence obvious) against paranoid individuals. These tactics only serve to increase the paranoid person's anxiety, leading to a reduction in logical thinking and problem solving.

Negotiating with the Mentally Ill

Lieutenant Robert "Rich" Richman has more than 20 years of law enforcement experience, beginning his career in the U.S. Air Force as a Law Enforcement Specialist. He is a 17-year veteran of the Austin Police Department. Richman became a Hostage Negotiator in 1998 and is currently their team's Negotiation Lieutenant. Lieutenant Richman served two terms as president of the Texas Association of Hostage Negotiators and is a graduate of the FBI's National Crisis Negotiation Course.

Over the past several years I have listened to numerous academic lectures and case studies regarding negotiating with persons suffering from mental illness. Although these lessons have been extremely helpful in developing my ability to recognize certain behavioral characteristics specific to personality disorders, they have never quite seemed to prepare me for the reality of having to deal with a person suffering a mental health crisis by myself and before back-up could arrive. As many officers soon realize at the beginning of their careers, many people they deal with on a daily basis often are suffering from some degree of mental illness. As each call for service comes with a varying degree of uncertainty, each call involving a mental health consumer can range from being unremarkable to being one of the most extreme life or death situations they have ever dealt with.

Many years ago, while I was a relatively new officer with the Austin Police Department I was assigned to uniformed patrol near the university campus. One evening I received a call of a suspicious woman dressed in a plastic bag carrying a large, broken, metal fence post. While in route to the call I received an update informing me that the woman was now at a local pizzeria, terrorizing patrons by swinging the metal fence post at them as they attempted to leave the restaurant. Although I had only been with the department for a little over a year, I immediately recognized the suspect's description to match that of a homeless woman I had dealt with multiple times in the past. The older, more seasoned officers assigned to the beat nicknamed her "Gypsy Mary" because she

commonly wore dresses fashioned from large black garbage bags, wore lots of overly applied make-up and would adorn herself in gaudy jewelry made from ornate pieces of plastic and metal she managed to scrounge from area dumpsters. What was most significant was that I had learned in past dealings with Mary that she suffered from schizophrenia. When not taking her medicine, Mary's behavior could be extremely erratic, violent and just downright unpredictable at best.

When I arrived at the restaurant a large number of witnesses pointed me in the direction of an alley just across the street from the pizzeria. I located Mary pretty quickly and radioed my back-up of my new location. As soon as Mary saw me, she sprang to her feet and began walking toward me carrying the jagged metal fence post in hand. Her eyes were locked on me as she slowly began to close the gap between us. I ordered her several times to stop, drop the fence post, and lie face down on the ground. Mary continued to ignore my orders until I pulled out my gun. She stopped just shy of about 10 meters from me and raised the fence post above her head as if she were preparing to hit me with it. Although I was clearly prepared to shoot Mary if she began to charge me, I remembered that during past incidents I had established pretty good rapport with her. I attempted to reason with her by saying, "Come on, Mary, just drop the fence post, I don't want to have to shoot you ... I like you ..." Mary looked me directly in the eye and said, "If you promise to shoot me between the eyes I will drop it and not kill you." I still had a short reactionary gap between the two of us so I decided to call her bluff so she would drop the post and not force me to shoot her. I said "Sure" while reaching for my pepper spray with my nondominant hand. She obviously believed I was actually preparing to shoot her and promptly dropped the fence post to her side. I did shoot her but not with a bullet; instead I shot a rather gratuitous stream of pepper spray just below her eyes. Mary must have thought that I had actually shot her because she suddenly tossed the fence post away and dropped to the ground screaming, "So this is what hell feels like ..." My back-up soon arrived and we were able to take Mary into custody without much resistance. At the jail Mary was still very angry with me for not having shot her and screamed "Liar, liar, @\$%!!, liar" as I booked her into the lock-up.

Although Mary spent a few months in jail for unrelated warrants, what was most important is she was able to get the psychological help and medication she needed. I had spoken with her several times after the incident and her release from jail. She was unable to remember anything that occurred that night.

Many years have passed and Mary has since passed away of natural causes. But the lessons I learned that night made a tremendous impact on the direction of my career. Things aren't always as they appear to be and those "shoot, don't shoot" scenarios aren't as clearly defined as they seemed in the academy. The ability to build rapport and credibility with a subject, even if it's done within seconds can literally mean the difference between life and death. A short time later I volunteered to become a hostage negotiator and mental health officer. Knowing what I know now, as a seasoned negotiator, I may have used a different verbal approach with Mary and possibly would have not tried to call her bluff with a lie.

Now fast-forward 10 years and many, many incidents later to December 2007. Again, while on patrol, but this time as a sergeant, I was monitoring my officers' calls when I

heard a call come from dispatch involving a family disturbance. While reading the text of the call on my mobile data terminal, it was clear to me that this call was not the run-of-the-mill family disturbance but possibly a barricaded suicidal subject. The call stated that the husband had pulled out a handgun and threatened to kill himself after his wife had asked him for a divorce. The wife and the children had fled to the neighbor's home before calling the police.

Upon arriving at the scene I found a rather chaotic perimeter. The home was rather large and the surrounding property offered little cover for approaching officers. While directing officers on-scene, the all-too-familiar sound of gunfire rang out. Although the initial responding officer and I were behind cover, it was clear, indicated by the hole in the fence near our cover, that the subject had shot toward us. Needless to say, this prompted a rather hasty SWAT call-out.

As responding SWAT units began to arrive, I switched hats from "Patrol Sergeant" to "Negotiation Team Supervisor" and was immediately confronted by an elderly woman jogging toward the perimeter holding a phone. I stopped her before she was able to breach the perimeter and discovered that she was the barricaded subject's mother and she was on the phone with him. She wanted to get to the house because her son had asked to see her "one last time." After some convincing, she allowed me to speak to her son using her phone.

Initially he didn't want to speak with me, but after I explained to him how I was worried that he was going to kill himself and how upset his mother was, he relented and decided to speak with me. We discussed his situation for a couple of hours. He told me that his first wife died in a terrible accident while they were on vacation. He had convinced her to drive as he slept on the passenger side and as his children slept in the back seats of their minivan. While he was asleep his wife drifted off to sleep and crossed over the center lane in front of a tractor trailer. He awoke to the sound of crunching metal and watched his wife die in his arms. His two-year-old daughter was still in her car seat but suffered severe lacerations to her head and his son was pinned in the back of the vehicle and unresponsive. He, too, was injured in the crash (I received this information from our intelligence team).

This man had suffered a great loss and for years had done everything he could as a father to seek help for both of his children. His son had become angry with him because he waited several weeks to tell him his mother was dead because he feared his son's condition would worsen. His two-year-old daughter stopped speaking after the accident and the last words she had said to him were about seeing her mother die in the accident.

Four years had passed since his first wife's death and in that time he had married a woman he had met during his children's grief counseling and it looked like things in his life were getting better. His son was doing well and his daughter had begun to speak again and was doing very well in school. Unfortunately, his new wife did not want to be married because her children were not acclimating well to the changes since they were significantly older. Her remedy was to divorce and remain in a "boyfriend/girlfriend" relationship with him. When she presented him with the news on this day, it was too much to handle and he wanted to shoot himself.

During our conversation it became very clear to me and my team that this man was a

wonderful father who wanted to be a good husband and he deeply loved his family. What was also very clear was that he had never gotten the help he needed for himself. He had never dealt with his feelings and emotions regarding the death of his first wife and he was badly hurting. We have become so used to hearing about combat veterans suffering post-traumatic stress disorder that we tend to fail to recognize that many people deal with PTSD after having lived through traumatic events similar to what this man had lived through.

As our team continued to feed me themes and ideas, we worked through this situation together. The man was so proud of his daughter's recent achievements and using his future with her as a hook to help him develop hope in his perceived hopeless situation was eventually what convinced him to put the gun down and talk about coming out to get help. Of course there was one last issue that he needed to overcome; he was convinced that he had hurt a police officer when he test fired his gun. It wasn't too hard to tell him that no one was hurt since my officer and I happened to be the officers who were too close to the wrong end of that barrel!

People in crisis come from all races and walks of life. It's important to remember that no matter how bad the situation may have become, the person on the other end of the line experiencing an episode of mental health crisis is someone's father, son, mother, or daughter. Finding empathy is not hard when we realize they are not bad people, but rather, they are people experiencing a bad time in life.

Case Study: Establishing the Relationship. From the first interaction, the negotiator started building the relationship. Through his even tone of voice, reassurance and requests for information, he hoped to begin building the subject's sense of safety and security. By showing consistent concern for the person, he emphasized his care. By avoiding criticism, he kept away from the subject's ambivalence toward authority. By not responding directly to the subject's comments about assassination and the presence of the President, the negotiator sidestepped the delusions and hallucinations—rather, he tried to refocus the subject on the current problem by asking for information.

The presence of the tactical van was particularly agitating to the subject. He fired rounds at it several times. The negotiator focused on this issue as a problem to be solved. He explained the department's concern that the subject was firing his gun out the window where the van was located. It was pointed out in a matter-of-fact, calm way that he had been shooting prior to the arrival of the van and that one of the reasons the van was there was to keep his bullets from hitting anybody who happened to be walking by. The negotiator explained that even a small caliber weapon like a .22 carried for up to a mile. So the van was a way of making the area safe for others. He wondered if there were any other ways of making it safe.

By focusing on the immediate threat to the subject and by explaining the dilemma faced by the police, the negotiator did several things: he got the subject focused on a current problem, which did not allow him time to ruminate on his delusions; he engaged the subject's Adult problem-solving skills; and he reinforced the message that the police did not want anybody hurt.

The subject suggested that the van be moved, and then he would not need to shoot. When asked about the shooting he had done before the van's arrival, he said that it had been because

of the police officer threatening him. Rather than challenging his assertion, the negotiator asked him to agree to hold his fire, if the van were moved. He agreed and the van was moved.

The negotiator considered the subject's solution and asked about his own concerns. He established that there were two sides to any argument and that his legitimate concerns needed to be considered by the subject in any solution. At the same time, he showed an understanding of the subject's concerns. Although he was taking a risk, his acceptance of the subject's solution established an atmosphere of mutual respect and compromise that was the foundation for future agreements.

Unfortunately, two things happened about 22 hours into the incident that led to a renewal of shooting. The new incident commander insisted on moving the tactical van back to the front of the apartment and the negotiator got sarcastic with the subject. The former was done "to show him who is in charge here," in spite of the fact that the subject had honored his agreement not to fire for 12 hours. The latter was done because the negotiator was trying to "joke" with the subject, assuming an intimacy he did not have. When the negotiator asked the subject why he did not come out and talk with him face to face, the subject responded by asking, "Do you know the story of the three little pigs?" (Perhaps alluding to the danger he saw in coming out of his 'house of bricks'). The negotiator was confused and responded, "Yeah, and I know 'Mary had a Little Lamb,' too." This was taken as sarcasm, which implied criticism. The subject was immediately angered and began shooting.

After the incident, the psychologist interviewed the subject. He explained that he had felt both threatened by the van and demeaned by the one-sided decision to renege on the original agreement. Additionally, he felt that the negotiator was ridiculing him, not showing him respect. He started firing to show that he still had power.

When the subject started firing, the commander decided that it was time for a tactical resolution. He ordered tear gas fired into the apartment. The subject tried to come out when the gas filled the apartment, but the door was blocked. He asked the negotiator to get the police officers outside the apartment to help him out. He was instructed to go to the window with his empty hands up and to do what the officers said. He was warned that the officers would be dressed in black combat gear and would be pretty intimidating. However, he was reassured that they would help him (he was not told that the tactical officers "will not hurt you" because "hurt" was seen as a trigger word that would probably raise his fear). He surrendered.

It is important to note that even though the subject was clearly schizophrenic, he was not always "out of touch." There was a part of him that worked on rational problem-solving in the midst of the gas attack. During the part of the incident that was the most threatening, he was able to assess his situation, consider his options, and choose a plan that maximized his chances of survival.

[Cognitively Impaired Persons](#)

With the number of veterans sustaining brain injuries in the war in Iraq and the growing number of elderly, issues of neurologically based cognitive impairment is becoming more of a concern for negotiators. Ireland (2008) defines cognitive impairment from the standpoint of

memory. She says that it is “damage to an individual’s memory, affecting their ability to think, concentrate, formulate, to reason and to remember details.” She suggests that negotiators: (1) stay aware of the timing involved in cognitive impairment, allowing people more time to process information; and (2) not rush conversation with cognitively impaired people. She states that they may have to be refocused if they get stuck on one topic. Miller (2007) in discussing subjects with Organic Brain Syndrome, the impairment of perception, thinking, language, memory, and behavior, suggests that negotiators:

1. Expect people to be confused and rambling—be patient.
2. Keep comment simple, concrete and positive.
3. Keep sentences short.
4. Reassure the person that you are there to keep everybody safe.
5. Use the subject’s short attention span to distract him if he becomes aggressive and threatening.
6. If he is compliant, be simple and direct with instructions.

Developmental Disorders

Another group of people with neurologically based impairments are the developmentally disabled. They include mental retardation, autism, cerebral palsy, epilepsy and hearing impairments. The major distinction between these people and the cognitively impaired people discussed above is that they generally are impaired from birth. Though there is a small chance negotiators will have to deal with them, it is not impossible. The authors have a friend whose mildly retarded brother periodically gets frustrated and acts out aggressively. In one instance, he got frustrated with his wife’s insistence on going to meet friends at a local bar, and choked her and threatened her with a knife. When she tried to leave, he refused to let her leave. Neighbors called the brother who was in law enforcement. The officer called the author for help. The author and the brother went to the house and essentially did an on-the-spot negotiation for three hours. Had the neighbor called the police department rather than the brother, the incident could just as easily have been a police incident.

McMains (2004) developed [Table 6.4](#) to summarize the clues an officer might expect from developmentally disabled people and the management skills that may help.

The major lesson from the discussion of cognitively impaired subjects, subjects with Organic Brain Syndrome and subjects with developmental disorders is: There is a biological basis to problem-solving, communications, and impulse control that negotiators need to consider, to plan for, to accommodate and ask about when developing intelligence and an intervention plan. The subject’s developmental history, history of high fever, concussions, seizures, and central nervous system infections are issues to explore during their intelligence gathering. Negotiators need to anticipate slowed cognitive processing, distractibility, and irritability, and make allowances for them. They need to recognize impairments in decision making, impaired memory, and difficulties in planning and help subjects compensate for their disability. A more in-depth discussion of veteran’s issues and the elderly is found in [Chapter 8](#).

Alcohol Dependence and Abuse

It is essential that negotiators stay alert to the possibility of alcohol and alcohol dependency in hostage/crisis incidents, because subjects who are involved in hostage/crisis incidents often have drinking problems. Research has found that of the 4,988 subjects on the HOBAS database, 28.4 percent had a history of alcohol abuse and 28.6 percent were intoxicated at the time of the incident. In addition, Feldman (in press) found that of the 1,544 subjects involved in the incidents he tracked, 6.43 percent had a primary psychiatric diagnosis of alcohol intoxication and 33.3 percent of the 63 subjects who had a secondary diagnosis were diagnosed as alcohol abusers/dependents.

Table 6.4 Developmental Disorders

Category	Clues	Management
Retardation	Physical appearance Education history Speech/language problems Social behavior Performance tasks Criminal history	Notify parents or custodian Contact agency dealing with MR Attitude Quiet/private place Go low and slow Short sentences One direction at a time Repeat as necessary
Autism	Impaired socially Impaired language Autistic/repetitive behavior Sensory impairments	Do not touch Simple language Go low and slow Concrete terms Give praise and encouragement Do not stop self-stimulation Show indirect attention
Cerebral Palsy	Stiff, jerky movements Unsteady and shaky Poor balance Trouble holding self up Random, involuntary movements Seizures Lazy eye	Usually motor impairment only Use REACCT Model
Epilepsy	Generalized/Grand Mal Stiffening Jerking muscles Loss of consciousness Loss of bladder control Auras Partial/Petite Mal Staring Loss of consciousness Going blank	Help the person lie down Put something soft under head Remove person's eyeglasses Loosen tight clothing Clear area of sharp objects <i>Do not</i> force anything into person's mouth <i>Do not</i> restrain person Turn on side Have person stay with them Medical attention if extended
Hearing Impairment	Impairment—a loss of physical or mental functioning at the organ level. Disability—Impairment is severe enough to interfere with functioning. Handicap—obstructions imposed by society that inhibits the pursuit of independence. Deaf—the inability to hear enough to recognize sound and word combinations.	Decide on method of communication—sign, notes, etc. Be patient Face the person Listen to both sides of story

Additionally, negotiators need to be aware of the use and/or presence of alcohol in an incident because alcohol has been shown to increase the risk of both suicide and violence. In

large studies, alcohol has been more predictive of violent acting-out than mental illness. DSM-IV (1994) defines alcohol dependence in much the same way that it defines dependence on other substances, including:

1. Evidence of having developed a tolerance to the effects of alcohol that may include having to drink more and more to achieve the same effect.
2. Evidence of withdrawal symptoms when the person stops drinking that may include two or more of the following: autonomic hyperactivity (sweating, or elevated pulse rate), increase in hand tremors, insomnia, nausea and vomiting, transient hallucinations or illusions, psychomotor agitation, anxiety, and grand mal seizures.

Acute alcohol intoxication, or the use of alcohol during the incident, may create several problems for the negotiators. It may impair the subject's thinking and judgment, increase aggression, decrease coordination, and impair memory: all effects that make negotiations difficult. The most important impact of acute intoxication is the impairment of thinking and emotion that results. Negotiators need to plan for these. Slatkin (2000) suggests the following for managing acute intoxication:

1. Discourage drinking during the incident but do not try to be a counselor.
2. Never negotiate for alcohol.
3. Speak slowly to allow the subject time to understand.
4. Repeat words.
5. Use simple, brief sentences.
6. Avoid accusations.
7. Give the subject the illusion of choice.
8. Use indirect suggestions.
9. Allow ventilation, expecting anger.
10. Be alert to increased risk of suicide.

In addition to alcohol, other substances that should concern negotiators because of their effects are: amphetamines, caffeine, cocaine, crack cocaine, DMT, ephedrine, ketamine, LSD, Ecstasy, methamphetamine, morning glory seeds, PCP, and phenylpropanolamine. Stimulant abuse may pose a significant problem because it increases the risk that the subject will act out aggressively. When confronted with substance users/abusers, negotiators need to:

1. Obtain expert consultation about the effects of the drug.
2. If the subject is intoxicated, expect slowed decision-making, irritability, and a longer negotiation.
3. If the subject is intoxicated, do a careful risk assessment—both for suicide and homicide.
4. Decide whether to encourage discontinuance of the substance during the incident on the basis of the anticipated effects of that discontinuance on the person's emotional, mental, and behavioral reaction.
5. Try to get agreement from the subject on securing any weapons while negotiations are going on, to ensure everyone's safety.

6. Be aware of the effects of withdrawal or intoxication during the incident and have a plan developed with tactical for dealing with the effects of withdrawals, should it be necessary.
7. Stay alert to the increased risk of suicide/homicide when there is substance abuse, and plan accordingly.
8. Use motivational interviewing principles to negotiate with the subject.

Substance Dependence/Abuse

The characteristic feature of substance dependence is the continued use of the substance in spite of clear evidence that it is causing problems for the subject. It will show up as cravings for the substance, the development of tolerance, and withdrawal symptoms (DSM-IV, 1994). Changes in thinking, feelings, and behavior occur both when the person is intoxicated and when he or she is withdrawing from the drug. The degree of impairment depends on the specific substance being used, the length of time of the use, the amount used, and a family history of abuse and the interaction of the drug with other drugs or physical problems. Two major questions are posed by substance abuse for negotiations: (1) is the subject currently intoxicated? And (2) is there a history of addiction/abuse that has impaired the subject's problem-solving abilities? Negotiators are well-advised to become familiar with the effects of intoxication and withdrawal from the major categories of dependence-inducing drugs. Two resources for this information are the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual*, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV), chapter on Substance-Related Disorders; and Worledge et al. (1997), *The Negotiator's Guide to Psychoactive Drugs*, published by the Critical Incident Response Group—Crisis Management Unit of the FBI.

Substance abuse is the repeated use of the substance in spite of the recurring problems it generates for the person. However, tolerance, withdrawals, and compulsive use of the substance are not present when the person stops using (DSM-IV, 1994). The subject can stop, he or she just does not want to. The person may be intoxicated at work, at home, or other places where he or she has responsibilities that he or she cannot perform because of the intoxication. The intoxicated person may repeatedly place him or herself or others in danger while he or she is intoxicated. Many domestic incidents that negotiators must deal with are the result of substance abuse.

Summary

Most of the people negotiators encounter are emotionally disturbed. Because of their problems, they have unique ways of behaving, feeling, and thinking. Through a careful analysis of the type of person negotiators are dealing with, appropriate tactics can be developed, pitfalls can be avoided, and the chances of success can be enhanced. The analysis of the personality structure of the hostage taker is usually the domain of the mental health consultant (MHC) on the negotiating team. However, in the absence of the MHC, it is essential

for negotiators to have a working knowledge of this area. Additionally, when the MHC is present, negotiators will more easily understand and use the advice of the MHC at the scene.

Discussion Questions

1. What are some key behavioral/emotional factors to examine when dealing with a hostage taker and attempting to make a diagnosis of mental illness?
2. In the opening scenario, review the negotiations and identify any issues that you think could have been handled better with the mentally ill person. Explain your answer to the class.
3. Think of somebody you know who fits the characteristics of the high-conflict personality. How would you convince them to calm down when they get mad during an argument?
4. What are some key indicators in a domestic violence situation that the abuser is a Borderline? Antisocial? Compulsive?
5. If you are a person who tends to be a Director, how would you adjust your style to communicate with a person whose style is more of an Expressive?
6. Your team wants to add a mental health professional as a team member. You have five persons you are going to interview for a position on the team. Develop a list of questions to ask each person and scoring criteria for their answers.
7. List five key negotiation tactics you would use with an inadequate person. Five with a borderline.
8. When negotiating with an antisocial personality, what could you say to him to increase his concern for an estranged spouse? Child?
9. What are the primary differences between a narcissistic personality and a histrionic personality?
10. How would you determine whether a person's complaints that his neighbors are harassing him are delusional or real?
11. You are negotiating with a barricaded actor who is inside his house. Intelligence reveals he is a serious alcoholic who drinks about two cases of beer a day. Early on, he continually hangs up the phone to go get a beer from the refrigerator. What could you do to stop him from drinking during negotiations? Should you stop him from drinking?

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Chapter 7

Crisis Management: Negotiating with Depressed and Suicidal Persons

Chapter Outline

Depression

Adjustment disorder with a depressive mood

Mood disorder

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References

Learning Objectives

1. Know the definition of depression.
2. Know the definition and the common characteristics of suicide.
3. Explain the six steps of suicide intervention recommended by Living Works.
4. Be able to assess suicide threat using the Surgeon General's criteria.

5. Explain the factors suggesting that negotiators may be dealing with suicide by cop.
6. Understand how to intervene in a suicide by cop incident.
7. Explain the factors that may influence incidents of negotiating with “suicide bombers.”
8. Explain the difference between altruistic suicide and the type of suicidal individuals negotiators normally deal with.
9. Understand the negotiating techniques that may be helpful in dealing with a “suicide bomber.”

The call came out at 4:30 P.M. A man was standing outside the rail on a high-rise bridge over the interstate. Patrol responded, blocked both ends of the bridge, and found a wallet and keys halfway up the bridge. In the wallet, they found a military ID card. When officers approached him, the man yelled, “Stay away or I will jump.”

Negotiators were called, a command area established, the fire department was notified, and an EMS unit was standing by. Calls began coming in to the dispatch office from the commuters who were rerouted. Some were upset about the delay and said, “Just grab that guy and let us get home.” Even before the negotiators could make contact, the IC was getting questions from the Chief’s office about how long it was going to take to get the man off the bridge.

A records check showed no arrests but a check of the calls for service at the address on the driver’s license showed several calls in the last month for disturbances.

The primary negotiator and the MHP went part way up the bridge and asked the actor, “Looks like you are not doing well. Can we help?” He did not answer but stared at the highway 30 feet below. The negotiator said, “It looks like things are pretty tough for you right now. I am Officer S------. With the PD. We want to be sure you are OK and it doesn’t look like it right now. Can you tell us what is going on?”

The man said, “It won’t do any good. Nothing will do any good.”

The negotiator said, “We have a wallet, and we think your name is George. Is that what I call you? George? I am Carl.”

The man said yes.

Negotiator: *“George, it is my experience that people who are hurting and feeling hopeless think they have lost something or somebody very important to them. They feel like the pain is never going to end. Has that happened to you?”*

George: *“Yes. The docs said it would get better, but it’s not. It just keeps getting worse.”*

Negotiator: *“Getting worse? Tell me about it.”*

George: *“We keep fighting, and she is about fed up. The pills don’t help. Now, they are talking about a medical. She just doesn’t understand.”*

Negotiator: *“Understand?”*

George: *“My wife thinks it is no big deal that they want to discharge me after three deployments because I have problems sleeping. She thinks it should be easy for a vet to get a job. She doesn’t understand that being an infantry grunt doesn’t work in civilian life. She doesn’t understand the dreams and why I want to sleep by myself. She says I have changed and if I don’t get help she will leave.”*

Negotiator: *“So, if I have this straight, you have been deployed three times, have some bad dreams, are facing a discharge from the service, doubt that you can get a job after you are out, and your wife doesn’t understand what’s going on but is frustrated. Right?”*

George: *“That’s about it.”*

Intelligence office had a patrol officer go to the address on the license, contact the wife, and confirm the arguments. She denied any intention of leaving and said that she had said that out of frustration. She stated that he had not been sleeping, would not take the medication he was prescribed, drank more than usual, and seemed to be losing weight. He had no prior suicide attempts that she knew of. She wanted to come to the scene to talk to George.

Where does the negotiator go from there? It is not uncommon for negotiators to manage incidents like the one above. In fact, statistics suggest that up to 50 percent of calls managed by crisis response teams are people who are depressed and threatening suicide. Therefore, it is important that negotiators understand what leads people to plan to take their own lives. This chapter focuses on the symptoms of and management of depression, a definition of suicide, the characteristics of suicidal people, assessing the risk of suicide and interventions that negotiators can use to reduce the chance that a person will complete the suicidal act. It should be clear from the start that negotiators cannot expect to prevent every suicide. However, the more negotiators know, the more they can prevent.

Hogewood (2005) reported that the 2002 American Association of Suicidology statistics,

which are usually several years behind, show that in the United States there were 31,655 reported suicides that year. Of those statistics, 25,409 were male, 6,246 were female. Basically, one person in the United States killed themselves every 16.6 minutes; 86.7 deaths per day. The elderly (65+), while making up 12.2 percent of the population, accounted for 17.5 percent of the suicides. Young people (15 to 24 years of age) accounted for 12.7 percent of the suicides, while making up 14.1 percent of the total population. Other than the elderly, the most at-risk group is 35 to 54 years of age, with 15+ percent per 1,000,000. Suicide is the eleventh leading cause of death in the United States. Homicide is fourteenth. Suicide attempts, at 745,000 per year, are a frequent call-out for many crisis response teams.

Depression

A depressed mood or loss of interest in activities that were previously pleasurable for the person is basic to all depressive disorders. Like paranoia, depression is a symptom that cuts across a variety of types of people, from adjustment disorder through dysthymic personality disorders to a major depressive disorder (DSM IV, 1994). For simplicity's sake, the general features of depression will be described below.

Depression is characterized by a pattern of feelings and thoughts that include dejection, gloominess and joylessness, self-blame, self-doubt, inadequacy and low self-esteem, worrying, negativism, fault finding, pessimism, and guilt or remorse (DSM IV, 1994). There is a sense of hopelessness and helplessness in the person's view of the world (Seligman, 1990). These people have learned that nothing they do will affect their lives, so they assume that they can do nothing.

Depressed people frequently believe that they have no power to get things done; that they must go along with other, more powerful people; and that the authorities in their life are critical and judgmental. They are rarely outwardly rebellious, assuming it is too dangerous to face all-powerful others. They are motivated by the need for self-esteem and power, even though they do not believe they can have either. They treat authority figures with a moody deference, expecting them to be condemning.

Depression can range from a temporary state that has its origins in a recent loss in the person's life to a chronic condition that is due to a chemical imbalance and has been a lifelong problem for the person. Most depressive crises that law enforcement officers encounter are temporary in nature.

Adjustment Disorder with a Depressive Mood

An adjustment disorder is a temporary state. It is a reaction to a specific life circumstance and it lasts only as long as the circumstance exists in a person's life. It is a maladaptive reaction that interferes with the person's functioning in work, family, or social life. It is usually a reaction to the stressors of life and is characterized by:

1. Depressive moods. Depressive signs and symptoms include:
 - a. Behavior such as: sleep disturbance (sleeping too much or too little); chronic fatigue; decreased effectiveness, activity, and/or productivity at work; withdrawal from usual social life; slowed speech and movement; tearfulness and crying.
 - b. Emotions such as irritability and anger; lethargy.
 - c. Thinking characterized by decreased attention or concentration on things going on around them; pessimism about the future; recurrent thoughts of suicide.
2. Tearfulness and crying.
3. A sense of hopelessness and helplessness.

An example of a depressed person in crisis is the 23-year-old male who barricaded himself in his parents' apartment after he broke up with his wife. He was afraid that he would never see his two-year-old daughter again. He had not eaten or slept for two days and nights. He had not been to work because he just did not have the energy. He had been drinking, and he was threatening to kill himself, using the shotgun in the apartment. When the negotiator contacted him, he was crying, slowly stating, "I've ruined it all. If it hadn't been for my drinking, she wouldn't have left and taken Genny (the daughter). It's my fault."

Two character and behavior disorders are likely to present with depression and suicidal ideation: the histrionic personality disorder and the borderline personality disorder.

Mood Disorder

People who have a mood disorder have a prolonged feeling of hopelessness that interferes with their functioning. In early hostage negotiation literature, they were referred to as manic-depressives. Essentially, they exhibit severe forms of depression. Sometimes they alternate with markedly energetic phases in which they seem grandiose, hyperactive, and impulsive. They may have a history of encounters with both the legal system and the mental health system. They are usually treated with medication, but they frequently refuse to take it.

Managing Depressed Individuals

This process assumes, that a relationship has been established with the hostage taker. In building a relationship with someone who is depressed, negotiators need to take a somewhat different approach than they do with paranoid individuals. Generally, they need to take a nurturing parent stance. The following are guidelines to establishing a working relationship with depressed people:

1. Start off like a nurturing parent (Bradstreet, 1992)—show an attitude of caring,

warmth, and concern.

2. Start slowly and pick up the pace of the conversation over time—depressed individuals are frequently slowed cognitively. It takes them longer to process information. Give them time.
3. Ask open-ended questions and be ready for long pauses.
4. Be ready to be more direct in questioning if the person does not respond to open-ended questions.
5. Reflect their feelings—their depression is usually masking pain and anger. It is helpful to recognize these feelings, to show them that the negotiator can handle their real feelings.
6. Be reassuring as often as is necessary (Greenstone, 2005).
7. Expect a slow response (Lanceley, 1999; Greenstone, 2005).
8. Beware of a sudden improvement in mood (Lanceley, 1999; Greenstone, 2005).
9. Be alert for the possibility of suicide by cop (DiVasto, 1997; Lanceley, 1999).
10. Discuss concrete, real-world issues rather than abstract principles (Lanceley, 1999).
11. Postpone suicidal actions (Lanceley, 1999).

Often the motivation of depressed people is to decrease pain they feel about a major loss in their life. The depression leads to trouble processing information about their situation or about their options. Negotiators may have to guide the person through an analysis of his or her situation, acting as a surrogate Adult. They may need to ask questions like, “Remember when your moodiness, your down feelings, began. Were there any changes in your life at that time? Big or small, any kinds of changes?” Such a question helps the person focus on losses he or she might not remember, because it causes too much pain. The questions help engage the individual’s Adult.

Similarly, the negotiator may have to focus the depressed person’s attention on past successes and happier times to engage her Adult. By saying things like, “Tell me about the first time you recall feeling good. What was different? What needs to change so you can feel good like that again?” Negotiators both remind the person that feelings change (they can change from bad to good as well as from good to bad) and help him or her focus on solving the problem of his or her pain in a different way.

Depressed people who take hostages are generally looking for help. The hostage taking can be seen as a “cry for help.” However, sometimes negotiators have to deal with a person who is depressed and wants to die but does not want to kill himself. Rather, he is setting up a situation that will force officers to do what he cannot. This is the “suicide by cop” incident (Van Zandt, 1993) and it will be discussed in detail in this chapter. Negotiators need to be aware of this possibility when dealing with a depressed person. They need to make a careful assessment of the individual to assess the risk of suicide by cop (see below).

Another general principle of which negotiators need to be aware when dealing with depressed individuals is that they may experience sudden shifts in mood. When a person becomes calm and collected after a period of agitated depression, it may signal a decision to commit suicide. If the negotiator senses that there has been such a change, he or she needs to ask if the person is thinking about harming himself. Such a question will not suggest the act of suicide, rather it will tell the person it is all right to talk about the possibility. Because slowed thought processes are a characteristic of a depressed person, negotiators need to expect to take

more time with the person than normal. Patience is required as the person thinks through questions, comments, and his answers.

When depressed, people have a pessimistic, moody outlook that is constricting. They think their problems are never going to end, that they will ruin the person's whole life, and that the problems are their entire fault. As Seligman (1990) describes it, the depressed person feels that problems are permanent, pervasive, and his personal responsibility. Negotiators need to help evaluate each of these assumptions. Cognitive therapists (Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1979; Seligman, 1990) have suggested several systematic steps in changing individuals' thinking about their situation. They include:

1. Identification of relationship between beliefs and depression—It is helpful to educate people directly about the relationship between their beliefs and their feelings. For instance, people who hold the belief that their problems will go on forever tend to feel more hopeless than those who believe that there will be an end to them. By pointing out the connection between thoughts and feelings in a firm and gentle way, negotiators can help the depressed person see that he or she has some control of things.
2. Exploration of beliefs—In exploring the depressed person's beliefs, it is important to listen for his Critical Parent. Statements like, "I'm to blame for it all" suggest a stringent Parent that is being accepted without criticism. The negotiator needs to identify such statements, even when they are unspoken, and gather evidence that they are not true.
3. Challenge beliefs with evidence—By asking for proof of statements like "It is all my fault," the depressed person's Adult is mobilized. He begins to examine the validity of beliefs he had previously accepted at face value.
4. Identification of overgeneralization—Words like *always*, *forever*, *everything*, and *nothing* reflect overgeneralizations and either/or thinking on the part of the depressed person. Both of these thinking styles need to be identified and then challenged in a gentle, supportive way (as a Nurturing and Competent Parent, Bradstreet [1992]).
5. Identification of either/or thinking.
6. Challenge of these situations—Challenging the generalizations and either/or thinking with questions like "How much of the time do you feel depressed?" "If you were to put a percentage on the amount of your life that has been ruined by this, what would it be?" "When was the last time you were not depressed?" and "What did you do to get out of your depression the last time?" engages the Adult and leads to an evaluation of the assumptions. They remind the person that his prior depression was temporary and suggests that this one will be temporary also.

Case Study: A Depressed Individual

The subject had called the dispatcher at 3:00 P.M., threatening to commit suicide. He had lost his job and could not make his house payment. He had to move in with his mother, who criticized his lack of work and he was pawning his belongings to buy drugs (amphetamines).

He reported having a shotgun that he planned to use on himself. The dispatcher had the telephone number traced and got an address. She sent patrol officers, who were threatened with the shotgun when they approached the house. They withdrew, established a perimeter, and called for a supervisor. The supervisor asked for the crisis response team.

The tactical team took the patrol officers' places on the inner perimeter. Their job was to prevent the subject from leaving the house, to provide surveillance, and to prepare for an assault, if that became necessary, to prevent the subject's suicide. They were equipped with ballistic shields, flak vests, and helmets that would protect them from a shotgun if they had to move on the subject. They could assault without having to fire.

Negotiators gathered intelligence from the man's best friend. They learned that the subject had been employed as a chef at a local, upscale motel until two weeks before the incident. He lost his job because of his use of drugs at the workplace. His friend reported that the subject claimed that he had tried to stop using but that he "just got too down." Since losing his job, the subject had been lethargic and unmotivated. He had not been looking for a job, even though he was skilled. He had slept a lot, lost weight, and claimed that there was no point in trying; he'd just lose any other job that he might get. His chief activity was trying to buy drugs.

The incident that precipitated the crisis this day was that the subject and his friend had spent the morning looking for a dealer from whom they could buy "uppers." They had been unsuccessful. Upon returning home, the subject found a notice that his truck was going to be repossessed. He realized that he had missed an appointment for a job interview and he expected his mother to "give him s____ for not getting a job." His girlfriend had broken up with him the week before. He had told both the dispatcher and his friend that his life was ruined, "It ain't s____" and, "it ain't getting any better."

Case Review. The actor had sustained recent losses typical of depressed individuals. He had lost his job, his girlfriend, his home, and was on the verge of losing his car. On top of this, there was some suggestion that he had been using amphetamines for some time to self-medicate: he may have been chronically depressed, using them as a method of coping.

His social support had become more and more limited. He was no longer in contact with friends from work or with his girlfriend. His mother was literally a critical parent and even his friend had spent the day telling him that he needed to give up drugs.

He had classic signs of depression. He was dejected and hopeless. He was withdrawn, sleeping more than usual, and not eating well. He was pessimistic, seeing little hope of getting a job. Consequently, he did not try to find work, making his pessimism self-fulfilling.

A quick assessment of his suicide potential suggested that he was a moderate risk. He had sustained recent losses. He had made threats and had a rudimentary plan involving a lethal method. However, the plan was not detailed or thought through. It involved threats to people who had the power to intervene (the police). Despite recently losing his job and apartment, he had a fairly successful history. He had been employed at the same job for three years before losing it. He was recognized as a talented chef. He had graduated from high school with above average grades. He had been gainfully employed most of the time after graduation. He had no record of prior contacts with police or mental health officials. Until recently, he had been socially active and he had dealt with his critical mother by accepting her and by not personalizing her criticisms.

Intervening with the Depressed Individual

With the depressed individual above, the negotiator started by introducing himself and asking how he could help. Then he quietly listened as the subject slowly said, “Man. I’m tired. I’m tired of trying. I can’t get it together. Now they want to repossess my truck. My mom will have a fit when she finds that out. How can I get a job without a truck? I just don’t know any more. I can’t even score.”

Negotiator: “Man. It sounds like everything’s falling apart right now. Tell me what’s been going on. If I understand it better, I can help you.”

Subject: “Nothing’s going right. I lost my job, my girl left and they want my truck. My mom’s on my back. Nobody understands. Even my best friend doesn’t want to hang around with me anymore.”

Negotiator: “Could you tell me more? When did all this start? What was going on?”

Subject: “Well, I think it started about two weeks ago. That was when they let me go from work. Said I couldn’t get there on time. (Getting more animated, energized) I was the best chef they had. They even said so. I could do the job. What was the big deal about being late?”

Negotiator: “I think I’d be mad if they fired me for not getting to work on time, especially if I was the best. It just doesn’t seem fair.”

Case Review. The negotiator used several of the principles discussed above. For instance, he: (1) matched the slowness of the subject’s speech pattern during the first interaction; (2) reflected the subject’s sense of loss of control (reflecting feelings); (3) phrased his or her words in a way that suggests that the subject’s problems are temporary; (4) at the same time, the negotiator maintains an encouraging, Nurturing Parent stance, emphasizing his or her desire to help; (5) he or she also asks the subject to be more detailed to engage his Adult; (6) reflecting the anger he sensed under the depression, the negotiator was using active listening to show understanding and support; (7) note that he reinforced the message that the subject was the best chef, building self-esteem on what the person actually said.

Challenging Beliefs. After several rounds of showing understanding and support, of being a nurturing parent and reassuring the subject about his safety, of using active listening to facilitate ventilation and validation, the negotiator can challenge the person’s beliefs more directly. In the case above, he explained:

“You know, a lot of what you are going through is the usual result of a lot of losses, all at the same time. Most people, including what I hear from you, feel depressed about their losses. Unfortunately, the depression causes them to think funny and the funny thinking gets them stuck in the depression. When I hear you say things like, ‘It’s never going to get better,’ I hear the funny thinking of depression. You don’t really know that it’s not going to get better. It just feels like it is going on forever, sometimes. In fact, you already told me that there have been times since losing your job that you felt better than at other times. You have experienced changes in the way you feel. It is that you are telling yourself that it will never get better that gets you down now. And, you know what; you don’t have to believe the funny thinking of depression. How else do you think that depression makes you think funny?”

Such a statement by the negotiator illustrates several things. It normalizes the person’s experiences. It says that almost everyone gets depressed. It makes the connection between the person’s feelings and his beliefs, pointing out that he can control his thoughts, thereby controlling his feelings. It illustrates the distortion in the person’s sense of permanence and it offers evidence from the person’s own experience that counters the assumptions. It challenges

overgeneralization and either/or thinking. It also focuses the subject on the task of finding new ways that his thinking is affected by the depression. This distracts him from a critical examination of the ideas presented to him.

***Subject:** “Yeah man, you’re right. I’ve felt bad for a while and then I’ve felt good for a while. And, sometimes it was without being f_____’d on drugs. I guess the feelings do come and go. I might feel better again. I guess another thing I’ve been telling myself is that nobody cares. My uncle has asked about getting together a lot in the last two weeks, but I haven’t wanted to. It seems like he cares, even though it hasn’t felt like it.”*

***Negotiator:** “Yeah man. That idea nobody cares is another funny way that depression screws you up. In fact, lots of people care. Your uncle has tried to get with you. The dispatcher was concerned enough to call us and I am here with you. We all care. In a funny way, even your mother cares when she’s on your back. If she didn’t care, she wouldn’t bother to jump your case.”*

After several rounds of reassurance and re-evaluating, the subject agreed that he had skills he could use to get a job, that the things he was experiencing were temporary, that going to a doctor for a prescription would be less expensive and perhaps more effective than self-medicating by using drugs and that he would come out and talk with his uncle, who had been brought to the scene and who agreed to mediate between the subject and his mother. He agreed to a referral to the local mental health clinic for follow-up. He agreed to give up the shotgun, until he and his doctor agreed that he was emotionally capable of managing it again. He agreed to call his uncle, whom he felt cared for him, if he got desperate and confused in the future. His uncle, who was a deputy sheriff in the county, agreed to give him a pager number to which the uncle responded 24 hours a day.

[Suicidal Persons](#)

In 1999, the Surgeon General of the United States declared suicide a serious public health problem and announced a blueprint for addressing the problem that included awareness, intervention, and methodology. He pointed out that 85 Americans die from suicide daily. Suicide rates are higher than homicide and automobile accidents together. For every completed suicide there are 100 attempts that require attention from first responders, emergency room personnel, the medical community and the mental health community.

The most recent statistics set the suicide rate in America at 12.4 per 100,000 (American Association of Suicidology, www.suicidology.org. Retrieved 04/11/2013). HOBAS shows that 354 of the 4,988 subjects involved in critical incidents either killed themselves or set up “suicide by cop.”

Though not a separate diagnostic category (DSM-IV, 1994), suicidal persons are frequently the responsibility of negotiators. Major departments across the country have reported that 16 percent of the cases handled by their negotiation teams were high-risk suicide attempts. That is, they were suicide attempts that posed a threat to others (McMains, 1988). Most departments handle almost as many suicide attempts as hostage incidents. Therefore, it is important for negotiators to understand and be able to deal with the suicidal person.

[Definition and Characteristics](#)

For the purposes of this book, Schneidman's (1985) has a definition of suicide as a "conscious act of self-induced annihilation in an individual who defines suicide as the best possible solution to a defined problem" will be used. There are two important points about this definition: (1) suicide is a conscious act and (2) it is a solution. The former implies that the person decided to end his life, while the latter suggests that it is a decision that has a goal—to end suffering. If it is true that suicide is a conscious act, it is also true that the person can change their mind and live. If it is a solution to a problem, it implies that there are other solutions and that the goal of suicide intervention is to help the person decide on another solution to his life problems.

Schneidman (1985) points out that all suicides (suicidal people) have several things in common. It is helpful for negotiators to understand them:

1. Common stressors—all suicidal people have frustrated psychological needs. They frequently have recent losses that are painful for them. They may have lost a job, a relationship, status, or even their health. Regardless of the nature of the loss, it is essential for the negotiator to understand that the person sees the loss as unbearable.
2. Common stimulus—unendurable psychological pain. The losses lead to psychological pain that the individuals think is unendurable. They do not believe that they can or want to live with the pain.
3. Common purposes—a solution to the problem of pain. Suicide is seen as a solution to the problem of pain. They think it is better to cease to exist than to live with the pain.
4. Common goals—cessation of consciousness and relief of ambivalence. Ambivalence involves the wish to live but the belief that to live means to continue to suffer. Death is seen as an end to the suffering and the mixed and confusing feelings.
5. Common feelings—hopelessness/helplessness; aloneness; fear of losing control.
6. Common thinking style—constricted, focused on pain and either/or, either live with pain or die and end it. People can only see these two options.
7. Common interpersonal goals—manipulation and control of others, expression of anger, and/or escape from interpersonal distress. Frequently, the precipitating event is the loss or threatened loss of a significant interpersonal relationship through separation, divorce, or death. Suicide is a way of controlling the other person and coercing him or her into feeling guilty or changing his mind.
8. Common history—prior suicide attempts, lifelong pattern of coping through escape, and low frustration tolerance.

Case Study Revisited: The case study above illustrates these characteristics. Though a competent professional, the man had recently lost his wife (stressor) on whom he had learn to depend over the years. In addition, he had lost his profession and health. These losses generated an overwhelming pain and fear of being alone (stimulus). He had a sense of helplessness and hopelessness about ever replacing the losses (common feelings). He wanted the pain to stop (common goal) but could not imagine any way for the pain to end other than to die (constricted/either-or thinking).

Managing Suicidal Individuals

1. Recognizes the potential for suicide
2. Engages the person to establish contact
3. Assesses the risk
4. Contracts with the person for new behavior
5. Transfers responsibility needs

Recognition

Suicide can come up at any point in the negotiation process. Negotiators need to be alert. Lanceley (2003) states that a frequent course of events is for an incident to start as a disturbance, morph into a barricaded incident and finally into a suicide threat. The primary and secondary negotiators need to be aware of the changes in mood during the negotiations. They may signal a decision to commit suicide. It is frequently reported that sudden elation during intervention with a depressed person may be a sign of resolved ambivalence and the person has decided to kill himself.

In addition, clues to suicide may not be obvious when talking with the person, but they may occur during the intelligence gathering. The intelligence officer needs to be alert for clues. Behavior like giving possessions away, telling people about their final wishes, getting insurance and legal affairs in order, and even saying goodbye may be clues that the person has shown before the actual incident. In fact, Mohandie et al. (2009) have found that a suicide threat just before a person encountering a police officer is a significant factor in distinguishing suicide by cop from other type of police-involved shootings. Situational clues like recent significant losses, relationship breakup, and deteriorating health, loss of financial resource or status, and loss of employment are the clues that the intelligence officer can gather.

The majority of people who are suicidal are depressed at the time. Negotiators need to always be aware of the potential for suicide when they are dealing with depression. [Chapter 6](#) discusses the range of depressed people negotiators deal with.

Behaviorally, there are several clues to the person's suicidal intent. They include the location of the incident, the physical appearance of the person, the intensity, rate, and pitch of their speech, and the content of their speech.

The location may be an obvious and clear sign that a person is suicidal. The person who is perched on the top of a 300-foot tower is likely to be considering jumping. Less obvious are the people who barricade themselves in the bathroom, bedroom, or kitchen of their own home. Every patrol officer knows not to allow people to go to these locations because there are weapons there. Lanceley (2003) points out that people frequently commit suicide in their bathrooms so they do not leave a mess for others to clean.



PHOTO 7.1 The principles of negotiating with suicidal persons are much the same as for anyone else. One difference is that negotiators may have to conduct face-to-face negotiations, a situation that is always more dangerous to all parties involved.

(Photo courtesy ETGI)

The physical appearance of the person may offer clues. They may be disheveled, looking like they have slept in their clothes. They may show poor personal hygiene with a scraggly beard or unkempt hair.

Their speech may be low and slow—a suggestion of depression.

The content of their speech may reflect several themes that are clues to their suicidal ideation (McMains, 2009). Primary among them are themes of helplessness and hopelessness: “This pain will last forever, it is ruining everything, and it is all my fault.” [Figure 7.1](#) shows examples of verbal clues to suicidal thinking/intent.

Engage

All of the usual principles of engaging a person apply to the suicidal person. Particularly important is the negotiator’s attitude about suicide. A nonjudgmental, caring posture that communicates hope, understanding, and interest is essential to effective intervention, because suicidal people are usually hopeless, cut off from others and sensitive to judgment about their thoughts. Frequently they have already said something about their suicidal ideation to others, only to be told, “Don’t think that way.” or “You really don’t mean it” or “Why would any sane person want to do that? I don’t get it.” They already feel abandoned and judged. They need a receptive, caring, nonjudgmental atmosphere to talk freely about their ideas, pains, and ambivalence.

Situational References	Time References	Relationship References
The doctor says there is nothing he can do.	It won't matter after today.	He/she is better off without me.
Nothing will make it better.	I just called to say goodbye.	They will be sorry when they find me.
I have nothing.	It is time to do it.	Everything will be OK when my wife finds me.
Tell my family I love them.	There will be no tomorrow.	He deserves what I am going to do.
I just want out of it all.	I want to sleep forever.	My children will be OK.
This ruins everything.	I can't live like this one more day.	I really messed up our marriage.
There is no way out.		

FIGURE 7.1 Examples of verbal clues to suicidal intent.

Another point about engaging the suicidal person is that the negotiator can expect some confusion, and perhaps slow thinking at first. The depressed, suicidal person may be locked in on their pain and plan. They may be thinking slowly. The negotiator may have to be patient and take the lead initially, focusing the depressed, suicidal person repeatedly on the topic. The BLS may need to be repeated several times to start getting a clear picture of what is going on.

Safety is an issue in the initial engagement of the suicidal person. Current research supports the clinical and street experience that depression and anger go together. Suicidal people can be homicidal as well as suicidal. Appropriate tactical awareness is essential for officers. Threats to safety may include the presence of a weapon or it may be the location itself. Getting too close to a suicidal jumper can be fatal for the negotiator.

Living Works (1999), a suicide intervention training program that was part of the inspiration for the REACT model, suggests that people who intervene in suicides need to take six steps that are helpful for the negotiator to keep in mind:

1. Engage the person who you suspect is suicidal—Explore his or her world from his or her perspective (use active listening). Give them a sense of support and acceptance and look for signs that suicide may be on their minds, including recent losses, blue mood, giving away prized possessions, withdrawal from meaningful activities, or people that were meaningful in the past, changes in appetite, sleep patterns, or health.
2. Identify the person's thoughts of suicide, if they exist—to identify the risk of the subject committing suicide, ask directly "Are you thinking about killing yourself?"
3. Inquire about the reasons suicide is being considered, estimate what stress he or she is thinking about, how the losses are connected with his or her suicidal plan, whether he or she is feeling helpless and hopeless, how alone does he or she feel, and how acceptable suicide is as a solution.
4. Estimate the risk—Assess the seriousness of the threat, the risk factors, the protective factors, and the person's potential for violence. Explore the person's resources and his or her ways of dealing with prior stresses or losses. Get a clear picture of the person's strengths and weaknesses. Get the details of the plan, especially the time frame, because this will dictate how fast and what types of intervention are necessary.

5. Contract with the individual to intervene, so as to reduce the risk of suicide.

Identifying the risk means nothing more than stopping, looking, and listening to the subject. Research has shown that most people communicate their intention to commit suicide. Suicide risk can be identified, if negotiators are looking for the possibility. Negotiators can look for several warning signs, including: depression, apathy, decreases in productivity, flat affect, slowed speech, withdrawal from friends and family, loss of interest in hobbies, giving away possessions, feelings of worthlessness, loneliness, sadness, hopelessness, or helplessness.

To establish rapport, both active listening and a straightforward, caring approach to the person are important. Negotiators need to communicate their caring and concern for the person—they need to be a nurturing parent, providing the person with a lot of face-affirming messages. Being judgmental about the person's suicide threat is counterproductive. Statements like, "I hear your pain, _____. I know you can always take your life, if you really want to. I just would like a chance to help you explore all your choices before you make any permanent decisions," show acceptance of the person while at the same time suggesting the choices he or she has not thought about. They communicate caring and concern.



PHOTO 7.2 Negotiating with suicidal subjects is one of the most frequent calls to which negotiators respond. Many of the scenarios presented at the annual Hostage Negotiation Competition at Texas State University – San Marcos, TX, have a suicidal actor component, and the evaluation form emphasizes negotiator skills in negotiating with a suicidal subject.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

Suicidal people frequently believe that they are the only one who has experienced or can understand the kind of pain they are going through. However, a clear reflection of their pain on the part of the negotiator can help them begin to see that others can understand them, thus reducing their sense of isolation. Statements such as, "Ed, it sounds to me like you are really hurting since your wife left. In fact, it sounds like you can hardly stand the pain." This type of statement lets the person know the negotiator can understand not only the person's loss but how desperate the person really is. Such a depth of understanding establishes the negotiator as an ally and friend, helping to reduce loneliness.

After the subject begins to be more open with the negotiator, after he describes his loss and after the relationship begins to build, it is important to assess the seriousness of the individual's threat. To do this, the negotiator needs to ask a transitional question that opens up the topic of suicide, gives the person permission to talk openly about his thoughts and feelings,

and shows the person that the negotiator is not going to criticize or judge him. The negotiator might say something like, “You know when people are as down and as hurting as you are, they will often think about hurting or killing themselves. I wonder if you’ve thought about hurting yourself or committing suicide.”

Assessing/Estimating Suicide Potential

The Surgeon General’s call for action identified 15 risk factors and seven protective factors. The risk factors are important because they help the negotiator anticipate the seriousness of the subject’s threat and to structure intervention planning. For instance, the speed with which the intervention needs to be made depends on the time frame of the subject’s plan. The risk factors are:

1. Previous suicide attempts
2. Mental disorders—particularly mood disorders
3. Alcohol and other substance abuse disorders
4. Family history of suicide
5. Hopelessness
6. Impulsive/aggressive tendencies
7. Barriers to treatment access
8. Relational, social, work, or financial loss
9. Physical illness
10. Availability of lethal method—guns
11. Unwilling to seek help because of stigma
12. Influence of significant people who have committed suicide—celebrities, peers, family members, etc.
13. Cultural and religious beliefs—belief that suicide is a solution
14. Local occurrences of suicide
15. Isolation

Protective factors include:

1. Effective and appropriate clinical care for mental, physical, or substance abuse
2. Easy access to a variety of interventions
3. Restricted access to lethal methods
4. Family and community support
5. Ongoing relationship with medical or mental health care provider
6. Learned skills in problem-solving, conflict resolution, and nonviolent resolution of disputes
7. Cultural and religious beliefs that discourage suicide as a way of coping with problems

The negotiator can ask about any prior suicide attempts and the details of the suicide plan (including time, place, and method). People who have made prior attempts at suicide even

once are a higher risk than the person for whom this is the first attempt. Likewise, people who have a detailed plan that includes a lethal weapon and an isolated place are more serious than are people who have had vague thoughts of dying sometime. For instance, one barricaded subject with whom one of the authors dealt had lost his job, his reputation, and his marriage. His ex-wife told him she was taking their eight-year-old daughter and moving out of state. He knew that his life was over. The only person he still cared for was leaving. He developed a plan to leave his daughter his few valuables, to get drunk while he was alone in his apartment and to shoot himself in the head. He was going to do it after his daughter's last weekend visit. He was going to leave his wife a note, commenting on how she had taken from him the last thing that made his life meaningful. His plan was detailed and fatal. He posed a more serious risk than the teenager who "would just like to die" after an argument with her parents but had no plan for dying in mind.

In addition to the risk factors, the protection factors need to be explored by the negotiator, because they frequently provide information the negotiator needs for an effective intervention. A review of the protective factors gives the negotiator valuable information about the individual's resources, which can be used to develop an intervention plan. These issues need to be systematically explored by the negotiator because the constricted problem-solving ability of the suicidal person leads to his or her needing to be reminded that they do have resources on which to draw, even though they have not thought about them. For instance, an 18-year-old man was barricaded, drinking, and threatening himself with a gun because of the recent loss of a relationship. He was asked about his family and it was discovered that, over his parents' objections, he had moved in with the girl who had left him. He was working construction and had no health benefits, so even though he knew he needed help, he did not think he could afford it. He reported having been actively involved in his church, which did not approve of suicide, but that he had stopped going to church when he moved in with the girl. He was reminded/asked about the concern of his family, the way his religion views suicide, and that he had a family physician or counselor on whom he has counted in the past. In addition, it can be pointed out to him that there are effective ways of coping with loss that he may not have thought about—such as short-term counseling, which is available inexpensively through community clinics. Finally, it could be pointed out that alcohol is a depressant and makes him feel even worse, and there are programs to help people with the drinking that might offer a face-saving option for him. systematic exploration and use of the protection factors will help negotiators intervene.

Ivey and Ivey (2008) suggest that counseling be done from a perspective of health and strength. They suggest that an essential feature of assessment is identifying the person's resources. This assessment is essential to intervention with suicidal people. A systematic evaluation of the person's strengths not only gives negotiators examples from the person's life that can help him or her strengthen the suicidal person's sense of self-efficacy and self-esteem, but it helps restore the person's sense of worth by focusing on their strengths. The very act of remembering positive events focuses the person on the life-sustaining side of their ambivalence.

Case Study Revisited: Assessing Suicide Potential. In dealing with the barricaded subject described above, an assessment of his suicide potential was made. Using the criteria discussed above, he was assessed to have a high potential for suicide. His daughters reported the

statements he made about joining his wife soon and his instructions to her to be sure and check the note he left in the envelope. He clearly had the intent. His plan involved a deadly method, firearms and barbiturates that he had available. He had cut himself off from his social support. He endorsed a set of beliefs that justified assisted suicide.

In addition, the protective factors were assessed. He had no access to care because he was unwilling to go to a mental health professional because of the embarrassment of being a highly regarded professional who could not care for himself. He had cut himself off from his usual health care provider and family. Though his religious beliefs may have been protective, he had quit going to Mass. He needed to get back in touch with his resources.

It is helpful for negotiators to keep a suicide assessment checklist, such as the one in [Figure 7.2](#), to remind them of the information they need. Not only does such an assessment give them a way of keeping track of important information, it frequently helps focus the suicidal person's attention on times in the past when things were better or on similar situations the person dealt with effectively. As a

Suicide Checklist		
Current Plan		
Location of Suicide	Public	Private
Lethality of Plan	Pills	Gun
Prior Attempts		
Self	Yes	No
Significant Other	Yes	No
Resources		
Lifestyle	Stable	Unstable
Alcohol/Drug Abuse	No	Yes
Hostility toward Negotiator	No	Yes
Current Personality	Mentally Ill	Normal
Past Psychiatric HX	Yes	No
Past Coping Abilities	Poor	Good
Daily Activities	Active	Passive
Daily Functioning	Passive	Active
Family Life	Chaotic	Intimate
Social Life	Withdrawn	Active
Depression	Severe	Mild
Anxiety	Severe	Mild

Strategies
1. BUILD RAPPORT
Introduce self and ask how you can help
Let them know that you take their threat seriously
Listen attentively and communicate understanding
Reflect feelings and do not argue with them about how they feel
Do not hesitate to talk to person about suicidal plan
Expect them to need to be reassured about your sincerity
Offer food, drink, candy, etc. (not alcohol)
2. MAKE ENVIRONMENT SAFE
Could you put the _____ down for now?
3. EVALUATE SUICIDE POTENTIAL (see above)
4. TRY TO GET MORE INFORMATION ABOUT PROBLEM
Tell me what's been going on
5. SUPPORT THE LIFE-SEEKING PART OF THE PERSON
I know you are hurting but part of you wants to see hope
It can get better; let's see what we can figure out
6. FOCUS ON ONE PROBLEM AT A TIME, BEGINNING WITH THE MAIN ONE
7. EXPLORE ALTERNATIVES THE PERSON HAS TRIED TO SOLVE PROBLEMS AND OFFER OTHERS
8. TRY TO GET A NON-SUICIDE CONTRACT
9. PLAN A CONCRETE COURSE OF ACTION, INCLUDING CONTACT WITH FRIENDS AND FAMILY
10. IMMEDIATE REFERRAL TO HOSPITAL, MHMR, OR DOCTOR
11. DEBRIEF FAMILY
12. Foster HOPE:
Persistence
Pervasiveness
Personal

FIGURE 7.2 Suicide potential checklist.

checklist, it is a guide to the information that negotiators and mental health professionals need to keep in mind in estimating the person's degree of risk. It is not a systematic test of suicide potential.

Controlling and Contracting: Intervention

Intervention involves helping the suicidal subject find hope; helping him or her move from a focus on the past and its losses and failures, through the here and now, to look to the future, seeing options he or she does not see. It involves working toward a plan or contract with the subject that reduces the threat to life and encourages his or her desire to live. To instill hope, the negotiator needs to get the suicidal person to challenge two ideas: (1) the pain will last forever, and (2) the loss is everything. According to Seligman (1990), it is these dimensions of permanence and persuasiveness that lead to hopelessness and helplessness.

In helping people challenge their belief that the pain will last forever, their past can be used. If they have had depressive episodes in the past, it is helpful to remind them that they have been through pain before and it got better; it will get better again. Frequently, time has already elapsed since the person's losses or frustrations. It is rare that someone is equally depressed that entire time. Their attention can be drawn to the fact that they have had times when they felt better, even since their loss. It helps them realize that feelings do change. Even

the smallest change for the better can be reinforced by the negotiator.

Factual information, such as “90 percent of people get depressed and it lasts six to eight weeks,” is helpful to introduce into the negotiations after a good relationship is established. Such information helps the person realize that his or her condition is temporary.

During the assessment, the negotiator can obtain information about the person’s activities, family, and friends, which is helpful in challenging the assumption that the loss has ruined his whole life. Frequently, it is the social withdrawal that has made him feel that the loss has affected everything. By asking how often he has contacted his friends and family about his problems or what they think about his problem, he can be reminded that there are others in his life. It also suggests that he can reach out. For instance, one suicidal person was convinced to give life another try when the negotiator reminded him of how close he had been to his niece and how difficult it was going to be for her to understand why her favorite uncle had left her.

Additionally, Living Works (1999) has suggested that the following are components of a good intervention with people who are suicidal:

1. The plan needs to be specific—What is going to be done about the subject’s needs, when it is going to be done, how it is going to happen, and when it is going to happen; all have to be clearly and specifically spelled out for them. People who are suicidal are frequently literal and need a step-by-step plan in order to feel that there is hope for them.
2. The plan needs limited objectives—It is not likely to solve all the person’s problems, nor does it need to. The intervention just needs to make a start on addressing the person’s concerns and showing him or her that there is help available and hope for the future.
3. The plan needs the commitment of the subject—It is important for the subject to commit to trying the plan. It does no good to develop a plan the person does not intend to stick with. Asking the person to repeat the plan and to discuss any reservations they might have about it helps the negotiator check on the degree to which the subject understands and is committed to the plan.
4. The plan needs to include crisis support in the event the plan cannot be carried out by the subject.
5. The plan needs to provide for a suicide-safe environment.

Lanceley (1999) suggests the following guidelines for managing suicidal individuals:

1. Explore feelings through active listening.
2. Let the person express anger.
3. Focus on the cause of the problem.
4. Talk openly about the reality of death.
5. Have person describe suicide as fantasized and disrupt plan.
6. Explore what the subject still finds meaningful in life.
7. Stall for time.
8. Put the plan into perspective by exploring how well it achieves its purpose.
9. Help him choose an alternative that achieves his purpose.

The motivational interviewing principles discussed in [Chapter 3](#) are helpful tools in facilitating the resolution of the person's ambivalence about living and dying. Refocusing him on reasons dying is a bad idea and living is a good idea helps resolve ambivalence and may get him unstuck. Negotiators need to remember to ask questions that allow the person to give the negotiator the reasons, rather than trying to sell the person on living, unless the person asks for the negotiator's opinion and/or advice.

The FBI (2003) suggests some of the reasons people decide to live, on which a negotiator can focus the suicidal person (focusing them on the positive side of the ambivalence). They include:

- Came to believe that they could eventually cope with and survive the crisis/loss
- Did not want to cause grief or hardship to their family
- Concerns about the effect of the suicide on their children

Strentz (2012, 2013), from his experience as a long-time negotiator with the FBI, has suggested several tactics in dealing with the depressed and suicidal person. They include:

1. Evaluate the pre-incident behavior
 - a. Recent losses; health, wealth, status, prestige, or relationship?
 - b. Giving away treasures?
 - c. Talk of not being here?
 - d. Recent act of violence?
 - e. Did the actor commit an act to draw police attention to him?
 - f. Deadline for own death?
2. Use the CPR method to evaluate at the scene:
 - a. Current plan – lethality, timing, public or private, preparation, etc.
 - b. Prior attempts by actor or significant other—family member, friend, etc.
 - c. Resources available—for committing suicide or for supporting efforts to live
3. Use the following negotiation tactics:
 - a. Communicate care and concern.
 - b. Use ALS and slow down.
 - c. Establish rapport.
 - d. Listen closely.
 - e. Ask about suicidal plans directly.
 - f. Is plan likely to be effective (the extent of damage they can do).
 - g. Focus on hope of a solution; not on the solutions.
 - h. Establish a plan that deals with one step at a time.
 - i. Gain success on one small issue before moving to another.

Finally, Lanceley (2004) has raised some interesting points about negotiators' encounters with suicidal people and others' experiences. He suggests that the people officers deal with on the

streets who are threatening or attempting suicide are different than those with whom suicide crisis lines deal. After interviewing negotiators who were present when 28 people with whom they were negotiating committed suicide, he suggested:

1. Negotiators need to use their rank to establish their power and authority; they need to assume the position of a doctor—an authority who cares about the actor but is not a friend.
2. That except for SbC, actors who complete suicide are calm; a sudden change of mood is not a reliable indicator in people who are intent on committing suicide.
3. Depressed, suicidal persons tell outrageous lies on many occasions.
4. Alcohol and/or other drug use is not necessarily a risk factor.
5. The usual indicators of risk do not apply.
6. The goal for negotiators in suicide cases is to convince the subject to accept help and that the negotiator can provide help.
7. Suicide-by-cop scenarios look different from “regular” suicides.
8. If the subject wants to die and has no fear of the tactical team, containment can become a dangerous illusion.
9. The *quid-pro-quo* position is a hostage negotiation idea and not appropriate for suicide cases.
10. Lawsuits arise where there is a bad outcome—expect them.
11. Negotiators need to keep good logs.

Case Study: Suicidal Physician

He was a 78-year-old retired physician who had lost his wife of 46 years to cancer six months earlier. His daughter came to visit after not hearing from him for two weeks and found him living in squalor. She asked him to come home with her and he refused, stating that, “It doesn’t matter. I will be with Jean (his deceased wife) soon.” The daughter did not know how to interpret his statement, thinking initially that he was saying that he was physically ill. When she called the next day, he sounded “down” and refused to let her come over stating that he had two things to do and that she needed to check the envelope he was leaving on his dining room table. She called the police to make a welfare check. The patrol officer responding to the call got no response when he knocked on the door. He looked through the window and saw the man sitting in a chair with a gun and a bottle of pills in his hands. When the subject saw the officer, he pointed the gun in the officer’s direction and told him to get away from his door. The officer withdrew and called the Crisis Response Team. Negotiators interviewed the man’s daughter and found out that he had a history of depression which he masked by self-medicating, usually using stimulants. His father had committed suicide when he was in medical school, but he had never talked about it with family members. He talked about supporting the idea of assisted suicide for people who had no hope of recovery from terminal medical conditions and did not want to be a burden to their families. He had retired from medicine because he had diabetes and was losing his eyesight. The daughter reported a good relationship with her father over the years and that she had two children who loved to spend time with “Pops.” He had two good friends who were still practicing medicine, one of whom was his family physician. Until recently, they had gotten together for coffee several times a week. He had been a strict Catholic, attending Mass regularly until his wife died. Since then, he had become more withdrawn.

Case Study Revisited: After gathering enough intelligence to make an educated guess about the doctor’s risk, negotiators developed a plan that focused on allowing him to talk about his losses, refining the assessed risk, reinforcing past successes and coping skills, possibly using the grandchildren as “hooks,” and focusing him on the resources he had trusted in the past (his physician friends). Negotiators contacted the doctor, using the telephone in his house. He

answered and the negotiator introduced himself as a negotiator with the police department and that they were asked to check on him by his daughter who was worried that she could not contact him. He told the negotiator to “leave me alone,” but did not hang up. The fact that he answered was considered a good initial sign. His thinking was slowed and his speech was slurred. Therefore, the negotiator immediately stated that he understood that he had lost his wife recently and that it must be hard without her. The doctor responded that the negotiator had no idea how hard. The negotiator took advantage of the opening and said, “You are right, I don’t know how hard it is for you. Tell me what you miss about your wife.” He then paused to let the doctor respond. The doctor recounted several stories in which his wife had taken care of things over the years, including the children, the finances, their social schedule, and the house. He stated that he was at a loss without her. He could not seem to get organized. The negotiator responded that the doctor seemed at a loss without his wife. The doctor said, “That’s it. I can’t function without her. I am looking at the bills stack up and I don’t know where to start on them.” The negotiator noticed a slight increase in the man’s rate of speech. However, still being concerned about the slurred speech, he said, “You seem to be pretty down. It has been my experience that when people are down after recent losses, they sometimes think about killing themselves. I wonder if that is what is on your mind, today?” The doctor responded with a quiet, “yes” and a sigh. Again taking advantage of what he thought was his opening, the negotiator followed up with, “How have you thought about doing it?” The doctor said, yes, he was going to overdose on the barbiturates he had in the house because he did not want his family to see him all messed up if he shot himself. The negotiator asked if the man had already taken anything and he stated that he had not. The negotiator asked when and where he was planning to die, to see how detailed the plan was and if there was a need for immediate action. The doctor said, “today, after you leave.” Being concerned about the doctor’s safety, the negotiator asked if he had the gun in his hand and asked him to put it on the table, so that there were no accidents while the two of them were talking. The doctor agreed. Refocusing the discussion, the negotiator asked what things he was having particular problems organizing. The response was, “everything,” to which the negotiator said, “It sounds like you are so depressed that it is hard to get anything done.” The response was, “You are absolutely correct. I just don’t have the energy for anything, anymore. I am so worthless.” The negotiator responded with, “What would you tell a patient who told you that they were so depressed that they could not get anything done?” He said that he would reassure him and suggest antidepressants. The negotiator asked what was keeping him from taking his own advice. He said, “It isn’t worth it. Besides what would people think if they knew that I had to take antidepressants?” The negotiator replied that they would probably think that he was able to care for himself just like he had taken care of them. After several interchanges in which the negotiator pointed out that anybody who was capable of running a successful practice could learn the things that his wife had done for him and that he had family who cared for him and would support him while he was learning, the doctor agreed to consult with his friend, the family practice physician about antidepressants. The negotiator responded with, “When? How about I take you, today?” The doctor agreed to go with the negotiator to see his friend. After he repeated the plan to the negotiator, he put the gun down and came out of the house.

Transferring Responsibility

In [Chapter 3](#), the importance of transferring responsibility for the person was discussed. Nowhere is it more important for negotiators to plan for this step than with suicidal people. Negotiators may have connected with the person, helped them resolve their ambivalence about living and dying for the moment, and gotten them to give up their current attempt, but negotiators are available to suicidal people beyond the temporary contact developed during the incident. The subject, on the other hand, may have a recurrence of their pain, the ambivalence they feel about living, their sense of isolation and loneliness. Suicide may become a viable option again. In fact, research has shown that one suicide attempt increases the risk of a second one by about 80 percent. It is important that the person reconnect with the resources in their life or new ones need to be provided.

There are mental health resources in the community. The most obvious is the local hospital or mental health facility. The person may have a counselor, therapist, pastoral counselor, psychiatrist, psychologist, or clinical social worker to whom they can be referred. A pastor may be acceptable to them, because it is a referral that gets around the stigma of “being crazy.” If there is a continuing concern about the person’s current potential for committing suicide, transporting them to a hospital or mental health clinic for an in-depth evaluation, hospitalization, and treatment may be appropriate. Most states give police officers statutory authority to take the suicidal person into temporary custody if they are mentally ill, are suicidal or homicidal, and there is no time to get a warrant. If the negotiator’s department has CIT officers, they can assist in this process. On the other hand, taking them voluntarily to a mental health facility, hospital, or their mental health provider may be part of the agreement the negotiator works out with the person during negotiations—they may go voluntarily.

A major resource for the person may have been contacted by negotiators during the incident. Friends and family members may have provided intelligence. They may be concerned and willing to connect with and follow the suicidal person after the incident. There are several issues in arranging for friends and family to be available as a resource to the suicidal person. They include the acceptability of the resource to the suicidal person and the resource’s attitude, their availability, and their knowledge.

Negotiators need to ask the suicidal person about their relationship with the friend or family member. Like assessing the relationship with a TPI, the nature and quality of the existing relationship can add to or subtract from the family member’s acceptability. For instance, if a family member has been aggressive in trying to make decisions and force changes in the suicidal person’s way of living, they may not be an acceptable resource for the person. If the triggering incident was a fight with the family member and it was part of an ongoing dispute between the two, the family member is probably not the best resource.

Negotiators need to assess the resource’s attitude. Like a good negotiator, the resource person has to be accepting, patient, and understanding. If the family member has been supporting the suicidal person for a long period and has seen no change, they may not have the patience to continue to support him.

There are subtler reasons people are reluctant to become involved with suicidal people, including:

1. A sense of helplessness—The friend or family member does not understand the reasons for suicide and does not know how to respond when faced with it. They may not know what to do, when their significant other is talking about suicide. They may not know where to go for help or support.
2. Fear—The friend or family member may ask themselves, “What if I mess it up and she dies?”

Negotiators can deal with these issues by recognizing the ambivalence the resource person is experiencing, focusing them on the reasons that helping is good (helping them resolve their ambivalence) and providing them with resources to which they can turn for support. Community resources may include hotlines, MHA, support groups, hospital emergency rooms, etc. They will vary in each community.

It is a good idea for negotiators to develop a pocket-sized card, like the one discussed in [Chapter 3](#), as a resource guide. Negotiators can refer to it when they need information about resources that may be of use to the suicidal person and/or the support person. Carrying fact sheets that can be given to family and friends, would allow negotiators to do on-the-spot education and referral information to concerned friends and family members. At the very least, negotiators can give family, friends, and people who have been suicidal the number of the national hotline, which will put them in contact with the closest crisis center to them. For example, The National Suicide Prevention Lifeline is a 24-hour, toll-free suicide prevention service available to anyone in suicidal crisis. If help is needed, call 1-800-273-TALK (8255) (www.suicidepreventionlifeline.org). A second resource is 1-899-suicide (1-800-784-2433). Their hot-line for the deaf is 1-800-799-4TTY (1-600-4889). (www.psycom.net/depression.central.suicide.html).

Other resources about suicide are:

- American Association of Suicidology <http://www.suicidology.org/web/guest/home>
- American Psychiatric Association Practice Guidelines for the Assessment and Treatment of Patients with Suicidal Behaviors http://www.psychiatryonline.com/pracGuide/PracticePDFs/SuicidalBehavior_Inactivated_04-16-09.pdf
- American Foundation for Suicide Prevention (AFSP) <http://www.afsp.org/>
- International Association for Suicide Prevention:
- IASP Guidelines for suicide prevention www.med.uio.no/iasp/english/guidelines.html
- National Suicide Prevention Resource Center http://www.edc.org/projects/national_suicide_prevention_resource_center
- At the time of this writing, the APAs DSM-V is one month from publication. It will have new guidelines for the assessment of suicide risk the reader may want to review.
- Risk Management Foundation Harvard Medical Institutions <http://www.rmhf.harvard.edu/files/documents/suicideAs.pdf>
- Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) Suicide Assessment Five-Step Evaluation and Triage (SAFE-T) <http://store.samhsa.gov/product/SMA09-4432>
- Suicide Awareness Voices of Education <http://www.save.org>
- Suicide Prevention International <http://www.suicidepreventioninternational.org/>

- Suicide Prevention Resource Center <http://www.sprc.org/>
- WHO Suicide Prevention <http://www.who.int/mentalhealth/prevention/suicide/suicideprevent/en/>

When Negotiations are not Considered in the Response Equation

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Hostage negotiators are a select group of law enforcement officials who seek to resolve conflict with their words, before a tactical resolution becomes necessary. Negotiators provide a valuable resource for police executives and the communities they serve. When successful in the negotiation process, then lives are undoubtedly saved and tactical teams are prevented from entering into a hostile environment where we know what potentially awaits. But what happens when negotiators are taken out of the police response equation and only a tactical solution is considered? This article will explore an actual case study and examine what dire consequences might (*and did*) develop when negotiators were not considered in the response equation.

On the early afternoon of Wednesday, September 24, 2008, Olga Negron, 55, arrived at the apartment of her son Inman Morales, 35, in the Bedford-Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn, New York, to take him to his previously scheduled doctor's appointment. Inman, who had two prior psychiatric inpatient hospitalizations, was diagnosed as suffering from paranoid delusions and bipolar disorder. His most recent hospitalization was for a paranoid incident, wherein he believed that people were stalking him. There were conflicting media reports that Inman had either been noncompliant with his medication or that his medication had recently been changed and was not working effectively. When Olga knocked on her son's apartment door, he was said to have yelled "*Don't let the animals in; didn't you know the appointment was cancelled?*" Concerned for his mental well-being, she summoned the police.

Inman ignored the knocks on his apartment door by the first responding officers. They then implemented the hostage/barricaded person procedure and requested the response of their patrol supervisor and the Emergency Service Unit (ESU), *the New York Police Department's (NYPD) tactical unit responsible for managing situations involving the mentally ill and emotionally disturbed*. The procedure also includes a notification to the Hostage Negotiation Team (HNT); however, the officers neglected to do that, either because they did not thoroughly understand the procedure or because they wanted their supervisor to make that call. The procedure goes on to state that if the officers neglect to notify HNT, the task then falls to the patrol supervisor. If the patrol supervisor fails to

make that notification, the task then falls to the patrol duty captain. The issue is that the hostage team was never notified at any level of the command structure, contradictory to the NYPD procedure. As the additional police units were arriving, Inman Morales fled naked out of his third-floor window onto his fire escape. He tried to enter a neighbor's apartment without success and eventually descended to the top of a roll-down store gate awning that was 10½ feet above the ground. While standing atop the awning, he obtained a discarded eight-foot fluorescent light bulb from an old store sign and began making jabbing motions at the arriving officers, and yelling "*I'm gonna die. You're all gonna die with me.*" Shortly after, the ESU team responded, along with their supervisor. Following a quick assessment of the scene, the ESU supervisor directed one of his team members to utilize a TASER (a less-than-lethal electroshock weapon) at Inman Morales. Upon being struck by the two electrically charged TASER darts, Inman quickly became immobilized, fell from his 10½ foot perch to the ground below, broke his neck and died. The crowd that had gathered grew angry and even hostile at the way the police had just handled this situation involving a neighborhood compatriot. The police duty captain on the scene called for the mobilization of additional police reinforcements to assist in controlling the angry crowd.

Fall out

Police brass responded almost immediately by transferring both the ESU supervisor who directed the use of the TASER and the officer that fired the device. Both were placed on modified assignment (stripped of their firearm and shield) and banished to an outside administrative assignment while the investigation continued. The NYPD Deputy Commissioner of Public Information released a press statement condemning the actions of the supervisor and officer. There was a tremendous storm of worldwide media attention, where reporters and cameras set up camp in front of the supervisor's and officer's homes, hoping to catch a photo or interview. The Brooklyn District Attorney asked that the NYPD investigative branch not speak to the two officers involved, while possible criminal charges were being considered. The medical examiner deemed that the death of Inman Morales would be classified as a homicide (the killing of a human being by another human being). The commanding officer of ESU, a police inspector, was transferred and replaced by a higher ranking deputy chief, and every ESU member was ordered to attend refresher training in the proper management of encounters involving the emotionally disturbed and mentally ill. All of these reactive actions produced a negative morale issue within ESU. They believed that all of the positive work and lifesaving public acclaim that they had grown accustomed to over the years had now drastically shifted to the harsh disfavor in the eyes of both the public and the Department; this feeling was no doubt amplified deeply within the supervisor who gave the directive to utilize the TASER. They were also angry at the way they perceived their colleagues were being treated before an investigation was even concluded.

Two days after this incident occurred, Olga Negron, the mother of Inman Morales, consented to an interview with the New York *Daily News*. The dramatic headline read: “

POLICE VOWED THEY'D TAKE CARE OF HIM! " She stated that she begged the police to protect him. "They could have done something better to protect my son. He didn't have a gun, a knife or any weapon, he was just sick. The police pulled me to the side of the building. They wouldn't let me go near my son! I said, please, he's sick. He needs help! Please put a mattress under him."

On Tuesday, September 30, 2008, the day of the funeral for Inman Morales, the supervisor spoke to a *NY Newsday* reporter outside of his home; he expressed his regrets and apologies to the Morales family and friends. "I am truly sorry for what happened to Mr. Morales," he said. A photograph taken at the time of the impromptu interview and published showed the stress on his face that had no doubt taken its toll on the supervisor.

Eight days after the initial tragic incident in Bedford-Stuyvesant Brooklyn, the episode came to a catastrophic and heartbreaking climax. In the early morning hours of Thursday, October 2, 2008, the ESU supervisor who had ordered the fatal TASER shot left his suburban Long Island home and sleeping family and drove to the ESU headquarters in Floyd Bennett Field in Brooklyn. Although he was no longer assigned there, he was able to make his way undetected into the lieutenant's locker room through a rear entrance. He knew the combination number of another lieutenant's locker, opened it, and removed the firearm that was secured inside. He wrote a note indicating that he loved his wife and three children very much and that he alone ordered the other officer involved to fire the TASER. He ended his note by saying that he could not bear to lose his family and go to jail. He placed several photographs of his wife and three children around the note, sat in a chair looking out over Jamaica Bay, placed the firearm to his head and pulled the trigger, killing himself on what was his forty-sixth birthday.

Aftermath

Life confronts us all with an impossible set of demands that aren't always meant to be understood but, sometimes sadly, are meant to be accepted. In attempting to understand what had transpired over this past week with these two tragic events, one would seek to find some rational sense in a senseless set of confused circumstances. There proved to be a lot of finger pointing in a lot of different directions in its aftermath. It must be noted that there were many flaws in the way that Inman Morales, and for that matter, the ESU supervisor were managed, with the police being only the final link in the chain of blame. Perhaps if only one part of the chain-of-events equation had been changed, then conceivably these two men might be alive today. The first link in the chain of blame must go to Inman's neighbors. In the week preceding this incident he was out on the fire escape "hooting and hollering," but was coaxed back into his apartment by neighbors (Freeman, 2008). Two days prior to the incident his upstairs neighbor noted that he was "yelling and breaking things." The neighbor is said to have come downstairs and listened at the door. He heard only Inman's voice "arguing with himself" and returned to his apartment (Johnson, 2008). In both incidents, none of these neighbors called the police or an ambulance; a phenomenon known as **diffusion of responsibility** (Ciccarelli & White,

2009); a sociopsychological phenomenon whereby a person is less likely to take responsibility for action or inaction when others are present—the individual assumes that others either are responsible for taking action or have already done so; also known as **The Kitty Genovese Syndrome** after the 1964 stabbing death of Catherine “Kitty” Genovese in Queens, New York, in an assault that lasted over 30 minutes. The resulting investigation revealed that approximately 39 neighbors had heard her screams; however, no one called the police. Perhaps if Inman’s neighbors had intervened during these earlier episodes, the end result might have been utterly different.

The second link in the chain of blame must be assigned to the mental health system. Inman was on public assistance and therefore did not have access to individualized medical care. Often-times medical administrators will assess if a patient can be moved to a lower level of care equivalent to what their insurance benefits can cover. Olga Negrón was quoted as saying that her son’s medication had been changed, but was there any real monitoring or oversight by doctors with excessive patient case loads? If Inman had access to better attentive medical care, then perhaps he would not have acted out that day and a different end result might have been realized.

The third link in the chain of blame must be assigned to the police department. The fact that HNT was not notified of this incident on any level is divergent from its own procedures. This point is not designed to be so arrogant as to suggest that the outcome would have been categorically different if the negotiators were notified, but rather to make the argument that when all available resources are not utilized in a police response, incident commanders can only set in motion a course of events that will almost always lead to an undesirable end result. In Olga Negrón’s *Daily News* interview she stated that the police pulled her to the side and would not allow her to go near her son. The question here then must be: why? Negotiators would have known that Olga Negrón might have been a viable resource in connecting with her son. Perhaps the only recognizable sense of sanity in Inman’s delusional world and in this quickly unfolding chaotic scene was his mother. Negotiators would have known that utilizing her as a third party intermediary (TPI) may have had some positive effect; or maybe not! The fact remains that we will never know.

There was a host of differing emotional responses following the suicide of the supervisor by all that knew and loved him: shock, bewilderment, horror, anger, hurt, sorrow, disbelief, among many others. For me, it was a combination of all these emotions combined with a confused sense of bereavement. Why would the supervisor grant himself permission to die in such fashion when he had a strong support system in his beautiful family, friends and colleagues? What I think I know about the ritual of suicide is that there is usually no rational thought process behind the act itself. It is mostly about the spontaneous evisceration of the unrelenting subterranean emotional pain to the point that nothing else matters. Perhaps in the supervisor’s case a clue might lie in the note that he left behind. He wrote that he could not bear to lose his family and go to jail. Most of us hold two support systems very close: our family and our jobs; when we feel that we are endangered of losing both, then our lives no longer have any purpose. I also pondered some hidden thread of rational thought into his very personal decision. Maybe he saw his act as an honorable means of redemption. It appeared to me

that the supervisor might have been performing a modern-day version of the ancient Samurai ritual of Seppuku, a voluntary form of suicide used by the Samurai in keeping with the warrior honor code of Bushido for those who believed they had brought shame on their clan. A Samurai would rather die with honor in ceremonious fashion than fall into the hands of their enemies (jail).

Finally, my thoughts brought me to examine that perhaps it was a cultural arrogance that killed these two men. Negotiators like to think they can resolve a crisis incident without the use of the tactical element. Likewise, tactical officers like to think they can resolve an incident without the use of negotiators (McMains & Mullins, 2010). Although NYPD procedures clearly direct that negotiators respond on this type of incident, it did not happen. One's action, or inaction, can have a profound effect on the desired outcome, either in a positive or negative way. Procedures are put in place for a reason, mostly because they have been tried and proven effective over time. In addition to the host of emotions that I experienced over Inman's senseless death at the hands of the police and the suicide of the supervisor that followed, I remember being extremely angry (and perhaps still am) that the negotiators were not notified. Ironically, there was an on-duty negotiator in the very precinct station house of occurrence where this incident was taking place. He was assisting his partner with an arrest and was unaware of what was happening less than a mile away. He could have been there in a matter of minutes, if notified. It is the task of the incident commander to maintain the integrity of response protocols and to ensure that all available resources work in a cohesive fashion to realize the best possible outcome. The fact remains that it doesn't really matter that negotiators and tacticians have differing approaches. Both sides must better understand and appreciate the value that each side brings to the equation so that future tragedies can be avoided.

The late Thomas R. Sullivan, president of the Lieutenant's Benevolent Association, said at the supervisor's funeral: "It is worth remembering that our police officers are not supermen, but rather flesh and blood human beings who deal with life and death situations that most of us cannot even imagine on a daily basis." I dedicate this article to the memory of Inman Morales, whose only crime was that he was sick, and to my friend, the supervisor. May they both rest in eternal peace.

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Suicide by Cop: Victim-Precipitated Suicide

A subset of suicidal people is those who will do something provocative to force the police to kill them. Negotiators occasionally must deal with such a person. Van Zandt (1993) has pointed out that, in addition to being suicidal, these people are frequently aggressive. In fact, they precipitate violent confrontations in order to get the police to kill them. Recent research by Mohandie et al. (2009) has confirmed Van Zandt's observation. In examining the differences between people involved in officer-involved shootings who were judged not to be Suicide by Cop (SbC) and those that were judged to be SbC, the authors found that people in SbC were significantly more aggressive than non-SbC subjects. Such a person is an unusual combination of the Rebellious Child and the Compliant Child. He expects criticism and judgment and wants to avoid responsibility for his actions in the way Compliant Children do. At the same time, he is angry and controlling like the Rebellious Child. Therefore, it is a good idea to assess the person's risk of violence along with his suicide potential.

Prevalence: Mohandie and Meloy (2000) reviewed the research on suicide by cop and found different rates. A study of the 437 shooting cases involving officers from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office from 1987 – 1997 concluded that 13 percent of fatal officer-involved shootings and 11 percent of all officer-involved shooting were suicide-by-cop situations. The next year, the rates jumped to 25 and 27 percent for officer-involved shootings and officer-involved fatalities. A study of 240 articles about police shootings from 22 different newspapers during a period from 1980 – 1995 found evidence of possible or probable suicides in 16 percent of the cases. In looking at a second sample of 33 cases from 1992 – 1993, the researchers found evidence in 47 percent of the cases of possible suicide intent. A Canadian study found evidence of subjects posing a lethal threat to officers from British Columbia police departments in 48 percent of 58 cases studied. Whether it is a result of more sophisticated reporting or an actual increase in rates, suicide by cop is becoming an issue of great concern for negotiators. Not only does it pose a major challenge because it is generally used by subjects who have a history of the most violence, impulsiveness, and rebelliousness, but when the subject is successful, it can have a long-lasting and devastating effect on officers who have been forced to kill a subject.

Motivations: Individuals have used suicide by cop to attain both instrumental and expressive goals (Mohandie & Meloy, 2000). They may want to escape the consequences of their behavior, use a confrontation as a tool for reconciling a lost relationship, avoid the exclusionary clause for suicide in an insurance policy, avoid the moral responsibility of suicide, or force another person to kill them: all instrumental motivations. On the other hand, they may use suicide by cop to communicate helplessness and hopelessness, to make a statement about being the ultimate victim, to express their need to save face—dying rather than surrendering, to communicate their extreme need for power and control over a situation, to express pent-up rage and revenge, or to communicate something about an important personal issue, all expressive motivations.

Using a checklist like the one discussed in [Chapter 4](#), Risk Assessment, in conjunction with the Suicide Assessment Checklist gives negotiators a way of evaluating the potential for a victim-precipitated suicide. The person who scores high on both the suicide assessment and the aggression assessment poses a potentially greater risk of precipitating an incident than

does the person who is high on the suicide assessment but low on the aggression assessment. It is important for negotiators to evaluate the potential for both suicide and aggression, and then to communicate their estimates to both the field commander and the tactical team, so that everyone will be prepared for aggressive action on the part of the suicidal person.

In addition to a systematic assessment of the person's potential for aggression, negotiators need to be watchful for other indicators of victim-precipitated suicide. The indicators suggested by Van Zandt and the following factors have been associated with suicide by cop (Mohandie & Meloy, 2000):

1. Insists that "jail is not an option"
2. Threatens officers or others with a weapon
3. Attaches weapon to his or her person
4. Countdown
5. Suspect calls police on self
6. Forces confrontation with police
7. Assaults or harms victims in police presence
8. Uses "chemical courage"

Mohandie et al. (2009) recent research provides other useful information on SbC for negotiators. They found the following differences between SbC and non-SbC shooting incidents involving officers. People involved in the SbC shootings were:

1. Older.
2. They threatened suicide at the scene more.
3. They had more prior suicide ideation.
4. They had shown recent behavioral changes that got people's attention.
5. They had current relationship problems.
6. They were struggling with spiritual issue, perhaps because of religious prohibitions about suicide.
7. They were more likely to have a mental health diagnosis.
8. They were more likely to have talked about suicide and suicide by cop before the confrontation.
9. They made behavioral threats to harm others during the incident (pointed guns, putting knives to people's throats, etc.).
10. They made verbal threats toward people other than themselves and the officers at the scene.
11. They threatened suicide during the incident, in some cases specifically mentioning SbC.
12. They harmed civilians during the incident.
13. They were more likely to shoot at police.
14. They were less likely to flee from police.
15. Possessed deadly weapon (gun or knife).
16. More likely to be using alcohol.

Although the intervention with suicide by cop is the same for negotiators, special care needs

to be taken with subjects who are suspected of entertaining the idea of suicide by cop, because they will kill others to achieve their ends. Civilians need to be evacuated from the area, if at all possible. Intelligence gathering needs to include the factors found by Mohandie et al. Negotiators need to be highly aware of the risk these people pose and use proper tactics. If officers do not have appropriate cover or if the subject is putting others at risk, appropriate force is the response of choice.

Suicide Bombers

Recent events in London have underlined the fact that not all suicide bombers die. English authorities arrested 28 people believed to be involved in the two bomb attacks in London subways in 2005. Israeli officials have reported negotiating with suicide bombers who have not completed their mission. It is not out of the realm of possibility for crisis management teams to have to negotiate with suicide bombers in the United States. Therefore, it is important for negotiators to give some thought to the similarities and differences between the usual suicidal subject and suicide bombers that are involved in a political or religious cause. This section will explore some thoughts on managing incidents involving these people.

The father of Suicidology, Emile Durkheim, pointed out a century ago that there were people who sacrificed themselves for others or for a cause greater than themselves. He called these people “altruistic suicides.” The soldier in war movies who throws himself on the live grenade to save his buddies is the most common image of this kind of suicide in our culture. The point is that there are people who kill themselves for reasons other than those discussed above and it benefits negotiators to understand these people, to the degree that is possible.

Altruistic suicides are motivated by an over-identification with a group and the group's needs. It is a choice by individuals who see self-sacrifice as giving their life meaning. The goal is to benefit the group, further the cause, and enhance the general good, rather than decreasing personal pain. People in this class are acting out of a sense of duty. Durkheim (1951) cited soldiers and religious martyrs as examples of altruistic suicides. Their hope is in the cause and not in ending personal pain.

Hoffer (1951) wrote on the motivation of mass movements. He used fascism and communism as models, but his analysis could just as easily apply to religious fundamentalists. He pointed out that people who are attracted to mass movements are, in some ways, broken people. They have a fundamental sense of worthlessness, disenfranchisement and powerlessness for which they make up by joining groups that have dramatic, world-changing missions. It is the group's mission that gives the person's life meaning. They have a disregard for reality, as it exists, and want to rebuild it, either as it used to be or as it should be. In the case of Fascists, it is looking back to a better time that serves as the goal. In the case of Communism, it is looking to the future that gives the person meaning.

Ostermann (2002) stated that an important cultural consideration that negotiators needed to consider was the difference in self-concept between our culture and others. She points out that being independent and self-sufficient are seen as ways of caring for the group. In other cultures, it is the survival of the group that assures the well-being of the individual. Thus, sacrifice for the group is seen as a way of helping the self. Hammer (2002) has made a similar

point about the allegiance that Muslims feel toward their family and religion.

Strentz (1981) described the profile of the terrorist cell as being made up of three personality types:

1. the ideological thinker who is the philosopher of the group;
2. the general, who plans and leads the field activities of the group; and
3. the soldier who is the follower and carries out the plans of the other two.

He believes that there are identifiable personality styles in these three groups. For instance:

1. The idealist tends to be intellectualized, a black-and-white thinker who is compartmentalized and rigid in his or her thinking.
2. The general tends to have characteristics like the antisocial personalities we are used to working with. They are impulsive, action-oriented, and have problems living within society's rules.
3. The soldier is much like the inadequate personalities with whom we work. They look to others for leadership and care.

Sullivan (1954) suggests that obsessive personalities and inadequate personalities are formed in people who have had to learn to deal with overbearing, overcontrolling, authoritarian personalities in the significant others in their lives. Could it be that terrorists come from such environments?

West German psychologists found that there was no psychopathology as such in the groups of terrorists. Rather, the terrorists shared the following characteristics:

1. Disenfranchised, rebellious people who had unhappy childhoods.
2. Came from highly structured, authoritarian, middle-class homes.
3. Were educated but not successful in their chosen field.
4. Felt repressed and mistreated by society.
5. Thought that they were acting to defend themselves.
6. Would tolerate no doubts about the cause.
7. Engaged in either – or thinking.
8. Embraced the radical destruction and rebuilding of society based on a utopian notion of how things should be.

Terrorists may well come from a background that makes them susceptible to mass movements, just as Hoffer describes.

Hammer (2002; 2005) and Ostermann (2002) have suggested that recent suicidal acts have to be understood in the context of their culture. In Islam:

1. There is a high value placed on not shaming the family.
2. People tend to look to the past as a model for how to live now.
3. The average man relies on religious authority for guidance.
4. Obligations are not based on contracts but on relationships.
5. Emotions are openly expressed to convince people you are serious.
6. There is a prohibition against taking life, your own or others, except under tightly

defined conditions.

7. A religious edict called a *Fatwa* is needed to justify killing.
8. *Jihad* means both a justified war in which a person who loses his or her life is considered a martyr and a personal, internal, spiritual struggle.
9. Even in a Jihad, noncombatants and innocent bystanders cannot be killed.

An understanding of these issues may provide some leverage when working with Muslim suicide bombers, an issue to which we will return.

All is not bleak in negotiating with suicide bombers of the type we have been discussing. Some principles are the same as other negotiations: build rapport, raise doubts, and suggest alternatives to the actor through indirect suggestions and problem-oriented questions.

The specific recommendations for negotiations that flow from the above are:

1. In rapport building, use and expect different verbal tactics.
 - a. Expect and consider using emotional expressions. If a position is logically presented, without passion, Muslims do not think you are serious. They look at your action as a guide to your real intent. Your actions must support your real position. Our usual approach of staying calm, controlled, and expecting to defuse emotions is not likely to work in a culture that values emotional expressions.
 - b. Validating cause without validating actions allows you to deal with the person and increase your interpersonal worth to the individual without accepting his or her suicidal behavior. Like other negotiations, the suicide bomber can be validated. Their need to derive meaning from their past can be recognized. The legitimacy of their need for self-rule can be honored. Whatever their issues, it can be validated without legitimizing suicide and or murder as a way of achieving their ends. This is particularly important in reaching the soldiers who are in the carrying out the bombings.
2. Raising doubts and getting the actor to question his or her suicidal actions can be facilitated by using several ideas from Islam. They include:
 - a. *Fatwa*—a religious document that legitimizes war and killing to defend the faith. It has to be issued by a high-ranking religious official and without it, an act is not considered just. It is interesting to note that the Shi'ite Muslims who attacked the Marine barracks in Beirut did not have the blessing of their religious authorities.
 - b. Jihad—a holy war that is sanctioned by a *Fatwa*. The term refers to either an actual act of war or the spiritual war that occurs in the person as he or she struggles to become more holy. The actor can be asked which meaning of the term applies to his situation and whether he has a *Fatwa* approving his participation.
 - c. Murder of innocents—Islam prohibits the murder of innocent bystanders. Even when assassination was sanctioned, the assassin was expected to take

pains to avoid killing household members or even bodyguards. He was expected to sacrifice his own life rather than kill innocents. One tactic may be to get the actor to recognize that there are innocents involved in the incident and play on Islam's prohibition in this area.

- d. Family shame—the thing that makes Muslims capable of altruistic suicide may also be a way of raising doubts in their minds. The importance of the group over the individual starts with the family. The negotiator may make progress by asking the actor to consider how his or her suicide will affect the family. Will it bring honor or shame?

3. Suggestion

- a. Storytelling—some cultures communicate through the use of stories to make a point. The communication is indirect and metaphorical. Negotiators in our culture need to be prepared to deal with that. Finding stories in the actor's tradition and history that emphasizes the peaceful resolution of conflict may help establish your relationship with him or her and they may suggest solutions in an indirect way.

In addition, Ostermann (2002) recommends the following guidelines based on understanding cultural differences:

- Respect family and group
- Be sensitive to face issues
- Utilize suggestion and indirect communications
- Recognize that oaths and promises do not count as much as relationships
- Be aware that deadlines are less important
- Expect others to change topics frequently
- Be prepared for a fatalistic viewpoint

Summary

In conclusion, a caveat and a note of optimism: The caveat is that we are all “feeling our way” in the arena of fanatical suicide bombings. None of us have enough experience with them to be considered experts. Take what makes sense to you, think through your approach, set up training scenarios, and prepare the best you can. No one can ask any more. And stay hopeful that people are more alike than they are different. People tend to rise or sink to the level you expect. Expect the best and you just may get it, even when you have to deal with the unlikely.

Discussion Questions

1. You are negotiating with a person experiencing mood fluctuations. The hostage taker

alternates between periods of severe depression and extreme elation. When are you most likely to make negotiating progress? When is the probability the greatest that this person will commit suicide?

2. What are the most important adjustments you have to make when you are negotiating with a severely depressed person? Explain.
3. One loss that leads people to think about suicide is the loss of health—a 38-year-old man is diagnosed with renal failure and told he has to go on a dialysis machine but none are available for two weeks. What would make him consider suicide as a real option in his life?
4. Part of the definition of suicide is that it is a conscious act: people decide and can re-decide on death as an alternative. This position makes it a rational decision and not a mental health issue. Do you agree that it is a rational decision? How can a negotiator create conditions in which a person might re-decide about killing himself?
5. One way of assessing the person's risk of suicide is to assess their current plan, their prior attempts, and the resources they think are available to them. Group each of the Surgeon General's risk factors under one of these headings and explain the reasons for your placement.
6. Refer to the case study examined in this chapter. List the issues used by the negotiators in developing their intervention. Discuss other issues you, as the primary negotiator, could use in developing your plan.
7. In reviewing the intervention by the negotiators, which elements of the plan do you think were the most effective in resolving the incident? Choose three.
8. Compare the similarities and differences between altruistic suicide and the usual suicidal person negotiators encounter. How do these differences affect your approach as a negotiator?
9. When people are suicidal, they usually are not focused on their strengths, and their self-esteem (face) is low. They tend to withdraw from others who care about them. How does the withdrawal from others benefit negotiators? How would you intervene to help a suicidal person regain his or her sense of self-esteem?

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Chapter 8

Crisis Management: Negotiating with Special Populations

Chapter Outline

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References

Learning Objectives

1. Understand the general characteristics of juveniles and why they present special issues for the negotiator.
2. Know the different stages of development and what occurs in each of those stages.
3. Know the guidelines for negotiating with juveniles.
4. Know the unique challenges presented by gang members.
5. Know the guidelines for negotiating with gang members.
6. Know how aging affects the individual.
7. Know the various central nervous system diseases that affect the elderly.
8. Know the progression of dementia and Alzheimer's.
9. Understand the issues of suicide among the elderly.
10. Know the guidelines for negotiating with the elderly.
11. Know the issues specific to the warfighter population: Battlemind, PTSD, TBI, and MST.
12. Understand the differences in being able to affect behavior when dealing with someone experiencing Battlemind, PTSD, or MST and not being able to affect behavior when dealing with someone with TBI (or Alzheimer's).
13. Know the guidelines for negotiating with the warfighter.
14. Understand the personality and other characteristics of suicide bombers.
15. Know the guidelines for negotiating with suicide bombers.
16. Understand and recognize the special challenges of negotiating with a police officer.
17. Know the guidelines for negotiating with a police officer.

Negotiators were called to 123 Elm Street regarding a domestic disturbance. Upon arrival, negotiators called the home and spoke with Jane, a 37-year-old lady who told them her father John, aged 87, had shot and killed his wife of 61 years and had now put a plan in place to kill himself by overdosing on prescription medication. She told negotiators to leave the property or she would "take care of them" so they could not interfere with her father. When negotiators told her they needed to speak with her father and stop his suicide, Jane got extremely agitated and fired a gun several times inside the house. Negotiators did notice that she spoke slowly and her words appeared to be slurred. Negotiators surmised she was intoxicated. Jane then slammed the phone down and refused to answer it when negotiators called back.

After a couple more phone attempts, the phone was finally answered by John, who stated he had found his prescription medication and took all 25 pills in the bottle. He refused to name the medication and dropped the phone. During intelligence gathering, negotiators discovered the following intelligence about the family: (1) Mary had recently been diagnosed with an inoperable brain tumor that would ultimately lead to her death within about 15 months, (2) John was in Stage 5 of Alzheimer's and his doctor said he had about six months (at the outside) to live, and (3) Jane was a career Army officer who had been discharged medically for severe TBI received while serving in Afghanistan.

SWAT was able to introduce a throw phone, whereupon shots were fired out the window. The IC told everyone to "hold position." Negotiators began ringing the throw phone, and after approximately 90 seconds, Jane answered, and began "babbling" about insurgents attacking the forward operations base (FOB). Negotiators tried to reassure her they were not insurgents, but Jane insisted they were lying and this was all a ploy to get inside the T-walls.

The primary slowed her rate of speech and began using shorter words and sentences. After about 30 minutes, Jane began to settle down some. The negotiator asked Jane to go into the bedroom. Every time she did, Jane insisted she was in the bedroom. The negotiator asked Jane to look in a mirror, which she did and then asked the negotiator, "Who is that in my house?" Believing the brain injury may involve the parietal lobe, the negotiator asked SWAT to get an officer near the window closest to the front door and put a big red square of "something" on the window. A SWAT officer hung a red bandana. The negotiator asked Jane to look at all the windows until she saw the red square. When Jane said she saw it, the negotiator asked her to move to that window and open the closest door and step through the door. Jane slowly moved to the window, opened the door, and stepped through. A tactical officer stepped in behind her, took her gun (Jane offered no resistance, just standing still and relaxed), and slowly led her off the porch and over to the intelligence officer, who took control of Jane.

Officers entered the house and found John sitting in a chair. When officers called his name and asked if he was okay,

John called the officer “Frank” and said, “Set up the checker board.” The officer walked over, took hold of John’s arm and said, “Why don’t you stand up and come with me.” John replied, “Are we going to see Mary?” While attempting to stand, John passed out. officers noticed his prescription medication bottle was open and empty, and found a note written by John, which said he was not going to watch his wife suffer, that he was not going to lose all of his assets fighting an illness that had no cure, that he would be dead long before her, that their daughter had severe brain injury from her military service and wasn’t able to care for Mary, and he couldn’t trust the medical care system to tend to his wife.

The above scenario illustrates two of the special populations negotiators are encountering on a more frequent basis: warfighters and the elderly. These are not the only two, however. Negotiators are responding with ever-greater frequency to negotiate with “special” populations. Murder/suicide rates among the elderly (and negotiations) are increasing in frequency and are expected to continue rising for the next several decades (MSNBC, 2007). Hostage taking, barricading, and suicide rates among juveniles are increasing (Bridge et al., 2008). Negotiators and police are dealing more and more with returning warfighters and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq wind down, stress-related issues, suicide rates, and other issues will continue to increase among warfighters. Police are asked to intervene with warfighters experiencing these and other issues on a regular basis. In addition, barricade and hostage-taking incidents among juveniles are increasing.

In general, suicide rates in the United States are on the increase, and this accounts for some of the increase in incidents negotiators are seeing. The American Foundation for Suicide Prevention (AFSP, 2013) reported that the U.S. suicide rate increased by 3.9% between 2009 and 2010. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (2013) reported juvenile and teen suicide attempts have been on the increase for the past several years. Elderly suicide rates have been steadily increasing, with murder – suicide becoming much more common. Reese (2013) reported that among those aged 55-above, the murder-suicide rate increased from 21% in 2002 to 25% in 2011. Warfighter suicide rates are also on the increase (Kemp & Bossarte, 2013), from a rate of 18 suicides per day in 2007, to 22 per day in 2013. It should be noted the warfighter suicide/day rate was 20.

In addition to suicide, negotiators are responding to an increased number of incidents involving these special populations for the same reasons they are responding to all incidents: relationship problems, lack of problem-solving ability, diminished cognitive function, lack of emotional control, not knowing how to solve a personal crisis, and so on.

This chapter will address these special populations and provide information negotiators can use to successfully resolve these incidents. In a nutshell, the basic negotiation principles apply with these populations. Allowing for ventilation and validation, use of active listening skills, problem-solving, dealing with demands, and the other principles previously discussed are all to be used with members of these groups. This chapter will focus on some specific issues that negotiators need to attend to when negotiating with members of these groups.

Juvenile Issues for Negotiators

Juveniles discussed in this section include youths ranging in age from 9 to 24 years of age. These youths are often referred to as the “Millennial” or “Y” generation. Nationally, they number about 75 million (Oblinger, 2003). It is important to note that this section will speak of

this generation in very general terms and will generalize among this entire generation. These generalizations should be viewed as very loose guidelines, with exceptions being the norm rather than the outlier. To characterize 75 million people as being the same is fraught with problems and oversimplifies an entire generation. But for purposes of providing information for negotiators, these generalizations provide a framework for beginning negotiations and intelligence gathering.

Among any one university class of the authors (and among friends of their children), many of the following generalizations and characteristics of this generation do not hold sway, just as they do not with many juveniles the reader may know. The Millennial Generation fills the continuum of the best of the best to the worst of the worst. When needed in the war on terrorism, this generation answered the call. Those that did were and will be forged on the field of battle, in the leading laboratories of science, in the halls of business and industry, and in the corridors of government. Those are not the ones of the Millennial Generation negotiators will deal with. Negotiators will deal with the juveniles at the other end of the continuum. Knowing the general characteristics of this generation allows one to determine where to look for the exception. For example, one question this author often asks his classes is how often they hand-write a letter. Out of roughly 250 students that have been asked, most indicate they have *never* handwritten a letter, and many of those indicate they have *never* written a formal letter. From their answer, I can then query those who have reported writing a letter (the outliers) the type of letter, to whom, implement they used to write (pencil, ballpoint, fountain pen, rollerball, etc.), frequency of writing, last time they wrote a letter, and other questions. So, using the generalization, I can then “home in on” the relevant questions to determine information about letter-writing behavior (as an interesting aside, when I ask about type of implement, one of the most frequently asked return questions is “What is a fountain pen?”). For the negotiator, the general characteristics contained in this section should be treated the same way—as a *starting point*. The same is true of the characteristics and generalizations presented later concerning the elderly and warfighters (and to some extent, terrorists).

Characteristics of juveniles

The Millennial Generation (9 – 24 years of age) were born and raised in a period of economic and material prosperity. They have never known recession or depression, a situation that is changing as this chapter is being prepared. They tend to be highly individualistic, and have little trust for “institutions” and organizational/societal structures. Having developed in times of prosperity, they were usually given the material goods they wanted (and those they needed), so their focus in life tends to be on the quality of life rather than amassing money and “things.” In contrast, to the G.I. Generation, born 1901 – 1924, and who lived through the Great Depression, saving money and “things” are more critical. A life of prosperity has also shaped their worldview, which tends to be optimistic and somewhat unrealistic. When things do go wrong in their life or the world, there is an assumption that technology can correct it. If they get sick, medical technology will cure them. If things break, get the newer version. They are a throw-away generation. If something breaks, replace, not repair. [Figure 8.1](#) lists some of the traits and characteristics that define many juveniles who are members of the Millennial

Generation.

Individualistic, not conforming
Do not trust “institutions” and organizational/societal structures
Quality of one’s life is more important than “things” or money
World view is optimistic and unrealistic
Believe technology can fix anything
Work does not define life:
No loyalty to organization
No expectation of job security
A job is something to do until something better comes along
Verbal skills are better than writing skills
Fight/flight generation
Unattended, undisciplined, and unskilled
Have never learned how to deal with losing
Alcohol, drug, and other addictions at highest levels ever
Desensitized to violence and sexual behavior
Information overload
Learning difficulties:
Do not learn as well as previous generations
Poorer retention rates
Poor abstract learning ability, much better with concrete learning
Communicate by text messaging and e-mail

FIGURE 8.1 Generalized characteristics of the millennial or “Y” generation, those youths between 9 and 24 years of age.

They are not organizationally loyal, viewing work as something to do rather than seeing work as defining their life. The organization is not a major component of their self-image. Thus, many have no expectation of either a career or job security. Changing jobs, job categories, or job fields is of little importance. Many who are working full-time see their job as a mere stop-over in life’s journey and a place to stay until something better comes along. Unlike their parents and grandparents, they have no expectation of spending 20, 30, or 40 years at one institution. To the Millennial Generation, a job is only good until something better comes along (Oblinger, 2003).

Their verbal skills are better than their writing skills (although their verbal skills are not as good as those of previous generations). In part, their socialization patterns are much different from previous generations, and they do not verbally interact nor practice in educational settings like previous generations. In fact, for many, the preferred method of communicating with peers and others is via text-messaging. Because of a lack of adequate communication skills, they are a “flight/fight” generation (Oblinger, 2003). Rates of school violence, bullying, assaults, domestic violence, road rage incidents, sports-related violence, and stalking are higher than ever before. When people cannot communicate effectively, the only options open are to fight or to flee. Thomas (2004) reported that in 2003, juveniles committed 2,000 murders and manslaughters, 5,300 forcible rapes, 32,500 robberies, and 72,300 aggravated assaults.

Many in the Millennial Generation grew up in an environment that left them unattended,

undisciplined, and unskilled (Mullins, 2008b). They are a “latchkey” generation. For many, both parents worked full-time jobs, so these juveniles were left to their own devices at home and after school hours. Unlike their parents, many in this generation experienced a lack of discipline. Neighbors, teachers, non-parental adults, and others refused to provide adequate discipline, often out of fear of litigation. For many of this generation, parents do not provide adequate or needed discipline. While this generation is providing the largest growing labor pool in the country, they are also providing the fastest growing segment of the workplace—the unskilled laborer. They are a generation that was taught to highly value self-esteem at the expense of self-worth. That is, one’s value to oneself is more important than one’s ability to contribute to the group. But again, it is important to reinforce the fact that these are very loose generalizations for an entire generation and are certainly not true for many in this generation. As an example, one trend seen among college students is to spend spring break assisting in society rather than going to some resort for a week-long party. Students by the thousands are foregoing the party to instead spend their time working for the good of society. Many volunteer with Habitat for Humanity, going to New Orleans and Galveston and helping to rebuild communities, volunteering for charities and other work projects. But those are not the juveniles negotiators will encounter.

This is a generation that has not learned how to lose. The majority have never faced adversity in life, they have played sports where no one loses, they do not interact with their peers while growing up like generations past, and they have never been placed in learning situations where failure is a real option. When then faced with adversity, they do not know how to respond and engage in inappropriate behaviors that then lead to police or negotiator intervention. As a corollary, by not knowing how to deal with adversity, many turn to alcohol, drugs, or other addictive behaviors in order to cope. Alcohol and drug addiction is at the highest levels ever, in part due to this generation not knowing how to confront adversity (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2008). As the economy worsens, these addictive behaviors can be expected to increase even more.

This is a generation desensitized to violence and the effects of violence. From television shows, to movies, to video games, to the Internet, this generation sees violence everywhere they turn and at every level. If someone dies, so what—just hit the “reset” button. Look at the popularity of shows such as *CSI* (and their spin-offs, *CSI: Miami* and *CSI: New York*), *Eleventh Hour*, *ER*, and other dramatic TV shows. Graphic violence is a staple and regular component of those shows. Similarly, they are assaulted with sex and the importance of sex. Nothing has been left to their imaginations. And like addictions, as one becomes more inured to violence and sex, it takes ever more to achieve the same level of arousal. Normal becomes routine, deviant becomes exciting. Over time, deviance becomes normal and unexciting and then has to be ratcheted up even more. For males of this generation, the number one visited Internet sites are pornographic sites. Among juveniles, media exposure to sexual content (i.e., music, movies, television, magazines) is predictive of sexual behavior (Brown et al., 2006). The more the exposure in the media, the greater the amount of activity.

There is too much information available to this generation. They are assaulted with information from every direction. There is more information available than they can process or use, which leads to frustration, anger, and cognitive dissonance. Information overload leads to even further communication difficulties and breakdowns. Further, information overload

leads to difficulties in learning, poorer retention rates, and less ability to think abstractly. This generation has difficulty thinking in the abstract. They are much better at learning and processing concrete information (Biocca, 2000).

In terms of communication styles and abilities, the Millennial Generation has grown up using text messaging and e-mail as preferred methods of communication. In 2008, for example, more text messages were sent than phone calls made, and more text messages were sent than there are people on the planet (Nielsen Wire, 2008). As one student related, most do not “ask” for a date, they text message about “hooking up.”

Developmental Issues for Negotiators

As youths progress through the teens, there are some developmental issues relevant for negotiators. In the early teen years (12 to 14 – 15 years of age), juveniles are experiencing hormonal changes and the beginning of interest in sexual desire (National Youth Development Information Center, 2008). Most identify more closely with members of the same sex and are somewhat shy and afraid of members of the opposite sex. Peer pressure is extremely powerful and exerts the major influence on their behavior. Thus, the young teen has tremendous loyalty to their peers. They also experience large and rapid growth spurts, which are not only unsettling, but lead to embarrassment and some shame when teased by their peers. But the young teen in this age group believes they know everything about everything, which can make them somewhat obnoxious to adults trying to deal with them.

In mid-adolescence (13 to 16 – 17 years of age) these individuals are dealing with physical growth and increased sexuality. Both sexes are experiencing hormonal changes, and at different rates (girls develop more quickly). For females, estrogen starts at 12 – 13 years of age, males start producing androgen at 13 – 14 years of age. By mid-adolescence, however, males have surpassed females in height and weight (McMains & Mullins, 2006).

It is at this age that critical thinking skills develop. The teen is able to gather information, sort it meaningfully by category and use it to solve problems. They can evaluate their own and others' ideas. As a result, their use of irony and sarcasm increase. Teens in this age group also start thinking abstractly, being able to think about issues without them having been defined by specific experiences.

Psychosocially, the teen forms an identity of self and their belief systems. They often question their parents and other adults, pointing out flaws in adult thinking, lifestyle, values, morals, and ethical conduct. They start searching for other models in an effort to demonstrate their competence and reinforce their new sense of independence. There is tremendous pressure to conform to the peer group. Teens will do things they would not normally do, nor like to do in order to conform to peers. Teens in this age group tend to revolt from societal norms and look at alternative lifestyles. To some, this can lead to an increasing sense of alienation. Especially relevant to negotiators, teens in this age group will often use projection when they get in trouble. That is, when things go wrong, it is someone else's fault (“They saw me riding my motorbike. They should have moved out of the way.”).



PHOTO 8.1 Sgt. Joe Jimenez from the Richardson (TX) Police Department. Joe authored Box 8.1 in this chapter and has served for years as a head evaluator at the Hostage Negotiation Competition held at Texas State University – San Marcos, TX, every January.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

In late adolescence (16 years of age to maturity, which can differ, but ranges from about 19 – 30), teens make many decisions concerning the path their life will take. Biologically, development reaches its peak (Nairne, 2003), motor skills become adult-like, coordination develops to its fullest, the brain reaches full size and continues to make new connections between neurons, and learning continues even though neurological development seems to stop.

Cognitively, problem-solving skills continue to develop, as does experienced-based learning away from home. Many seek out other learning opportunities. Abstract thinking develops more fully, although drugs, alcohol, deprived environments, etc. can slow or stop cognitive development.

Psychosocially, the teen's identity becomes defined by their opposition to adults. They believe they are the first to ever have an original thought, adults are ignorant/uncaring/indifferent, and there is no need to listen to adults. Physical intimacy becomes more important than ever. Peer pressure and group affiliation becomes less important than one-on-one relationships. The power of the group diminishes in favor of the power of the "significant other." They become more assertive and aggressive with parents and other adults, but many may not be able to distinguish between the two. This period of development also leads to developing a sense of what they want to do for a living and how they want to contribute. The teen may find his or her career identity in a gang, the military, etc.

[Negotiation Guidelines for Juveniles](#)

As with most other groups, negotiators are most likely to come into contact and have to negotiate with juveniles who are not well-adjusted, are not handling the growth and maturity process well, do not have the needed skills to progress to adulthood, and have not developed

or acquired the skills necessary to solve difficult and personal problems. It is imperative that negotiators remember the cognitive, emotional, and psychological limitations of juveniles when negotiating. Thomas (2004) suggested that juveniles are motivated by one of three things when involved in a critical incident: (1) they may be seeking attention and recognition from peers, parents, authority figures, etc.; (2) they may be acting out in anger over a real or perceived wrong; (3) they may be engaging in the act for revenge to get back at people who have humiliated them and/or caused them to lose face.

[Figure 8.2](#) summarizes many of the negotiation guidelines that should be used with juveniles. Only some of the more important will be discussed here. First, negotiators should do a suicide assessment and then constantly monitor for suicidal intent. Many adolescents may see suicide as a way of gaining attention, and may not realize the permanence of their act. For others, such as in homicide/suicide acts (i.e., school shooters), the incident may be their way of making a statement and leaving their legacy. One of the most critical guidelines for negotiators is to focus on solving the immediate crisis. The juvenile will attempt to engage the negotiator in trying to problem-solve life issues and many issues tangential to the pressing crisis. It is important that the negotiator redirect focus back on the immediate crisis and offer solutions to resolve that crisis. It is quite acceptable to suggest resources the juvenile can later use to help resolve some of his or her other life issues.

The negotiator should avoid being a “parent” or other authority figure in most cases (in some cases, however, the negotiator can use authority to their advantage). Most teens are rebellious and resent authority figures. Strive to become a peer rather than a leader. Most teens will be more responsive to an ally than adults in crisis. On a related note, many teens feel powerless in society, and believe that the world does not think they have the knowledge, skills, or abilities to contribute to society in a positive manner, so they feel abandoned and rejected by the world. By engaging the juvenile as a partner, the negotiator can increase their sense of belonging, contributing, and fitting in. Give the juvenile plenty of opportunity to cite examples of situations where they have contributed to the group, school, or family unit.

Many juveniles do not have a sense of their own mortality or concept of eternity. To them, a lifetime in prison has no intrinsic meaning. Cognitively or emotionally, they simply cannot fathom what that means. That means they do not necessarily understand the seriousness of their actions, or that with suicide, there is no “reset” button. The negotiator should avoid these concepts and instead focus problem solving on more immediate events that are important to the juvenile. That might mean “Going to jail means you will miss the prom,” or “If you commit suicide, then you will miss the new *Star Wars* movie.” Find future relevant events in the juvenile’s life that they can relate to.

Juveniles, as a rule, have a short attention span. Keep conversations focused on single topics, problems, or solutions, and keep conversations short. It is much better to break discussions into several

Assess suicide potential early and constantly monitor for suicidal intent
Solve the immediate crisis
Understand issues of authority and emotional conflict
Do not force your values on the juvenile
Be prepared for high expectations (juvenile may expect you to have ready solutions for many problems)
Personalize the juvenile and treat them as an individual
Remember that relationships are more important than achievement
Juveniles are often frustrated by their sense of powerlessness (real or perceived)
Juveniles may not understand seriousness of their actions, so focus on more immediate issues
Keep your emotions in check
Avoid anger, frustration, irritation, agitation, etc.
Do not respond emotionally to threats, attacks, words, name-calling
Saving face is critical
Avoid words that suggest "losing"
Expect the juvenile to have a short attention span
Do not "micromanage"
Give frequent recognition and reward
Avoid use of "big" words, ambiguity in language, complex sentences
Match your communications to the juvenile and their level of understanding and processing
Juveniles prefer a group, so negotiate from "us" perspective
Expect the juvenile to assign blame to others and not accept blame for their actions
Juveniles often need "life" mentoring, so use your authority as trained negotiator to become mentor
Be empathetic, not sympathetic
Use active listening skills to build rapport
Listen for and respond to expressive demand issues
Expect them to be in contact with the outside world
Juveniles may be more technologically "savvy" than negotiators
Use the Internet to gather intelligence

FIGURE 8.2 Negotiating guidelines for negotiating with juveniles.

conversations spread over time rather than try to fit everything into one conversation. This also gives the juvenile time to process and integrate the information.

It is critical to ensure that the juvenile saves face. Instead of using terms such as "surrender" or "give up," use terms that do not imply losing. Use "come out," "leave the room," or "step into the hall." During surrender negotiations, set up the surrender so the juvenile can save face. This may mean no media, be allowed to walk out to the end of a driveway, not be seen wearing handcuffs. As mentioned in the communication chapter, when discussing William Ury's principles, it is important not to get even, but to get what you want.

Active listening skills are critical when negotiating with the juvenile. The juvenile will almost always have expressive demands in addition to their instrumental demands. It is imperative that the negotiator discover what these expressive demands are in order to resolve the situation. Many juveniles may not be able to articulate these expressive demands, may confuse expressive emotions for other emotions, or not realize the importance of expressive demands. It is important that the negotiator help shift into, explain, and identify these expressive demands. For example, the juvenile may be threatening suicide over failing a test. The teen may demand that he be given a passing grade or moved to another classroom. The real issue (expressive demand) is that the juvenile has been asked by the popular girl in school to escort her to the big dance and he cannot attend the dance because his parents grounded him. If the negotiator does not discern the loss of a date with the popular classmate and the emotional cost of missing that date, the situation will not be resolved. The grade is a secondary issue to the date.

Technological issues are important for negotiators in two respects. First, from an intelligence-gathering perspective, negotiators should always check Internet sites such as MySpace, YouTube, Facebook, or LinkedIn for pages and information posted by the juvenile or by others about the juvenile. Many juveniles use these social networking sites and Internet sites to reveal both their public persona and their true persona. They are not only a valuable source of intelligence information, but also a source for developing negotiation strategies and guidelines. Second, many juveniles are technologically sophisticated and it may be difficult to isolate them from the outside world. They may use text messaging, have multiple cell phones, be on the Internet and talking with others via e-mail, social networking sites, and/or chat rooms. Always ask the juvenile if they are in contact with others (including how they are in contact), and try to discourage them from contacting others. Many juveniles will contact others for mere bragging rights, not necessarily for advice.

Specific Issues and Negotiation Guidelines

In addition to the general guidelines suggested above, there are five specific areas of consideration for negotiators. These are issues of (1) communication, (2) information processing, (3) emotion/personality, (4) learning/cognition, and (5) socialization/peers (Mullins, 2012a, 2012c, 2012d).

As noted in an earlier chapter, today's teen texts more than talks on their phone. The author has even observed two teens sitting within 10 feet of each other texting rather than talking (see the section on social media in [Chapter 5](#) on Communication for a full discussion of IM and texting). Using these interpersonal methods of communication may mean the juvenile does not learn good communication skills when interacting with others. In fact, one of the most popular ways to ask someone on a date is through the use of "asynchronous communication" (as many refer to this form of communication). To many of these teens, the "date" is nothing more than a "hookup" via Facebook, Twitter, texting, etc. If they do meet in person, the expectation is both will arrive separately, casually interact at the location (theater, restaurant, bar, etc.), and then go their separate ways. As one of the interview subjects stated to Williams (2013), "it's one step below a date, and one step above a high five." "Dating culture," she also said, "has evolved to a cycle of text messages, each one requiring the code-breaking skills of a cold war spy to interpret." Many of today's teens have never written a letter or taken hand notes in class. Some elementary schools, in fact, have stopped teaching cursive—instead distributing PDAs and laptops.

In terms of communication issues for the negotiator talking with a juvenile, active listening is critical. Many cannot accept criticism. Problem-solving strategies often involve mild or perceived criticism. Active listening does not. Empathy is better than sympathy. It is okay for the negotiator to "understand" the juvenile's issue, it is not okay to "have been there." The negotiator needs to be careful to keep emotions in check and make sure to avoid any hint of anger, frustration, irritation, curtness, and so on. Unlike the adult, who can at times respond positively to these expressed emotions, it is very unlikely the juvenile will. Their negative emotional states will increase and they will further distance themselves from the negotiator. Avoid responding to the juvenile's threats, acting out, or words with emotion. Take a deep

breath, pause, and then give a measured response. The secondary (coach) and mental health consultant can be valuable in helping keep negotiator emotions in check. Avoid finite words like “surrender,” instead using terms such as “leave the room,” “come out,” and so on.

Finally, in terms of communications, recognize that it is difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the juvenile technologically. The negotiator should expect the juvenile to maintain communication with the outside world. Many have multiple modes of communication (devices) and multiple ways of maintaining contact (software). Many juveniles carry two or more phones, a laptop, PDA (or two), etc. They may have multiple phone numbers and e-mail/Twitter/Facebook accounts. Even keeping them engaged and on the phone with the negotiator does not negate them from staying in contact with the outside world. Today’s juvenile is very adept at multitasking and conducting multiple communications at one time.

Many juveniles would rather live vicariously through video games, television, the movies, etc. than experience life. They can vicariously play sports, skateboard, travel the world, date, hang out with other people, drive a car, fly an airplane, and do a million other things without ever leaving the sofa or chair. Many can live their life through an “avatar,” a computer-generated “person” created by the user (with any personal characteristics the user prefers) and explore both fictional and real worlds, interact with any number of other users who are also represented by avatars, earn and spend money, buy and sell merchandise and property, have sexual relations, and do most other activities offered in the real world to real people. They can realistically live their entire life as an avatar. Unlike previous generations, who had to leave the house to experience these things, today’s juvenile never has to see the sunshine (and millions don’t). They have much information available to them, which prohibits the ability to process and use that information. When the author was given a term paper (e.g., on the Pearl Harbor attack), he had to spend hours in the library (remember those?) and may have turned up 3 – 7 reference sources. Today, try doing an Internet search using those key words. Thousands of “hits” turn up. (Try this as an exercise. Sort the references by those which are valuable and those which are not—it is likely you will be unable to do it in any reasonable time frame.) For the juvenile, this information overload may lead to frustration, anger, confusion, cognitive dissonance, and even more disconnected communications. Many do not know how to filter the information they receive and believe all information carries the same weight and value. The author is reminded of a recent television commercial where a young lady says to her friend, “well it has to be true. It’s on the Internet.”

When negotiating, expect juveniles to have a short attention span and to switch topics often. They may even discuss several topics at one time, jumping between each easily and without preamble. When offering solutions or engaging in problem-solving, offer the entire range of response options. Many juveniles cannot think issues through well. Help them do that. For example, the juvenile may not understand their actions in the incident affect the outcome. The negotiator may have to explain their actions dictate the ultimate outcome: from a small fine to life without parole. The negotiator has to provide the “decision tree.”

In terms of emotion and personality issues, the juvenile has a partially developed ego and many have a fragile personality. Many have spent their life having their self-esteem enhanced (what can I get for me) and their self-worth ignored (what can I contribute to the group). A person cannot learn how to win without learning how to lose. Many of the current generation of juveniles have never learned to lose. They are victims of getting rewarded for presence

instead of performance, of social promotion, of “not keeping score.” Many have been desensitized to violence and the effects of violence. They are assaulted with sex and the importance of sex at almost every juncture. Seventy percent have engaged in sexual intercourse by the age of 19 (Abma, Martinez & Copen, 2010; Martinez, Copen & Abma, 2011). Many are bullied on a regular basis (and there is an increase in juvenile suicide as a result of being bullied), are fearful of the world around them, and have difficulty handling rejection. Many juveniles are now bullied over the Internet, with their tormenters taking to Facebook and other social networking sites. The juvenile being bullied may never see or even know those doing the bullying. As with adults, the most common causes of juvenile suicide are reasons related to relationships.

As a consequence of these issues, negotiators have to reinforce the juvenile actor continually while avoiding any communications that can be construed as negative. Likewise, it is critical the actor does not see tactical officers or patrol at the perimeter. When intelligence gathering, always check social media and Internet sites. Their posts and comments reflect their personality, value system, and so on. The juvenile may be engaging in today’s action because they only know a fight/flight response. The negotiator can engage in teaching as part of the Negotiation Accommodation Stage and give the actor other options to solve their problem (which may very well be acted upon). The juvenile may not like the negotiator, but they may have high expectations of your ability to solve the incident. The negotiator may be the only stabilizing adult influence in their life and they may respond positively to the negotiator. Many juveniles may not understand the seriousness of their actions. It may be difficult for the negotiator to make them understand and appreciate the seriousness (what does “forever” mean to a juvenile? Many will not understand that abstract concept). Telling the juvenile that killing a hostage will result in life in prison does not have the same emotional or behavioral impact it would with an adult. Telling the juvenile, instead, that “it might make you miss the prom,” may have more impact on shaping behavior.

In terms of learning and cognitive issues, many juveniles that get involved in critical incidents will likely have poor learning histories (Mullins, 2012a, 2012c, 2012d), have poor retention rates, not be able to process abstract information, and use a bullet-point style of thinking. The negotiator needs to go slow, keep communications short and brief, present only one idea at a time, and keep ideas simple. For example, if trying to explain a complex surrender ritual, it would be better to cover one simple point at a time (i.e., “One, set the gun on the dining room table.”). Once this instruction is fully understood and can be reiterated, go on to instruction number two, then three, then four, etc. After each instruction, go back to the start and go through all, in order, to that point.

Socialization and peer issues may be the most difficult for negotiators to deal with. Many juveniles have poor socialization skills, and their peers have often reinforced the inappropriate behaviors. They do not tend to accept responsibility for their actions, instead blaming others (e.g., “We wouldn’t be here today if she hadn’t sent me a text saying she didn’t want to ever see me again.”). As previously mentioned, many do not engage in “play” or organized sporting activities, where they learn how to lose, resolve conflict, and interact as a group, as well as many other life skills. In fact, some schools are dropping organized sports because not enough juveniles are coming out for the teams. Many juveniles prefer group over individual activities (i.e., wolfpack dating) and social networking over physical interaction. Alcohol and other drug

use among juveniles is common.

The negotiator should concentrate on resolving the immediate crisis, not others the actor may mention. Far more than adult actors, juveniles do not know how to resolve crises or make good decisions. Other times, they may not want to engage in crisis resolution because they do not like the outcome or want to expend the additional effort (e.g., “I know I need to forget her and get another girlfriend, but that’s too much trouble and work.”). Suggestions and decisions often have to be explained in detail (as anyone with children know full well). One paradox is the negotiator has to personalize the actor as an individual, yet realize the actor prefers the group. The negotiator has to build rapport and ultimately make the actor realize it is “us” against “them.”

(The authors recognize some of these negotiating guidelines have been repeated from the previous section, but they are well worth repeating if negotiating with a juvenile.)

Negotiating with a Juvenile: Lessons from a Case Study

Sergeant Joseph Jimenez has been a police officer with the Richardson Police Department for 27½ years. He has been a negotiator for 20 years and has been involved in numerous incidents throughout his career. He has received extensive training in hostage/crisis negotiations during his tenure as a negotiator and serves as a Judge/Evaluator at the North Texas State (formerly SWT) annual Negotiator Competition in San Marcos. Sergeant Jimenez received the “Negotiator of the Year” award from the Texas Association of Hostage Negotiators in 1995. Sergeant Jimenez is a member of the Texas Association of Hostage Negotiators. He also served on the Board of Directors and assisted in the planning and in the presentation of several Negotiator Conferences. Sergeant Jimenez again joined the T.A.H.N. board of directors in 2010 and is currently the vice president for Region 1, which includes the Dallas/Ft. Worth area.

How do we, as a negotiation team, resolve a critical incident involving a teenager or young adult? What tactics do we employ? What do we do differently? How do we decide who is going to be the primary negotiator? These are just some of the questions we need to have addressed long before an incident occurs. The team should research and conduct ongoing training on how to address these situations. Fortunately for us, our team is composed of a rather diverse group. The team, which includes two females and six males, consists of three sergeants, two detectives, a school resource officer (SRO), and two Crime Prevention officers. The team’s collective experience brings somewhat of an expertise aspect in the areas of youth crime, adult crime, youth ministry, and narcotics investigation. I believe this training and experience has prepared us, for the most part, to successfully deal with any critical incident. But, like any other skill, we need to continue to train and keep up with the current trends.

I was recently involved in a critical incident involving a young adult. I work day watch patrol along with Sgt. Harry Helliwell. In mid-February Harry responded as Incident Command to a situation on the northeast side of town. The incident involved an 18-year-old who had been diagnosed with depression and had attempted suicide in the past. The subject was truant from school and was at his home. It was reported to the police that he had taken some pills and was threatening to kill himself with a knife. The responding officers saw him running away from his home and noted some blood on one of his hands. The officers could not get a good stationary perimeter because the kid kept jumping fences and eluding them. Harry asked that I respond as a negotiator and

provided a cell phone number for this kid we will call “Chase.” It was rather tense as I was driving to the location, monitoring the police radio, and talking to Chase on the phone. I introduced myself as “Joe” and asked him about his injury. Chase asked me if I was a police officer. I told him I was but that my main concern was his injury and asked him if I could come out and look at his hand. Chase said he was OK but he did not want to tell me where he was at this time. I told him he did not have to tell me but he could call me back if he changed his mind. A few minutes later Chase called me back. He was in mid-stride and said the “cops” were chasing him. I told him to stop running and that I would come help him. He gave me his location and said he would wait for me. As I pulled into the intersection I gave the officers Chase’s location. I called Chase and ask him to leave his knife behind and come out toward me. Chase agreed and came walking out without his knife. But instead of walking out toward me he found himself on the opposite side with the responding officers. We had the paramedics check out Chase’s injuries, which were not life-threatening. Chase also took me to where he left the knife. I was lucky to be able to build rapport with Chase so quickly and I think it helped us in resolving the incident more quickly. It may have not been pretty, but it was still a win on both sides.

A couple of weeks later I sat down with team member Sgt. Jamie Gerhart and told him about the incident. We started talking about problems we might face when responding to a critical incident involving a teenager or young adult. A year or two ago Jamie also had the opportunity to work a brief incident involving a teenager/young adult. The incident had a successful resolution. However, we acknowledged that negotiating with a juvenile or young adult is probably something we don’t train enough in or even talk about, for that matter. Jamie is a knowledgeable negotiator and can handle himself well in any situation. However, he said he was caught by surprise one day when he and his 15-year-old son were having a “discussion.” At one point his son said to him, “Dad, you don’t listen to me.” It sure is different when you are dealing with one of your own kids. Having raised girls, I could only smile back and think, “You have no idea.” We continued to talk about juveniles and how they are such a unique group. We then decided to come up with a list of things we should know about dealing with juveniles and young adults in crisis. We decided we could then use this “list” to guide us in our training as a team. When we compared notes we discovered we had noted many of the same things.

Some of the things we noted were that juveniles do not communicate in the same manner as adults. They not only have their own language but we probably need to be ready to negotiate via “texting” rather than via a more traditional manner like the telephone. The “street language” or slang of the teens today is far different than that of previous generations. The juveniles’ reasoning skills are still being developed so rapport-building may be a tedious and arduous undertaking. They are trying to get to know who they are and their friends are the only ones who have instant credibility with them. A juvenile in crisis would be more worried about what their friends think of them than what consequences they might face for their actions. So what do we do?

First, I think we need to understand we are dealing with a person who is still developing physically, emotionally, and mentally. Next, negotiators will need to modify

some of the basic techniques used in incidents involving adults. We need to remember that many teenagers do not trust authority figures like parents, teachers, and of course, the police. While trying to establish ground with a juvenile in crisis, a negotiator's patience, focus, and objectivity may at times give way to frustration, emotional exhaustion, and even a loss of confidence. One of the most effective tools a negotiator can have is an accomplished skill of active listening. Patience is a big part of active listening. Juveniles often feel as though their parents and teachers don't "listen" to them. As adults we sometimes expect too much of a juvenile. We forget their brains are still growing, their emotional stability is fragile, and their coping skills are still developing. And whatever we do, we should not negotiate with them as if they were one of our own children. We have to remember that, although they might be about the same age or gender as one of our own children, they are in fact not one of our children and may not react to the same things in the same manner.

Jamie and I decided to put these ideas together and present it to the team's coordinator. Next we would develop a training plan for our team so that we can effectively and successfully address negotiating with the youth of today. I challenge all of my counterparts who have not already done so to do the same thing and ensure that their team is well prepared for that inevitable call-out involving a juvenile.

Gangs

The *American Heritage Dictionary* (1973) defines a gang as *a group of criminals; a group of people who regularly associate socially*. The second definition points to an important reason for gangs, whether they are criminal gangs or not. That is, people are social animals. We all have a need to be a part of a group, to a greater or lesser degree. We noted the importance of early adolescents having a group of friends that help them define who they are. Social affiliation is a natural developmental stage and it continues to be an issue for most people well into adulthood. In one sense, developing a professional identity is about belonging to a gang. Police officers have initiation rites. It is called the academy and the field training officer (FTO) program. They are tested to see how they will handle themselves on the street, i.e., will they behave in ways that make them acceptable to the group. It is a test to see whether they fit in. All of us belong to some kind of gang. They are just not criminal. However, negotiators do have to deal with criminal gangs. The following section will provide a brief overview of gang issues negotiators may have to deal with.

Reasons for gang membership

People become gang members for several reasons, most of them having to do with the developmental issues they are dealing with at the time they are recruited. Sharpe (2002) paraphrases Regan (1996) in suggesting that gangs play a valuable role in socialization as people seek the approval of their peers. Acceptance and identity issues are satisfied through

gang membership. It is no accident that juveniles are recruited into gangs as they are making the transition from middle school to high school. Issues of identity and belonging are important to early adolescents. Being approached by a recruiter for a gang speaks to these needs.

In addition, Sharpe (2002) suggests that juveniles who come from families that cannot meet their needs for affection, belonging, loyalty, appropriate supervision, and activities are more likely to join gangs. It is suggested that the gang becomes a surrogate family for these at-risk youths.

Finally, community and school issues play a part in gang membership (Sharpe, 2002). Juveniles who seem to be at high risk for joining a gang live in socially disorganized neighborhoods in which gangs already exist, and that have a high incidence of violence; have friends who are gang members; have difficulty in school; and have a low commitment to school.

In summary, there appear to be four reasons people join gangs:

1. **Affiliation**—people join gangs to belong.
2. **Safety**—people join gangs to feel safe.
3. **Identity**—people join gangs to have a sense of who they are.
4. **Recognition**—people join gangs to feel important.

Gangs are generally organized into levels. Some have suggested that they include: leader, hardcore members, affiliates, fringe members or wanna-bes. In analyzing the terrorist cell structure of the 1970s, Strentz (1981; 1988) has suggested a typology that appears to fit gangs as well, and has utility for negotiators. He suggested that terrorist gangs were composed of leaders, generals, and soldiers. The leaders were obsessive, idealistic thinkers, but not good organizers. The generals were good planners, leaders, and organizers. In addition, they were frequently antisocial. The soldiers were the ones who carried out the plans of the group, were joiners, and depended on the group for guidance, meaning, and affirmation. This typology can be applied to street/criminal gangs as well: the hardcore members can be seen as the generals, leading the troops in the street, and the soldiers are for the most part the affiliates, fringe members, or wanna-bes. This distinction is important for negotiators because the negotiating strategy and tactics will be different, depending on the level of gang membership. Negotiators need to recognize the fact that leaders are obsessive and use appropriate negotiating techniques, while the hard-core people can be approached like antisocial personalities and the soldiers can be dealt with like dependent personalities.

[Considerations when negotiating with gang members](#)

There is little research on negotiations with gangs. However, on the basis of his team's experience, Starbuck (2004) suggests that the following issues need to be considered in negotiating with gang members:

- Negotiators' patience will be tested
- There will be a lot of frustration and a temptation to "go tactical"

- Usually, there will be no substantive demands
- The subject will try to goad the negotiator
- Gang members will be familiar with police techniques
- Police are a symbol of authority—what gang members dislike the most
- Gang members will see the event as a way of gaining “respect”

Negotiating guidelines with gang members

- Attitude—As always, the negotiator’s attitude toward gang subjects sets the tone and influences the effectiveness of negotiations. Developmentally, juveniles have attitude. Officers need to be careful not to respond in kind. The old maxim, “I treat them the way they treat me” does not apply when negotiating with juveniles. Being “dissed” is reason enough for retribution among gang members and it underlines the importance of negotiators’ maintaining a respectful, open, genuine attitude toward gang member subjects.
- Use active listening to get by the expected verbal aggression; gang members are used to using aggression to get their way—it is their juice. They will try threatening, aggressive, demands because that is what they expect to work. Negotiators can expect an increase in aggressiveness when the threats do not work but are responded to by a reflective statement. Continue to use active listening until they are completely defused.
- Level of membership—As noted above, there are different levels of membership in gangs and there are different personality types that occupy different levels of membership. Negotiators need to be aware of what kind of person they are dealing with and use the appropriate strategy and tactics. Unless they are running a warrant at a gang headquarters, negotiators are more than likely going to deal with the antisocial/narcissistic personality style of the general or the dependent/joiner of the soldiers (see [Chapter 7](#) for negotiating with different personality styles).
- Face—being “dissed” is all about attacking the other person’s face. Revenge is all about restoring face for gang members. Negotiators need to track face statements.
- Belonging—A major part of being a gang member is to belong. Membership becomes part of the way people define themselves. Loyalty to the group is as important as loyalty to people. Negotiators need to be aware of this powerful dynamic and not challenge the gang’s legitimacy. It is like attacking the individual and will be resisted.
- Take the time—Establishing rapport with someone who belongs to a group that thinks of you as the enemy will take time. As with the paranoid, the negotiator will have to find ways of separating himself from his own “gang” in the eyes of the adolescent without looking disloyal to his own group. He will have to plan on taking the time to be sure that he is understood by the gang member and the time to find common ground on which to meet.
- Maintain contact—Resolutions can only be reached if you hang in there. Gang members will try to force negotiators to respond like other adults in their life, by getting angry in return or by disengaging. They win if negotiators do either. Continue to use active listening and focus on problem solving.
- Use problem-solving questions—Direct confrontations usually get confrontation in

return. Therefore, it is important for negotiators to use indirect methods of getting ideas across to gang members. The use of problem-oriented questions is a particularly good way to get people to evaluate their own ideas without challenging them directly.

Negotiating with the Elderly

At the opposite end of the age spectrum are the increasing number of call-outs to negotiate with elderly people. In negotiation seminars conducted by the authors, it is not unusual to have negotiators report having negotiated with persons in their 60s, 70s, and 80s. One author's team negotiated with a 78-year-old man. The population is aging and negotiators will have to be prepared to respond to this change. In 1870, only about three percent of the population lived over 40 years. In 1999, 12 percent lived longer than 65 years of age, and it is predicted that by 2030 approximately 25 percent of the population will be over 65 and 1.3 percent over 85 years of age. Between 1960 and 1980, there was a 19 percent population growth in the United States, and a 35 percent growth rate for ages 65-plus. In 1999, the U.S. government added a new population category: the "oldest old," which includes all those over 85 (approximately 4.6 million persons) (Howard, 2007). In Texas alone, in just one year (2010) over 2.5 million residents will be older than 64, a 25 percent increase since 2000. Taken as a whole, the fastest growing segment of the U.S. population are senior citizens (65-plus). For the first time in our history, by 2020, there will be more citizens over 65 years of age than under 20 years of age.

General issues affecting the elderly

With age comes wisdom. But with age come other changes in a person's life. First, age is a time of loss. Senior citizens have retired, many move to different areas of the country, retirement villages or homes, their social contacts change, and their friends are left behind. In addition, general health decreases, physical abilities fade, muscles lose tone, and they cannot engage in physical tasks that once were easy. The senses lose their sharpness; vision worsens, hearing dims, and smell fades. Mental tasks become more difficult and communication patterns change (communicate less, more directly, and with less patience). With the losses they are experiencing internally, there are also external losses. Many see their time as past, they are no longer needed by society or their family, and their contributions are no longer welcome. Friends, colleagues, and family die. Not only do the elderly grieve those losses, they also grieve the fact that more losses are coming.

Second, aging is a time of change and adaptation. The elderly must adapt to the above-mentioned losses, but they must also change their lifestyle and adapt to their new environment, position in society and family, and lack of career value they once enjoyed. These changes and the need to adapt to a different life adds tremendous stress to the elderly. Resistance to change increases the stress, as others viewing this resistance consider them stubborn, set in their ways, and an "old fogey." Younger generations cannot understand this resistance to change. Most frightening, they fear a loss of control over their life, home, and

environment.

Third, aging is a time of reminiscing; of viewing and reviewing one's life and self. Aging is a period of self-examination and self-evaluation. There is a need to bring meaning and closure to life. For many elderly, it is a time to integrate life choices made in the past and assess the path taken. For some, aging is a time of regret over choices not made, roads not traveled, or directions not followed. To a few, this is a time to rectify decisions and choices. Many elderly engage in extensive storytelling and bouts of nostalgia. This helps the older person place their life in a meaningful context. If this reminiscing is interrupted by disease, well-meaning relatives, or other environmental factors, behavior can become maladaptive or dangerous.

Fourth, aging is a time of change in one's life priorities. Material goods and things become much less important than in the past. What becomes important are people, especially family and friends. Values become readjusted and spirituality increases.

Fifth, aging is a time of frustration. They may be frustrated with themselves over items discussed above, they may be frustrated with family and relatives over their inability to understand the changes they are going through, they may be frustrated with choices they made and cannot change, they may be frustrated with having to leave their home and independence, they may be frustrated about illness or disease. This frustration can easily lead to anger directed at those close to them. Because of this anger, they may become aggressive with those who are trying to assist them or who are involved in these changes. They may do something to a son or daughter who recommends a nursing home, or takes the car keys from them, or who takes control of their finances.

Sixth, aging is a time of fear. Many elderly fear the world around them. Society has undergone many changes they cannot keep up with, they don't fully understand the world they live in, they are not computer literate or technologically savvy, and they are afraid of younger people. Gated communities for the elderly are a billion-dollar-a-year business. They fear going out in public spaces, out after dark, to crowded places, etc. A time for relaxation and enjoying the fruits of one's labors is instead a time filled with anxiety, stress, and uncertainty. They don't understand the world around them, and that can lead to paranoia and paranoia-related disorders. Depression and paranoia-related illnesses are high among the elderly, but few get help or treatment. It is estimated that approximately 15 percent of the elderly (and up to about 37% for those in care facilities; Mullins, 2008a) suffer from depression or paranoia disorders (Howard, 2007). Their lack of comprehension of the world around them makes the elderly prime targets for con artists and scammers. Whether in-person, via telephone solicitation, or over the Internet, scammers and con artists make a living off of elderly targets. Often, the victims never come to the attention of law enforcement. This can be due to fear of being scammed, embarrassment, not wanting others (family, friends) discovering their gullibility, or just not being fully aware of the total damages.

Seventh, the elderly are especially vulnerable to alcohol and drug abuse. Rates are higher among the elderly than other groups. Adding to the problem is the fact that the elderly are more biologically sensitive to the effects of alcohol and drugs. Regarding prescription medications, the vast majority of the elderly are suffering from at least three serious medical conditions and are taking five or more medications. Some estimate that at least eight percent of all prescriptions are incorrect or inappropriate for the illness (Howard, 2007, Mullins, 2008a). Many of these medications have serious and damaging side effects that affect behavior,

cognition, and emotions. More tragically, many elderly that should be taking medications for illness do not because they cannot afford the cost. This state of affairs will only worsen as the economy worsens. It is suspected that the inability to obtain prescription medications due to their high cost does, in part, contribute to the elevated suicide rate among the elderly.

Eighth, with age comes a loss of memory. IQ does not decrease with age, rather the person's ability to filter distractions becomes reduced, so it is harder to recall information. There is some evidence that short-term memory can be less effective with age, while long-term memory improves, especially for older memories. That is, the elderly seem to best remember events that occurred many years ago. This can be a critical point for negotiators when attempting to get the elderly to remember happier or more positive times.

Ninth, for many elderly who should have caregivers or be admitted to long-term care facilities, these support structures are just not available. In the U.S., there are only about one-half the number of geriatricians needed to care for the elderly. It is estimated that by 2025, there will only be about one-third the number needed. There are only about 40 percent of the number of caregivers needed, and that is expected to fall to about 25 percent by 2015. More than 34 million seniors are cared for by family members (who are not trained nor prepared to provide that level of care) at a cost of \$350 billion. The situation is just as dire for long-term care facilities. There are about half the number of facilities needed. Of those, approximately 30 percent are operating at levels below acceptable standards, and about 15 percent close every year. A great many of the nation's long-term care facilities refuse to accept Medicare and Medicaid. The amount paid by Medicare/Medicaid will not cover operating expenses for the patient's care (The American Geriatrics Society, 2003).



PHOTO 8.2 Negotiators have to train for every type of actor, young or old, male or female, high-school drop-out or college graduate, veteran or civilian, etc. Over the course of a negotiating career, negotiators will deal with actors from every conceivable walk of life and social strata.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

CNS disease

In addition to the above-mentioned general problems confronting the elderly in this county, there are some specific illness issues that affect the elderly and increase the probability that

the senior citizen will come to the attention of law enforcement. The two most serious and common central nervous system (CNS) diseases among the elderly are dementia and Alzheimer's. *Dementia* is a general loss of mental abilities as a person ages, and may be the result of the general aging process, stroke, aneurisms, circulatory disease, or other illnesses. Vascular dementia accounts for 20 to 30 percent of all dementias. The frequency of dementia is related to age. In those over 65 years of age, dementia affects 5 to 8 percent of those seniors. For seniors 75 and older, 15 to 20 percent will develop dementia. For seniors 85 and older, up to 50 percent can be affected. Dementia is characterized by confusion and agitation, problems with memory and language, unsteady gait and falls, urinary frequency, urgency or incontinence, and personality and mood changes (Science Daily, 2008).

Multi-infarct dementia is the result of a series of multiple strokes. Many of these strokes, in fact, many be unnoticed by the sufferer or family (referred to as "silent strokes"). Each one produces damage in the brain, and each may be in a different area of the brain. The person suffering from multi-infarct dementia will display the same symptoms of other dementias. Additionally, they will have trouble following instructions, will display inappropriate emotions (such as laughing when sad, or crying for no reason), and may have great difficulty making monetary transactions (Science Daily, 2008).

Dementia is not an all-or-nothing disease. It progresses through stages from mild to severe.

STAGE 1—The person loses items on a routine basis, they get lost in familiar places, forget names, forget appointments, and have memory loss for recent events.

STAGE 2—The person loses the ability to think abstractly and complete complex tasks, has trouble maintaining their finances and paying bills, cannot follow recipe instructions, has trouble driving, and often does not understand movie and television show plotlines and news stories.

STAGE 3—The person has difficulty with words, and substitutes phrases for single words, misidentifies people (i.e., confusing their sister for their mother), uses empty phrases, and finds it almost impossible to follow instructions and directions.

STAGE 4—There is a general loss of behavioral inhibitions, increase in impulsivity, making thoughtless and hurtful comments, engaging in social inappropriate behaviors, and not knowing friends and family. The person is usually not considered severe enough for institutionalization, however.

Alzheimer's

Dementia can lead to Alzheimer's. In fact, 70 percent of all cases of dementia are Alzheimer's. It is estimated that half of the population who are 85 years of age and above have Alzheimer's. There are about 5.2 million total cases of Alzheimer's in the U.S., and a doubling of the number of cases is expected by 2030 (Science Daily, 2008). Whenever the author speaks at negotiator conferences regarding the elderly, he asks the audience (by a show of hands) if any have a relative with Alzheimer's disease. On average, approximately 70% of the audience raises their hands. When he includes knowing someone, more than 90% raise their hand. At present, there is no cure or stopping the progression of Alzheimer's. Alzheimer's is a disease of the brain that is progressive in nature. Like dementia, the progress of the disease is identifiable by stages, each progressively worse.

STAGE 1 Alzheimer's—Very mild impairment with little loss of any neural functioning.

STAGE 2 Alzheimer's—Mild impairment with almost no loss of functioning. In fact, there may be no symptoms at all during the first two stages.

STAGE 3 Alzheimer's—Mild decline in brain functioning. This is typically the first stage at which Alzheimer's can be diagnosed. There may be problems recalling words and names, a reduced ability to remember names, some memory loss,

a slight decline in ability to plan and organize events, and some behavioral changes noticeable to those close to the Alzheimer's patient.

STAGE 4 Alzheimer's—Moderate cognitive declines. There is loss of memory for recent events, impaired ability to perform mental arithmetic (i.e., being able to count backwards by 7s from 100), impairment in ability to perform complex tasks (i.e., paying bills, planning meals or parties), reduced memory of personal history, and withdrawal from social activity.

STAGE 5 Alzheimer's—Moderate severe decline in mental abilities. Person cannot recall important details of their life such as phone numbers or address, confusion about day of week/month/year, trouble with simple mental arithmetic tasks (i.e., counting backwards by 2s from 100), forgetting names of relatives and close family members, and poor ability to make decisions (such as selecting clothes to wear, etc.). The person can perform simple critical tasks like eating, bathing, etc.

STAGE 6 Alzheimer's—Severe cognitive decline. Person loses awareness of recent events and experiences, cannot recall personal history, forgets names of those closest (i.e., spouse) but can recognize faces, needs assistance getting dressed, needs help with simple critical tasks such as eating, and has a disrupted sleep/wake cycle.

STAGE 7 Alzheimer's—Very severe cognitive decline. Final stage of Alzheimer's, where person loses capacity for recognizing speech, loss of facial recognition ability, full-time care for simple tasks such as eating/toileting, progressive degeneration of simple physical abilities (lose ability to walk, then sit, then smile, etc.), reflexes become abnormal and muscles grow rigid, swallowing impaired, breathing impaired. Essentially, the Alzheimer's patient "forgets" how to swallow and breathe, which results in death.

Other CNS diseases

There are a host of other CNS diseases that affect the elderly. Many of these can mimic Alzheimer's, but cause different reactions in a stressful or negotiated situation. Some of these diseases include Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome (loss of specific brain functions caused by thiamine deficiency), Huntington's disease (genetic, in which nerve cells in brain degenerate), ischemic vascular dementia (IVD—second most common with loss of function or slowing of cognitive ability—if symptoms appear suddenly, person usually had a stroke), normal pressure hydrocephalus (walking instability, dementia, urinary incontinence), Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (brain damage that causes rapid decrease of mental functioning and bodily movement), Parkinson's disease (shaking, difficulty motor movements, and coordination), Lewy Bodies dementia (another form of dementia), Pick's disease (rare and permanent dementia similar to Alzheimer's but only affects frontal or temporal lobes), progressive supranuclear palsy (PSP—symptoms are group of three dementia symptoms, but can include others—often misdiagnosed as Parkinson's), and mixed dementia (combination of above listed conditions). All have different biological bases, but all produce similar behavioral, emotional, and cognitive effects. All areas are impaired, including loss of memory, loss of emotional control, and inability to deal with stressful situations (Family Caregiver Alliance, 2009).

Suicide and the elderly

Suicide is very common among the elderly, with rates twice as high as for other age groups. Suicide risk increases with age, going from about 25 per 100,000 for 65 to 69 year olds, to more than 30 per 100,000 for those 70 – 74 years of age, and to almost 65 per 100,000 for seniors 85 years of age and older (Slatkin, 2003). The Centers for Disease Control (2008) reported slightly lower rates (20/100,000 for 65 – 69 years of age, 30/100,000 for 75 – 79, and 45/100,000 for 85 years of age and older). The suicide rates among the elderly continue to increase (MSNBC, 2007). A multitude of factors contribute to these higher suicide rates. Living alone, losing

spouses and family members, being socially isolated, increased rates of depression, fear of institutionalization, and a sense of hopelessness/helplessness all contribute to suicide among the elderly. The greatest factor, however, may well be related to health issues. Terminal illness drives most elderly suicides. This author often tells audiences that we can easily increase the quantity of life, but we cannot necessarily increase the quality of life. The elderly do not necessarily feel compelled to watch their life savings, legacy, and inheritances be given away to extend a poor quality of life. Neither do they want to live with the pain some of these illnesses produce. Many people have told both authors that a diagnosis of a particular illness (and most often it is Alzheimer's) will cause them to "pull the trigger."

Two states (Washington and Oregon) have passed laws legalizing assisted suicide in certain cases. The Hemlock Society, Caring Friends, World Federation of Right-to-Die Societies, Compassion and Choices, and Final Exit Network provide information on committing suicide. Two members of the Final Exit Network have recently been arrested in Georgia for assisting a person commit suicide. Other states are investigating group members for assisting other people in committing suicide (Bluestein, 2009).

Unfortunately, the United States is seeing a significant increase in the homicide/suicide rate (Reese, 2013). That is, one spouse kills their mate, and then commits suicide. There have also been several incidents nationally where an elderly person has killed a spouse or child (or friend/neighbor), believing they were an intruder. In the first case, a spouse is not going to watch their lifelong mate suffer with a horrendous illness or disease. The person refuses to allow their spouse to suffer in pain. Nor will the person continue to live without them. In these homicide/suicide cases, the perpetrator is most likely the male and usually uses a firearm, although drug overdoses are becoming more common. In the second instance, an elderly person is typically suffering from dementia or Alzheimer's and a child or relative moves into the house to care for them. One day (and most often shortly after the victim has moved in), the elderly person forgets they are there, forgets momentarily who they are, believes them to be an intruder, and kills them. Often, the perpetrator is never aware that they did something wrong nor their relationship to the victim. Finally, many elderly commit suicide in the wake of the death of a spouse. Without their mate, life is just not worth living. In some cases, they just "quit living." One phenomenon somewhat common among the elderly is a surviving spouse dying within a month of their mate dying. The authors had a good friend whose mother died, and within a week the healthy husband/father died. The only cause of death doctors could attribute to the husband/father was that he just did not want to live without his wife so he just quit living.

[Negotiating with the elderly](#)

[Figure 8.5](#) lists some general guidelines for negotiating with the elderly. One of the initial intelligence tasks negotiators should undertake is to make a generational assessment of the subject ([Figure 8.3](#)) and use the generational negotiation guidelines ([Figure 8.4](#) shows a framework for conducting

<p>G.I. Generation (those born 1901–1924—approximately 6% of the population)</p> <p>History of great accomplishments (maybe the greatest in history of mankind)</p> <p>Builders</p> <p>Inventors</p> <p>Organizers</p> <p>High Standards of behavior, commitment, morality, values</p> <p>Silent Generation (those born 1925–1942—approximately 15% of the population)</p> <p>Protected, affluent, and consumers</p> <p>Raised by the G.I. Generation</p> <p>Were not required to sacrifice or delay consumption</p> <p>Not builders, but are remodelers</p> <p>Less judgmental, more open, and question politically and socially</p> <p>Fair in treatment of others</p> <p>Believe in polls, blue ribbon commissions, panels, etc.</p> <p>Believe problems can be solved by negotiation and litigation</p> <p>Baby Boomers (those born 1944–1964—approximately 30% of the population; largest group in society)</p> <p>Most influential in U.S. history</p> <p>Transformed society at all levels</p> <p>Never known poverty, struggle, or true hardship and have taken life for granted</p> <p>Expect instant gratification/reward</p> <p>Difficulty handling when hardship strikes (elevated suicide risk)</p> <p>Raised in a period of permissiveness and affluence</p> <p>Visionaries and moral perfectionists</p> <p>High emphasis on personal values and personal accomplishment, not group goals</p> <p>Try to shape world into their values and expectations</p> <p>Neither builders nor remodelers, but users</p> <p>Need to understand everything and question everything</p> <p>Contributions made later in life than other generations</p>

FIGURE 8.3 Generational assessment guidelines for negotiating with the elderly.

<p>G.I. Generation</p> <p>Will respect law enforcement but likely to resist negotiating</p> <p>Show them respect</p> <p>Focus on their accomplishments and completing jobs they start</p> <p>Reflect their values, morals, and manners (i.e., use “Sir,” rank if retired military)</p> <p>They see problems as challenges to solve</p> <p>Reinforce them often</p> <p>Silent Generation</p> <p>Will not necessarily trust law enforcement but will trust your authority as a trained negotiator</p> <p>Must know the reasons behind decisions or the process and will insist on being included</p> <p>Will likely be receptive to a negotiated settlement</p> <p>Want instant gratification, so follow through on agreements and provide plenty of positive reinforcement</p> <p>Afraid of losing affluence and reputation, so saving face will be critical</p> <p>Baby Boomers</p> <p>Will likely not trust law enforcement or negotiators</p> <p>Must understand the issues and decisions</p> <p>Will likely respond in time to your authority based upon knowledge and experience</p> <p>Must explain the “why” to them</p> <p>Must reduce fear and what will happen after surrender</p> <p>If suicide (or homicide/suicide) must offer plenty of reasonable alternatives, with explanations</p>
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FIGURE 8.4 Generational negotiation strategies.

negotiations). Persons from different generations have different perspectives on life, law enforcement, their place in society, etc. Decisionmaking with a decorated World War II veteran will be quite different from that of a member of the Yippie Party (a 1960s/1970s counterculture movement). So will rapport-building.

The negotiator – elderly relationship is a good match (Mullins, 2012a, 2012c, 2012d). Both are wanting to slow things down, take time to process information, and be deliberate in moving forward. That can be used to the negotiator's advantage to reduce emotions, calm the subject, and reduce stress in the subject. Saying things like, "Let's step back, take our time, and really think about this ..." can be used effectively to not only reduce emotions, but also let the subject know you understand what they are

Make a generational assessment of attitudes, values, outlooks and expectations
Eliminate distractions, environmental and sensory
Help subject slow things down, keep sentences and ideas short, pause often
Short-term memory is poor
Longer sentences and thoughts can confuse, frustrate, and cause anger
Give them extra time to respond
Allow for hearing, interpreting and assessing
Use familiar and common words/phrases
Repeat, repeat, repeat
Do not interrupt when the subject struggles for a word or phrase
Do not interrupt at other times as it affects subject's ability to remember and communicate
Elderly easily lose train of thought
Do not finish sentences for the subject
Make sure you understand what "no" really means
Use names frequently – subject, yours, orienting names
Maximize active/creative listening
Encourage the identification of emotions used to communicate
Be empathetic and monitor tone of voice
Present limited options; give choice between option "A" or "B"
Discover the subject's triggers and avoid
Do not contradict
With dementia or ALX will produce an emotional or angry response
Know the subject's physical limitation – they may not be able to do what you want
Priorities are different for the elderly
Future is less important
Loss means something different
Encourage reminiscing
Do not treat the subject like a child
Time of day can be important

FIGURE 8.5 Negotiation guidelines for negotiating with the elderly.

experiencing as a function of age. Keep sentences, thoughts, ideas, and decisions short and on single issues.

Eliminate distractions. The elderly are easily distracted by their environmental surrounds and sensory inputs. The negotiator should do everything possible to reduce distractions to the subject. Turning a TV or radio off, expanding the outer perimeter to further reduce traffic noise, keeping SWAT still, reducing phone static, and eliminating other environmental distractions will help the subject focus and concentrate. The negotiator should constantly monitor the subject's environment and eliminate any distraction that arises.

Use words and phrases that are familiar to them. Repeat often. The subject may not remember previous conversations or decisions. This can produce frustration and anger. The negotiator can help reduce these emotions by both using words that are familiar and repeating often. Both tactics assist memory and recall.

When the subject struggles for a word or phrase, do not interrupt and “fill in the blank.” Your word or phrase may be the wrong one and indicates impatience. It also leads to frustration; frustration on the part of the subject with himself that he cannot remember, and frustration with you for not listening and understanding. Pause, wait, and then wait longer. If, after a time, the subject still cannot remember, the negotiator can then interject with, “Maybe I can help you. Are you trying to say ...?” Do not be judgmental; offer to be a partner. Do not finish sentences for them. Many elderly see this as rude and condescending. Even when they do remember, do not interrupt. More than with other groups, the elderly easily lose their train of thought. When the negotiator interrupts, the elderly subject’s ability to remember and to communicate is affected. If, however, the subject interrupts the negotiator, they should always be allowed to do so.

Make sure you know what “no” means to the subject. With an elderly subject, “no” can take on several meanings, even within the same conversation. It could mean the subject does not agree with you, it could mean the subject does not understand you but is afraid to admit it. You might ask the subject to come out with their hands clasped behind their head. The subject might refuse simply because they do not understand what “hands clasped on head” means and are embarrassed to ask. “No” might mean the subject does not understand the context of the conversation. The negotiator may be wanting the subject to consider several alternative decisions, and the subject rejects them because he simply cannot process the information. “No” might be an attempt on the part of the subject to establish control over the negotiator and/or situation. More than with many other groups, “no” can have many contexts with the elderly subject.

Use names frequently. Use the subject’s name, use your name, and use names to establish orientation. Memory is likely impaired, so the subject will have difficulty remembering your name. Open every conversation with your name, and during longer conversations, find a reason to use your name again. Always use the subject’s name (and other terms of respect). Unless given permission by the subject to use their first name, address them as “Mr.” or “Colonel” (or other retired military rank). Do not ask early to use their first name. Wait until rapport is built. Never use nicknames such as “bud,” “pal,” “amigo,” etc. Use familiar names to orient the subject’s memory. For example, the negotiator might say, “I know your daughter Ruth would want ...,” rather than just, “Your daughter would want ...” Never assume their memory for people, events, or places. If asking them to recollect an old memory, do not ask about what they did in the war, but ask what they did on Saipan.

Be careful how you ask questions. One complex thought may be beyond the subject’s ability. The negotiator may suggest (in the form of a series of questions) that the subject meet with all his children and have the children schedule visits to three care facilities for evaluation and assessment for long-term care possibilities. The subject may not be able to process this string of events. Two, questions that require short-term memory recall may frustrate and embarrass the subject because he has problems with short-term memory. The negotiator may ask what the subject had for breakfast and the subject responds angrily, “What the _____ does

it matter what I had for breakfast?" The issue to the subject is not the irrelevance of the topic, but the failure to remember what he had for breakfast.

Maximize the subject's active and creative listening ability. The elderly tend to be emotional and their communication patterns reflect that emotionality. They may not, however, be able to identify or verbalize their emotions. By encouraging the subject's active listening, the negotiator is helping identify the emotion. The negotiator can teach the subject active listening skills. The negotiator could explain how the subject could use reflecting statements, I-messages, paraphrasing, etc. to improve memory and decision-making skills.

Be empathetic. The elderly have a lifetime of learning history that allows them to more easily spot "phoniness." The negotiator must be sincere and truly want to help resolve the incident. The elderly are good at reading emotions in someone's voice. If they read insincerity, impatience, or agitation, they will respond in kind.

When working on decisions or problem-solving, give the subject only two options. The more options available to the subject, the more confused, disoriented, and angry they will become. When discussing issues, present only two options. Instead of asking the subject what they want to do if the police were to leave the scene, the negotiator may instead ask, "Would you rather watch TV or read the newspaper?" Also, provide opportunities for the subject to make decisions. Do not make their decisions, but give the subject the opportunity to make the decision (even if just the perception). When discussing surrender, for example, the negotiator could ask how the subject would like to exit the house, then offer suggestions based upon the subject's decision.

Do not forget that life priorities are different for the elderly. Possessions have little relevance. The future is not important, and loss has a different meaning. Ascribing your values and life priorities to the subject may not work and be detrimental to the negotiation process. What is important to the elderly is a meaningful life lived yesterday, not what can be accomplished tomorrow.

Encourage the subject to reminisce. Reminiscing contains hooks the negotiator can use, provides intelligence information, and provides insights into emotions and communication patterns. In addition, reminiscing allows the subject to define themselves. The negotiator can also use reminiscing to let the subject know the future is important, that they have a story to tell and have to be around to tell it. This author has conducted extensive interviews with ex-POWs of the Japanese in World War II. One of the most important things in their life and reason for living is to *tell their story*! The world has to know what was done to them, how they suffered at the hands of an enemy, and how that can never be allowed to happen again. It is their reason for living. If they die, who will tell the story? The negotiator has a responsibility to find "the story" in the life of the subject and can then hopefully use that to provide a future.

The subject is not a child. Do not cognitively or emotionally treat the subject as one. Communication patterns and decision making can make it seem as if the negotiator is dealing with a juvenile. You are not! You are dealing with a subject who has lived a long and full life. To treat them as a child will lead to resentment and anger. Their emotions and behaviors may be child-like because of their age and/or illness. But they know they are not a child. Treating them as if they were is extremely demeaning. They may be hypersensitive and/or paranoid about this issue. Their family and friends may treat them this way on a daily basis. Avoid

doing the same.

Time of day can influence negotiations. For the elderly person, their cognitions, attention, and emotions vary significantly during the day. Most are much better in the morning than evening. For this reason, most elderly tend to be “morning people.” Younger people tend to be “evening” or “night” people, meaning they are most alert, aware, at the peak of cognitive abilities, and most emotionally stable, during the later part of the day. To the elderly person, as the day progresses, there is a rapid and significant deterioration of abilities. And physical abilities may peak at different times from cognitive and emotional abilities. For persons suffering from dementia or Alzheimer’s, be aware of a phenomenon known as “sundowning.” Sundowning is late-day confusion that occurs in early evening when light levels get low, shadows increase, and fatigue sets in (Mayo Clinic, 2009). Sundowning can be reduced by keeping lights on (inside and outside), keeping the person in familiar surroundings, using familiar communications, having them remember familiar memories, and giving them quiet time. Negotiators should be prepared for slower information retrieval and processing, and should slow the negotiation process even further.

In sum, the elderly present some unique challenges for negotiators. As a rule, negotiations will likely be content oriented and focus on the issues, which should make negotiations easier and go more smoothly. The subject will be able to communicate better than other hostage takers, be more responsive to rapport-building and decisionmaking. On the negative side, it may be difficult for the negotiator to develop a reason for the subject to live. The elderly are in the twilight of their life and continuing to live is not as great a priority. To help negotiators resolve crisis incidents involving elderly subjects, [Figure 8.6](#) lists some Internet sites negotiators can use to better understand elderly issues, diseases that affect the elderly, and some suggestions for improving and simplifying communications with the elderly. Negotiators should review these sites prior to a crisis incident, then refer to them during an incident. Many teams have WiFi capability in their vehicles or in their agency, so they can readily avail themselves of these sites when needed.

[Warfighters](#)

Between September 11, 2001, and September 11, 2011, more than 2.3 million military personnel have served in Iraq and/or Afghanistan, and about half of those have served multiple deployments (Martinez & Bingham, 2011). More than 1.3% have been discharged from the military, and more than 711,000 have utilized Veteran Administration services. More than 1,200 are amputees. Of the 2.3 million service members in October 2011, 1.3 million have deployed. More than 7% of the U.S. population are veterans (more than 22.6 million), and of those, 8% are female. In fact, there are approximately 1.9 million living veterans from World War II. The unemployment rate for veterans is higher than for the general population (12.1% – Iraq/Afghanistan, versus 9.1%).

The suicide rate for veterans is higher than for the general population, and has been steadily rising since the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan started. The suicide rate for deployed veterans has risen from 9.1 per 100,000 in 2001 to more than 20 per 100,000 in 2011 (Mullins, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012f). Stated another way, as of spring 2013, more than 22 veterans commit

suicide per day (Kemp & Bossarte, 2013). Active-duty personnel are not immune. The suicide rates among active-duty service personnel have steadily risen every year and in 2012 hit an all-time record high number of 349 deaths due to suicide (Burns, 2013). Military suicides have surpassed combat as the number one cause of death of military personnel. Somewhat surprisingly, 69% of veteran suicides are among those 50 years old and above. As stated by Haiken (2013), however, this data shows “31% were by veterans 49 and younger.” In other words, these are committed by men and women in the “prime of life.” In 2008, 41 active-duty Marines committed suicide (19/100,000, up from 33 in 2007 (16.5/100,000), and 25 in 2006 (12.9/100,000)) (Perry, 2009). Marine suicides in 2008 surpassed the number of Marines killed in combat (Iraq = 32, Afghanistan = 27). Rates are similar for the U.S. Army, at 20.2/100,000 for 2008. The Air Force (11.5/100,000) and Navy (11.3/100,000) rates are much lower (Kube & Johnson, 2009). Army rates have been rising steadily for the past four years, with no reduction in sight (U.S. Army, Media Relations Division, OCPA, 2009).

- www.ahrq.gov (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality)
- www.aoa.gov (Administration On Aging)
- www.cms.hhs.gov (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services)
- www.cdc.gov/aging
- www.alz.org
- www.alzfdn.org
- www.alzheimerssupport.com
- www.nia.nih.gov/alzheimers
- www.caregiver.org
- www.nimh.nih.gov (National Institute of Mental Health)
- www.thefamilycaregiver.org
- www.ninds.nih.gov (National Institute of Neurological Disorders)
- www.alzdiscovery.org
- www.cjdfoundation.org (Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Foundation)
- www.lewybodydementia.org
- www.ahaf.org (Amer. Health Assist. Foundation)
- www.aarp.org

FIGURE 8.6 Internet sites that may assist negotiators when dealing with elderly subjects.

One piece of data not recognized in all of the suicide numbers are all of those veterans and service members who may have committed an “unrecognized” suicide. All of the accidents, single-vehicle traffic fatalities, drug overdoses, and other causes of death are classified as “accidental.” How many of those, in reality, are suicides? A study conducted among Texas veterans that used VA services found that veterans had a suicide rate five times as high as the general population and an overdose rate 5.3 times higher (Bell et al., 2013).

There have also been around 300,000 American civilian government employees and contract

employees serving in these areas. The issues discussed in this section apply equally to military and civilian personnel. When negotiating with a subject who states they were never in the military, do not stop the intelligence work—determine if they were a civilian employee in a war zone.

One of the unique aspects of service in OIF or OEF theaters is that anywhere in-country is a combat zone. Unlike previous wars, where troops advanced to battle lines for combat, then retreated to rear areas for relief, being anywhere in-country in either Iraq or Afghanistan is front-line combat duty.

While much has been written concerning PTSD and combat stress-related disorders, there are several issues relevant for law enforcement and negotiators when dealing with warfighters. Battlemind, PTSD, Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), and Military Sexual Trauma (MST) may each independently or in combination affect the behavior, cognitions, and/or emotions of the warfighter. Before considering each of these issues, a couple of general comments need to be made.

Neither are women immune from the effects of combat. Although women are not technically serving in combat occupations, they are still in-country and still susceptible to all of the same issues males are. Women account for 11 percent of all troops deployed, and more than 185,000 women have served their country in either Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) theaters (Tanielian & Jaycox, 2008).

Much of the information in this section (especially as it pertains to PTSD and TBI) comes from a recent RAND Corporation report, *Invisible Wounds of War: Psychological and Cognitive Injuries, Their Consequences, and Services To Assist Recovery* (Tanielian & Jaycox, eds., 2008), and a companion summary volume, *Invisible Wounds of War: Summary and Recommendations for Addressing Psychological and Cognitive Injuries* (also edited by Tanielian & Jaycox, 2008a & b). These are the most comprehensive reports available to date concerning the psychological, emotional, stress and neural injuries suffered by warfighters. Both reports should be required reading for all negotiators and anyone else in the criminal justice system who may come into contact with warfighters. Although somewhat dated at this point, both are still seminal research works in the understanding of veteran issues.

Battlemind

Warfighters learned to survive the type of combat experienced in OIF and OEF theaters through a combination of military controlled training environments and in the combat theater itself. This training produces an enduring set of behaviors, mental condition, and toughness, and reactions to unique, critical, and stressful situations and has come to be called *Battlemind*. Battlemind responses are a learned set of responses that occur in intense environments; thus, they will be present with the individual to some degree for the rest of their life (Mullins, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012f). They are responses the person relies on when confronted with unique, stressful, and critical situations. If the person is confronted with an assailant, for example, the person is likely to “automatically” revert to the Battlemind training to resolve the threat and engage in aggressive (and potentially inappropriate and/or illegal) behavior. In this situation, rather than taking the time to think it through, consider a range of response options and then engage in talking/discussing/negotiation or backing away from the threat, the person

reacts instead of acts and uses the Battlemind set of responses to resolve the crisis. While Battlemind is certainly appropriate for survival in combat, it is mostly inappropriate in the civilian world. [Figure 8.7](#) lists the Battlemind responses in ex-warfighters. For the sake of clarity, in this chapter the term *warfighter* will be used to discuss all ex-combat veterans. Warfighters whom negotiators deal with will not be in OIF or OEF, but at home in the civilian world. There are a few relevant to discussion here.




FIGURE 8.7 Battlemind behaviors.

The warfighter shares company with other veterans, because other veterans are those who can understand and share their experiences. In combat theaters, warfighters form tight, personal relationships with fellow soldiers (“battle buddies”). The relationship with a battle buddy becomes one of the most intense, personal relationships anyone can form, even tighter than a marriage bond. Many will remain in contact with a battle buddy for the rest of their life. Years ago, the author attended an annual convention of WWII submariners. It was amazing how those veterans bonded with their shipmates, clustered into groups based upon the boat on which they served, and how the close relationships had been maintained for more than 50 years. Many were closer to their shipmates than they were to their families. They tend to avoid and shy away from nonveterans, especially on emotional issues or important internalized issues. Warfighters are more likely, for example, to share emotional pain from a failed relationship with another veteran than they are with the partner in the relationship. For negotiators, this means that a negotiator who is a veteran is more likely to establish rapport with a subject.

Warfighters extend their personal space and guard their possessions, including things like a

backpack, music player, paper and pen, etc. In combat, closeness meant danger and threat. Much of the combat and enemy threat (in OIF especially) was in urban, close-quarters environments. Additionally, when back on base or encampments, troops lived in close proximity. Personal space was that within arm's reach. Possessions were to be guarded from theft, unauthorized use by others, etc. Thus, when negotiating, expand personal space for the subject and do not let the subject get the perception of "closing in."

Warfighters tend to personalize when things do not go their way or when people disagree with them, including family and those close to them. Disagreements are seen as threats and attack. When negotiating, constantly reinforce the fact that negotiations are about the issues, not the person. When disagreeing, preface remarks with the fact that the disagreement is about an issue. For example, the negotiator might say, "Joe, I want you to know that I do not agree with what you just said because it is not the kind of decision that helps us resolve this situation. My disagreement has nothing to do with you personally. It is over the issue."

Warfighters become anxious and agitated in group situations. They have an elevated startle response and stress reaction. If in a negotiable situation, just the large response presence of law enforcement will elevate their emotional level, stress level, and anxiety. They will be more prone to aggression, be defensive in words and actions, and be more emotional. Also, they are almost always armed. Very few warfighters will be without a weapon within easy reach. For many, the higher the potential threat level, the more weapons they will have.

Warfighters remain detached emotionally from others, especially family and friends. They know what it is like to lose friends and comrades, so to avoid the emotional pain of loss, they remain aloof and distant, and withdraw emotionally from those close to them. Likewise, they do not tend to share their combat experiences out of a fear others will not understand or care. For many, they are afraid civilians are against the war and will condemn them for fighting. For negotiators, this will mean it is difficult to build rapport and establish an emotional bond. The warfighter may act like that is happening, but is doing so merely to gain a tactical advantage.

Warfighters may be bothered by their actions in combat, may believe they did not do enough, or did not carry the load. A friend of the author's was wounded severely and removed from OIF first to Germany, then to Walter Reed Army Medical Center and finally to Brooks Army Medical Center for treatment and surgeries. The one thing that still bothers him is the fact he left the job unfinished and has tried to reenlist to return to OIF and "finish where he left off." This feeling of failure and inadequacy may be an expressive issue the negotiator needs to help resolve in the short term.

The warfighter may be inflexible when dealing with their spouse, children, or the troops they command. To the warfighter, disagreement means being exposed and vulnerable to danger. Their thinking is rigid, they tend to select a single course of action (even though they know it is not the best course of action) and stick with it regardless, and entrench their thinking to justify that course of action. That inflexibility may be the primary reason negotiators are dealing with the warfighter. It becomes the job of the negotiator to redirect the decision-making process.

One especially critical item for negotiators and the crisis response team is the fact that warfighters are at a high stage of tactical preparedness and awareness. Many were initially trained by law enforcement SWAT members and active shooting instructors for urban

combat. The warfighter is aware of and knowledgeable about tactical operations and practices. They may know as much as the tactical team and they will prepare an appropriate response to counter tactical operations. *Always* be prepared for this tactical awareness.

Whenever negotiating with a warfighter, negotiators should always consider the Battlemind responses and assume the subject is engaging in those responses. It is better to err on the side of caution and be overly protective. Underestimating this subject can be more costly than with any other subject.

PTSD issues

It is estimated that PTSD affects approximately 25 to 30 percent of returning warfighters. In a major study completed in 2008, the RAND Corporation reported that more than 300,000 warfighters have developed PTSD, and that rates are highest among women and part-time warfighters (Guard and Reserve: Tanielian & Jaycox, 2008a & b). Almost every law enforcement officer in the United States has received training regarding stress and PTSD issues, so rather than giving a full rehash of what the reader already knows, this section will just present some issues unique to the warfighter population.

There are several reasons PTSD rates among warfighters are so high. First and foremost is the military stop-loss program. Warfighters are serving two, three, four, and in some cases even five tours of duty in OIF/OEF. Each tour increases the probability of getting PTSD. The combat death rate in OIF/OEF is lower than for any previous war, being about one in 10. That is for every one combat death, there are 10 injuries. And many of these injuries are catastrophic; major amputation, burns, or brain injury. Troops that in past wars would have died from their injuries are now being kept alive by extraordinary combat medical advances. Recently, a Marine at Brooks Army Medical Center (San Antonio, TX) survived second-and third-degree burns over 90 percent of his body. He underwent more than 100 surgeries, before finally succumbing to an MSRA virus. He survived his burns, and ultimately died from something unrelated to those burns. His story is not that uncommon. That these veterans are surviving is, of course, great news. It does present issues down the road in terms of stress and PTSD.

Many more women are being exposed to combat than ever before. Even though they may not be in a combat occupational specialty, just being in-country exposes them to a combat environment. Combat is nonlinear, operations are contiguous, and the enemy is unknown and unseen. These are all factors that contribute to higher PTSD rates. Of the total force in OIF/OEF, about 34 percent are Guard personnel and about 20 percent are Active Reserve. More than 50 percent of the combat force in both theaters are part-time soldiers. Also, the average age of the Guard and Reserve soldier is much higher than for the full-time soldier: 33 years of age versus 22 years of age. Guard and Reserve warfighters have careers and families, have interrupted their lives to serve, and receive less stress management training than their full-time counterparts.

For the warfighter, there is little transition from war to home. When a tour ends, the soldier packs up, loads onto a plane (military or civilian charter) and is flown home. In the space of hours, they go from a combat theater to the peaceful United States. There is no opportunity to make a mental or emotional transition. It is believed that one of the reasons PTSD rates for

World War II veterans was much lower than currently that for the current wars was the troopship ride home from the war. Most WWII veterans, when they rotated home, spent 3 – 6 weeks on a troopship. During this time they were able to decompress, share and normalize their experiences, and reach emotional resolution for the trauma of combat. This is not to suggest that PTSD was not an issue for WWII veterans. It was (and still is among surviving WWII veterans). Many WWII veterans had an opportunity today's veteran does not have-the opportunity to normalize the combat experience with other combat veterans. By merely being placed on a troopship for the voyage home, veterans bonded, shared, normalized experiences and prepared themselves to return to civilian life, their families and careers. They were ready to move forward with their lives. Today's warfighter does not have that opportunity.

Many warfighters, as with past wars, will not seek treatment for PTSD, and instead live with the stress and pain until something happens to cause an explosion. To many, suicide is the solution. Like other groups who consider and commit suicide, dying is not about finality. It is about escaping the pain. [Figure 8.8](#) lists some of the symptoms of PTSD common among warfighters. These are in addition to other common symptoms shared by a person who experiences PTSD. These traumatic memories lead to hyperactivity and avoidance, increase substance abuse, cognitive and behavioral difficulties, and, as already mentioned, suicide.

Reexperiencing the event:
Intrusive thoughts
Nightmares
Flashbacks
Hyperarousal:
Insomnia
Elevated startle reflex
Anxiety
Depression, comorbid with other symptoms
Avoidance and numbing:
Decreased activity
Less emotional response
Substance abuse, also comorbid with other symptoms (usually depression)
Physical:
Headaches
Stomach aches/cramps
Phantom pains
Increased susceptibility to illness
Psychological:
Depression
Fear
Difficulty making decisions
Anger
Increased proneness to accidents

FIGURE 8.8 Symptoms of PTSD common among Warfighters.

Negotiators must be aware of the potential for PTSD among warfighters and must resolve the short-term crisis caused by PTSD. In many situations, it will be easy to misread the cause of the crisis. For example, in a domestic disturbance situation, negotiators may assume (based on

intelligence) that the issue is about a spouse's constant haranguing. In reality, the subject brought on the confrontation because he is over-using alcohol to hide traumatic memories of combat. Negotiators have to recognize what, expressively, led to the confrontation, not what has been stated by either the subject or victim.

Traumatic brain injury

One of the great tragedies of the current war are the number of troops experiencing Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI). Estimates of TBI among warfighters range from 20 to 30 percent. Brigadier General Loree Sutton (director of the Pentagon Centers of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury) stated that up to 360,000 OIF/OEF veterans suffer TBI (reported by Zoroya, 2009). Among those, between 45,000 and 90,000 have persistent symptoms and should be receiving (or are receiving) specialized care. General Sutton's estimate is a little higher than that released in the RAND report (2008), which estimated that TBI affected 320,000 warfighters. To date, little has systematically been done to assess and treat brain injury except in the most severe cases where the warfighter needs extended in-patient care. That situation is changing, however. The DOD is beginning extensive research and medical programs for TBI, building facilities devoted to TBI, and engaging in ongoing assessment and treatment for warfighters suffering TBI (even the most minor cases). The NFL has partnered with the DOD in examining TBI, donating over \$30 million to the National Institute of Health's Neurology Institute to study TBI and other brain injuries (Waldron, 2012). In combat, for example, soldiers who may experience TBI from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or other explosions are removed from the combat environment from one to several weeks. One of the things we know about TBI is that the effects are cumulative. That is, if a person receives TBI and while that injury is healing receives an additional TBI, the effects on the brain are compounded. That is one of the reasons football players are so susceptible to the long-term effects of TBI. They receive multiple concussions in a short period of time.

The effects of TBI are far too varied to try to list and discuss in this forum. [Figure 8.9](#) provides a partial list of some specific effects and symptoms of TBI by area of the brain affected. The specific symptoms are completely contingent upon which area of the brain has been affected by the trauma. Two people can receive the exact same blast or hit and have completely different symptoms. One person may have minor TBI with very few symptoms, and another person can have major trauma and require hospitalization. One person may fully recover, the other may never recover. One excellent resource for negotiators is the website: <http://www.traumaticbraininjury.com/> (TBI, 2009).

There is one critical point to mention regarding TBI and one that every negotiator should never forget. Unlike other issues affecting subjects' behavior and emotions, which negotiators can exert influence over and change, with TBI, what you see is what you get and you cannot change behavior or emotions. For example, when negotiating with a warfighter experiencing PTSD who is being highly emotional, the negotiator can use active listening and other skills to get the subject to calm down. With the subject with TBI who is being emotional, there is nothing the negotiator can say or do to change those emotions or behavior. TBI is organic. The subject has no control over changing their behaviors or emotions. If the temporal lobe has been affected and the subject is experiencing constant tinnitus (ringing in the ears), there is

nothing they can do to make it stop. If the subject's long-term memory has been damaged or affected, there are no strategies the negotiator can employ to make them remember. Negotiators have to negotiate within the framework of the symptoms present.

Minor TBI is characterized by general symptoms such as fatigue, headache, visual disturbances, memory loss, inability to concentrate, unusual sleep patterns, poor balance and dizziness, some loss of emotional control, seizures in some cases, some depression, confused thinking, a slowing of thinking, and an increased sensitivity to light and sound. In severe cases, these effects can be magnified or worsened and may also include losses of attention and concentration, loss of memory (short-and long-term), reduced speed in information processing, cognitive confusion, increased impulsiveness, loss of language (use and/or processing), and even loss of some executive functioning (www.traumaticbraininjury.com, 2009).

Cerebral Cortex—Outer Layer of Gray Matter	
Left Hemisphere—Logic, Interpret Information, Language, Mathematics, Abstraction, and Reasoning	
Right Hemisphere—Visual Spatial Skills, Art, Dancing, and Fine Motor Skills	
Frontal Lobe	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Especially Vulnerable Concentration, Elaboration of Thought Personality And Emotions Voluntary Motor Activity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Loss of Recent Memory, Inattentiveness, Inability to Concentrate, Difficulty Learning, Lack of Inhibition, Emotional Lability ("Flatness")
Parietal Lobe	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Processing Sensory Input Body Orientation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inability to Discriminate Sensory Stimuli Neglect of Body (Cannot Locate and Recognize Parts) Inability to Recognize Self Inability to Write Disorientation of Space
Occipital Lobe	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Primary Vision and Visual Association 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Loss of Vision Opposite Side Loss of Ability to Recognize Objects in Opposite Field Light Flashes or Stars in Vision

Temporal Lobe
• Auditory Areas
• Language, Speech Reception
• Memory Retrieval
• Expressive Behavior
Hearing Deficits
Agitation and Irritability
Childish Behavior
Limbic System
• Olfaction
• Emotions, Sex, Rage, Fear
• Integration of Recent Memory
• Biological Rhythms
Loss of Smell
Loss of Emotional Control, Agitation
Loss of Recent Memory
Basal Ganglia
• Initiation and Direction of Voluntary Movements
• Balance And Postural Reflexes
Movement Disorders, Tremors at Rest
Difficulty Initiating Movement
Abnormal Increase in Muscle Tone
Parkinson's

FIGURE 8.9 Partial list of effects of TBI by area of the brain affected.

In many TBI cases, sensory channels are affected, as control of sensory mechanisms tend to be on the exterior lobes of the brain (vision in the occipital lobe, hearing in the temporal lobe, for example). In terms of communications, for example, that means the subject may have difficulty speaking, hearing, understanding oral communications, may have different rates of speech (very fast or slow), and may have problems reading and/or writing. It would be difficult to negotiate with the subject because of the areas of the brain affected. This in no way implies not to negotiate, just that negotiators need to consider the injury and negotiate within that framework: slow communications, use different words, repeat often, asking the subject to repeat back to you, and have the subject repeat back to you (“Joe, explain back to me what I just asked you to do.”). The negotiator can also try to get communications in through the visual channel. For example, the negotiator could say, “Joe, I want you to set the gun down, hold the phone in your right hand and pick up the pencil with your left hand. Joe, I want you to visualize that in your mind—set the gun down, put the phone in your right hand, pick up the pencil with your left hand. Can you see yourself doing that? Take it one step at a time. Can you see yourself setting down the gun? Can you see yourself holding the phone in your right hand? Can you see yourself picking up the pencil in your left hand? You can? Good, Joe. Now Joe, I want you to take a second, imagine yourself doing those things and I want you to repeat back to me exactly what I want you to do. Okay, Joe, repeat it back to me.” The negotiator should also make sure Joe gets plenty of time to process, integrate, and repeat back. It is worth reemphasizing at this point that the negotiator cannot change the way Joe acts as he or she can with other subjects. If Joe is going into emotional outbursts, the negotiator

cannot stop those as with non-TBI subjects. The negotiator can, however, potentially identify topics or areas that seem to lead to those outbursts and control them.

Military sexual trauma

A final area of concern for negotiators dealing with warfighters is the issues of military sexual trauma (MST). In OIF/OEF theaters, women have been fully integrated into military units. This has had the effect of increasing MST rates. Among female veterans who use VA services, 23 percent have reported having been sexually assaulted while in the military. This is twice the civilian rate. Some data suggest that one in three female service members are victimized by sexual assault (Erdely, 2013). For the first time ever, in 2013, Senate subcommittee hearings were conducted on the problem of sexual assault in the military. About 78 percent of females and 23 percent of males reported having been sexually harassed (Veterans Administration, 2004). Many will not report sexual abuse or harassment out of fear of what it will do to unit integrity, being made an outcast among peers, ruining their future career, or embarrassment.

Being a victim of MST may lead to many long-term effects that are in some respects similar to PTSD. Many victims of MST will develop PTSD in their lifetime (65% for males, 50% for females— Street & Stafford, 2009). In fact, the victim may “mask” the trauma as PTSD due to some other cause. As with civilian victims of sexual assault, the warfighter may experience anger, embarrassment, fear, guilt, sadness, and shame. They may avoid places and events that remind them of the event, may withdraw from friends and family, may experience trouble sleeping or have nightmares, experience intrusive thoughts that interfere with cognitive functioning, and have difficulty forming and maintaining relationships. The victim may develop nonspecific health problems and other readjustment problems following discharge. Depression is common and the potential for suicide is elevated. Use of alcohol and drugs may increase. Victims are at higher risk of developing PTSD.

Negotiators must do adequate intelligence gathering to determine if MST is a factor in the subject’s actions and contributed to the crisis event. Negotiators must then deal with the trauma produced by MST, even as a short-term resolution to the crisis.

Guidelines for negotiating with warfighters

The following items are some general guidelines negotiators can use when negotiating with warfighters. Military veterans are just like the rest of society; some are good and some are bad, some are mentally stable and some are mentally unstable, some are honorable and some are not, some will never run afoul of the law and some will be lawbreakers, some will be able to handle crisis in their life and some will not. When warfighters commit criminal acts, they have to be treated just like anyone else. The following guidelines are presented merely as suggestions and techniques that can smooth negotiations and hopefully make the process easier. For the negotiator, their job is the same as with any other subject, to resolve the incident safely and peacefully, with no injury or loss of life to any party involved; law enforcement personnel, innocent persons, and the subject.

- Start slowly and spend time building rapport
- Stay slow—take a deep breath and then take another
- Be nonjudgmental regarding their current and past actions
- Do not discount emotions, but do not get frustrated or angry if subject cannot verbalize and explain their emotions
- Avoid using your rank or position—instead, focus on your authority based upon expertise, experience, and success
- Pay attention to dangerous elements in their environment, including weapons, their developing a “kill zone,” arranging their environment
- Recognize that the subject could go into “battlemind mode”
- Avoid sudden movements, especially among tactical personnel
- If subject does go into “battlemind mode”:
 - Consider a negotiator who is a military veteran or TBI who is a veteran, such as a member of the military, VFW, or American Legion
 - Be careful about intruding into their personal space
 - Avoid using nicknames, especially those used when the subject was in the military
 - Use active listening skills to reduce anxiety, stress, anger, and other emotions
 - Make the subject stay still and reduce “scanning” behaviors
 - Negotiator can become a “weapon” by keeping SWAT away
- Watch for and stop impulsive behavior
- Use active listening skills
 - Build rapport
 - Stay in communication as much as possible
 - Watch for suicide or homicide
 - Continually reassure that you are there to help
 - Prepare for sudden emotional shifts and use ALS to reduce
- Share common experiences (Not “I’ve been there,” but rather “I have a similar experience from a different time and place ...”)
- Practice adaptation and coping. Gather intelligence to determine what skills they used in a non-military environment (such as in business, pre-deployment family or school situations, etc.)
 - Have them recall these past situations to get them thinking and focusing on these more appropriate coping and adaptation strategies
 - Use real examples from the subject’s past; get them to recall example, and then to identify specific strategies they used to solve or resolve the situation
- Suggest and make use of help arenas
 - Nearby military installation programs and counselors or peer team groups
 - Family groups of serving veterans

- VFW and American Legion groups
- University and community veteran groups
- Veterans administration
- Private counseling centers and veteran counseling groups
- Wounded Warrior Project

[Figure 8.10](#) lists some Internet sites that may be beneficial to negotiators when negotiating with warfighters. These web sites may assist negotiators with all issues discussed in this chapter; battlemind, PTSD, TBI, and MST. In addition, www.militarysonesource.com, www.battlemind.com, and the Wounded Warrior Project provide some generalized information relevant to all warfighters. As with the web sites for the elderly, the reader should familiarize themselves with these web sites and then open them during negotiations if needed.



PHOTO 8.3 The key to being able to successfully negotiate with a member of any special population is training, both in the classroom and in scenarios. Negotiations are part science and part art. Classroom learning must be supplemented with practice. Michael McMains is watching this exercise in the background.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

Police Officers

After reading the scenario below, stop and ask yourself, ‘What issues would I need to be thinking about if I were responding to this incident?’ ‘Would I make the same decisions?’ Why or why not?

- At 7:30 a.m. on a Sunday, a deputy sheriff was flagged down by a woman who reported that her husband, a police officer, was barricaded in their home, threatening to shoot himself.
- Eight-year veteran, field training officer, active on streets, no complaints.
- Former deputy with sheriff’s office.
- Served with divorce papers on extra job.
- Drinking on way home from his extra job.
- Conflict with wife at home.

- 7:40: Call-out of emergency response team.
- 8:45: SWAT, negotiators and command are all on scene. Contact is attempted.
- 10:00: Deputy chief and negotiator sergeant from officer's agency arrive on scene.
- 10:30: Media arrives on the scene and sets up two blocks away.
- 10:30: Deputy chief is on the phone, issuing an order for the man to come out. Response: "How do I know that you are the deputy chief?"
- 11:00: Officer's lieutenant is on phone, assuring him that the deputy chief is for real. The officer refuses to come out, speech is slurred, thinking is slowed, and he wants to go to sleep.
- 1:00: Forward observer reports that the officer is on the porch with a weapon. The officer denies that he has a weapon.
- 1:30: Mentation is much improved, and the officer agrees to meet his lieutenant and doctor in the front yard. Command denies this request for safety reasons.
- 3:15: The officer tries to exit via the back door and is ordered back into the house by SWAT.
- 4:00: Wife is re-interviewed—she says that he wasn't threatening himself or her. She said that to get a response. She did not expect the police to be involved and expressed concern about the officer's job.
- The officer refuses to come out. He expresses concern for his career.
- 7:00: The officer again states that he will come out and meet with his lieutenant and doctor, in a patrol car at end of the driveway. Command agrees, if appropriate safety measures are in place.
- 7:30: The officer meets with his lieutenant and his doctor. SWAT takes the officer down.



FIGURE 8.10 Internet sites that may be beneficial to negotiators when dealing with Warfighters.

This incident, although unusual, illustrates some of the issues involved in negotiating with a fellow police officer. Though the negotiators at this incident were experienced and successful, they did some things that complicated negotiations. For instance, they put a commander on the phone, thinking that the officer had been a good officer and he would respond to a direct order. This section will discuss some of the issues involved in dealing with incidents that are “too close for comfort” (Terhune-Bickler, 2004).

Statistics on the number of incidents that involve police officers is scarce. Terhune-Bickler (2004) reports that 22 incidents involving officers had been reported to HOBAS by 2002. However, they are highly publicized when they happen. A sampling of incidents involving

officers that were reported in the media provided to the authors by Max Howard (2005) showed the following:

- **4/03, Nassau County, New York:** NYPD lieutenant climbed into the window of his girlfriend's home resulting in a murder-suicide with gun.
- **4/03, Nassau County, New York:** NYPD lieutenant found dead at home of gunshot wound to head.
- **4/03, Tacoma, Washington:** Police officer killed his wife and himself with his service gun in a parking lot with his two children watching (domestic).
- **5/03, Albuquerque, New Mexico:** Attorney general investigator forced suicide-by-cop when caught robbing a bank (financial issues).
- **7/03, Fayette, Alabama:** Lieutenant was found dead in his yard of a self-inflicted gunshot wound (health problems and death of son).
- **9/04, Atlanta, Georgia:** A 17-year veteran of the Atlanta Police Department was arrested after third bank robbery (personal business failure).
- **6/02, Waxahachie, Texas:** On-duty Ellis Co. deputy fatally shot himself in the chest while seated in his office.
- **2/03, San Antonio, Texas:** Officer in 12-hour standoff at home (just served with divorce papers).
- **12/03, El Paso, Texas:** U.S. Customs inspector killed his wife at work, took hostages, then killed self.
- **5/04, Dallas, Texas:** Dallas Police Department officer held gun to daughter's head (age 7) and threatened to kill his wife. Later threatened investigators.

It is clear that law enforcement personnel do have crises and that they sometimes have to be managed by negotiators. It benefits negotiators to have thought through their procedures and developed plans for this eventuality, so they are not left without a plan when dealing with a fellow officer. Otherwise, the stresses involved may lead to errors that the experienced negotiator ordinarily would not make. The value of policies and procedures is to provide guidance in the exceptional situation when there are factors that may influence critical decision making.

Considerations in officer-involved crises

Often officers who are in the same agency or who work in an adjacent jurisdiction have a prior relationship with the officer in crisis. In the scenario above, not only did the officers in the subject's agency know him, the negotiators all knew him from his prior employment with their agency. Prior history can work for or against the negotiator, depending on the nature of the relationship the officer had with the negotiators. If they had a good or neutral relationship, the negotiator can probably handle the incident. However, if there were conflicts and unresolved issues, then these issues will flow over into the negotiations. One of the first decisions negotiators may have to make is whether or not they should negotiate with the officer or if they need to call negotiators from an adjacent jurisdiction or other agency. At times, depending upon the actor (officer), position within the department, relationship with

negotiators, act, etc., negotiators may want to have another team take the lead and then host team serve in support or background roles.

Media exposure. Incidents involving officers are high-profile events. The media will certainly be there. It will put added pressure on the negotiators and may be an issue to be addressed with the subject. In the incident described above, the officer's real issue—the reason he wanted to surrender behind his garage or after dark—was that he did not want his picture on television. It was shameful and embarrassing. Departments need to be prepared to deal effectively with the media and the media exposure. Negotiators need to be aware of the face issues involved in an incident for an officer in crisis.

Untrained superior as incident commander. Terhune-Bickler (2004) has pointed out that departments are likely to want to avoid embarrassment and exposure, so the supervisor or ranking official at the time an officer is involved in an incident may be reluctant to call out the crisis management team. This leads to relatively untrained commanders and personnel handling the incident.

Pressure to resolve quickly and quietly. To reduce exposure, there is pressure to resolve an incident involving an officer quickly. The hope is that if it is resolved rapidly, it will get less press. So, there is pressure to violate one of the elements needed for successful negotiation—the use of time. Command pressure to resolve the incident quickly will increase the stress on negotiators.

Issues because they are officers

Officers known to team. The first issue that needs to be addressed is: Who will negotiate? Will it be someone from the officer's parent agency or someone from another agency with whom the department has a memorandum of understanding? Will it be someone the officer knows or is there a stranger available? Generally it is better to use negotiators who have no prior relationship with the officer in crisis because they do not bring any unresolved issues into the relationship. However, if that is not possible, as in the incident described above, the primary needs to be chosen on the basis of who had the best relationship with the officer prior to the incident.

Terhune-Bickler (2004) has made the point that one of the issues for an officer in crisis having to deal with negotiators from his own department is that he knows the policies and practices of the department and may not trust the negotiator to have his interests in mind. She recommends having a working relationship and memorandum of understanding with an adjacent department to minimize the impact of this issue.

Assumption of knowledge. Implicit in Terhune-Bickler (2004) point about familiarity with the department is the implication that the officer in crisis not only knows the political tenor of the department, but that they know the department's negotiating style, policies, and procedures. While this may be true, the authors' experience with police-involved incidents has been that officers did not know as much about negotiating as was thought. For instance, one officer who had actually studied negotiations was barricaded and kept telling the negotiators that he knew what they were up to. However, when he heard the SWAT team clearing adjacent rooms in the motel, he shot himself, thinking that they were assaulting him. He assumed that the negotiator was setting him up for a tactical solution. It is important not to

assume that officers know what negotiations are about. Officers may need to be educated about the process of negotiations in the same way other subjects need to learn that negotiators are not there to harm them.

Police personality. Historically, there has been much debate about whether there is a “police personality.” The general consensus among police psychologists is that a wide variety of people come into police work, but that, over the years, they grow more alike. They are socialized into similar thinking, values, and behaviors, like any tightly knit group. They value discipline, attention to detail, and their reputation. They become perfectionistic and are driven by the threat of shame. That is, their reputation (face) becomes important. This makes incidents that expose them to possible criticism by their peers, administrators, or the public highly stressful for them. This issue has to be taken into account in managing any incident involving a police officer.

Precipitating events. Terhune-Bickler (2004) has reported that the limited research on police-involved suicides involved relationship problems, legal troubles, psychological problems, and work-related stress. Relationship problems in policing are frequently the result of the same things that those in the “real world” find difficult: power and control, saving face, and fear of abandonment. If this is the source, negotiators need to deal with it like any other domestic incident they negotiate. If the source is a legal problem, reputation and self-esteem are likely to be issues. Incidents involving officers who are having psychological problems should include a MHC on the management team to assess the seriousness of the problems, explain the impact of treatment, communicate with treating professionals, and help develop strategies.

Threat to career. Officers will fear the department’s reaction to the exposure the incident brings to them. A significant question and issue to be resolved is “what will happen to me now?” The officer in the incident above asked that question multiple times and not without reason. Representatives from his department were pushing early on for a resolution to the incident, even if it took a tactical solution. Administrators were discussing ways of managing the image problems the incident was creating for them, including termination of the officer. Negotiators need to anticipate this issue and have a strategy for responding before it is brought up.

Suicide risk. Being faced with departmental repercussions and the shame of public exposure because of an incident are major stressors. Losses of things in which people invest a lot emotionally, physically, and personally will often result in depression and the risk of suicide. Officers involved in incidents that may end with their being on television and losing their job may feel hopeless and helpless. They may turn to suicide. Negotiators need to constantly evaluate the risk of suicide in incidents that involve officers.

Saving face. To a large degree, being a member of a tightly knit group requires people to value the reputation and opinions of the group. An officer looks to his peers for approval, acceptance, belonging, and safety. His reputation among fellow officers is an important part of his worldview. Being involved in a crisis with fellow officers raises significant “face” problems. The officer who is in crisis may well have difficulty with both the personal embarrassment of having fellow officers know that he had a problem he could not handle and the embarrassment he is generating for the department. Both the officer and department will be interested in saving face and avoiding embarrassment. In the incident above, the officer’s

real concern was about not appearing on television and having to explain it to his friends and family. Negotiators need to look for ways of helping the officer “restore face.”

Negotiating with police officers

Several authors (Howard, 2004; Terhune-Bickler, 2004; McMains, 2005) have suggested guidelines for negotiating with police officers who are in crisis. They include:

- Expect rapport to be tricky—Officers do not necessarily trust fellow officers in times of crisis. In fact, Terhune-Bickler (2004) has suggested that rapport may already be established because of the officer’s familiarity with the negotiator. On the down side, however, the officer who is in crisis may see the negotiator as a representative of the department and he may consider the department a cause of his problems. Thus, rapport is not automatic, just because the negotiator is known to the officer in crisis.
- Normalize feelings—Because officers generally value action over feelings, they tend to deny their feelings until they are overwhelming. When they get to the point of being overwhelming, officers feel out of control. Therefore, it is important for them to hear that they are responding like a normal human being and it is important to hear it from a fellow officer.
- Allow ventilation but do not spend a lot of time—Because officers tend to devalue feelings, shifting from ventilation to problem-solving needs to be done as quickly as possible. When they have had time to ventilate and they begin to accept the idea that their feelings are “normal,” negotiators can begin to focus on problem-solving, emphasizing the officers’ prior success in solving others’ problems as a “face-restoring” strategy.
- Be respectful and competent—Officers tend to have learned to be perfectionistic and detail-oriented. They expect other officers to be equally competent. They are sensitive to criticism because of the high standard they are expected to meet. Therefore, show them respect and your expertise.
- Stay problem-focused rather than feeling-oriented.
- Use problem-oriented questions and paraphrasing—These active listening techniques minimize feelings and focus the officer who is in crisis on skills they have considerable experience with. Asking them what they would advise someone who was in a similar situation would be an example.
- After rage is defused, the officer is likely to be contrite and cooperative—Police officers are one of two organizations in our society that are sanctioned to use force to solve problems. They are trained on the use of threats and force to control situations and people. When under stress, they use the tools that have worked in the past, so expect them to use threats as a way to try to control their situation. However, they do respect authority and after they have time to get themselves under control, they are likely to respond to the situation by becoming cooperative.
- Provide structure by sharing what “normally” happens in negotiations—To deal with the fact that officers may not know as much as you think about negotiations, share your experiences with them.

- Share experience to establish “expertise”—negotiators can share their experiences of successful negotiations with an officer to establish his competence and expertise. He can say things like, “I’ve been involved in X number of incidents and they have generally turned out well.” If asked how many involved police officers, he can say something like, “I’m glad you asked. I have studied every incident I could find involving police officers and they generally are resolved peacefully.”
- Minimize “fault/blame”—Face is important to officers and if they are in a barricaded or hostage situation, feeling things they have not felt before and doing things they normally would not do, they are likely to have a sense of failure and shame. Minimize their self-criticism and introduce ideas that restore face to them.
- Choose a negotiator carefully—Assess prior relationship.
- Assess risk carefully, especially suicide. The loss of face, the availability of a weapon, and the frequent use of alcohol combine to increase the risk of suicide among police officers.
- Review the answers to the questions that were asked before the scenario above was presented. Answer them again, knowing what you know now about issues surrounding incidents that involve police officers. Have your answers changed?

Summary

Negotiations with all of the special populations discussed in this chapter pose unique issues for negotiators, but are not insurmountable. At one time, it was believed that we could not negotiate with terrorists, but experience has proven time and time again that we can, and very successfully (Mullins, 2012e). Likewise, we can be just as successful with the special populations discussed in this chapter. The challenges, however, can be overcome by negotiators who are trained and prepared to respond to those challenges. Juveniles, the elderly, warfighters, and police officers all present some specific issues that negotiators need to understand. Within these groups, those with organic illness or damage may present the greatest challenges. Negotiating with a person who has Alzheimer’s or a warfighter with TBI may be the most difficult of all special populations. In these two cases, unlike any others, negotiators have little or no ability to impact behavior or emotional change. Negotiators have to work within the framework of the hostage taker or barricade and “take what they get.” One way to somewhat mitigate the difficulties presented by these subjects is to train, train, train, and train some more, and prepare for additional resources to assist in negotiations. Negotiators may contact a medical doctor or caregiver and seek their assistance at an incident. Pre-planning and preparation are the keys to success.

Discussion Questions

1. How did your approach to incidents involving juveniles change after reading this chapter?

2. How did your approach to the elderly person change after reading this chapter?
3. How did your approach to warfighters change after reading this chapter?
4. How did your approach to incidents involving police officers change after reading the chapter?
5. Of the four groups discussed in this chapter, which would be the hardest and which the easiest to negotiate with? What makes them the hardest and the easiest?
6. During normal development, adolescents switch emphasis from needing to belong to a group to needing to learn to relate to others as individuals. What “hooks” does this give the negotiator in dealing with adolescents? What “barbs” (issues to avoid) does it suggest?
7. Discuss how your negotiating strategy might be different in dealing with a gang leader, a gang general, or a gang soldier.
8. Tour a facility that treats patients with Alzheimer’s, strokes, or brain injury. Talk with staff and caregivers about how to negotiate with one of those persons if they were threatening a family member. What strategies and tactics would you use with a person who you need to calm and reduce anger?
9. Your team has to negotiate with a police officer who had been your field training officer because, after an internal affairs complaint of sexual harassment, she is barricaded and threatening suicide. While she was your field training officer, she propositioned you and your wife insisted that you resign from the department. You worked it out with your wife, but never reported the event. Your team leader wants you to be the primary negotiator. What do you tell your team leader about your previous relationship with this officer? Do you negotiate? What issues are important in making this decision?
10. For each group in this chapter, assume a member of that group has taken a significant other hostage and is threatening to kill that person because the other person has been “cheating” on them with someone else. Do a general risk assessment for a member of each special group. Who presents the most serious risk of danger? The least? Who would be the easiest to negotiate with and why? The hardest?

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Chapter 9

Crisis Management: The Extraordinary and Unique: Prisons, Correctional Facilities, and Special Negotiation Incidents

Chapter Outline

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Learning Objectives

1. Know the similarities and differences between hostage negotiations in prisons and hostage negotiations in the police sector.
2. Understand the various situational dynamics present in the prison situation.
3. Know the purposes of negotiating in prison situations.

4. Know what needs to be done prior to beginning negotiations in prison situations.
5. Know and understand the principles and goals of negotiating in prison situations.
6. Understand which demands are negotiable and which are non-negotiable.
7. Know the process necessary for developing a prison hostage negotiation team, including:
 - A. Team membership
 - B. Why all prison personnel should be trained in hostage negotiation
 - C. Establishment of a Victim's Assistance Team
8. Know the critical lessons learned from high-profile, high-intensity prison situations.
9. Understand the basic role of negotiators in kidnap incidents and know who to contact to receive training in these types of incidents.
10. Know the role of law enforcement and negotiators in protest movements and demonstrations. Understand the limitations of law enforcement responses and how negotiators can bridge gaps between the protestors and law enforcement.
11. Know the limitations and difficulties of negotiating a maritime incident.

It was a busy month for the Anytown Crisis Negotiation Team. In addition to three call-outs to deal with a (1) high-risk suicide threatening to jump from a bridge, (2) a barricaded actor threatening suicide because her boyfriend broke up with her, and (3) a domestic situation with victims (estranged father held children at gunpoint, demanding better visitation rights)—all resolved successfully—the team responded to other unique situations.

SITUATION ONE – Inmates at the Anytown Regional Correctional Center (ARCC) rioted at lunch on Tuesday. A member of the Anytown Tango Blast (local gang) insulted a member from another Tango Blast gang. A fight and melee erupted in the mess hall. While officers were breaking up that mini-riot, three other inmates went into the kitchen and took the kitchen staff hostage (two civilians and three inmates). According to intelligence, the only weapons the inmates (Dave, Frank, and Mark) had were knives and other kitchen implements. They secured both doors (one to the mess hall, the other an exterior metal door). Both had double-locking systems and were extra-heavy duty. The Anytown CNT arrived and obtained the inmate records on the three, and rapidly discovered all three were doing somewhat short sentences for minor felonies (Dave, 4 years for drug possession and burglary; Frank, 3 years for auto theft and switching VIN tags; Mark, 4 years for Forgery of Official Documents [making fake DLs, SSN cards, and other IDs]).

Prior to contacting the inmates, negotiators were informed by the warden of the ARCC that it was the state's DOC policy that it did not negotiate with inmates. Negotiators explained the process to the warden, who allowed negotiators to call the inmates but could not agree to any demands. IC made contact with state authorities (Director of State DOC) and informed them of the situation and what CNT was going to attempt. The Director told IC to do whatever was necessary to secure the safety of the staff and that he would deal with the warden.

Negotiators initiated contact and spent several hours using active listening skills, getting the inmates to calm down and become less emotional. Negotiators also identified the leader of the three (Dave) and would only talk with him. If Frank or Mark answered, negotiators would ask for Dave repeatedly until Dave got on the phone. Once negotiators reduced the inmate emotions, they got a promise from Dave to not harm the staff while they tried to work through the issues. Dave agreed but said he couldn't speak for Frank or Mark. Negotiators asked to speak to each in turn, and secured promises from each to not harm staff as long as negotiators were talking and trying to resolve the incident. Dave then asked for a handcuff key, explaining that they had handcuffed the staff to kitchen appliances until things settled down. The staff who had the handcuffs did not have the key on them. Negotiators spent more than two hours (with IC negotiating with the Director) trying to convince authorities that this was a beneficial move and would help negotiators resolve the incident by building trust and rapport. The Director finally agreed, and tactical delivered a key through a small air vent.

It was then discovered that Dave and Frank were from a different state and Mark was from a town on the other side of the state. Their demands were simple; each wanted to serve their sentence near their hometown so their families could visit. Negotiators spent several hours discussing and exploring this issue with Dave. During these discussions, negotiators learned that the real issue was the other inmates (primarily the gangs) physically abusing the three, stealing their possessions, forcing them to clean cells, taking their PX privilege cards, etc. IC got a commitment from the Director to allow the three to be roommates in a segregated part of another facility, isolated from other inmates, to avoid further victimization. DOC policy was to move inmates who engaged in this type of incident. Negotiators presented this commitment to Dave. Dave said they would agree to that if no further charges would be brought against them. The Director agreed, and shortly thereafter, all three surrendered with no harm to the staff. The promises made were kept, and

the inmates served the rest of their sentences in a different facility and presented no further problems to authorities.

SITUATION 2 – Anytime CNT was dispatched to the ship channel at the request of the Coast Guard. The CG told negotiators a gunman aboard the SS Buck had taken the pilot and helmsman hostage and was threatening to kill them. The SS Buck was a small work boat that delivered supplies and crews to oil rigs in the Gulf. The boat had been making a run to deliver a specialty pump and only had three crewmen aboard: the pilot, helmsman and engineer. The boat delivered its cargo and was returning when the incident unfolded. The boat was approximately 2 miles out and had shut its engines down. CG advised that a storm was heading inland from the Gulf, and within about 3 hours, seas were expected to swell to 10 feet, winds of 40 – 60 knots, and heavy rain.

Negotiators met with the boat company owner and obtained intelligence on the three crew members. They discovered the engineer had an anger management problem and had been ordered to counseling by the company. Negotiators met with his wife, who related that just hours ago she discovered on his e-mail that he was having an affair. She called him on the cell phone and told him she discovered his affair and told him to never come home.

Negotiators tried to contact the boat by using crew cell phones, marine radio, and CB radio. None worked. CRT advised CG they would have to go out to the boat. CG advised their vessel was rather small, and with their skeleton crew aboard, could only take four additional people. IC decided two negotiators and two tactical officers would go. The only support the primary and secondary would have was via phone and radio back to shore. Also, seas were beginning to swell and were at 6 feet, too high to effect a tactical boarding of the SS Buck.

As the CG vessel pulled up beside the SS Buck, negotiators on the outer bridge began using the CG loud speaker to hail the hostage taker (HT), John (“pulled up beside” is somewhat misleading, as facing 6 ft seas and building, and a boat not under power, the closest the CG would go was about 50 feet). John came out on the bridge, holding the pilot at gunpoint. Negotiators kept telling John to turn on his radio. John yelled back, but no one could hear him over the wind. Tactical advised that a sniper shot was out of the question (and given the weather and wind, CG advised their airborne snipers team helicopters could not fly). Negotiators finally went outside on the bridge with a portable hailing horn, and using hand signals, believed they got John to agree to take it if they threw it over. The secondary negotiator used the loudspeaker to tell John he had to have the helmsman start engines and stabilize the SS Buck while this difficult maneuver was accomplished. They saw the work boat start its engines (smoke aft), and the CG moved close enough to toss the hailing horn. John had the pilot go pick it up and take to John. The CG kept their vessel as close as possible while the negotiator and John talked via the loudspeaker systems. Sentences and talking points were kept very short and to the point. The situation took active listening out of the equation. Shore-based negotiators then called and said they had convinced John’s wife to meet with him and discuss their marital situation.

The negotiator told John this, and after an hour or so, John accepted this as true. He then asked what would happen to him criminally? The negotiator was truthful and said he would probably be charged, but that he (the negotiator) would say that John cooperated. The negotiator noticed John began pacing around the deck and indicated he was seriously considering the resolution. The negotiator began reiterating that John needed to meet with his wife and work things out. The negotiator repeated that over and over. John yelled over, “I’m just not sure!” The negotiator kept repeating the same thing, but added, “The only way to get her back with you is to meet and talk. There is no other way. You can’t do that from out here.” John finally agreed to surrender. He was told to throw the pistol overboard and the CG vessel would approach under power and to jump across. Within minutes, John was safely in custody and both vessels were headed back to port.

SITUATION 3 – Anytime CNT was dispatched to a high school stadium development project on the edge of town. When they arrived, they were informed there were a group of about 15 protestors that had climbed various large trees on the property and refused to leave. The trees, some of which were over 100 years old, were slated for removal and the protestors were there to ensure they were saved. Negotiators informed the city authorities and construction company that there was not much they could do, that the protestors were not violating any laws at this point, and if they were, the negative publicity would offset any possible police actions. Negotiators did agree to talk with them, and after determining the protestors had no weapons, moved forward and started face-to-face contact. The first issue for negotiators was to identify a leader and talk to that person. Everyone claimed they were leaderless. The team then split up and talked to each protestor, some of whom were sitting over 50 feet in the air. Negotiators did determine they all had backpacks and seemed like they were ready to remain in the trees for a long period. This was confirmed when negotiators discovered they had a support team on the ground that would deliver supplies and other necessities.

After speaking with each for a period, negotiators met back together as a team and determined who was the primary “spokesperson.” They identified a female who called herself “Bluebonnet.” The team decided it would be better if only two negotiators moved forward to speak with her, which they did. In addition, those two negotiators took off their uniforms and wore their CNT polo shirts (to be less threatening). Bluebonnet was adamant that there was no compromise in saving the trees. Negotiators offered many suggestions: planting new trees for every one cut down, planting 100 trees for every one cut down, putting memorial plaques on the stadium to these trees, and even moving and replanting these particular trees. Every suggestion was rejected out-of-hand. The two negotiators then backed off.

The team leader recommended to IC that there was no more they could do and it was time to leave. IC advised the Chief and recommended a patrol unit be assigned overtime at the site to just keep an eye on the situation. The CNT team leader developed a schedule so that every day at a prescribed time, two negotiators would go by and negotiate the list of demands with Bluebonnet. One thing the team leader hoped this strategy would accomplish is to give the tree-sitters “alone” time to talk among themselves. Maybe they would consider the demands and one day they just may agree to compromise.

Every day at the prescribed time, two negotiators went by and talked with several of the protestors, checking on their general welfare and making small talk. They would always then go to Bluebonnet and reiterate and discuss the demands. On day five, surprisingly, Bluebonnet said the group had considered the offer to plant 100 trees for every one cut. Negotiators advised the team leader, who shortly arrived on-scene with IC (only those two, as it believed a large police presence would make the protestors back off and entrench again). City officials and construction crew leaders were brought up as well. In a discussion with Bluebonnet, she again said they would climb down if 100 trees were planted for every tree cut down, but they needed some assurances and proof that that would occur. It was decided to bring in a media reporter to report the agreement. The mayor arrived and spoke to the press, agreeing publicly to honor the agreement and that the city landscape department would assign planting spots. The demonstrators, Bluebonnet and her fellow tree-sitters, climbed down, ending the demonstration.

These three incidents illustrate that many times negotiators are taken out of their comfort zone and asked to negotiate incidents outside the scope of their usual negotiation paradigm. This chapter will present some of those situations, along with some recommendations for negotiators when confronted by these situations. As will be discussed further in the chapter, two of those unique situations will be discussed by guest authors who have experience in these unique situations.

Prison and jails are more familiar to police negotiators and are not necessarily “unique” as are the other incidents discussed in this chapter. It is not the intent of the authors to minimize the importance of prison negotiations and prison negotiating teams, as these are volatile institutions that have had some of the most violent, significant, and newsworthy events in the history of negotiations. Prisons are included in this chapter simply for continuity and convenience. If any of our prison friends are upset by this arrangement, we deeply apologize. Our intent is not to minimize the contributions and value of prison negotiations and teams. In many respects, their jobs as negotiators are more difficult than those of their law enforcement counterparts. Often, the prison team is confronted with co-workers, colleagues, friends, and even family members who are being held hostage (or who have been killed). They have to work in a hostile environment while maintaining a large inmate population and keeping the facility functioning.

Police departments are not the only agencies that face hostage situations. Prisons are especially vulnerable to hostage incidents. Attica, New Mexico, Oakdale, Atlanta, Talladega, Lucasville (Ohio), St. Martinsville (Louisiana), and Lewis (Arizona) prisons are part of American folklore because of the national publicity that their hostage situations generated. They are not alone, however. Prisons and jails throughout the country have dealt with hostage situations. Prisons are especially vulnerable to hostage situations due to the nature of their business: the type of people incarcerated, the number of prisoners versus the number of officers, and the physical arrangement.

One of the most famous hostage incidents in the United States occurred at New York’s Attica Prison in September 1971. Tension had been building in Attica for several months, when on September 9, at approximately 8:45 a.m., a group of inmates from Cell Block A overpowered the correctional officers, broke a defective door separating their cell block from the keeplock area (master door controls for all cell blocks), and unlocked all the cell blocks. In minutes, inmates had taken control of the entire prison, holding 42 correctional officers and civilians hostage. The inmates, with their hostages, moved to the D yard and established an operations base. Inmate leaders presented a list of 32 demands to prison and state authorities, including replacement of the prison superintendent, administrative and legal amnesty to all prisoners involved in the takeover, placement of Attica under federal jurisdiction, application

of New York's minimum wage law to working prisoners, religious freedom, an end to prison censorship, implementation of realistic and effective rehabilitation programs, educational and narcotics treatment programs, better diet, more recreation time, increased numbers of black and Hispanic officers, establishment of an inmate grievance procedure, expansion of work-release programs, outside doctors and dentists to visit inmates for medical and dental work (at the inmate's expense), and airline flights to other countries for any inmate who wanted to leave the United States. Over the following three days, prison and state officials negotiated with the inmates on these demands, making little progress. On Monday, September 13, New York Commissioner of Corrections Russell G. Oswald, with the concurrence of New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, ordered the New York State Police to regain control of the prison (New York State Special Commission on Attica, 1972).

At approximately 10:00 a.m. on September 13, the State Police and correctional officers stormed the wall surrounding D yard, firing shotguns and pistols at anything in front of them. Clearing the wall, officers entered D yard and, using lethal force, quelled the prisoners and ended the siege. In just over 15 minutes, the officers had killed 39 people and wounded 80 others. Eleven of the dead and 33 of the wounded were correctional personnel. One officer and three inmates had been killed by inmates during the siege. After the retaking of the facility, several more inmates suffered serious injury in reprisal actions by officials.

Following the event, the New York State Commission on Attica (1972) reported that the authorities had erred in several areas. The intent of state officials all along had been to retake Attica by force. The assault was not planned with the intent to minimize loss of life. The choice of weapons on the part of the police was made by what was available at the time and not by situational dynamics. No safeguards were in place to prevent the excessive use of force. No controls were present to prevent firing by those who were not part of the main assault. No arrangements were made for medical care and those needs should have been anticipated. Finally, no system was in place to prevent vengeful reprisals against inmates following the siege.

The events at Attica brought about numerous changes and reforms in prisons and jails in the United States. Included in those reforms were mandates to develop tactical response teams trained in prison uprisings and to train hostage negotiators conversant in penal situations. Lawsuits from the Attica case have just recently settled, almost 30 years after the riot. In the aftermath of the riot, civil suits were filed on behalf of 1,281 inmates at the facility at the time. The plaintiffs originally asked for \$2.8 billion. In 2000, the courts awarded the inmates \$8 million from the State of New York, with an additional \$4 million awarded for attorneys' fees (Chen, 2000). This settlement is the largest ever in a prisoner's rights case and demonstrates the lasting effects that mishandling an incident can have.

Other significant and noteworthy prison incidents include the New Mexico State Prison riot of 1980, in which 33 inmates were killed (two were beheaded in the Segregation Unit. Eighty-nine other inmates were injured in a 36-hour riot. Fortunately, no correctional staff were harmed. In 1987, at Oakdale Federal Detention Center, Louisiana, inmates took 26 hostages in a nine-day incident. Also in 1987, at the Atlanta (GA) United States Prison, 100 hostages were held during a 12-day incident. In 1991, at Talladega Federal Correctional Institution, inmates took 26 hostages, including 10 correctional officers and held them for nine days. In 1993, at Lucasville, inmates took over a wing of the facility and held eight people for 10 days. At St.

Martinsville, Louisiana, Parish Jail in 1999, inmates took three staff members hostage (the warden and two correctional officers) and held them for five days (Sage, 2003). And in 2004, two inmates took two correctional officers hostage in a tower at Lewis Prison in Arizona and held them for 15 days. In all of these incidents except New Mexico and Talladega, the incidents were resolved through a negotiated settlement (Bazan, 2004).

One reason prison incidents tend to be so highly charged, emotional, and large-scale is the nature of the causes for the incident. At the Lewis Prison incident, for example, a state blue ribbon commission appointed by the Arizona governor reported that problems had been building for years and that the ultimate hostage event was the result of a combination of factors, including “complacency, inexperience, lack of professionalism, inadequate staffing, vague security procedures, poor training, lack of situational awareness, premature promotions, noncompetitive pay, ineffective communication, malfunctioning equipment, high inmate-to-officer ratios, bad architectural design and myriad other causes” (*Corrections Digest*, 2004). Many of these problems plague prisons across the nation, federal as well as state institutions.

This chapter will cover hostage taking in prisons. There are many similarities to the police negotiating effort, but there are some subtle differences for the prison staff or business community. These differences will be explored in detail. Note that although we discuss prisons, the discussion also applies to county and municipal jails.

Negotiations Specific to the Prison Situation

Fuselier (1988) and Needham (1977) have stated that hostage negotiations in prisons are like those faced by the police negotiator. The Office of the Attorney General of New Mexico (1980) reported that the riot at the New Mexico State Prison was resolved using standard police negotiating strategy and tactics. Fuselier et al. (1989), following the Oakdale and Atlanta riots, stated: “... all negotiators involved in the two sieges agreed that standard ‘criminal’ negotiations guidelines are applicable in protracted situations having a large number of hostage takers ...” We agree in principle that prison and civilian hostage-taking scenarios are similar, but some differences exist that can have implications for negotiations, negotiating strategy, and incident tactics.

Negotiators with the FBI’s Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), Crisis Negotiation Unit, teach a seminar on negotiations in the correctional setting and discuss the similarities and differences between correctional and police negotiations. Much of the information presented in this section, unless otherwise cited, comes from the work done by CIRG at the FBI. Also, what is discussed here for the prison situation applies equally to jail and other correctional setting negotiations (i.e., private prisons, halfway houses, etc.)

During a prison incident, the first assessment concerns whether the situation is a contained hostage/barricade situation or whether it is a planned or spontaneous riot (Romano, 2003; Bazan, 2004). If it is a contained situation, then the general principles of crisis negotiation apply and the response units can use time in the same way police negotiation units use time. If it is a riot, a rapid tactical response is recommended if there are numerous injuries or property damage is ongoing. If a rapid tactical response is not physically possible, then the response units are forced into negotiations.

One of the more significant advantages the prison negotiator has is that the hostage takers are already known to the negotiators. The hostage takers are prisoners and the negotiators are prison staff. Negotiators have complete intelligence on the hostage takers. There are extensive background histories, medical and mental health files, psychological profiles, aggression and violence indexes, and other data available on the hostage takers. The crisis site is known, physical layouts are familiar, blueprints are on hand, and other obstacles are known to the response team. Related to this is the fact that the situation is already contained to some degree, and the issue generally becomes where to provide additional containment (that is, moving the situation to a smaller, confined area). At the very least, the response elements know the situation is going to remain inside the four walls of the facility. To the hostage takers (and unlike many hostage takers the police deal with), they realize and know they are vulnerable to tactical efforts. To the prison response team, the problem often becomes sifting through and discarding unhelpful information and intelligence rather than trying to gather intelligence. Additionally, the prisoners are already incarcerated and may have a history of violence and anti-authority sentiment, so negotiators already have a basic framework within which to begin negotiations.

Another difference is that hostages are usually coworkers (Miller et al., 1988). When prisoners take hostages, some of the hostages are likely to be correctional staff. This can be both positive and negative for the negotiators. On the positive side, negotiators have intelligence on the hostages and know them behaviorally and psychologically and can predict how the hostages are likely to react. On the negative side, the negotiators are acquaintances and friends of some of the hostages, which places added stressors on the negotiators and added demands on decisionmaking. This situation is analogous to a police officer being held hostage.

Also, the inmate hostage takers know the prison staff and their hostages. The treatment afforded the hostages will, in large part, be a function of how the staff treated inmates prior to the incident. Thus, the familiarity between hostage takers and hostages can either help or hurt negotiators and other response elements. In general, staff workers who are taken hostage are likely to be better treated than are correctional officers who are taken hostage.

There are some disadvantages faced by prison negotiators. First, tactical entry may be a problem (Romano, 2003). The tactical response unit may not be able to physically breach the site without loss of life (team or hostages). At the Lewis Prison incident, tactical resolution was not a viable option because of the architectural design of the physical structure. The tower was designed to keep people out. That function was fulfilled all too well. Second, the prison situation often involves group dynamics issues among hostage takers. One rather common experience among prison negotiators is the fact that a group of hostage takers is much more likely to become violent than is a single hostage taker. Third, the negotiators and other response personnel may have prior negative relationships with the hostage takers. Fourth, leadership among the hostage takers may become an issue when negotiating, especially if the hostage takers are of different races. Prison gangs share a common hatred toward correctional staff, but also share a hatred of other inmate groups and gangs. Negotiators need to determine who to direct negotiations toward, and who has the authority and influence to make decisions (Romano, 2003).

A final difference is that demands may require command personnel to involve higher

government authorities in negotiating demands. State prison officials, the state prison board, or the governor may become involved at the county jail or state prison level. The Bureau of Prisons, the FBI, or State Department may become involved with federal prison hostage situations. At the Oakdale and Atlanta sieges, the highest-level State Department administrators and the President of the United States were involved in demand resolution. Obviously, stress on the negotiators and response team increased significantly.

Negotiating in the Day to Day Routine Life of a Prison System

Lee Fairchild was in the Air Force between 1977 – 1997, where he served in various capacities in Security Forces. In 1997, he began work as a correction officer for the Oklahoma Department of Corrections. He soon became a Sergeant and Correctional Case Manager. He joined DOC negotiating team, western division in 1999. He is still a negotiator. Lee started and manages the Friends of Folks canine rehabilitation and training program for the DOC in Lexington, OK. He is also a world-renowned disc-dog sports handler and champion.

Fast forward to 2013; I have now worked in the Oklahoma Correctional system for over 15 years and I am currently a Correctional Case Manager, where I manage the case files of between 60 – 120 medium-security offenders. In addition, I am also the coordinator for the Friends for Folks dog training program at the prison in Lexington, Oklahoma. The FFF Program, which was established in 1991 and was the second prison dog program to be established in the United States, rescues and rehabilitates dogs from pounds and various rescue organizations, including the Second Chance Animal Sanctuary in Norman, Oklahoma. Most of the dogs go to elderly people in Oklahoma as companion animals, some go to nursing homes, and some go to people just wanting a well-trained friend. The current resident companion dog, named “Sarge,” at the Veterans Administration Center in Norman, Oklahoma was trained by the FFF program and was rescued by Second Chance in Norman. The offender who trained the dog is serving a life sentence and is himself a veteran. This was a great way for the offender to give something back to society.

We also train a few privately owned dogs for donations to help support the upkeep of the program. Offenders, most of whom are serving long-term sentences, including life sentences, are taught to properly train dogs in basic obedience. The training of the dogs includes, walking properly on a loose leash by your side without pulling, sit, down, stay, crate training, house training and basic good manners. Occasionally the owner, or future owners, request additional training such as picking up an item on the floor and retrieving it, some agility training, working the dog around a wheelchair, or if the dogs are high-energy type dogs, catching a flying Frisbee through the air. Playing with the high-energy dogs in a controlled manner helps develop a strong bond with the dog and burns off some excess energy to help the dog take to the basic training easier.

The program has been featured on Animal Planet in past years, and just recently a documentary, funded by the Kirkpatrick Foundation, was produced and directed by Greg Mellott and his staff at Oklahoma City Community College (OCCC). Hopefully this will be shown in various venues and highlight the plight of homeless dogs and how it can be helped, along with giving a way for the offenders to show that they still have

something to give back to the society from which they may have taken from many times in their past. This is a win-win-win situation. A great home for the dogs, a great friend for the person or persons who ultimately receive the dog into their family, and the offenders get a sense of responsibility and know that they have made a person and a dog's life better.

This job was a perfect fit for me. I am strongly involved in disc-dog sports, where I am a two-time world champion (2010 and 2012) in the Skyhoundz Organization. I also teach this sport to others, along with doing numerous demonstrations that showcase my dog's abilities.

How does this relate to crisis negotiation? Working inside a medium-security prison and running a dog training program on a unit that houses drug and sex offenders, murderers, violent offenders and even some offenders with poor mental health history, is a tremendous challenge. Many of the offenders have less than a 10th grade education, were raised in an environment without a proper father figure, or raised in a gang culture with the gang mentality, where drugs are a way of life. And to top it all off, there are gangs inside the prison that must co-exist in the environment. Also there are many different races and cultures among the offenders. So, from this pool of prospects, I am tasked with picking 10 – 12 offenders to be in the dog training program. Of course, some factors do narrow the field, as I pick offenders that want to be in the program, want to work with the dogs, learn to train dogs, and want to take on all of the other responsibilities associated with having a dog. I prefer offenders that are level 3 and 4 and that have not received a misconduct for a minimum of 6 months. They also must not have tried to escape while in custody. The majority of these offenders have never owned, much less trained, a dog. They must also be able to get along with the other offenders in the program, be responsible to take care of all the needs associated with the care and training of the dog entrusted to them, and be self-motivated enough to work the dog on their own free time without being told. The offenders are given jobs in the kennels and yard areas of the program, and are expected to make everything look good at all times and make sure the kennel area is clean and sanitary. This area is always shown off on the tours of our prison facility, so it must be above par at all times. I oversee official training classes two times a week. This allows me to see if the offender is properly training his dog and also gives me a chance to help if any training issues arise. The offenders must learn to take direction from me and also train their dogs in an environment that uses a lot of praise and encouragement with minimal corrections on the dog. Many of the shelter dogs have been abused and have developed bad habits that need to be corrected. Use of Active Listening Skills is a must in this environment. For example, if an offender gets upset at his dog because it is being resistant to training, I use emotional labeling, telling the offender, "I can see by your actions that you are frustrated." Using minimal encouragers, I tell them that they have encountered this issue in the past with other dogs, or other offenders' dogs, and ask them what they think they should do to help solve the problem. Thus, using problem solving, I can help them find a solution, but I do like them to learn on their own. So, if they come up with a good solution that encourages positive training methods, I allow them to give it a try. Otherwise, the dog is put up in the kennel until both it and the trainer has had a

moment to relax. Many times, after a “cooling off” period, the offender will then want to come and talk to me about the situation. Normally during these discussions all of the active listening skills will come into play as we develop more rapport with each other and we reflect on the content and meaning of the situation that has occurred. As long as the offender has not abused the dog in any way, they are still a part of the program and I want them to learn from their mistakes, as it will make them a better dog trainer and a better person in future situations. I definitely use a lot of open-ended questions, reflection and paraphrasing during these conversations. I have learned that I always need to be firm, yet fair.

Being a negotiator has taught me several things. My own cognitive thinking as a man was to try to problem solve almost everything that occurred in my environment at the prison and in the dog training program. But negotiating has taught me to step back and develop understanding and communications with the person that I am dealing with, and let them help come up with a solution, effectively using the skills that I have learned in negotiations to guide them toward that. Summarizing every few minutes and totally concentrating and adapting to the person I am speaking with have rewarded me in many ways over the past few years. Negotiation has helped me greatly when dealing with the verbal threats that we often receive in the prison setting, and also has helped me be able to assess if those threats could become physical. Not only am I dealing with the offenders and their dogs, but I am also dealing with the offenders and their actions with the other offenders in the program and on the unit.

Sometimes, as in any prison, bad situations can occur. We recently had a stabbing at our prison. I truly believe that due to my ability to be firm and fair and develop relationships with the offenders, I was able to find out how the stabbing occurred, and other factors that ultimately led us to the person that did the stabbing. Great teamwork occurred by both the unit staff and officers in this very tense situation. After the offender that committed the stabbing was transferred to a higher security prison, we were able to get back to normal after a very brief one-day lockdown of the facility.

Negotiator training has been a tremendous tool in my arsenal. I constantly use it in my daily duties as a case manager and dog training coordinator at the medium security prison that I work at, as well as in my daily life away from my job.

Situational Dynamics in the Prison Situation

The basic purposes of negotiations in prison incidents are similar to negotiations in any hostage situation. They are to preserve life and re-establish control of the prison population. Negotiations attempt to save the lives of hostages, citizens (if involved), prison staff, and hostage takers, in that order. Prison staff should negotiate to regain control of the prison environment and, in order of priority, prevent escape, minimize casualties, apprehend the hostage takers, and recover property (Bazan, 2004). One may ask why preventing escape is a higher priority than minimizing casualties. There are two answers to this question. First, many of the hostage takers will be the violent population of the prison (and will be prisoners

sentenced for violent crimes such as murder, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated assault, abuse of a child, etc.) and, if they are allowed to escape, pose the greatest threat to the community's safety. Second, history has shown that casualties are most likely to be other prisoners. While not devaluing the life of prisoners, we must be realistic and compare the lives of prisoners to the lives of community members. If a choice must be made between taking the life of a prisoner and freeing a convicted murderer into the community, taking the prisoner's life would be the preferred alternative. Finally, the prison negotiator must be concerned with property recovery, an objective that is not necessarily a police negotiator's concern. The prison's property is necessary for maintaining the prison population. Experience has shown that prison hostage takers destroy prison property that is necessary to the control of the population. The cost of the New Mexico Prison riot, for example, exceeded \$28.5 million in damages, prison renovation, repair, and remodeling costs (Dillingham & Montgomery, 1985). At the Lucasville, Ohio, prison riot in 1993, repair costs for L-Block were \$28 million. (It only cost \$30 million to build the entire prison in the early 1970s.) Thus, one objective is to prevent the prisoners from "burning down their own house."

During the onset or crisis stage of the incident, the situation itself will be more highly charged and emotional than non-prison situations. The inmates will be trying to establish control and dominance; prison staff will be trying to protect themselves and prevent inmates from taking control; and prison staff and officials outside of the situation will be attempting to rapidly and decisively establish control and prevent other staff from being taken hostage. It is crucial that early on in the incident negotiators focus on using active listening skills. The inmates are not ready to make demands and solve problems. They are instead displaying expressive behaviors designed to ventilate emotions, anger, and frustrations. Be extremely careful about trying to move too fast and offer too much, because the hostage takers may not be emotionally ready. Instrumental, or demand-making behavior, will surface (and may have to be induced), but only with the passage of time.



PHOTO 9.1 There are few differences in the negotiation process between prison and law enforcement teams. Prison teams tend to be larger, as their incidents are more likely to be sieges; often the hostages are fellow workers, friends, or even relatives, which elevates the stressors on negotiators; the actors may know the negotiators so prior relationships are important; and intelligence information is readily available.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

As demands begin to surface, the negotiator will have to determine whether the hostage

taker's demands are intended to benefit all inmates or whether they are self-serving. The Attica riot was an example of the former, the New Mexico Prison riot the latter (Mahan, 1985). The negotiator can use two factors to determine which is the case. If demands are stable over time and if property destruction is minimal, the demands are probably designed to benefit all inmates. If demands change frequently and if there is significant property damage, demands are probably self-serving.

Leadership among the hostage takers can become a significant issue for the negotiators. Many prison situations begin without clear leadership. A prison riot, for example, may involve several groups of inmates, each with a different agenda. Negotiators should be prepared to help the hostage takers get organized and build a leadership structure. There will have to be a spokesperson for the group and the negotiator can clearly assist in choosing this person. Negotiators should select a moderate and reasonable individual who has some influence among the hostage takers (Fagan & Van Zandt, 1993). This can be discovered through intelligence and knowledge of the inmates. Once identified, the leadership of this person can be developed through talking with him and making minor concessions to this person and only this person. The act of making concessions to this person reinforces his standing and status with the other hostage takers. To them, the way to make progress and have demands met is through this person. With groups of inmates joined by circumstances, the negotiators may have to help the inmates form "committees" to work under the leader to get decisions made.

The basic principles of crisis management and negotiations are the same in prisons as in law enforcement settings. The most significant differences are that prison teams are much larger, they generally know the subjects (and the subjects know them), and much of the intelligence information is already available.

Before beginning negotiations, there are several other things the negotiating team should do. We have already mentioned that the hostage takers should be contained. In many prison situations, the hostage takers have control of a building, cell block, or other large area of the prison. The prison's special response team should reduce this "freedom" as much as possible before negotiations begin. At the Lucasville riot, prisoners controlled two gymnasiums and a cell block with eight wings. The tactical team slowly took "real estate" away from the hostage takers and, when the physical area had been significantly reduced, negotiations opened. At the Lewis Prison incident in Arizona, the containment of the hostage takers produced the major problem: the tactical team could not get to them. Sealed in a tower in the Morey Unit, entry could not be made fast enough to neutralize the hostage takers before they could injure or kill the hostages, nor could the sniper be used (Dubina, 2005; Dubina & Ragsdale, 2005).

Negotiators should not open a dialogue until all possible intelligence has been gathered. In the prison situation, negotiators have a tremendous advantage over their police counterparts. Prison records will have complete information on the hostage taker and the hostages. Prior criminal history, educational history, work history, psychological profile, family history, and other significant information will be available to the negotiators. Similar information on the hostages will be available. Additionally, the negotiators can put the hostage takers at an immediate disadvantage by using this intelligence from the outset.

Additionally, in a mob or riot situation, negotiations should not begin until the situation has stabilized. Negotiating with a rioter is impossible. If the situation does not stabilize, it may be preferable to assault rather than negotiate (Saenz & Reeves, 1989). Also, it maybe preferable to

assault before group leaders begin to emerge (Fuselier, 1981; 1986). In regard to assaults, the courts have ruled that using force to quell a riot is not unlawful unless the assault team acts maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm (*Whitley v. Albers*, 1986). If the force is wanton and unnecessary, as occurred in the aftermath of the Attica riot, prison officials may be guilty of violating the prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights (*Hudson v. McMillian*, 1992).

Many principles and goals of hostage negotiations are the same for the prison staff as they are for the police negotiator. A few are different, however. Negotiation is the preferred method of dealing with a hostage situation. As in the civilian world, fewer people will be hurt by using negotiations than other solutions. In the prison, the hostage holds no intrinsic value to the hostage taker. The hostage's only value is as a bargaining chip for demands. Prisoners riot and ultimately take hostages for either instrumental or expressive purposes. Instrumental reasons are for status and power. The hostage takers tend to be rational and have a clear slate of issues, such as to end overcrowding, improve food, improve visiting conditions, improve facilities (recreational and educational), and improve grievance procedures (Dillingham & Montgomery, 1985). Expressive violence is designed to release anger and frustration, is irrational, and is usually non-goal-oriented (Bowker, 1985). Many riots that begin as expressive become instrumental once emotions are spent. If the riot is expressive in origin, the negotiator should recognize the need for emotional release. One good indicator that the riot began as expressive venting is if demands are not well thought out, are disjointed, and are poorly presented. If that is the case, the negotiator should assume that the situation is expressive and concentrate resolution efforts on emotional issues. In general, the hostage taker does not want further violence to occur. He wants his demands to be met peacefully and to arrive at an agreeable resolution to the incident.

The goals of hostage negotiations are to open communication lines, reduce stress and tension, build rapport, obtain intelligence, stall for time, allow ventilation, and establish a problem-solving atmosphere. Time is a crucial variable for prison negotiators, possibly more so than for police negotiators. The hostage takers need time to vent their frustrations and resentment of authority. At both the Oakdale and Atlanta Prison sieges, negotiators agreed to many demands early in negotiations (no deportation and individual case review), but these concessions actually hurt negotiations. The inmates still had a need to vent frustration and anger, which these early concessions did not satisfy (Fuselier et al., 1989; Van Zandt, 1989). The prison situation needs to "mature" in order for ventilation to occur.

Because prison situations often last for a considerable length of time, Byron Sage, retired FBI Special Agent in Charge and hostage negotiator, recommends that the negotiation team have a well-laid-out NOC (negotiation operation center) and make regular use of negotiation position papers (NPPs). The NOC should be large enough for the team, have tables and comfortable chairs (remember, prison situations tend to be sieges), and not be too close to the on-site command center. Access to the NOC should be restricted, including people opening to the door to see what is going on. One of the issues at the Lewis Prison siege was unauthorized people interfering with negotiators by coming into the NOC (Dubina, 2006). Police teams should use NPPs as well, if it is suspected that the incident is going to last for more than a day. NPPs are summaries of what has occurred to date in the incident and serve to help the negotiators, on-scene commander, tactical commander, and others receive current

information, encode that information, process the incident status, and make assessments and decisions. NPPs do not replace any oral briefings—they supplement them. For the negotiating team, NPPs help: (1) in getting everyone's input into planning and future directions, making the team proactive rather than reactive; (2) in avoiding groupthink; (3) as a briefing document for the relief teams, and to supplement situation boards, logs, and audiotapes; (4) assist in briefing anyone outside the team concerning negotiating strategy, tactics, and progress; (5) to document the team's assessments and strategy on an ongoing basis, so if there are discrepancies later on, there is a written record. Byron Sage suggests that the NPPs be set up in the following format: (1) list the number of the NPP (NPP-1, NPP-2, etc.), date, and time prepared in the upper right corner; (2) include a short introduction, giving the number of contacts and the time of those contacts the specific NPP is based on; and (3) divide the body into three parts that give status, assessment, and recommendations (Sage also adds that bullets under each part are preferable to paragraphs, as this keeps the NPP short, concise, and simple). The status section should give a short summary of the situation from recent contacts and should include names, welfare, or status of actors and hostages, any demands presented and deadlines keyed. The assessment section is for a review of motivations, behaviors, seriousness of threats and demands, rapport between negotiator and hostage taker, etc. The recommendation section is to present negotiation strategy, what is hoped to be accomplished by the negotiators, how that will be accomplished, and to request command decisions before implementing a specific strategy. NPPs should be prepared any time teams rotate or at any other times the negotiator commander recommends.

Negotiators should also be aware of the role that prescription medications can have on the hostage takers. Many inmates are on some type or combination of types of medications. The more common include anti-anxiety drugs, antidepressants, antipsychotics, and antimanics (Dennerly, 2000). Negotiators should have an understanding of how these drugs affect people (behaviorally, cognitively, and emotionally), side effects, length of action, deterioration of action effects, withdrawal symptoms, and other effects of the drug (a good resource is Worledge et al., 1997). It is crucial that the team have at the very least a health care professional on-call to discuss drug effects and provide input.

The surrender may present special problems for the prison negotiator. Demands center around unfairness and living conditions, and prison authorities may concede to these demands. Before surrendering, the hostage takers may want a formalized ceremony in which documents are signed. They will likely want the media and outsiders to witness this ritual. At Oakdale, the hostage takers wanted Miami's Bishop Agustin Roman to witness the resolution agreement (Fuselier et al., 1989). The bishop was brought in and the signing ritual ended the siege.

Several demands are non-negotiable in the prison situation. Release or escape, weapons, exchange of hostages, and pardon or parole are all non-negotiable (the reasons should be obvious). All other demands are open to negotiation. Unlike the police situation, in which the police negotiator may discuss the possibility of granting non-negotiable demands, the prison negotiator should be clear up-front (if the issue arises) that the demand is not open for discussion.

One maxim of negotiations is to "always get something for something." Never cede to a demand without obtaining a concession in return. The cultural diversity faced by the prison

negotiator may require violating this tenet. The Cubans at Oakdale and Atlanta told negotiators they did not trade in Cuban culture (Fuselier et al., 1989). The Cubans wanted something for nothing and at a later time would give something for nothing. At one point, the Cubans just released some hostages. The next day, negotiators gave the hostage takers mail and turned on the water. The negotiators had to forego their training and mindset concerning negotiations and work within the culture of the hostage takers. All negotiators may face this dilemma, but it is more likely to be experienced by the prison negotiator.

One issue that arose at the Oakdale, Atlanta, and Talladega sieges that has major implications for all prison negotiators is language. Often a large population of inmates speak English as a second language or speak only a very limited amount of English. Should negotiations be conducted in English or the other language? This question will have to be addressed by the response team at each situation. Fuselier et al. (1989) identified several factors the response team should consider when making this decision.

If negotiations are conducted in a foreign language, the negotiator will have to translate everything for the rest of the negotiating team. This will slow negotiations considerably and place an added strain on the negotiator. Additionally, the opportunities for more mistakes, errors, and miscommunications are present due to translating's additional step. The assessment process will also be slowed and incorrect assessments may be made. Many language idiosyncrasies that are used to identify specific pathologies may not be present in a foreign language or may be lost in translation.

The hostage takers might have difficulty expressing themselves in English, thereby frustrating the ventilation process and increasing stress and anxiety. The hostage takers may become frustrated and violent by their inability to speak good English. They may also be embarrassed and hesitant to speak to the negotiator. To assist in venting emotions, negotiating in the hostage taker's native language may move the situation forward. The hostage taker may also be able to more clearly articulate and express the issues if talking in their native language.

On the positive side, using English may prevent some violent-sounding dialogues. Spanish, for example, is an emotional and passionate language. Some statements and outbursts in Spanish should not be given the same attention that they might in another context. At the Atlanta siege, for example, negotiators were constantly told (following outbursts in Spanish), "Don't pay any attention to that threat; that's just the way we are" (Fuselier et al., 1989).

English can reduce the emotional content of negotiations, especially if the hostage takers are violent and highly emotional. Using English will force the hostage takers to slow down and think about what they are going to say. Merely mentally translating will reduce emotions and increase rationality. This will also tire the hostage takers psychologically and wear them down (Van Zandt, 1989).

The specific situation will dictate what language to negotiate in. The best solution may be to compromise and negotiate in both languages. When the content is emotional, it may be best to use English, then switch to the foreign language when people are calm and thinking rationally. Negotiators at the Talladega prison riot began negotiating in English and then switched to Spanish, a strategy that proved exceptionally effective (Fagan & Van Zandt, 1993).

[The Prison Negotiating Team](#)

The prison should develop its own negotiating team. Each prison will have to develop its own plan for creating a negotiation response team. All prisons should follow some general guidelines. The team should be nonmanagement and nonofficers. Wardens, deputy wardens, sheriffs, chief jailer, all correctional officers, etc., should not be considered for the negotiating team. The reader may question this statement and argue that supervisors are allowed on police teams, so why not on prison teams? In a prison, inmates know the correctional staff, so they will know that managers (and even officers) have some decision-making authority. Also, officers are among the inmates on a daily basis. Due to their lack of familiarity with prisons and the unique demands of prison hostage situations, law enforcement teams should not be used as primary response teams. The prison may call upon a law enforcement team to assist in negotiating, but this should be for assistance, not direction. Police and sheriff agencies who are responsible for a jail should make sure to include correctional staff on their negotiating team. Team members should go through a selection process. They should be volunteers, emotionally stable and mature, have good communication skills, calm under pressure, intelligent, have good listening skills, team players, in good physical condition and health, adaptable and flexible, and culturally diverse (Hazelton & Rhodes, 2000).

The negotiation team should consist, at minimum, of a team leader, a primary negotiator, a secondary negotiator, a mental health professional, and a recorder. If personnel are available, the team might include a liaison with an Emergency Response Team, an intelligence gatherer, and a communications equipment person (as with police, the negotiating team and emergency response team should be separate teams). The prison should also consider doubling or tripling the size of the team. Prison situations are often sieges, so negotiators will have to rotate on duty. The training and responsibilities of these team members are the same as for any negotiating team. Because hostage situations in prisons often become sieges, the prison negotiating team should receive plenty of experiential case studies (Braswell, 1985). In a hostage situation, the negotiating team should develop written summaries of significant events to date. These written summaries should include demands, pertinent intelligence, identification of leaders, observations, and recommendations. These summaries should be made available to all parties involved in the negotiating process.

One prison team issue concerns the primary negotiator and whether that person should be from the same institution or from the outside. Advantages to using a same-institution negotiator are that the negotiator knows the hostage takers, the hostages, and the institution. Disadvantages may be that the negotiator and hostage taker have a prior relationship that is negative, the hostages may be close friends and objectivity is lost; and the negotiator becomes too emotionally involved, and that following resolution of the incident, the negotiator and hostage takers will be in contact with each other (although many institutions now have a policy requiring hostage takers to be transferred to another institution). A compromise position might be for the negotiating team to use a primary negotiator from a different institution and the team performs the rest of the functions. There are, however, problems with this solution as well, including loss of team unity, or lack of relationship between the primary negotiator and hostage takers.

Strict timetables for on-duty team members and shift rotation schedules should be made and closely adhered to. Critical positions such as primary negotiator, tactical team sniper, etc. should rotate every six to eight hours. Other team members should be limited to 12-hour

shifts. Typically, team members will want to violate the time limits (i.e., “We’re close to resolution. I need to be here for it.”). Do not allow them to violate the time limits.

Staff should receive quality first responder training. All prison staff should receive basic training in hostage negotiation and hostage survival. [Table 9.1](#) lists some of the critical items staff should be trained in and some of the critical skills staff should focus on if they are taken hostage (these are good points to remember for anyone who is taken hostage). This training does not have to teach staff how to be negotiators, but should familiarize them with the basic purposes of negotiation, negotiation strategy, and tactics. Hostage survival skills should include the “do’s and don’ts” of hostage behavior, adaptation, and coping skills, survival skills, developing the Stockholm Syndrome, important intelligence needs of the response teams and how to gather that intelligence, and aftereffects on hostages. This training will help prison staff survive the hostage situation physically and mentally and, more importantly, allow the hostage staff to help the negotiating team resolve the situation. If the hostage knows how to “behave,” it will make the negotiator’s job much easier and keep the hostage alive.

The chain of command during a hostage situation will have to be developed by each prison. In general, the negotiating team should report directly to the warden or sheriff, work in conjunction with the emergency response team under the auspices of a situation commander, and receive support from other prison staff.

One important point not faced by the police negotiator is worth mentioning at this point. Often in the prison hostage situation, one or more of the hostages will be a ranking member of the prison administration. Chances are this administrator will want to assume his or her everyday supervisory role. Under no circumstances should this be allowed to occur. Policy should be clearly written and communicated before an incident that any captive staff has no authority over any noncaptive staff (including the warden’s designee if the warden is a hostage). The captive administrator will not be thinking clearly, his or her interests will not be in the situation’s best interests, he or she may be under duress from the hostage takers, and he or she gives unwanted, unneeded, and unnecessary control to the hostage takers.

[Table 9.1](#) Prison Hostage Survival Skills

Do	Don't
Prepare for extended time	Panic
Keep up strength	Do anything stupid
Escape mentally	Be a negotiator
Limit conversation with hostage taker	Increase stress on the hostage taker
Appear neutral and nonthreatening	Offer suggestions to the hostage taker
Pay attention to details	Argue with the hostage taker
Stay in sight of the hostage taker	Argue philosophy with the hostage taker
Show yourself as a person	Show emotions
Retain personal control and dignity	Pay obvious attention to ongoing crisis (draws undue attention)
Be a good listener	
Give credibility to the negotiator	
Have an emergency plan	
Remove signs of your office	
Be a group member	
Be aware of your body language	
Discuss issues with family prior to event	
Escape attempts	Assault
Only try to escape if certain of success	Drop to floor with hands overhead
Review plan of action	Stay still and be calm
Do not attempt if other hostages might be injured or killed in retaliation	Obey orders of assault team
Your escape may add pressure to other hostages	
Source: Adapted from Hazelton, J., & T. Rhodes. (2000). "Prison Negotiations and Hostage Survival Skills." Presented at the Hostage Negotiator Competition, Southwest Texas State University, San Marcos, TX (January).	

A clear example of this occurred in a 1993 nonprison situation in Costa Rica. Two armed terrorists (who later turned out not to be terrorists but drug dealers) took the Federal Supreme Court of Costa Rica hostage and demanded the release of fellow drug dealers, money, and transportation to a safe haven. The Chief Justice of the Court, who was a hostage, insisted on being the spokesperson for the hostage takers and continually gave orders to the primary negotiator (who worked for the Federal Judicial Police and reported directly to the Supreme Court). His actions endangered the hostages, hindered negotiations and intelligence-gathering efforts, and prolonged the incident for many hours. Because of his interference, the federal police did not discover until the end of the situation that the hostage takers were not terrorists and the incident had to be resolved tactically. To the credit of the negotiator, who successfully circumvented most of the judge's interference, no lives were lost.

Because prison hostage situations usually become sieges, and because prison workers are often hostages, it is advisable to establish (prior to the incident) a victims' assistance team. This team should be trained to deal with the hostages' families. This training should, at a minimum, include stress management techniques, post-trauma stress issues and effects, emotional debriefing, and basic crisis counseling skills. When a situation occurs, the victims' assistance team should notify the hostages' families and establish a family services area. They should provide emotional support to the families, disseminate information and intelligence on the hostage situation, and shield family members from the news media (Miller et al., 1988; Squires, 1988). This team may also be used to conduct the emotional debriefing of all released hostages.

Lessons Learned from History

Based on the Lewis Prison situation (and a review of others), Dubina (2005) provides an excellent summary of issues that correctional negotiators should be aware of, prepare for, and make part of their response policies and operations. First, chain-of-command issues can be critical. At many prison situations, the ultimate incident commander may be a director of corrections (or other title) who is a political appointee and who may have little or no experience in a prison or in command of an incident. It is especially critical that wardens, associate wardens, and others who may be designated incident commanders receive incident command training. Also, it is advisable to make sure one of these trained individuals is assigned to the office of the director of corrections to advise that person on situational issues, incident dynamics, response team issues, demand issues, etc.

If negotiators are noncorrectional personnel, correctional advisors should be assigned to the team and should be utilized to educate team members on correctional issues. Correctional personnel should also be brought in to assist the intelligence gatherers, tactical team, media relations people, and anyone else who does not have a correctional background. Prisons have their own language (terminology, slang, etc.), issues specific to a facility, and other special requirements that non-correctional personnel will probably not be aware of. One thing not anticipated by the police negotiators at Lewis Prison was that the prison (or Arizona Department of Corrections) had a policy that inmate hostage takers would not be given handcuff keys; they were a non-negotiable demand. Negotiators were making progress in meeting the inmate demands for a key, reached the point where a trade was imminent, and then were told that it was a non-negotiable demand. A great deal of time, effort, energy, and goodwill were expended by not being aware of this issue.

The negotiating area, or NOC (negotiation operations center), should be chosen carefully, keeping in mind that the prison negotiating team may be significantly larger than a law enforcement negotiating team, and that the incident may last for several days or weeks. In addition to adequate size, furnishings should be selected and brought in that provide a modicum of comfort. A padded swivel chair will make the job easier for the primary negotiator than sitting on a metal folding chair for 10 hours at a time.

In terms of the team, a work/rotational schedule should be established right away and negotiators made to adhere to the schedule. Rotations should be clearly indicated, people assigned to specific tasks for each shift, and personnel should leave the area when they are not on duty. The negotiating team structure may need to be modified to facilitate negotiations and communications. At Lewis Prison, for example, negotiators were assigned to the command post, a tactical liaison was maintained at all times utilizing a negotiator, and the negotiator team leader was assigned to the NOC. The entire team on duty should be utilized in some capacity. Team members should not be allowed to wait around with no job to perform. Extra personnel can be assigned to collect intelligence (and intelligence gathering and dissemination is ongoing throughout the incident), assist the scribe/recorder/historian, assigned to monitor equipment, etc. The team should also be regularly used to brainstorm and plan communications. It is critical that all communications with the hostage taker be planned. Prior to each phone conversation, the team should plan each communication and brainstorm the handling of critical issues that may arise.

Complete, concise, and accurate situation boards are a must. A good scribe and running log are necessary. The log should be time stamped and typed, and should be disseminated to all personnel on a regular schedule, especially when the team rotates. A full briefing by off-going team members given to on-coming team members using the typed log and negotiation summaries is necessary.

Negotiations should be taped and copies should be made of the tape. Any participating team member (including tactical and command elements) should have open and free access to any negotiation tapes. It is a good idea to have on-coming negotiators listen to recent taped conversations to get a sense of the flow of negotiations. This is also related to the point that equipment needs in a long-term siege should be anticipated and filled in advance. For example, it may be anticipated that tape recorders will be necessary, but will batteries for those recorders be remembered (and what if a cord breaks, electricity goes out, etc.).

Aggression Among Inmates

Prison inmates are as culturally diverse as the civilian world. Inmates, however, are much more homogeneous than in the civilian world. Cultural groups tend to coalesce and unite with one another. Interests, language, and cultural identity all may account for cultural clustering in prisons. However, cultural groups unite and close ranks primarily for safety and protection. This section presents an overview of the more common groups in prisons and provides information for possible negotiations with these groups.

Prison officials should be aware of and prepared to handle race-related issues in hostage situations. These issues had implications for Federal Bureau of Prisons personnel at the 1991 Talladega, Alabama, prison riot (Phillips, 1991). If the riot and hostage situation are race-related (or even involve one race), prisoners of that race incarcerated at other locations should be carefully monitored or even “locked down.” Prisoners at other locations are likely to want to help their “brothers” achieve their goals. There is a possibility of the episode serving as the catalyst for other episodes.

It is crucial that negotiators be aware of, attuned to, and prepared for racial and cultural issues. Diversity issues in the prison may revolve around race, ethnicity, nationality, and/or religion (Pryor, 2000). Consideration should be given to economics, politics, geography, family structure, climate, technology, and education. Influences that have worked to shape the hostage taker that produce cultural and racial differences are family, personal experience, theology, and media, to a limited extent. The negotiator should be aware of these influences and differences and be sensitive to them when negotiating. Being able to deal with diversity issues is a combination of skill, knowledge, and motivation (Beebe & West, 1999). It is strongly encouraged that prison negotiators, especially, be trained in cultural diversity issues.

Whites in prisons are apt to join the Aryan Brotherhood, a right-wing organization under the umbrella of the Aryan Nations (Mullins, 1988; 1997). This far-right organization believes in white supremacy, and many members base this belief on religion. Members of the Aryan Brotherhood have been involved in many violent activities, including the killing of minority inmates and attacks on minority correctional officers. One part of the membership “contract” is that the member kill the police officer who arrested him.

Other right-wing groups that are likely to have inmate representation or recruit from inmate populations include the Ku Klux Klan; religious organizations such as the Christian Patriot Defense League (CPDL); the Covenant, Sword, and Arm of the Lord (CSA); neo-Nazi organizations (National Socialist White People's Party and American Nazi Party); and various factions of the skinhead movement. All these organizations have two factors in common: they hate all minorities and they are extremely violent.

Their violent activity in prisons will first be directed toward minorities and will be acts of perceived self-protection: individual and for all whites. If their perception of the minority threat grows, they are likely to riot and take hostages. Minority correctional staff are especially vulnerable to hostage taking and injury or death. The group's demands will revolve around issues of segregation, "white" rights, and even separate facilities for whites. They will not negotiate with minorities and may not acquiesce if the commander or prison authority is non-white. Also, if they are involved in an incident, civilian members of the far right will demonstrate at the prison and engage in activities designed to interfere with negotiations and assist their "brethren" in achieving their goals.

Blacks and Hispanics in prisons are more likely than white inmates to riot and take hostages. Blacks and Hispanics are the fastest-growing prison populations (Irwin, 1980; Barak-Glantz, 1985). Black inmates tend to be urbanized, sophisticated, and somewhat racially radical. Many will join the Black Muslim religion, a religion in which some factions (especially those in prison) advocate the rise of black supremacy through violence. This violence is directed specifically at white power structures, such as the prison administration. The black inmate also has an acute sense and mission of the civil rights struggle of the past several decades. This civil rights movement has gained momentum in the past several years, and in the prison can easily become manifest in violence and hostage taking. The religious, racially militant, black inmate is prepared to use violence to achieve his objectives (Barak-Glantz, 1985). Black inmates have a highly developed social structure that increases the likelihood of blacks leading a hostage situation. The organizational unity present in the black subculture further promotes rioting and other acts of mass violence.

As with blacks, Hispanics have a highly developed social subculture, as evidenced by the majority of Hispanic inmate membership in the Mexican Mafia and Nuestra Familia (Bowker, 1980). Prisons now are seeing an influx of MS13 and Zeta gang members and active members of various drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), a situation that will only worsen in the future. The Hispanic inmate, maybe even more so than the black inmate, sees himself as an oppressed minority. When an attack (real or perceived) comes from an outside source, Hispanics will put forward a unified front to meet the challenge. In addition to resisting, the Hispanic inmate will attack the source of resistance. The attacks do not have to be physical; they can be attacks of injustice, unfairness, or control by another group. The negotiator must be acutely aware of the Hispanic hostage taker's cultural milieu and must negotiate within that framework. The negotiator must be careful in asserting authority and control over the hostage situation. More than with whites or blacks, the Hispanic hostage taker will see this authority as an insult and use it as the basis for more violence. It is important to the Hispanic to be able to maintain his respect in the eyes of others (Fuselier et al., 1991).

In recent years, black and Hispanic inmates have been heavily influenced by gang members. These young, urbanized, and organized males bring a level of aggression and violence never

before seen in prison populations. These younger inmates are extremely militant, highly organized, and unusually violent. They pose a special problem to the hostage negotiator because they have very little regard for the lives of others or themselves. They are likely to kill a hostage just to show they can. They are often irrational, unpredictable, unreasonable, and uncompromising. They would rather die than concede their demands. Negotiating means getting their way. One of the few approaches open to the negotiator is to ensure that the leaders save face and concede while appearing to win. The negotiator must be very careful not to sound authoritative, but must take a deferential role and act as if the inmate hostage taker is in control. The gang member is very concerned with the gang (or group). The negotiator should emphasize the group and how the resolution will benefit the group.

Turner and Miller (1991), in a study for the Federal Bureau of Prisons, identified five factors that could result in increased aggressiveness and hostage-taking behavior among prison inmates.

1. Foreigners with less than two years in the United States before their first felony were likely to be more aggressive than other inmates. These inmates were not likely to be verbally aggressive, but would use physical aggression. If they did become physically aggressive, they would also be likely to employ verbal aggression, such as shouting and screaming. This suggests that their aggression will involve a high emotional level and they will be irrational.
2. Inmates with an eighth to tenth grade education were most likely to be violent. Inmates with a ninth to tenth grade education were also likely to be physically violent, but more often their violence was verbally directed, and employed refusal, insolence, and sarcasm. The least violent inmates were those with a college degree or those with no formal education.
3. Inmates who were raised without a father or father figure and who had the stereotypical “macho” attitude were more likely to be physically aggressive.
4. Noncitizen inmates who espoused the traditional values of their culture were more likely to be physically aggressive. Cum’Fa, Jamaican Posse, Obeah, Rastafarian, and Voudun are cultures that believe in violent problem solving. If one inmate with these values became violent, other members of that culture were likely to become involved. One exception found by Turner and Miller (1991) were Haitian Vouduns who did not practice Voudun. These inmates were very passive, superstitious, and extremely dependent upon others.
5. Type of crime predicted violence. Inmates who committed crimes for profit tended to be more verbally aggressive than physically aggressive. When they did turn to physical violence, this violence was usually preceded by verbal threats. Inmates who committed crimes of self-indulgence were the most physically aggressive.

Veterans in Prison

Military veterans in the nation’s prisons and jails make up 12 percent of all inmates. Some information concerning that population segment is presented to help negotiators understand

the military veteran hostage taker and to provide a negotiation framework. The information presented is summarized from a Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report by Mumola (2000). Only about 20 percent of inmate veterans saw combat duty, with more than half serving during a period of combat. Most veterans were Vietnam War era (1964 – 1973), followed by the Persian Gulf War (1990 – 1991), Korea (1950 – 1953), and WWII era (1941 – 1945). Almost 60 percent served in the Army, followed by Navy service (14% federal, 17.2% state), Marine Corps (16.2% federal, 15.6% state), and Air Force (11.9% federal, 8.9% state). The average length of service was 45 to 48 months (for federal and state facilities, respectively).

The majority of military veteran inmates are white (49.8% federal, 52.8% state), while the majority of nonveteran inmates are black (38.4% federal, 47.8% state). Veteran inmates, on average, are 10 years older than nonveteran inmates (veterans had a median age over 40), were more likely to have been married currently or in the past (71% for veterans, 39% nonveterans), and had more education than nonveterans. In fact, 41.6 percent of federal veteran inmates and 32 percent of state veteran inmates had some college or a degree (comparatively, 24.2% and 10.7% for nonveteran inmates). Age, marital history, and education can play significant roles in negotiating with the military veteran.



PHOTO 9.2 Sheriff's Office negotiation teams often have jail and prison negotiation responsibilities as well as being prepared to respond to crisis situations in the community. It is important that these teams include correctional personnel as team members and train in jail/prison issues.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

Veterans were more likely to be serving sentences for violent offenses and were less likely to be drug offenders than nonveterans, although at the federal level, more than 51 percent of veteran inmates were serving time for drug offenses (most for trafficking). Robbery was the most common offense for veterans at the federal level; sexual assault and homicide at the state level. About 25 percent of federal veteran inmates were serving time for a violent offense, about 55 percent of state veteran inmates were serving time for a violent offense. At the state level, combat veterans were less likely than noncombat veterans to be serving sentences for violent offenses. Veterans were serving longer sentences than non-veterans at both the federal and state levels, and were spending longer time in prison prior to release. Pre-incarceration drug use among veterans was lower than among nonveterans. Around one-third of veteran inmates reported alcohol abuse prior to incarceration.

Among state veteran inmates serving time for violent crimes, most knew their victim (69%). Thirty-one percent victimized a friend or acquaintance, 22.4 percent a relative, 11.4 percent an intimate (spouse, boy/girlfriend, or ex), and 5.2 percent knew the victim only by sight. Thirty-one percent did not know the victim. Nonveteran inmates were most likely to have victimized a stranger (48.9%), 27.3 percent a friend or acquaintance, 9.3 percent a relative, 8.8 percent an intimate, and 7.1 percent known by sight. Thirty-six percent of the veterans victimized a juvenile, 20.4 percent a child under the age of 12 (this compares to 19.8% and 9.4% for nonveterans, respectively).

For other differences among veteran inmates, the reader is encouraged to read the full report by Mumola (2000). The issues reported here are those most significant for the prison negotiator, and can help with negotiating strategy, communication directions, and resolving demand issues.

Kidnapping Negotiations

One type of incident that has been occurring with much greater frequency in the past several years is kidnapping. Internationally, kidnapping has become far more frequent and a recognized way for terrorists and criminals to make a political point or for ransom. In Colombia, between 1987 and 2000, kidnappings increased 1,600% (Navia & Ossa, 2003). Most of these were for ransom. Other areas that have seen a surge in kidnappings include Afghanistan (mostly by terrorists to make a political statement—most end in a televised execution), and Nigeria. In the United States, the majority of kidnappings are committed by criminal organizations or drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and are associated with the drug trade (e.g., lost drug loads, lost drug money, etc.) or human trafficking trade. Many are called “express kidnappings” (Alexander & Klein, 2008), in that ransoms are relatively modest so they will be rapidly paid. In the southern border regions of the United States, the victim may be taken to Mexico to be guarded during captivity. If American citizens are kidnapped overseas, the FBI has jurisdiction to work the case and generally provides the assistance of FBI negotiators in offering advice, strategy, and recommendations for the kidnapping negotiation process through the use of third-party intermediaries. In other cases, private insurance company negotiators (who are sometimes retired law enforcement negotiators) may be tasked to assist. In some kidnappings, the families will not contact authorities, but instead will handle negotiations and ransom payments on their own. If law enforcement is brought into the situation, there are some guidelines that can help negotiators help the family.

It is important to realize that in kidnappings decisions regarding the payment of ransom are ultimately made by the family of the kidnapped (Clauss, 2013). Negotiators are there to assist the family and can provide valuable assistance in potentially violent situations, and experience handling the various aspects of kidnapping for ransom, including ransom demands and handling threats and deadlines.

The authors are uncomfortable discussing kidnap negotiations in depth in this text. Unlike most other actors, many DTOs, other criminal organizations, terrorist groups, and many other organized groups that engage in kidnapping operations have intelligence-gathering networks and actively research law enforcement and military tactics. For these groups and

organizations, they may have a viable working knowledge of law enforcement tactics, negotiation strategies and tactics, and tactical operations. This section will provide a few general guidelines for negotiators. For further information and/or training, please contact the authors or the FBI CIRG.

At a kidnapping, if requested by the family, negotiators can aid the family in selecting a family member or spokesperson to talk to the kidnappers (TPI = Third Party Intermediary), establish a NOC, and record negotiations and intelligence, conduct liaisons with the family and banks/company/other financial institutions/etc., help arrange for payment that may have to cross international borders, provide media guidance, develop and implement communication strategies, and assist with post incident debriefings.

The selected spokesperson (TPI) should be a person who can control his or her emotions, clearly articulate (and speak the language of the kidnappers, if foreign), follow instructions, and accurately reiterate kidnapper statements to others. Caution should be taken when selecting the TPI (McAdoo, 2013). Why is a certain person being requested by the kidnappers? Why is someone volunteering to be the TPI? Does the TPI have his or her own agenda? Will it place the victim or TPI in danger?

Kidnap negotiations may last for days or weeks (or approximately a year, as was the case with Martin Burnham and Gracia Burnham in the Philippines in 2001 – 2002). Negotiators can help organize information boards and help the family keep track of demands, statements made or received, the progress of negotiations, intelligence information, and so on.

Negotiators can also assist the investigative team in helping the family arrange monies from banks, financial institutions, or companies when ransom is to be paid. They can also help arrange for the payment to be made to foreign institutions or large sums in crossing a border.

When the victim is released, negotiators should participate in post-incident debriefings, including emotional debriefings. For negotiators, post-incident debriefings are an ideal opportunity to gather an understanding of the facts and circumstances of the victim's abduction and captivity. Negotiators should focus on hostage survival issues. Law enforcement investigators should participate and gather facts that may be pertinent to the investigation of the incident. Negotiators can also assist with emotional debriefings and can suggest mental health resources the family can use. Negotiators can provide support for the families not only during, but after the incident (Atchley, 2013). They can also offer suggestions on how to prevent future kidnappings.

Finally, and it goes without saying, if the location of the kidnappers and victim are discovered and it is in the United States, the incident immediately becomes a law enforcement concern for the crisis response team. Having been part of the kidnap negotiations, CNT negotiators can assume negotiations with no loss of continuity.

[Negotiating with Protest Movements](#)

Between December 10, 1997, and December 18, 1999, Julia “Butterfly” Hill lived in a 200-foot tall redwood in the northern California logging country to bring publicity to the practice of logging ancient redwoods (some estimated the tree she sat in was over 1,000 years old). During her tenure in the tree she named “Luna,” several different law enforcement authorities

negotiated with her, including ATF negotiators. She surrendered and climbed down the tree only when Pacific Lumber Co. agreed to preserve the tree and establish a 200-foot buffer zone around it (Martin, 2000). In return, the protestors and Hill agreed to pay \$50,000 (raised during the tree-sitting) to Pacific Lumber to donate to Humboldt State University for forestry research. In 2007, the University of California, Berkeley, finally won a court battle to oust tree sitters who had spent the better part of a year (dozens that rotated sitting) in Evergreen Coast Live Oaks. The university planned to fell the trees and build a training facility for athletic teams. Even though the university promised to plant a new tree for every one cut, this did not satisfy the tree sitters (AP, 2007).

Tree-sitting, the G9 summit protests in the United States and other countries, the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement, and other social and political protests and demonstrations are currently the vogue. Students protest decisions by school administrators, parents demonstrate against schools when they change their mind, gun advocates and anti-gun advocates protest the government and each other, neighborhoods and communities protest government decisions and court rulings, special interest groups protest anything against their cause, and so on.

Protest and dissent is legal. It is a constitutional guarantee. The police may be called to monitor the event, keep order, separate groups that show up to protest the protestors (for example, every time an extremist group such as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) protests, anti-KKK protestors show up and the two parties try to physically engage each other), and maybe even move the protest to another approved area. Negotiators may be utilized, as they have the communication skills, ALS, ability to reduce emotions, skills to engage in rational decision-making, and knowledge to address protestor concerns without elevating emotions.

The material in the following section was provided for this edition by Officer Craig Menzies of the Grampian Police, Scotland (northeast). Even though he serves in Scotland, all of what he says has utility in the United States. The guidelines and suggestions he provides can be used by negotiators to deal with protesters and movements. We have broken convention and included his references in Box 9.2 to make it easier for the reader who wants to learn more.

Menzies served in various capacities, including security escort motorist and drives, firearms officers, police sniper, protection of the Royal Family and other VIPs, and Critical Incident Manager in the primary Force Control Room. He became a negotiator in 1989 and completed the Scottish National Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Course at the Scottish Police College, Tulliallan Castle. In 2001, he became a member of the Directing staff and is still a lead instructor. He is also a member of the Directing staff at the Metropolitan Police Training School, London, in their hostage negotiation program. During his tenure as Grampian Police's Force Negotiator Coordinator, he became involved in dealing with a number of overseas hostage-taking incidents, primarily in Nigeria, and has been seconded to New Scotland Yard as an advisor in this capacity. He subsequently was nominated to attend the first of only two courses run in the UK by the Metropolitan Police in relation to overseas hostage taking. He remains one of only two negotiators in the country specializing in such incidents, and developed national response protocols in this area as well as hosting a number of security seminars for the North Sea Oil and Gas Sectors. He has a M.S. degree in Emergency Planning Management from the University of Leicester, and is lecturer and coordinator at the Scottish Police College, Associate Lecturer at Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen, and Practitioner

Fellow of the Scottish Institute for Policing Research, with a specialty in protest groups.

Police liaison with protest groups: A European perspective

“By the mere fact that he forms part of an organised crowd a man descends several rungs in the ladder of civilisation”

— Gustave Le Bon, 1895

In 1715, King George I of England introduced “an act for preventing tumults and riotous assemblies, and for the more speedy and effectual punishing of the rioters” (Gutenberg website, 2012).

This legislation is commonly known as the “Riot Act” and included in its scope “... that part of Great Britain called Scotland, which are tolerated by law, and where his Majesty King George, the prince and princess of Wales, and their issue, are prayed for in express words”, thus making it UK wide in nature.

The 1715 Act allowed that, following the authorities making “with a loud voice command, or cause to be commanded silence to be, while proclamation is making, in these words, or like in effect: Our sovereign Lord the King chargeth and commandeth all persons, being assembled, immediately to disperse themselves, and peaceably to depart to their habitations, or to their lawful business, upon the pains contained in the act made in the first year of King George, for preventing tumults and riotous assemblies. God save the King”.

The penalty for failing to disperse following such a proclamation was clear and unambiguous,

Any persons to the number of twelve or more, being unlawfully, riotously, and tumultuously assembled together, to the disturbance of the public peace, and being required to disperse themselves, and peaceably to depart to their habitations, or to their lawful business, shall remain or continue together by the space of one hour after such command or request made by proclamation shall suffer death as in a case of felony without benefit of clergy (Gutenberg website, 2012).

While it is undoubtedly true that the policing and management of public protest has moved on since the introduction of the Riot Act, recent riots in the United Kingdom have served to highlight the very real difficulties and dilemmas faced by modern policing techniques in relation to protest. The rights of the individual to protest peacefully are enshrined in legislation such as the European Convention on Human Rights 1953 (ECHR) and the Human Rights Act of 1998. In particular ECHR Articles 9, 10 and 11 protect the right “to manifest a religion or belief, to freedom of expression and to freedom of assembly and association respectively” (NPIA/ACPOS, 2010: 24).

The study of crowd behavior is by no means new, and the emergence of a scientific basis to this subject can be linked to France in the nineteenth century which Stott describes as “the birthplace of scientific crowd psychology” (Stott, 2009: 4).

The events of the French Revolution which began in 1789 were deeply seated in crowd behavior and disorder such as the infamous storming of the Bastille in June that year. Ultimately this resulted in the declaration of a French Republic and the execution of King Louis XVI in 1793.

This concept of crowd psychology was further developed by the French social psychologist Le Bon who published ‘Psychologie des foules’ in 1895. He argued that “the individual in a crowd, even in a highly developed culture, loses his critical capacities and behaves in an

affective, primitive, barbaric way. In the situation of the crowd, the individual is easily convinced and is subject to the psychological contagion which allows leaders to easily steer crowds where they please” (University of Virginia Library Website, 2011). Le Bon also stated that “by the mere fact that he forms part of an organized crowd a man descends several rungs in the ladder of civilization. Isolated he may be a cultivated individual, in a crowd he is a barbarian—that is, creature acting by instinct” (Le Bon, 1895:22).

The theories of Le Bon, sometimes referred to as “classic” theory, were further sustained by more modern theorists such as Festinger who put forward the theory of “deindividualisation” (Festinger, Pepitone and Newcomb, 1952, quoted by Stott, 2009: 5) which argued that individuals within a crowd can lose any sense of individuality and, therefore, have more of a tendency to engage in violent activity. A major consideration for policing, however, must be the lingering assumption that the behavior of individuals within a crowd is a function of the crowd itself, which is fundamentally “unpredictable, volatile and dangerous” (Stott, 2009: 6), and as such must be controlled by force. Studies of football crowds, tax protests, student demonstrations and environmental protest have given empirical support to the concepts of individuals within a crowd having a sense of self, coupled with a degree of shared social identity which can run through a crowd gathered for a common purpose.

Changes of crowd behaviour are directly related to or, indeed, precipitated by reaction to the manner in which they are policed. Ideally, a crowd is made up of generally responsible citizens acting in a manner which they view as totally legitimate and being policed by guardians of their right to peaceful demonstration. If the police then view the crowd as a single entity and obstruct or impose restrictions on them, they can unite in new and more “oppositional” ways which can have a direct and adverse effect on the policing of a crowd now united in a common purpose: This reaction generates a “redefined sense of unity within the crowd in terms of the illegitimacy of and opposition to the actions of the police” (Stott, 2009: 7). In turn this “... could then draw the crowd into conflict even though the vast majority had no prior intention of engaging in disorder” (Stott, 2009: 7).

Thus, the question must inevitably arise as to whether the policing response to legitimate protest can of itself generate a crowd dynamic which is contrary to the strategic objective of ensuring peaceful protest. The policing challenge is to effectively balance the rights of the individual against the rights of the communities the police serve, whilst assessing and addressing real time instances where peaceful protest ends and criminality begins.

The methods utilized by UK police forces in relation to protest cannot be said to have been totally effective in this regard, but some, such as the Police Service of Northern Ireland, who have considerable experience in the policing of contentious protest events, have re-evaluated their traditional confrontational approach to a style more overtly aligned with the desire to allow protest in line with human rights. In the most recent police training guidance on the policing of protest, Chief Constable Meredydd Hughes, the Head of the Association of Chief Police Officers Uniformed Operations Business Area states that “The world of protest has changed and public order practice and training must change with it.” (NPIA/ACPOS, 2010: 7). As far back as 1996 King and Brearley postulated that “significant developments had occurred in recent years in the raising of (public order) commander’s sensitivity to the importance of negotiating with figures and groups playing a leading part in the generation of crowds. This included communicating effectively with the march and demonstration organisers...” (King

and Brearley, 1996: 84). There is, therefore, a lack of clarity in terms of the balance between these “significant developments” and a disconnect from current research in relation to the modern policing of protest. This lack of clarity is exacerbated by the existence of current examples of the successful integration of research into effective policing models such as that adopted by the Swedish Police.

In terms of specific approaches towards crowd communication, modern developments are typified by the experiences of the Swedish Police in 2001 and also of the Portuguese in the policing of the Euro 2004 football tournament, both of which differ from the current United Kingdom approach. The policing of Euro 2004 was heavily influenced by academic research, as Stott and Adang (2003) were invited by the authorities to assist in the formulation of policing tactics. Two policing bodies in Portugal utilized differing tactics towards crowds at the tournament. The Portuguese Security Police (PSP) adopted an approach based on ESIM principles, whereas the Republican National Guard (GNR) used methods “more reminiscent of those used in the UK” (Lydon, 2010: 35). The two approaches were analyzed using participant observation data to examine the impact on crowd interaction. The PSP approach utilized an approach which allowed for close monitoring of the crowds and early intervention where appropriate utilizing a “... positive and close relationship with the crowd...” (Reicher et al, 2007: 412). Reicher et al (2007) reported that only 0.2% of participants identified any type of violent confrontation with the police. In contrast, the GNR “high profile coercive style” (Lydon, 2010: 36) was associated with two separate instances of serious disorder resulting in 52 arrests. This study would at least suggest that “... options for policing crowds and protest, based on negotiated management and up-to-date crowd psychology have distinct advantages over the legacy methods of policing in the UK” (Lydon, 2010: 37).

The experiences of the Portuguese Police in 2004 serve to support the findings of the police in Sweden. On 16 June 2001 there were a number of clashes between the Swedish Police and protesters at the European Union Summit being held in Gothenburg. During the most violent of these confrontations police officers fired at protesters and wounded three of them, one seriously. More than 40 police and demonstrators were injured. Police arrested at least 100 of the thousands of protesters (CNN Online). These events were viewed in Sweden as a “national trauma” (Holgersson, 2010: 15) resulting in the commission of the Gothenburg Committee which reported on the police handling of the events of June 2001. Their report, published in 2002, highlighted “serious deficiencies in crowd management training for the police as well as deficiencies in terms of know-how” (Holgersson, 2010: 15). As a result of these findings, and police internal reviews, in 2004 the Swedish National Police Board undertook to implement police tactics on a national level designed to deal with the challenges of large scale protest and the potential for disorder. This national model was built around a recognized Command and Control protocol (strategic, tactical and operational levels and operated by a Special Police Tactics Unit (SPT) with a Sweden-wide policing remit under central control by the National Criminal Police. The SPT developed and deployed a “mobile operational concept and a situational conflict management model” (Holgersson, 2010: 16). A central element of the SPT development was the introduction of Dialogue Police Officers.

Utilizing the academic and evidence base of the work of authors such as Stott, Reicher and della Porta as outlined earlier, dialogue policing is built on the concepts of “... dialogue, de-escalation and non-confrontation” (Holgersson, 2010: 15), which allow for a more dynamic

approach to crowd management including pre-event prevention and the active de-escalation of conflict situations by the application of "...knowledge, facilitation, communication and differentiation, thus promoting self policing by protest groups"(Holgersson, 2010: 15).

In the development of the Swedish model, initial approaches were made to trained police negotiators as it was recognized that many of their communication skills were directly transferrable. A former dialogue police coordinator, Holgersson has highlighted that the formation of the unit was not without its own problems, both internal and external to the Swedish Police. He states, "some senior officers viewed dialogue as a sign of weakness and in their opinion it should not be included in the police organization's duties" (Holgersson, 2010: 24). As the concept became better understood within the organization, however, commanders began to recognize the option to enter into dialogue with groups, particularly at the planning stages of demonstrations, as another tactical option which could assist in the establishment of meaningful dialogue during more spontaneous events due to pre-existing relationships.

It is widely accepted in police negotiator circles (McMains & Mullins, 1996) that commanders and decision makers should avoid becoming involved in direct negotiation with groups as this removes the advantages of not being portrayed as the prime decision makers and buying delay in response. The Swedish model promotes the concepts of very early establishment of contact and cooperation, continuous dialogue and debrief with protest groups to promote and maintain mutual trust. The Swedish Dialogue Policing Model argues that communication between groups and the police is crucial to effective management, and that this communication is greatly enhanced by "previously established social contact", and "knowledge of the protest culture and specific activist organizations gained more easily through direct contact with organizers and individual activists" (Holgersson, 2010: 36). The Model also proposes that dialogue prior to events can foster increased order in protest situations as it can facilitate early agreements and a clearer understanding of conduct (or the perception of conduct) on both sides, thus allowing the police at least the possibility of having "not to win the fight but to be able to avoid it" (Winter, 1998: 40).

It is argued that the prime skills of the police in dealing with protest include skillful negotiations with protest groups as opposed to simple repression. The Swedes also found that many groups were interacted with on a recurring basis. This dynamic has resulted in a clear requirement for total honesty in all interactions. Traditional negotiation has often been built on the principle of skilled police officers gaining an advantage for the police, often to the detriment of the subject, however this is not a long term strategy for success when dealing with recurrent protest. Holgersson (2010) argues that "a strategy consisting of deception, in which it was mainly the police who gained any advantage from the negotiations, was doomed to failure in the long run ... we must aim to establish a genuine dialogue built on mutual respect".

Also key to the Swedish approach is an understanding of crowd dynamics based on modern theory in which the crowd is not viewed as a homogenous group with a small number of agitators who can be removed if circumstances dictate. This is seen as an attack on the legitimacy of the protest and can lead a crowd to react negatively towards the police. This approach does not mean that the police relinquish the ability to take action if required during protests, however it does ensure that any restrictions or direct action by Commanders can be clarified by direct contact with organizers or those in positions of influence in order to at least

attempt to arrange alternatives which retain the crowd's sense of legitimacy. This also promotes the sense of trust and respect which may have taken a considerable investment in policing terms. In turn this engenders an atmosphere of honest dealing which may derive mutual benefit in future encounters. As commented on earlier, King and Brearley (1996) conclude that... "otherwise 'respectable' demonstrators will view the prospect of being the subject of police surveillance and by implication 'suspect'." However, if the Swedish Dialogue Policing Model is examined in its detail it becomes very clear that the function is one of building trust and mutual respect. If this is combined with a clear differentiation from any kind of intelligence gathering role, then it becomes evident that King and Brearley's argument for effective communication and negotiation being perceived as surveillance is no longer valid, and the Swedish dialogue model remains a viable option for deployment.

A signal event in the modern policing of protest, and one which has been the subject of detailed judicial and media examination was the response by the Metropolitan Police Service to the G20 summit in London on 1 and 2 April 2009. The entire policing operation was brought into sharp focus by the tragic death of Ian Tomlinson, an event which resulted in a comprehensive review *Adapting to Protest* by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, published in July 2009. The review sought to make clear distinctions between different types of protest, differentiating between organized declared protests, nondeclared planned protests, nondeclared spontaneous protests, long-term protests, and violent protests. Vitally *Adapting to Protest* estimated that "95% of protest activity involves organized, declared, planned protests in the form of demonstrations, processions and static assemblies which are notified to the police" (*Adapting to Protest*, 2009: 21). These events, by their very nature, allow for good communication between the police and the identified organizers both in the planning stages and also, crucially, give opportunities for ongoing dialogue during the operation.

Conversely, nondeclared planned protests, nondeclared spontaneous protests and violent protests, including peaceful civil disobedience and intentional violence, are typified by having little or no organizational structure and no desire to interact with the police. It is very difficult, therefore, to engage in any meaningful form of dialogue, although this does not diminish the importance of seeking to communicate by whatever means available such as the media and social networks.

Included in the immediate recommendations of the review were some key areas for protest liaison such as communication, where police should "seek to improve dialogue with protest groups in advance where possible, to gain a better understanding of the intent of the protesters and the nature of the protest activity; to agree how best to facilitate the protest and to ensure a proportionate policing response" (*Adapting to Protest*, 2009: 47).

Given this focus on peaceful protest, and having regard to the psychology of crowd dynamics as discussed earlier, it is important to highlight current policing practice, particularly in respect of the potential transition to less compliant and more aggressive crowds in direct response to police tactics.

Again, the events of the G 20 protests in 2009 highlight the problems in relation to what were then perceived as legitimate police tactics. A key tactic utilized was that of containment or "kettling" where large numbers of people are indiscriminately restricted into confined areas in order to impose control over a crowd. This goes against the evidence provided by Stott and Reicher as the crowd perceive less legitimacy in the actions of the police.

The most current public order training material available is the 2010 Manual of Guidance on “*Keeping the Peace*” published by the National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA). In the preface to this document Chief Constable Meredydd Hughes, Head of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Uniformed Operations Business Area, states that “The world of protest has changed and public order practice and training must change with it” (*Keeping the Peace*, 2010: 7). The guidance contains a large number of key statements which would tend to underline that communication and positive engagement with crowds are central to effective policing:

1. “Engagement and dialogue should be used, whenever possible, to demonstrate a ‘no surprises’ approach....and links with communities, groups, event organisers and other relevant parties should be established and maintained in order to build trust and confidence” (*Keeping the Peace*, 2010: 11).
2. Planning should “never start from the premise that crowds are inherently irrational or dangerous. In fact, modern theories into crowd dynamics suggest that some methods of police intervention may be linked to an escalation of violence within a crowd” (*Keeping the Peace*, 2010: 87).
3. When developing a crowd engagement plan the aim is to “positively encourage the crowd’s propensity towards self-regulating behaviour” (*Keeping the Peace*, 2010: 88).
4. To be effective “crowd liaison should be structured from the onset of any operation” (*Keeping the Peace*, 2010: 88).
5. “Effective communication between protest organisers, participants and police is vital to facilitating peaceful protest. Communication prior to, during and after the protest event will assist in managing expectations of all stakeholders...” (*Keeping the Peace*, 2010: 90).

The current police training in relation to protest seems very clear and strongly advocates liaison and communication as key components of successful operations. It would seem that there exists in the United Kingdom a degree of delayed reaction between the acceptance of modern crowd dynamics theory and its integration into operational deployment on the ground. Whilst the importance of communication is clearly stated it is less clear in the guidance who is expected to carry out this pivotal role, and what training is available to carry it out.

In order to gather real-time information on crowd dynamics and protester intentions, police officers must be on the ground and have the trust of organizers, or at least be seen as having a legitimate function by the protesters. This does limit the intelligence gathering capability which can undermine trust but, as clearly shown by the Swedish Dialogue Model, intelligence gathering is not a primary function.

The answer as to who is best placed to liaise with protest groups before, during and after the event is, on the face of it, relatively simple and contained in the Swedish model where this task is performed by specially trained individuals. However, in the UK it remains the subject of some debate which police officers are best placed to carry out this function and what skills are required. Clearly, such individuals should possess extremely well developed communication skills and be adept at dealing with individuals face to face in an open and honest manner. Such skills are fundamental to hostage and crisis negotiators who are trained

to extremely high levels in the UK. However, it is also vital that these negotiating skills are augmented by a good working knowledge of public order training in order that police options and capabilities are clearly understood. Another fundamental requirement is a clear and current understanding of police command and control protocols where the strategic (gold), tactical (silver) and operational (bronze) roles and responsibilities are defined and deployed in dynamic circumstances. It is clear that the pool of police officers who possess such a skills set may be limited, therefore it is essential to have the capability to provide effective training to allow the deployment of such a specialized resource in a manner which will facilitate meaningful results. Should these officers be trained negotiators who are given public order awareness? Should they be experienced public order officers who are given negotiator training? In practice these questions become immaterial providing that they are intelligent, well informed, mentally agile officers and have excellent communication skills.

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It is only recently that appropriate training has emerged, some three years after the death of Ian Tomlinson, and two years after the publication of *Keeping the Peace*. This Protester Liaison Team (PLT) training has been developed by the NPIA along with Stott, and is being disseminated to police forces in England and Wales. PLT training, whilst not embryonic, is clearly in its infancy. Whilst it has a slant towards public order practice, this is not as pronounced as may have been the case, and the vital communication skills of those being trained has been embedded as an essential characteristic of potential team members.

Maritime Negotiations

Large areas of the United States border water: oceans, the Gulf, great lakes, large lakes, rivers, and swamps. These areas are not immune to critical incidents and hostage taking. Negotiators, if they have not already, may get the call to grab their equipment, load onto a boat, and head out into the water to negotiate with an actor on a boat, barge, oil rig, or ship. One of the world-recognized experts in maritime negotiations is Andrew Barrie Brown, who has graciously accepted the author's invitation to write this section. As with the Menzies section on protest movements, Andrew Brown's references are included in Box 9.3 to assist the reader.

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Maritime negotiations—A challenging dynamic

Historically, the intervention of negotiators in hostage or crisis management has been carried out in a land-based environment. However, any incidence of a hostage or crisis event on water brings negotiators into a different world that presents many challenges in a complex operating arena. Maritime incidents can be divided into three categories:

- Internal threat – Crisis
- Environmental threat – Protest
- Criminal threat – Modern Piracy & Maritime Terrorism

Internal Threat – In a truly global business, a majority of a ship's crew may originate from a multinational background, whether on a cruise liner, oil tanker, or other cargo vessel navigating the vast expanses of the world's oceans.

In addition to the multinational dimension, on an individual level, mental disorders are common in the United States and internationally. An estimated 26.2 percent of Americans aged 18 and older (about one in four adults) suffer from a diagnosable mental disorder in any given year (Kessler et al, 2005). Given the reality of the incidence of mental health issues within the overall population, the frequency of people suffering mental illness cannot be said to be confined to those who are employed on land. The author experienced two incidents where crew members have suffered from a mental disorder that has spiraled into a hostage/crisis event.

The first incident was a second mate of a Dutch registered cargo vessel who was suffering from extreme paranoia. He carefully planned and carried out a sustained attack on the multinational crew, and attempted to destroy the vessel itself by setting fire to it. Using marine flares he attempted to kill fellow crew members, strategically placed weapons around the vessel with which to attack the crew, and by using the flares as ballistic weapons, he activated the Halon system in the engine room in an attempt to suffocate the engineer.

A second incident related to a female crew member onboard a luxury motor cruiser, who after dealing with the demise of her marriage, resorted to alcohol. The vessel was moored in a bay along with several other vessels participating in a yachting regatta. Alone and intoxicated on the vessel, she hailed a distress call and retired to her cabin where she equipped herself with a handgun, some 300 rounds of ammunition and had access to three pump action shotguns and a .375 rifle.

While such incidents as this are relatively rare, there has been research that demonstrates

that both workers in the offshore and fishing industry are subjected to their own unique stressors. Sutherland and Flin (1989) highlight that this group of workers has seven factors that impact on their stress levels:

- relationships at work and home
- site management problems
- factors intrinsic to the job
- the “uncertainty” element of the work environment
- living in the offshore environment safety
- interface between job and family

Given the large numbers of crew, and indeed passengers spread over the world’s cruise liners, there is a distinct possibility that someone suffering from mental illness could instigate a crisis event that affects the safety of the vessel and those on board.

Environmental Threat – There continue to be many environmental groups that campaign on a number of subjects in a relatively peaceful manner, and which have actively utilized peaceful protest in a maritime environment to send their message globally by disrupting both commercial and military naval activities.

One such organization is Greenpeace, which states on its website that its goal is to “ensure the ability of the Earth to nurture life in all its diversity” and focuses its campaigning on worldwide issues such as global warming, deforestation, over fishing, commercial whaling, genetic engineering, and antinuclear issues. The decommissioning of the Shell’s Brent Spa, an offshore installation, in 1991 saw Greenpeace using direct action by occupying the installation in 1995 for three months gaining support from the British Government and a global population. It was this campaign that cost Shell millions of dollars. Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) is one of Europe’s biggest single-issue peace campaigns, with more than 32,000 members in the UK. CND campaigns for the abolition of nuclear weapons everywhere. Whilst these are only a proportion of the global environmental groups, their ability to conduct peaceful protests in a maritime setting provides unique challenges in terms of an appropriate and viable tactical response. Part of that response must be to negotiate with a strategy of a peaceful resolution to ensure that the human rights of all are upheld while the integrity of security operations is maintained.

Criminal Threat – The evolution of modern piracy and kidnap for ransom has become a lucrative global criminal business. The Financial Action Task Force reported that in 2010, hijackings off the coast of Somalia resulted in 49 vessels captured and 1,016 hostages taken, as well as eight fatalities. An additional four vessels with 165 crew members were hijacked elsewhere in the world. As of 3rd March 2011, off the East Coast of Africa, 33 vessels were being held along with a total of 711 hostages. Ransoms have risen from an average of USD 150,000 per vessel/crew in 2005 to an estimated USD 5.2 million per vessel/crew in 2010 (Financial Action Task Force, 2011). Importantly, the issue of piracy is not confined to the East Coast of Africa. The Worldwide Threat to Shipping Report (Maritime OPINTEL Report, 2012) documents threats to, and criminal action against, merchant vessels across the world’s oceans and specifically in the following areas:

- South America: Guyana

- West Africa: Congo, Ivory Coast and Nigeria
- Indian Ocean: East Africa: Yemen, Somalia, India, Indian Ocean, Oman and Iran
- Southeast Asia: Bangladesh, Singapore and four incidents in Indonesia

The criminal activity can be defined as the following activities:

- Attempted Boarding – Close approach or hull to hull contact with report that boarding paraphernalia were employed or visible in the approaching boat.
- Blocking – Hampering safe navigation, docking, or undocking of a vessel as a means of protest.
- Boarding – Unauthorized boarding of a vessel by persons not part of its complement without successfully taking control of the vessel.
- Firing Upon – Weapons discharged at or toward a vessel.
- Hijacking – Unauthorized seizure and retention of a vessel by persons not part of its complement.
- Kidnapping – Unauthorized forcible removal of persons belonging to the vessel from it.
- Robbery – Theft from a vessel or from persons aboard a vessel.
- Suspicious Approach – All other unexplained close proximity of an unknown vessel.

Lehr (2011) introduces that transportation by air was attacked in the events of 9/11; and transport by rail in Madrid in March 2004; transportation by ship could be the next target for the new terrorist world.

Technological advances in ship building, where the latest container ships have a carrying capacity of 18,000 containers, are energy efficient and are adapted for slow-steaming to save fuel, can have implications. For example, slower steaming speed can make ships more vulnerable to piracy and other forms of attack. Also, the vulnerability of the energy infrastructure, its potential to impact on global energy prices combined with the estimate that the total cost of piracy-related incidents is \$7 – 12 billion per annum (One Earth Future Foundation, 2010) has given rise to multiagency and multidisciplinary approaches to security in often complex environments. Brown highlights the United Kingdom government support in deploying private armed security guards on ships to help combat piracy. There are concerns regarding the private security company standards, coupled with the fact that in confronting pirates, it is clearly defined in international law that lethal force may only be used in self defense (Haberfeld, Hassell & Brown, 2012).

The maritime terrorism threat is still very real and growing in its complexity as is the spread of modern piracy. A multidimensional approach to these issues by governments, military and law enforcement agencies is now bringing this trend to the foreground so we can effectively combat it.

Challenges

This section is based on the special interest and experience of the author in law enforcement responding to and critiquing exercises based on maritime hostage/crisis incidents. History

shows us that in either a hostage or crisis situation, the role of the negotiation team is integral to the success of any tactical intervention where it is the primary aim to bring a peaceful resolution to the incident.

Information and intelligence

At the initial reporting of an incident there will always be an element of chaos until control is exercised and the facts are established to determine what has actually occurred. It is all too easy when information comes from various sources, for the message and the facts to be initially distorted. Early and accurate assessment of the situation is vital to ensure the appropriate resources are deployed. A chain of command for information and intelligence gathering must also be clearly defined and maintained to ensure that decisions are evidence based. The rapid development of communications technology poses a challenge to the law enforcement negotiator. Many will recognize that their children are far more adept than they at mastering the use of technology and social media communications, not only in terms of motor skills but in their depth of understanding. It is essential for negotiators to have a working knowledge of maritime communications equipment, language, and procedures. They also need to be acutely aware that most VHF communications are insecure. A thorough understanding of maritime communications is critical for the proper interpretation of communications, especially in gathering intelligence. Also, a working knowledge of the maritime industry will assist in developing intelligence from the details of crew lists, cargo details, hazards, and design and structure of the vessel. Given the multinational element of crews, knowledge of how to obtain intelligence on foreign nationals through recognized channels is imperative for informed decision making. All of this information will also contribute to preparations for any tactical assault plan.

Assess threat and develop a working strategy

Brown highlights that the normal function of a law enforcement response for a land-based incident is to contain, isolate, evacuate (if necessary) and negotiate. This obviously becomes more complex in a maritime environment. Nevertheless, this response provides a firm structure for the development and implementation of a clearly articulated strategy and tactical options designed to resolve incidents in the safest manner possible. The simple fact is that these functions are well tried and tested and proven to work in dynamic, challenging and often dangerous circumstances (Haberfeld, Hassell & Brown, 2012).

Negotiator teams are well versed in crisis response and their early involvement will exponentially increase benefits in terms of intelligence gathering. Perhaps more importantly, their ability to provide a highly informed assessment of the incident, hostage(s) and perpetrator(s) will allow robust threat and risk assessments to be made.



PHOTO 9.3 One of the initial difficulties in a maritime incident is getting response personnel to the scene. It may be a problem to find a vessel large enough to transport the team or to hold the team for negotiating. This means reduced personnel for the response and may create a real bind for the team.

(Photo by A. Brown)



PHOTO 9.4 In maritime negotiations the vessels (including participants) are not stationary, and maintaining communications, getting control of released hostages or victims, tactical actions, and sniper options may be near impossible.

(Photo by A. Brown)

A team of trained negotiators used in any incident, maritime or otherwise, will allow for the development of working strategies which are realistic and achievable, such as:

- minimizing the risk to any hostages
- minimizing the risk to the public in the immediate area
- maximizing the safety of police/staff
- minimizing the risk to the perpetrator(s)
- arresting/detaining the perpetrator(s)
- recover and preserve any evidence/weapons

While it is sometimes necessary to take risks during fast-moving dynamic incidents within

complex environments, it is imperative that any decisions made and actions taken endeavor to protect human rights.

Powers and policy

In maritime incidents, it is important to consider the remit of law enforcement to ensure that any action taken is legal and within the jurisdiction of the relevant agency. For example, certain legislation allows law enforcement officers to operate outside the normal 12 mile coastal limit. In the United Kingdom, The Petroleum Act 1998, Section 10, specifies:

1. Her Majesty may by Order in Council provide that, in such cases and subject to such exceptions as it may be prescribed by the Order, any act or omission which –
 - a. Takes place on, under or above an installation in waters to which this section applies or any waters within 500 meters of any such installation; and
 - b. Would, if taking place in any part of the United Kingdom, constitute an offence under the law in force in that part, shall be treated for the purposes of that law as taking place in that part.
2. Her Majesty may by Order in Council provide that, in such cases and subject to such exceptions as it may be prescribed by the Order, a constable shall on, under or above any installation in waters to which this section applies or any waters within 500 meters of such an installation have all the powers, protection and privileges which he has in the area for which he acts as constable.

In essence, the legislation gives the law enforcement officer the same legal powers within the waters of the United Kingdom Continental Shelf and outside the 12 mile territorial limit as if that officer were on land.

It is also essential that both commanders and negotiators maintain policy logs to accurately record decisions made and the rationale behind those decisions.

Options and contingencies

It is the basic elements of law enforcement capacity and capability that, if not well established, destabilize the foundation for any deployment and response. The infrequency of such maritime incidents invariably means that there will be a limit to the tactical options that can be considered by the Commander in a collapsing time frame. Deploying negotiators not only gains vital intelligence, but can calm the situation and allow time for specialist resources to prepare and respond.

The maritime environment can be a dangerous place to those not familiar with its surroundings. Officers must not only be equipped with personal protective equipment but must also be trained in its use and in basic sea survival. Succumbing to sea sickness can become debilitating for most, so being self aware is essential. Boarding of vessels, working in confined spaces and entering into enclosed spaces, such as cargo holds, is fraught with danger.

The Marine Accident Investigators International Forum identified a large number of fatalities in the shipping industry worldwide that were related to work in confined or enclosed spaces. Unfortunately, these fatalities are attributable to:

- complacency leading to lapses in procedure
- lack of knowledge
- potentially dangerous spaces not being identified
- would-be rescuers acting on instinct and emotion rather than knowledge and training.

It is unlikely that a full negotiator team would be deployed to sea, and therefore the team may be limited to the primary negotiator, coach and log keeper. The remainder of the team would be land based with direct communications with the waterborne team to ensure support, intelligence flow, tactical updates and the ability to defer decisions to command.

As the primary and coach would focus on negotiations, it is imperative that the log keeper not only document key points in negotiations but also record the factors of the challenging environment for the risk assessment purposes. Therefore, it is essential for command that they are aware of all available tactical options, balanced with the health and safety issues of deploying law enforcement on water as they manage the risk to all involved.

Take action and review

In addition to considering the tactical options prior to deployment to a maritime incident it is essential that Commanders consider the wider response.

Given the open nature of VHF maritime communications, one of the most significant challenges in dealing with a maritime incident is working closely with the media. This alone can have a huge impact on resources, can distract from the main strategy for resolution and if not managed correctly, can have a negative impact on organizational reputation and the families of those involved.

Providing this liaison between the law enforcement agency and the affected families not only assists in managing their needs, concerns and expectations, but also allows identification of relevant and realistic action in the investigation. It also allows for the sensitive gathering of relevant information, such as hostage profiles and evidence pertinent to the investigation whilst taking cognizance of the family's fundamental right to private life at a traumatic time.

Conducting crime scene investigation in a maritime environment also presents physical challenges right across the range from scene preservation and interviewing witnesses to the capture and preservation of fragile forensic evidence. Having trained crime scene investigators who are equipped to deal with such incidents would go some way to mitigate the high incidence of failed prosecutions found in many piracy cases.

Again, as with all of these challenges, having appropriately selected and trained staff can make a significant difference in the management of the incident, the people involved and the integrity of the organization. Reviewing actions during the duration of the incident is imperative to ensure that the correct decisions have been made and at the termination of the incident both a 'hot' debrief and a full debrief are used to capture the learning points.

Conclusion

In any critical incident, it is the law enforcement agency's ability to effectively train staff, provide continuous professional development and undertake risk assessments based on available intelligence that provide a sound basis for the protection of human rights and the integrity of the organization.

Summary

Hostage negotiations in prisons are comparable to hostage negotiations in the civilian world. The same basic principles apply, although there are some differences in phenomenology. A major advantage for the prison negotiator is in the amount of intelligence data available at the outset of the incident. Hostage takers are contained, and understand the potential for force to be used against them. Each prison should have a trained and prepared negotiating team ready for any situation that may arise. The negotiators should be ready to respond to emotional frustrations as well as instrumental demands. Additionally, prison negotiators should prepare for incidents of much longer duration than civilian-world incidents. Crucial training for the prison negotiator should include cultural diversity training.

Discussion Questions

1. You are the primary negotiator at a prison situation in which two inmates have taken a civilian nurse hostage and are locked in a closet. Both inmates are highly agitated and are threatening to rape and kill the hostage. Without having any demands presented, what could you do to reduce the possibility of violence toward the nurse?
2. Develop a method to select hostage negotiators for a prison team.
3. You are negotiating at a federal prison where inmates have rioted and taken numerous prison staff hostage. One of the hostages is the Deputy Director of Prisons for your region. He insists upon ordering you in what to do and what demands to agree to. What would your response to that person be? What could you say to the inmates to keep him off the phone? How could you get him to relinquish control?
4. At Oakdale, negotiators quickly agreed to the instrumental demands of the inmates. What strategies could the negotiators have used to delay progress until the inmates made their expressive demands known?
5. You are called to a prison hostage situation. The prisoners are demanding two airplanes to fly inmates to another country where they can be free. This is their only demand. The inmates tell you that unless the airplanes are ready to go in 10 hours, they will start killing hostages. How would you respond to their demand?
6. This chapter discussed the similarities and differences of the prison situation as compared to the police situation. How could the advantages employed by a prison team be applied to a police negotiating team?

7. You are dispatched to a local freshwater lake to negotiate with a group of animal rights activists who are standing on a public boat ramp and preventing a group of bass fishermen from launching their boats. The group is taking part in a weekend tournament. The protestors have linked arms, using “sleeping dragons.” What would you say to them that might resolve the protest and allow the fishermen to launch their boats?
8. A hostage taker boards a houseboat 14 miles from shore in Lake Michigan, and takes a banker, banker’s wife, and three children hostage. He calls the bank and says he wants \$1 million or he is going to kill the family. He wants the money in 12 hours. If not delivered, he is going to start killing a hostage every hour until the money is delivered. The bank contacts the police department and CRT is dispatched. What are the difficulties each part of CRT will experience in resolving this incident: IC, tactical, and negotiators? Assume you are IC: Develop a deployment plan for each component of CRT.

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Chapter 10

Crisis Management: Hostage Dynamics

Chapter Outline

Hostages and victims

Hostages

The Stockholm Syndrome

Etiology and description of the Stockholm Syndrome

The Stockholm Syndrome revisited

Hostage dynamics

Psychological effects of captivity

Defense mechanisms

Coping mechanisms

Survivors and succumbers

Post-traumatic stress and hostages

Emotional aftereffects

Cognitive aftereffects

Behavioral aftereffects

Physical aftereffects

Medical aftereffects

Positive aftereffects

Recovery from PTSD and the role of negotiators

Note

References

Learning Objectives

1. Recognize the difference between a hostage and a potential victim.
2. Understand the ways in which different personality styles affect the way hostages react.
3. Understand what threats confront people when they are taken hostage.
4. Know why the extensive POW data set can assist us in understanding hostage behavior and reactions.
5. Know the defense mechanisms hostages employ as well as which are beneficial to

survival and which are detrimental to survival.

6. Know the various adaptive and coping strategies that hostages employ during captivity. For each, know how the strategy can either help or hurt the hostage's ability to survive captivity.
7. Know Strentz's typology of Survivors and Succumbers.
8. Understand the aftereffects of captivity and how they are affected by situational variables, such as length of captivity, severity of captivity, etc.
9. Understand the process of recovery for hostages and what negotiators can do to decrease potential aftereffects.
10. Understand how to conduct an emotional debriefing with released hostages.

Kurt was a 22-year-old who worked a minimum-wage job at a fast-food restaurant. He never finished high school and had no job skills. One morning he arrived at work and was fired by his manager due to slower annual sales. Kurt went home, smoked some marijuana, and began getting angry about getting fired. He called his buddy, Dwight, who told him, "Dude, you know that if you had passed that math class in high school, you would have graduated and could get a real job!" Kurt answered, "F-----A!" He hung up, smoked some more marijuana, and let his anger continue to build. He went in his closet, loaded up his two pistols, and drove to the high school. He went to his old math class, burst into the room, fired a round from his pistol into the air, and ordered everyone to sit down. He shouted to his old math teacher, "You're the reason I can't get a job. I'm going to shoot your a---!" Before he could, the school SRO pounded on the locked door, interrupting Kurt's plan.

CRT responded ASAP. Tactical officers flooded the hallway, outside walkway and rapidly evacuated the other classrooms and building. Negotiators sent two team members forward with tactical to initiate voice-to-voice contact. Within ten minutes of the call-out, negotiators were outside the classroom door, shouting at the hostage taker to speak with them. Kurt yelled back, but would provide no information about himself, only that he was going to kill his "worthless math teacher!" The negotiator continued to call to Kurt, asking him to take a throw phone so at least they could talk. Kurt refused. Negotiators in the rear managed to learn several student names and obtained some cell numbers for those students. They called one of the numbers, which was assigned to a girl named Sarah. After a couple of rings, Sarah answered. She was hysterical and hard to understand. The rear negotiators heard Kurt begin to scream at Sarah to hang up the phone. The forward negotiator yelled to Kurt that it was the police and to let Sarah talk. Kurt stopped screaming and told Sarah to talk to the police.

Negotiators tried to talk to Sarah, but all she could do was cry and act hysterically. The negotiator tried active listening, and when that did not work, the negotiator became firm and directing (see [Chapter 5](#) on Communication). That calmed Sarah enough that she cried into the phone, "He's got a gun and wants to kill our teacher. Please help us!" The negotiator assured Sarah they would get everyone out if the students would sit quietly and be quiet. The negotiator got a promise from Sarah to do that, and to talk to other students about being quiet. The negotiator then asked to speak to the actor. When he got on the phone and started yelling and shouting, the negotiator listened and employed active listening skills. The negotiator got Kurt to give his first name.

After about 20 minutes, Kurt got mad when the negotiator asked him to come out. He threw down the phone and said, "I'm not talking to you anymore." Negotiators then called a student named Jim on his cell phone. Jim answered and was angry and belligerent, threatening to take matters into his own hands. The negotiator was able to talk to Jim and get him to calm down and promise to stay seated and not do anything rash. Next, the negotiator asked Jim a few questions and told him to only answer yes or no: (1) Was Kurt listening or could he hear the conversation? (No), (2) was any other student acting real emotionally? (Yes) (3) The negotiator told Jim he was going to read the class roster and for Jim to not say anything unless the negotiator read the name of a student who was being overly emotional (from the names read, Jim indicated that Tony, Marcy, and Dawn were being emotional), (4) was any other student doing anything that was making Kurt mad, angry or emotional? (No), (5) Has the teacher been harmed? (No), (6) Has anyone else been harmed? (No), (7) When I say the number that is the number of guns Kurt has in his possession, answer Yes, otherwise be quiet (When the negotiator said, "two," Jim said Yes). The negotiator continued questioning Jim in this vein, collecting intelligence on Kurt and finding out more about how the hostages were acting. Prior to hanging up with Jim, the negotiator asked him to pass the phone to either Tony, Marcie, or Dawn.

When Marcie got on the phone, the negotiator said, "Marcie, we are going to get everyone out safely, but I need your help. Do you understand?" When Marcie answered yes, the negotiator told her that she needed to relax, stay calm, and not get emotional and cry. He elicited a promise from Marcie to do those things. The negotiator next spoke to Tony and Dawn and got the same promises. While talking to Dawn, the negotiator asked her if there was a class leader. When Dawn said there was, the negotiator went through the class list until Dawn told him Larry was the class leader.

The negotiator next talked to Kurt, keeping him calmed down and reducing his anger. After several hours, and after the negotiator was sure Kurt would remain calm, the negotiator asked if he could speak to Larry and make sure all the

students were OK. When Larry got on the phone, the negotiator told him he was a class leader and it was his responsibility to keep every other student calm and quiet, to not to do anything to try and overpower Kurt, nor to help the police. Larry agreed.

The negotiator continued talking to Kurt, and after about another hour, Kurt put his guns down and surrendered. The negotiators then met in another classroom with all the students and conducted an emotional debriefing, provided resources for any who had any stress symptoms at a later date, and provided printed material to help with any emotional or psychological aftereffects. During the incident, negotiators had met with school counselors and other teachers and briefed them on what some of the short-and long-term emotional effects (including PTSD) might be. Negotiators had also met with parents, telling them what to expect and that they may experience emotional aftereffects, and provided information about available counseling services they could use.

This case illustrates the importance of the negotiator understanding hostage behavior, hostage emotional states, psychological reactions to being held captive, and other aspects of hostage behavior. The most critical reason for knowing this information is to know how to deal with hostage issues and keep them alive and from becoming harmed. Recognizing the potential benefits and liabilities posed by hostages and ways of managing them are necessary tools in the negotiator's tool box. Being able to deal with hostages upon completion of the incident is also critical. Negotiators should conduct an emotional debriefing with released hostages and reduce the potential for long-term effects of captivity. This chapter will look at the definitions of hostages and victims of a crisis incident, outline the kinds of people who become hostages/victims, examine what happens when people are taken hostage, explore how people adapt to and cope with being held hostage, define what Survivors and Succumbers are, and explain what happens to people when they are released from captivity. Guidelines for debriefing released hostages will be presented and discussed.

Hostages and Victims

One important determination to be made at the beginning of an incident is whether it is a hostage incident or a nonhostage incident. This is important because the risk of injury or death is greater in nonhostage incidents than in true hostage incidents. Noesner (1999) has pointed out that the majority of the FBI's training for commanders focuses on this issue. It is not as simple as it appears, because what you see is not always what you get in crisis situations. Sometimes people take family members or friends captive without having a substantive goal. These people can be considered "victims in the making."

Noesner (1999) defines a hostage incident as one in which *a subject holds other people in order to force a third party to comply with his or her substantive demands*. Substantive demands are those that the subject does not think he or she can obtain without the use of hostages. Therefore, the hostages are leverage in these incidents, not targets. It is only by keeping the hostages alive that the subject has leverage with the police. Demands are reasonable and goal-directed.

Nonhostage incidents involve the subject acting out of emotion, having ill-defined goals, and making no substantive demands (Noesner, 1999). The demands seem unrealistic—demands that no reasonable person would expect to be fulfilled. In these incidents, subjects either are barricaded, or they hold others to express their frustration, hurt, disillusionment about events or, more dangerously, about the individuals they are holding. The people in these incidents are not hostages; they are victims. Most of these situations are domestic incidents, the victims

being children or estranged spouse/partner. The risk to the people being held is considerably higher in nonhostage incidents than in hostage incidents.

Hostages¹

The American Heritage Dictionary (1980) defines *hostage* as: “A person held as a security for the fulfillment of certain terms.”

Several points need to be emphasized when considering this definition. First, it is important to understand the implications of the involvement of a person. A living being, not an inanimate object, is at risk. Inanimate objects can be used in extortion, but it takes a living person to make an incident a hostage incident. The goal of hostage negotiation is saving lives, not preservation of property. In discussing the Williamsburg incident, one authority said, “The primary consideration in such circumstances is to secure the lives and safety of threatened hostages, the police officers, innocent bystanders, and the criminals themselves” (Schlossberg, 1979a). This makes hostage negotiations consistent with the public safety responsibility of the police, which includes aiding individuals in danger of physical harm, assisting those who cannot care for themselves, and resolving conflict (American Bar Association, 1980).

The emphasis on saving human life does two things for the negotiator: (1) It increases negotiator stress, because of the high cost of failure, and (2) it attracts political and public relations attention due to the drama of a life – death confrontation.

In most hostage incidents, the explicit threat is to the hostage’s life. It is not the loss of property, status, or belonging to a community that is at stake. Life itself is at stake. The cost of failure in such an incident places significant stress on negotiators. The recent recognition of the impact of traumatic stress on emergency service personnel, police officers involved in shootings (Nielsen, 1986; Solomon & Horn, 1986; Somodevilla, 1986; McMains, 1986; Reese, Horn & Dunning, 1991), military personnel and warfighters returning from Iraq and Afghanistan (Mullins, 2008) is ample evidence that loss of life can create significant stress. Negotiators need to plan for this stress.



PHOTO 10.1 Negotiators have a primary responsibility to the hostages or victims being held by an actor. All too often, the hostage element is overlooked in the stress and emotions of trying to get the actor to release them. Negotiators must focus on

hostages and emphasize their well-being during and after an incident. That often means talking to them instead of the actor.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

Incidents that involve life and death have a sense of the dramatic (Keen, 1991). There is rarely a hit drama television show or film about the adventures of a certified public accountant or Hollywood screen writer; there is no life-and-death struggle (and our apologies to all of those in both professions. It is not our intention to demean or minimize either profession. Both are honorable and have some of the finest individuals we know. In fact, one of our great and close friends who is a screenwriter is a retired police officer and negotiator. We simply mean to illustrate that both professions lack the drama of life-and-death inherent in hostage situations). However, hostages are different. There is the threat to life; therefore, there is high drama. Terrorists understand and play on this drama. The media, neighbors, family members, and friends are attracted to such incidents. Negotiators and police departments should anticipate this attraction and plan for the management of this audience. All this attention makes negotiation incidents high-visibility and potentially high-liability situations. Because of this public interest, many units of the police department may be needed at the scene. Because of the potential liability, the department's crisis response teams need to be well trained and well rehearsed.

Second, it is important to understand that the person is "held." The hostage is not there voluntarily. The holding may be physical or psychological; the impact on the person is the same. A person is traumatized because of his or her lack of control and is made to feel powerless and dependent on the hostage taker. The former points to the need for victim debriefing. The latter lends itself to the development of negotiation strategies and tactics.

Knowledge of traumatic stress has led some police departments to expand the use of their negotiators to crisis debriefing in situations other than hostage incidents. That is, some departments have used their negotiators to help search-and-rescue workers manage the emotional impact of their work. Some have used them to debrief crime victims (McMains, 2000).

Third, the person has utility. The person is being held as security—as a guarantee. The hostage is the hostage taker's currency, his or her power. The hostage is not a person, and has no value to the hostage taker as a person (Schlossberg, 1979b). Part of the negotiator's job is to personalize the hostage for the hostage taker. This has to be done subtly, however. If too much attention is directed toward the hostage, his or her worth is perceived as increased. This gives the hostage taker the perception of more power. The negotiator's goal is to personalize without valuing. The negotiator needs to encourage the development of the Stockholm Syndrome.

Fourth, the person is being held as security for certain terms. This means there is an expected return—a quid pro quo for the hostage taker. The hostage taker has needs that he or she expects to be met in return for the safety, security, and/or release of the hostage. The principal job of the negotiator is to find alternate terms for the hostage taker. Goldaber (1979) has pointed out that every hostage taking is reducible to two elements: Who are the hostage takers and what do they want? Negotiation adds two more elements to the equation: What will they take and what are we willing to give? For instance, rather than the escape a gunman demands during a bungled robbery attempt, he might settle for the negotiator going to court

with him to testify about his cooperation in releasing the hostage.

The Stockholm Syndrome

A great deal has been written about a phenomenon called The Stockholm Syndrome. In 1973, Jan-Erik Olsson and Clark Olofsson attempted to rob the Sveriges Kreditbank in Stockholm, Sweden. During the robbery attempt, the police were notified and Olsson and Olofsson took four bank employees hostage. This simple robbery ended up being a hostage situation that lasted for more than 130 hours. Following the resolution of the situation (in which no one was physically injured), authorities were stunned when the hostages showed great sympathy to the two hostage takers and animosity toward the police. The hostages refused to testify at the trial of Olsson and Olofsson, spoke in public on their behalf, and even attempted to raise money for their defense fund. Several months after the incident, one of the bank employees became engaged to Olsson.

This incident gave a formal name to a psychological syndrome observed on occasion in hostage situations: the Stockholm Syndrome. Basically, the Stockholm Syndrome is an emotional reaction by people taken hostage and is an attempt, at least initially, to survive. As the hostage situation progresses, the Stockholm Syndrome becomes less of a survival reaction and more of a coping and adaptation response, and can have an empathetic component as the hostage learns more about the hostage taker. Even following their release, the ex-hostages can remain victim to the psychological reaction of captivity.

As described, there are three components to the Stockholm Syndrome (Ochberg, 1980b; Strentz, 1982; Olin & Born, 1983). First, hostages develop positive feelings and affection toward their captors. Second, hostages develop negative attitudes toward the police. Third, following the hostage situation, hostages retain a measure of empathy and compassion for the hostage takers. Simon and Blum (1987) have pointed out that hostages are in a cognitive bind. On the one hand, they depend upon the hostage taker for their survival; on the other, they depend upon the police for their ultimate rescue. This places the hostages in a catch-22.

Etiology and description of the Stockholm Syndrome

Shortly after the onset of the hostage situation and following the Crisis phase, hostages will begin to develop positive feelings toward the hostage takers. Initially, there is gratitude on the part of the hostages toward the hostage takers for being allowed to live (Eitinger, 1982). If the onset of the hostage situation is one filled with violence (i.e., hostages injured or gunfire and other violence), this gratitude is even stronger (Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986). Some authors see this gratitude as a regression to childhood (Strentz, 1979; Ochberg, 1980a). The hostages become dependent upon their captors for not only their physical needs, but also for emotional security. Symonds (1983) referred to this process as traumatic psychological trauma.

Quarles (1988) said that hostages become obedient, civil, agreeable, and compliant with their captors so as not to antagonize them. Over time, hostages come to know their captors as persons who have the same wants, desires, and needs as the hostages (Turco, 1987). This

humanization can best be exemplified by the Gerard Vaders experience. In 1975, a group of South Moluccan radicals took the occupants of a passenger train hostage in The Netherlands. To demonstrate their seriousness, the Moluccans decided to kill Vaders. Before the execution, the terrorists allowed Vaders to say goodbye to his wife (over the telephone). After listening to the tearful farewell, the terrorists returned Vaders to his seat and selected another hostage for execution (the person was only wounded and survived). Hearing Vaders' farewell to his wife made Vaders a human being to the hostage takers, not an object to be used. Killing Vaders was not an impersonal act anymore. On the other side of the equation, to Vaders, the gunmen were no longer masked terrorists. They became people who were caught up in circumstances as much as the hostages. Following the resolution of the incident, Vaders said of his captors: "You had to fight a certain feeling of compassion for the Moluccans. I know this is not natural, but in some ways they came over human ... I knew that they were victims, too. In the long run they would be as much victims as we. Even more ... You couldn't help but feel a certain pity" (Soskis & Ochberg, 1982).

Finally, the stress and tension inherent in hostage situations help form the Stockholm Syndrome. The people in a hostage situation are a small group, and as such, respond as any small group would (Wesseliuss & DeSarno, 1983). According to the Stockholm Syndrome theory, they come to know each other, form alliances, bond, and use group problem-solving techniques to benefit the group. With time, individual autonomy disappears and is replaced by group cohesiveness. If allowed to develop (a factor of both time and treatment by the hostage takers), the police will have to deal with the group and not the individual hostage takers. Indicators that this is occurring include frequent changing of or indecision about demands, many people speaking to the negotiator (especially if earlier conversations were exclusively with one person), long delays, or hesitation in making decisions (especially if the hostage taker has to keep "getting back to you").

This issue can be particularly troublesome in jail and prison situations. When prisoners take hostages, they are already a group. All of the group dynamics discussed above are already firmly in place when the negotiator first makes contact. The first task of the negotiator becomes that of identifying the leader and talking with that person. The negotiator has to be prepared for and work within the group dynamics of the situation.

The second component of the Stockholm Syndrome that has been described is an antipolice sentiment on the part of the hostages. One part of the Kreditbank incident that is often overlooked or ignored is that one of the hostages, Kristen Enmark, called a television station and said she was more afraid of the police than of the hostage takers. She accused the police of playing with the lives of hostages and repeatedly argued for her captor's case (Cooper, 1978).

Third, the presence of the police may make the hostage taker do something rash or violent. As a rule, by the time the police response teams arrive at a hostage situation, the emotions of the hostage takers and hostages have begun to dissipate and return to somewhat normal levels. The appearance of the police negotiators elevates emotions and the hostage taker again becomes fearful, angry, and emotional. The hostages fear that the hostage taker will harm them to make a point with the negotiator.

The third component of the Stockholm Syndrome is positive feelings by the ex-hostages for the hostage takers. Ex-hostages sometimes refuse to cooperate with the police, refuse to testify against their captors, establish defense funds, and work to keep the hostage takers from being

incarcerated. These after-incident positive emotions can be greatly reduced by the negotiating team in the post-incident debriefing. The aftereffects of the Stockholm Syndrome will disappear in time. Depending upon the severity of the incident, it can take weeks or months for ex-hostages to return to normal (and some have been known to experience aftereffects for years). An emotional debriefing can reduce this time to minutes in most cases.

A final component of the Stockholm Syndrome is the positive relationship that develops between the negotiator and the hostage taker. Rather than being built on fear, however, this relationship is built on trust. The hostage taker must believe in and trust that the negotiator is truly helping to resolve the incident. This is one of the reasons rapport building is so critical. If this trust does not develop, the negotiator will not make progress in resolving the incident. As the negotiator/hostage taker relationship develops, the hostage taker will become dependent upon the negotiator. When this dependency develops, the negotiator can lead the hostage taker to a peaceful resolution. It cannot be stressed enough, however, that this dependency is based upon the hostage taker trusting the negotiator.

[The Stockholm Syndrome revisited](#)

The Stockholm Syndrome does not occur in all hostage incidents nor in many barricade incidents. There are several factors that interfere with the development of the Stockholm Syndrome in these incidents. First, most hostage-taking incidents are too short in duration for hostages and captors to develop any type of relationship. It is rare for a hostage incident to last more than several hours, and when they do, it is generally a prison siege incident (and prisoners taking correctional staff hostage presents its own dynamic). Second, most incidents are not intense enough. A premise of the Stockholm Syndrome is that the incident has to be of high intensity. Most hostage situations do not have this intensity. The terrorist hostage incidents that have become notorious in Iraq are certainly intense enough to meet this criteria, but even there, the few captives that have been released report no relationship with their captors or any animosity towards their military saviors. In these terrorist incidents, however, the behavior of the terrorists has been so egregious (i.e., beheadings and dismemberment) as to render hostage empathy toward their captors nonexistent. In many instances, captives are sequestered in basements or closed rooms and there is no interaction at all between captors and hostages. Even when fed, terrorists just throw food in and don't interact at all with the hostages. At the Moscow Theater in Russia, no released hostage spoke kindly of their captors, nor did they work against the police while captive (Dolnik, 2004). Third, in the United States, many hostage situations involve hostages and hostage takers who have a prior relationship. Domestic incidents, work-place violence hostage incidents, school hostage taking incidents, prison sieges, and others are all situations in which hostages and hostage takers have prior relationships. Behavior within the incident is predicated upon these prior relationships. The stress and intensity of the incident does not change prior dynamics. Fourth, since September 11, 2001, people have a heightened awareness of survival and self-preservation. People have psychologically steeled themselves against being victimized. They will resist what their captors do and not become psychologically attached.

This is not to say that negotiators should not try to personalize the hostages to the hostage taker. In incidents in which there is a prior relationship, the negotiator can still use some of

the following suggestions to strengthen personalization. First, the negotiator should have the hostage taker give the hostages' names. The negotiator can suggest to the hostage taker that the names be given so he can inform relatives on the outside, so the negotiator knows who he is dealing with, etc. Possibly the names of the hostages can become a negotiable demand. At the outset of negotiations, the hostage taker will probably be reluctant to divulge the hostages' names. As time passes and the negotiator gains the trust of the hostage taker, the hostage taker will usually give the hostages' names. In addition to providing intelligence, knowing the names of the hostages will personalize them to the hostage taker.

Second, the negotiator could ask the hostage taker to find out whether any of the hostages has an illness or injury, if any needs medication, or other special consideration. The early stages of negotiations, in addition to building trust, should be used to personalize the relationship between the hostage taker and the hostages. If the negotiator focuses some conversation and attention on the hostages, the hostage taker will be forced to consider the hostages' needs, thereby personalizing them. The negotiator should be careful, however, to not overemphasize personalization of hostages and increase the hostage taker's perception of power.

Third, when referring to needs, include everyone. The negotiator should focus on the group situation rather than the individual situation. Send in bulk food and explain why, continue asking if everyone is okay, if anyone is hot or cold, if any relatives should be notified. Do not let the situation become "me" against "them" to the hostage taker. The negotiator is also a part of this group and should include him or herself in the group. When food is delivered, the negotiator should "eat," when discussing air temperature the negotiator should indicate his or her personal state, etc.

Fourth, do not use the term *hostage*. Refer to the hostages as "persons," "people," or with other personalized terms. If the negotiator knows the names of some hostages, he or she should always use their names. The negotiator could ask the hostage taker to deliver messages (oral, by the negotiator) from relatives, spouses, or close friends ("Would you please tell Jane her children said they hope she is okay and can come home soon."). In domestic situations, there may be a great deal of animosity and hatred between the hostage taker and the hostages. In attempting to bring about the formation of the Stockholm Syndrome, the negotiator should focus on the past relationship between the hostage taker and hostages (i.e., "Think back to a happier time in the relationship. Tell me about your courtship, marriage."). Recounting the relationship's past positives may decrease the present-day animosity and hatred, and return long-forgotten feelings of affection.

Fifth, rely on the passage of time. The longer the hostage taker and hostages are in contact with one another, the more opportunity they will have to interact and the better the probability that the Stockholm Syndrome will develop. If the hostage taker is not interacting with the hostages, the negotiator can often force interaction. For example, if the hostages are tied and bound, the negotiator could suggest that the hostage taker untie them so permanent physical damage does not occur. Do not force the passage of time solely to develop the Stockholm Syndrome, but as with other factors related to the hostage situation, make time an ally.

Hostage Dynamics

Even without the Stockholm Syndrome, there are plenty of psychological, emotional, and physical issues confronting hostages for negotiators to be concerned with. Often at a crisis situation, because of the variety of demands placed upon negotiating teams, concern about hostages (*not* to be confused with concern *for* hostages) takes a low priority. It should be given the *highest* priority. Hostages are central to the situation and should be afforded the highest priority during and after the incident. It is critical that negotiators understand the stresses placed upon people when taken hostage, how people react when taken hostage, how people survive captivity psychologically and physically, and what happens to captives after their captivity ends. Unfortunately, data on hostage behavior is extremely limited. One excellent data source that does deal with hostage behavior comes from the literature dealing with prisoners of war and ex-prisoners of war. Much of the discussion in this chapter relies heavily on that POW data, especially literature and research dealing with ex-POWs of the Japanese from WWII (possibly the most heavily researched and written about group in all of the POW literature). The POWs of the Japanese experienced the worst period of captivity imaginable. For POWs of WWII in the European theater, less than one percent of all United States POWs died during captivity, while in the Pacific theater, 40 percent of all United States POWs died while in Japanese prison camps or during sea transit between confinement sites (Stenger, 1992). This data does not include Navy personnel (but it is believed their death rates are comparable).

Psychological effects of captivity

The psychological effects of captivity begin almost immediately upon being taken hostage. The psychological effects of being held hostage are similar to that experienced in other trauma situations, such as disasters, major accidents, significant illnesses, terrorist attacks, and so on (Alexander & Klein, 2008). First, and most obviously, is a threat to life. Many hostages initially believe their captors are going to kill them. This belief is reinforced by the emotional state of the hostage taker. During the initial hostage taking, the hostage taker is emotional, angry, shouting, aggressive, and threatening, all in an attempt to gain control of the situation and force compliance. Hostages believe this angry and emotional person will kill them. They are panicky, anxious, uncertain, and fearful (Oots & Wiegale, 1985). They may feel overwhelming helplessness, existential fear, and sensory input overload (Hillman, 1983). Some may have been injured or killed, which adds to the survivors' stress. The hostages see themselves as victims of circumstance. They were going about their normal, everyday activities in an orderly world. All at once, the order of their lives has disappeared and they are facing an uncertain, and possibly short, future. More importantly, they are in a situation in which their actions, thoughts, and emotions are being controlled by someone else.

Second, there is a threat of bodily injury. Hostages believe they will be maimed, violated, lose a limb, suffer permanent disfigurement, etc. To many, this severe bodily injury is more threatening and scary than death.

Third, there is a threat to security. People believe the world is an orderly and predictable

place, that they have some control over their environment and events, and that they can plan activities and engage in routines that are safe and provide emotional security. When taken hostage, people lose this sense of orderliness and security. The world becomes random and events unpredictable. Tied in with this loss of control is the uncertainty of the future and what the future holds. Hostages question whether they are going to live, how long they will be held captive, what will happen to loved ones, etc.

Fourth, there is a threat to psychological self-image when someone is taken hostage. When people are taken hostage, they believe they did something wrong, that they let themselves down, and that they are less than good or honorable because they allowed themselves to be taken captive. For many POWs, being taken captive meant (at least at a psychological level) they let down their country, their military unit, and their buddies. As one ex-Bataan POW, J.L. "Jake" Guiles recounted, "We were ordered by General Wainwright via radio that for us the war had ended, that we were to surrender. At that time I thought surrendering was one of the most disgraceful things a person could do" (LaForte et al., 1994).

The stress confronting the hostages produces a physical arousal. This physical arousal is likely greater for the hostages than for other participants in the situation. Hostages will experience an increase in blood pressure, heart rate, neural interference, and may experience loss of muscular control (Gilmartin & Gibson, 1985). They may lose bladder control, faint, vomit, or even have heart failure, hemorrhage, or stroke. The hostage may hyperventilate or experience an asthma-like attack. The stress of the hostage situation may cause an onset of any medical condition of the hostage (Nudell & Antokol, 1990). Diabetes, migraine headaches, gastrointestinal disorders, and other illnesses may appear. The stress may be so great, in fact, that some of the hostages may hallucinate (Lanza, 1986). Siegel (1984) reported that almost 25 percent of hostages may hallucinate. These hallucinations include sensitivity to light, difficulty in visual focusing, disorientation, preoccupation with body imagery, dissociation, geometric patterns, tunnel vision, tactile-kinesthetic hallucinations, and auditory hallucinations.

In addition to these four major psychological threats to survival, there are accompanying psychological frustrations and fears of unreality, an extreme sense of danger, a total sense of vulnerability, deep feelings of helplessness and hopelessness, sensory overload, intense feelings of defenselessness and powerlessness to fight or flee, and a lost sense of worth to themselves and others. Finally, the sense of the hostage taker being hostile, threatening, powerful, and unpredictable adds tremendously to the psychological effects of capture.

These fears can best be exemplified by the POWs themselves (LaForte, Marcello, & Himmel, 1994): William G. Adair, captured on Bataan, said, "No one I knew had made any plans to surrender or to make escape plans because they just couldn't believe it." Onnie Clem (Corregidor) said, "It was hard to realize that here you are, you've never been caged up in your life before, and all of a sudden you're caged up and somebody has the power of life and death over you." James C. Venable, captured on Wake Island, related, "We were brought into a group and lined up in a solid body, several ranks deep. Suddenly, machine-guns crews came running out, and they set up their machine guns. They lined up a number of machine guns in front of the group, and they loaded them with ammunition, they jumped down behind them, they cocked them. Then there was a deadly silence. And I recall one guy said, 'Well, this looks like it's it. So let me tell you, when they start pulling the trigger let's just jump up and get a gut full ...' At the time it sounded like a very logical thing to do, and I was mentally prepared

to do it.”

Concerning the helplessness and hopelessness felt by the POWs, Albert E. Kennedy (Burma-Thailand Railway) said, “Another punishment was a case of my missing my number when counting off. I was number eight in line, and the guy that was number six said he was seven in the wrong way. I just had a blank and got the hell beat out of me. The worst part of it is the frustration of not being able to strike back.” Henry Stanley (Bataan) said concerning sensory overload, “I’ll never forget the surrender, but I don’t know how to describe it. You just felt like you were on a boat, and the boat just went out from under you, and you were out in the middle of the ocean.” Charles W. Burris (Bataan) said, “The fact is, I think, that it would have been better if we had gotten as many fliers out of there as possible—me included. Let us fight someplace else rather than let us wither on the ground there and do nothing.” Dean M. McCall, who also surrendered on Corregidor, stated, “I can’t recall exactly what my feelings were, but I felt sort of sorry about surrendering. I felt ashamed that we lost, I know that.”

As the situation progresses, the initial stress dissipates and the hostages calm down and begin dealing with the situation. After a period of time, stress begins to increase as basic needs are not met. The presence of the police produces stress. To the hostage, the police are as much of a threat as the hostage taker. The hostage does not know how or if the police can differentiate them from the hostage taker and thus they are as much a threat to life as is the hostage taker.

The resolution phase produces a threat to hostages. By the resolution phase, the hostages have settled into a routine and become familiar with their situation. The resolution produces uncertainty and anxiety. They realize the hostage taker may become irrational and let his fear overcome his ability to act in a rational manner. As they are released, the hostages are treated as criminals by the police.

In domestic situations, there is a special stress on the hostage/spouse. The hostage knows the hostage taker intimately and knows what the hostage taker is capable of. Additionally, the spouse/hostage feels some responsibility to assist the hostage taker to resolve the incident successfully (i.e., not only get out of the situation alive, but also to not go to jail). In these situations, the hostage feels a responsibility to assist in resolving the incident as well as the stress produced regarding his or her own survival.

In prisons, hostages also have the additional stressors of knowing their captors. Unlike the domestic situation, however, the hostages are aware of the violence their captors are capable of. Often, people are injured before they become hostages. All the hostages know that if the authorities do not fulfill demands and resolve the situation, the hostage takers will injure or kill the hostages. The hostages know the hostage takers hate the hostages and would, in some cases, be glad to harm the hostages. In jail and prison situations, the nature of the relationship between the hostages and hostage takers in and of itself significantly increases stress on the hostages. Survivability and success as a hostage depends on the personality of the hostage. To some extent, negotiators can assess the personality type of the hostages and obtain a sense of how hostages will act and react to various stimuli.

1. The *Histrionic Personality* describes a person motivated by a constant need for approval, affiliation with others, and support. They are often dramatic in dress and action. They are prone to emotional displays that draw attention to themselves. They believe that the best way they have of dealing with life is to ingratiate themselves to

others, particularly people in power. Negotiators are likely to deal with them because they make a suicide gesture, especially when they think they are being neglected. As hostages, they are likely to be good candidates for the Stockholm Syndrome, or they may single themselves out through dramatic and emotional overreactions.

2. The *Schizoid Personality* is characterized by a pattern of isolation, aloofness, and withdrawal from others. They are motivated by a need to avoid being overwhelmed by excessive external and interpersonal stimulation. They tend to be loners and only become aggressive when they feel that other people are putting too many demands on them. Under the stress of being a hostage, these people would be expected to withdraw and keep to themselves. They might quit reacting to instructions because they feel overwhelmed by the incident.
3. The *Compulsive Personality* is motivated by a need for perfection and social acceptance. They adhere to rules and regulations. They are concrete and specific. They fear making mistakes and being seen as socially inappropriate. They rarely are involved with the police. These people can put themselves at risk by being judgmental and critical of the hostage takers.
4. The *Avoidant Personality* is motivated by a desire to be accepted by others. They are so afraid of rejection that avoiding others becomes a defense against this threat. They rarely come to the attention of police, but when they do, they are usually easy to persuade. They are one of the types that is the most likely to develop the Stockholm Syndrome.
5. The *Dependent Personality* is characterized by acquiescing to the desires of others to gain acceptance and support. They are passive and submissive. They come to negotiators' attention when they are paired with a more assertive partner, like the antisocial person who is generally the leader. They frequently barricade themselves in a high-visibility location to draw attention to their problems and to get themselves help. As hostages, they tend to be cooperative and compliant. They are another group that is likely to develop the Stockholm Syndrome.
6. The *Narcissistic Personality* expects special treatment. They have trouble postponing gratification and they must be seen by others as extremely competent. They have an inability to empathize with others and they fail to bond emotionally. Narcissism is a key element in the antisocial personality. These people will single themselves out by their unusual dress or behavior. As hostages, they may have trouble because they cannot believe the hostage taker means them when he gives orders. They may be at risk because they become a management problem for the hostage taker.
7. The *Aggressive Personality* is motivated by the need to control others. They are vigilant and mistrustful. They fear having to rely on others, being taken advantage of and being humiliated. They assume that only the strong survive, so they are sensitive to power and power struggles. This is another major element in the antisocial personality. If unchecked, this characteristic aggressiveness will lead them to challenge the hostage taker.

Once the initial psychological shock of being captured wears off, hostages begin settling into a psychological routine of adaptation and coping to endure their captivity. It is crucial to realize that at this point many hostages can start to psychologically deteriorate (and in intense

captivity, even die) from their captivity. Surviving hostages begin to use beneficial and successful adaptation and coping strategies to survive their captivity, while others do not or cannot adapt and cope. As one ex-POW, Louis B. Read, said (LaForte, Marcello, & Himmel, 1994), “If I had to single out one thing, I would say it would have to be adaptability—ability to change with the environment. In my term as a prisoner, I’ve seen hundreds of guys—many of whom were personal friends of mine—sit down and die for no good reason because they could not adapt to circumstances.”

It is known from extensive POW literature that the nonadapters and noncopers could not be forced to adapt and cope, even with the urgent assistance of other POWs. It is well-documented that adaptation and coping strategies employed in captivity are largely a function of one’s background, family situation, lifestyle, education, age, experience in the world, and other historical and behavioral variables, and that if one is not prepared in a historical sense when taken captive, one will not learn the necessary psychological tools for survival during captivity. It is crucial to reinforce this point: The defense mechanisms, and adaptation and coping strategies an hostage will use during captivity are *learned behavior*. The ones used in the past during stressful and crisis situations are the ones that will be used during (and after) the hostage situation. This means negotiators can gather intelligence and predict how hostages will behave. That is one of the reasons that high-risk employers, such as correctional institutions, military, State Department, etc., offer hostage survival training. It is hoped that this training will either develop or reinforce the appropriate adaptation and coping strategies.

Defense mechanisms

Adaptation is the use of different behaviors, responses, and strategies to reduce stress and maximize chances of survival during captivity (Mullins, 1988). To adapt, a person relies on psychological defense mechanisms and coping strategies. Defense mechanisms are those unconscious psychological responses that reduce danger and anxiety during captivity and they are largely a function of a person’s personality.

Typically, during captivity, a hostage relies on one or a combination of several defense mechanisms to withstand the psychological conditions of captivity ([Table 10.1](#)). One beneficial defense mechanism is intellectualization. This is a defense mechanism whereby the hostage removes the emotional components of captivity, and uses reason and logic to understand what is happening, what might happen, and what is likely to happen in the future. Intellectualization enabled the hostage to attempt to ascertain the facts of captivity and not dwell on the fear and dread. One of the best examples of use of intellectualization as a defense mechanism occurred among crewmen of the *USS Pueblo* when it was captured by the North Koreans in 1968. Most crewmen were subjected to severe physical beatings by their captors. Several days into the physical torture sessions, one crewman realized they would soon be released because all of the beatings were designed to show no physical marks or injuries. Once this knowledge was shared, most crewmen had a significant change of attitude, realizing their lives were not in real danger, and the North Koreans were merely engaging in a barbaric form of psychological torture (Bucher & Rascovich, 1970).

Table 10.1 Defense Mechanisms Used by Hostages to Survive Captivity

Beneficial Defense Mechanisms
Intellectualization
Creative Elaboration
Humor
Detrimental Defense Mechanisms
Counter-Phobic Reactions
Denial Reaction
Reaction Formation
Identification

A second beneficial defense mechanism employed by hostages is that of creative elaboration, or the use of fantasy. The use of creative elaboration allows the hostage to psychologically escape the conditions of their captivity, including the brutality and abuse, starvation, torture, and deprivation for short periods and regain a sense of sanity in their world. For example, Melford L. “Gus” Forsman, recounted in a book on the Death Railway (LaForte & Marcello, 1993) that: “I talked to myself all day long. Asked myself questions, counted the bricks and counted the cracks in the bricks, got a fly and pulled his wings off so he couldn’t fly away, and talked to him and played with him. I had an odd cell. It had 437 bricks on one wall and 435 on the opposite wall ... Sometimes I’d try to remember things. I tried to remember a book. I read all the sequences of the book. I tried to remember when I was a kid and studied catechism and was confirmed. I tried to remember mechanics—the parts of a carburetor, what made it work. I just tried to occupy my mind.”

Humor is a third beneficial defense mechanism hostages use. Humor, usually bizarre, helps the hostage escape the psychological realities of captivity and move into a land of his or her own making. The more bizarre the humor, the better escape mechanism it is. Hostage takers are given names befitting caricatures or cartoon figures. Horrors are laughed at in a grisly sort of way. The worst conditions experienced become fodder for a humor that borders on the macabre. Often, the worse the conditions, the greater the humor.

Some hostages attempting to psychologically adapt select inappropriate defense mechanisms— methods that hasten rather than stave off psychological deterioration or death. One of these detrimental defense mechanisms is a counter-phobic reaction. Hostages using this defense mechanism give behavioral responses opposite to basic survival instincts. For example, when threatened by the hostage taker, instead of looking sullen, castigated, and ashamed (necessary behaviors for immediate survival), the hostage may return the threat, argue with, or challenge the captor. This can mean physical abuse or death for the hostage. This detrimental action is not done consciously, but is done as a psychological survival mechanism over which the hostage may have no control. It is a function of personality and prior learning.

A second detrimental defense mechanism is that of denial reaction, or the hostage’s refusing to believe they are really captive. The hostage using this defense mechanism functions as if everything in the world was normal, that they are not subjected and enslaved to a threatening and hostile captor. They continue to attempt to act as they did in the free world. They ignore orders and directives from the hostage taker and attempt to continue whatever course of action they were engaged in when the incident began. In a bank situation,

for example, the customer may tell the hostage taker to get in the back of the line and then try to tell the teller to finish the transaction.

A third detrimental defense mechanism is reaction formation, or the hostage adopting attitudes and beliefs in opposition to their true attitudes and beliefs. Emotional anger becomes mental respect, fear becomes defiance. That is, the hostage might quiver in fear, but would tell their fellow hostages to let the hostage taker “take his best shot.” The use of this defense mechanism can best be summed up by Crayton R. Gordon, who related, “A lot of things were psychological. Like I said before, you know, venting your anger on a dead man. It helped you out. You’d think, ‘The son-of-a-bitch died to get out of this, and now I’ve got to bury him’” (LaForte & Marcello, 1993).

Another detrimental defense mechanism is identification. Hostages who use this defense mechanism are not really becoming psychologically close to their captors, they are more likely using a faulty set of behaviors and perceptions to attempt to survive captivity (see below for more on coping and surviving captivity). In the Japanese prison camps of WWII, there is almost no recorded instance of a U.S. military POW associating with (or even being civil toward) his captors, nor with the neighboring civilian populace, while captive in Japan. Fujita (1993) describes one POW who interacted with the Japanese (virtually the only recorded account of this occurring). This POW, however, was not using identification. He was a traitor who openly worked for the Japanese during the war. He was later tried and convicted for sedition (but later released on appeal). A second example comes from prison hostage-taking incidents in the United States. Ex-hostages do not report using identification during captivity, nor show empathy and concern for their captors afterwards. In fact, the common experience is anger and desire to exact justice or revenge.

Coping mechanisms

In addition to relying on beneficial defense mechanisms to adapt to captivity, hostages also rely on psychological coping mechanisms for survival. Coping is the case in which the hostage uses innovation to continually shift and alter their behavior, adjusting to the situation as it evolves and develops (Mullins, 1988). There are several coping mechanisms practiced by hostages.

First is the psychological strategy of *Relinquishing Control* to one’s captors. Accepting that the hostage taker is totally in charge and adjusting one’s behavior and emotional state accordingly is not a sign of weakness among hostages, but is a coping mechanism of survival. Hostages who attempt to fight their captors, whether physically or psychologically, may be killed for their efforts. Additionally, not relinquishing control makes the psychological ramifications of capture unendurable, in and of themselves, and can result in excessive psychological stress or death. Relinquishing control means physical control as well as mental control. The hostage must control their physical behavior and posture as well as their psychological posture.

Another coping strategy is *Rationalization*. Similar to intellectualization, rationalization is the strategy by which hostages remove the emotional content of captivity and exist purely on rational and logical thought. Even more than intellectualization, however, rationalization requires hostages to completely suppress any emotions concerning their fellow hostages,

friends they have seen killed, and/or families. The hostage must eliminate fear and anxiety, reduce emotions, and take a cognitive look at the circumstances of their captivity, motivations of the hostage taker, and other issues concerning their captivity.

A third coping strategy is *Controlling Emotions*. Hostages who are able to firmly grasp their fear, anger, dismay, emotional turmoil, etc. are hostages who survive their captivity, psychologically and physically. Conversely, hostages who let emotions control them are hostages who do not survive. Natalie Crouter (1980) was a civilian internee of the Japanese in the former Filipino Constabulary Camp Holmes near Baguio during WWII. Taken captive and held for the majority of the war, Natalie wrote in her diary, "The response (to the Commandant's orders) is instantaneous, wholehearted. Far underneath is fear, anxiety, hope, speculation but no waver of intention to support Carl and the committee and the Commandant. Now that we all face facts and a crisis, the tension has begun to ease ... Feeling their black depression which was once ours, I find no hate within me, only a strange sympathy and a recent understanding, a sadness that we all had to meet in the great psychosis of war (1980)." Controlling emotions did not involve denying emotions (rationalization). Emotions were acknowledged but ignored.

A fourth coping strategy is *Creating Diversions*. Physical diversions, such as playing cards and games, reading, and sports—in short, any activity that focused the mind on the activity and off captivity—increases the chances of the hostages surviving. Any diversion a hostage can create benefits him or her, whether the diversion is psychological, as in trying to rebuild an engine in the mind, to physical, such as reading, playing cards, racing bugs or covertly trying to assemble a radio. During the South Moluccan incident, Gerard Vaders and his fellow seatmates on the train wrote a book. Each would write a sentence, pass the book to the hostage next to them, who would write a sentence and pass it to the next person, etc. This diversion helped pass the time, removed them mentally from captivity, and was a mental respite in a time of absolute emptiness.

Role Rehearsal is another coping strategy used successfully by hostages. That is, coping hostages can look beyond their immediate future and try to foresee and predict the future, examine various options concerning what the hostage taker might do, and how they should react to that change. Attempting to predict the future is only a part of role rehearsal, however. A more valuable component, at least as far as survival is concerned, is planning on how to react for future change. Merely knowing that the future will be different is not sufficient, in and of itself. For the coping strategy to be successful, the hostage has to plan how he or she would change their behavior to accommodate that change.

A sixth coping strategy is *Humor*. Much as with the adaptive defense mechanism of humor, this coping strategy turns the negative emotions associated with captivity into a positive emotion, at least temporarily. Humor allows the hostage to temporarily escape from the overwhelming fear and anxiety that is a part of their daily existence. For example, one POW of the Japanese, John W. Wisecup, at Bicycle Camp (West Batavia, Java), Changi (Singapore), Kanchanaburi, and other camps along the Death Railway, drew cartoons (LaForte, Marcello, & Himmel, 1994). Others bet on *benjo* (bathroom) runs by dysentery-affected POWs. In short, anything that could enliven a dreary existence was used by coping POWs.

A seventh beneficial and important coping strategy is *Gathering Information*. In addition to rationalization and other coping mechanisms, coping and surviving hostages will attempt to

gather information on what the future intentions are of the hostage takers, think of future work assignments, food situations, and perhaps most importantly, information concerning what progress is being made by police negotiators. Hostages do not know the length of their captivity, but from gathering information, they can estimate when their release may occur. Also, if negotiations are breaking down and the hostage taker is becoming ever more agitated, they can step in and take over negotiations (a drastic last resort, but one that can save their life).

Maintaining a Daily Routine is an eighth coping strategy that is essential for survival. Establishing and maintaining a personal routine gives hostages an anchor on reality and reduces the surreality of the experience. In many terrorist and POW situations, captors recognize adaptive and coping strategies and try to remove them from the hostages. They may blindfold or separate hostages, move hostages around, take away writing or reading material, refuse to allow showers, etc.

The coping hostage will develop a *Daily Routine*. A daily routine does not have to be elaborate. It may be as simple as standing up at the same time each hour or day. It may just be sleeping at the same time, or taking a bathroom break at the same time. As most readers know from personal experience, days off work can be disconcerting to a small degree because they break one's regular routine. Establishing a routine is one of the best, and simplest, things a hostage can do to restore psychological order to their world.

Religion and Prayer can be important coping strategies to most hostages. The old military saying, "There are no atheists in foxholes," can be retranslated to the hostage experience as, "There are no atheist hostages." Religion provides a concrete pillar for the hostage that eases the fear of captivity. Religion does not necessarily mean the worship of God. Religion can be an enduring faith and belief in the U.S. government, the military, the police or other crisis responders, or in oneself.

The next two coping strategies, *Positive Bonding with other Hostages* and *Forming Relationships with other Hostages*, are interrelated coping strategies. Hostages need, especially in a psychological sense, the assistance and support of their fellow hostages. Gavin Daws (1994) spoke of the immense importance of "tribes" among the various nationalities of POWs in Japanese camps. While tribes were one facet of bonding and relating, the coping strategies were much more than tribal alliances. These coping strategies were rooted in the deep, personal, one-on-one relationships a POW would form with another POW. As went the fate of one, often went the fate of the other. Tribal bonding occurred in groups of two, three, but seldom more than four POWs. Not only did these bonds provide physical comfort and relief, as in the sharing of food, cigarettes, and minor material goods, but the utility of the bonds was in the sharing of the psychological hope of survival. Members of the small peer group bolstered other members in emotional ways that were immeasurable toward ultimate survival. J.L. Guiles (LaForte, Marcello, & Himmel, 1994), interned in Cabanatuan on Luzon in the Philippines, said, "In fact, a buddy and I got together because your chances of survival were much better than it was earlier when it was every man for himself. You needed somebody you could depend on or somebody who could help you." There was a definite strength of survival in small numbers.

Another coping strategy seen among the coping hostages is the strategy of *Cooperation with Captors*. Cooperation does not mean the hostage assists, helps, or provides information to his

or her captors. Cooperation is merely accepting a psychological deference that the hostage taker is in charge. If a hostage taker says “sit,” the hostage sits (not overly or noticeably confrontational).

One of the most intangible, but most important, of all coping strategies is the development of a *Purpose for Survival*. Almost every ex-POW and ex-hostage mentions repeatedly that early in captivity he or she developed a deep, psychological need for survival, although most could not define what it actually was. Paul Papish, a prisoner of the Japanese, related, “About that period was when your thought of survival came in. I felt that in no way was I going to succumb to anything, or no way was I going to let anything get me down. I was going to do the best I could and live the longest I could under the circumstances” (LaForte & Marcello, 1993). Most hostages and POWs who rely on any positive coping skills almost universally include Purpose for Survival as one of the positive coping mechanisms. Although there is no way to establish an exact number, a significant number of POWs of the Japanese died of what is referred to as “nondeliberate death.” That is, these POWs developed no purpose for survival and just simply “gave up living.” Account after account tells of POWs who died of nondeliberate death. In LaForte and Marcello (1993), for example, almost every POW describes fellow POWs who died in this manner. Edward Fung said; “Some men gave up on life. I remember the classic example distinctly. I didn’t believe him at the time. He was a little Dutchman, a native of Holland. He said in 1942 that if he wasn’t free by a certain date in 1943 that he wouldn’t live anyway, and so he killed himself. Now, of course, he had a self-fulfilling prophecy.” Roy M. Offerle related, “They tried everything in the world to save them, but some would quit eating and just give up. They would box them and slap their ears, cuss them, threaten them—everything to try to get them to eat or to make them mad or to give them an incentive to live. But some never gave up, and some would just give up. It was pitiful, but they would do it because we’d been prisoners for so long, and the weather was so bad, and the conditions were so terrible that some of them just didn’t have any will or reason to live. So they just gave up.”

Hostages who do not cope will do the exact opposite of those who cope. The noncoping hostage, for example, does not relinquish control to their captors. They may argue, become belligerent, or even try to give orders or instructions to the hostage taker. They may continue to be emotional for long periods, until eventually the hostage taker becomes angry at their emotional outbursts and harms them. They may refuse to bond with others hostages and remain loners; they may not establish any routines; they do not keep mentally occupied, instead sitting for hours dwelling on the morbidity of their situation; and they do not develop a purpose for survival. They do not believe the police will rescue and save them. Their psychological future is one of doom, gloom, and potentially death.

Survivors and succumbers

Dr. Thomas Strentz, a retired FBI agent and good personal friend of the authors, spent the majority of his career studying hostages and hostage situations and is one of the few recognized experts in this area. He developed a typology of hostages that perfectly describes hostages and summarizes the adaptation and coping strategies employed by hostages. According to the typology developed by Dr. Strentz, hostages can be classified as either

survivors or succumbers (Strentz, 1982, 1984; Strentz & Auerbach, 1988).

Table 10.2 lists the factors employed by both survivors and succumbers. As can be seen in the list, survivors engage in the positive behaviors, emotions, and mental exercises that reduce fear and uncertainty, lessen anxiety, and mitigate many of the horrors of captivity as a hostage. Succumbers, on the other hand, engage almost exclusively in a range of totally inappropriate behaviors that are almost guaranteed to get one killed, either by the hostage taker or, in the event of long captivity, through ignoring internal resources.



PHOTO 10.2 Dr. Thomas Strentz, one of the founders of the FBI Hostage Negotiation team and a recognized authority in the field. Dr. Strentz is also one of the foremost experts in the world on hostage behavior and hostage dynamics.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

Table 10.2 Typology of POW Survivors and Succumbers

Survivors	Succumbers
<div>1. Blends in with other captives</div> <div>2. Does not try to lead</div> <div>3. Contains and hides hatred/disdain</div> <div>4. Avoids religion/political, inflammatory, hostile language</div> <div>5. Concentrates on survival</div> <div>6. Controls outward appearance and emotions</div> <div>7. Projects confidence and self-esteem</div> <div>8. Positive mental attitude and faith in military and country</div> <div>9. Uses fantasy and daydreaming</div> <div>10. Keeps to routines</div> <div>11. Affiliates with other POWs</div> <div>12. Accepts fate and adjusts</div> <div>13. Uses humor and imagery</div>	<div>1. Stands out (too subservient or compliant)</div> <div>2. Wants to lead</div> <div>3. Shows hatred/disdain</div> <div>4. Uses hostile language</div> <div>5. Concentrates on retaliation</div> <div>6. "Bowl of jelly," and raises everyone's attention</div> <div>7. Projects fear and anxiety</div> <div>8. Forgotten by outside world</div> <div>9. Dwells on hopelessness and despair</div> <div>10. Has no routines</div> <div>11. Loners</div> <div>12. Constantly second-guessing</div> <div>13. Dwells on seriousness and morbidity</div>
<div>Developed by Dr. Thomas Strentz from examining hostages in hostage situations. This typology also ideally describes coping used by POWs of the Japanese in World War II.</div>	

As the old saying goes, the “proof is in the pudding.” Supporting evidence for the psychological seriousness of using positive defense mechanism, adaptation strategies, coping mechanisms, and having a “survivor” personality can be seen in the death rates of POWs of

the Japanese. We can ask why so many POWs died in Japanese prison camps as compared to the European prison camps. Certainly, the physical brutality and treatment by the Japanese toward the POWs played a key role. Torture, starvation, duration of captivity, tropical disease rates, inadvertent attacks by Allied military on camps, internment sites, and transport ships, as well as the code of the *bushido*, all played roles in POW death rates. But none of these factors, alone or in combination, played as great a role in POW deaths as did the psychological warfare inflicted upon the POWs by their Japanese captors. The detection and deliberate destruction of POW adaptive and coping strategies, deliberately increasing fear and anxiety over long periods of time, constantly moving the POWs and disrupting POW peer groups, and other psychological manipulations designed purposely to emotionally, mentally, and psychologically destroy the POWs, were categorically the most significant factors in the high POW death rate among all Allied POWs. Adaptive, coping, and survival strategies were systematically removed from the POWs psychological arsenal until there was no hope left.

What Do You Say to a Hostage?

Dr. Tom Strentz is a retired FBI agent who designed, developed and directed the FBI hostage/crisis negotiations program from 1976 until 1985 as the FBI changed its approach to such sieges after being successfully sued for the first time in the infamous Downs vs. US case. He earned his doctorate by taking night classes at Virginia Commonwealth University in Richmond, some fifty miles south of Quantico, for nine years. He has not had a migraine headache since he earned his doctorate. His dissertation focused on hostage survival. His research involved training and supervising hostage role players during several week long pre-Olympic field training exercises, interviewing dozens of former hostages in many countries and participating in the U. S. Navy Survive-Evade-Resist-Escape (SERE) training program where he also interviewed several former POWs. Since his retirement he taught in the Department of State Anti-terrorist Assistance Program at LSU, has written dozens of articles, three books, is the Editor of the California Association of Hostage Negotiators (CAHN) news letter and has been granted honorary lifetime membership in CAHN and the Louisiana Crisis Negotiators Association. He has been a judge at the annual negotiations competition at Southwest Texas State University for many, many years.

What do you say to a naked person? It all depends ... **Introduction**

Introduction

If this side bar was easy to write, others would have done it long ago. However, since I earned my doctorate, at the expense of the FBI, taking flight attendants hostage and training them to deal with the stress of captivity, it seems appropriate that I should comment on this potentially volatile topic and sometimes necessary tactic.

There are several caveats the negotiator must consider and within which he or she should work when communicating with a hostage. These include, but are not limited to:

1. Are there any hostages?
2. Are we really speaking with a hostage?
3. Is the subject listening?
4. Does the hostage want to talk or listen to us?
5. We must not pay too much attention to any hostage.
6. Will the hostage believe what we are saying?
7. Will the hostage tell the subject what we told them?
8. What is the mental or legal status of the hostage?
9. Is the Stockholm syndrome/Identification with Aggressor a factor?

Time

An accurate analysis of hostages to determine if and how a negotiator can and should speak with them takes time. Time is to a hostage negotiator what an anesthetic is to a surgeon. Without its beneficial effects, the most mundane medical maneuver may be fatal. Take the time to identify the hostages before any soothing, specific or intelligence gathering communications are attempted.

They may have been forced to make the physical transition from freedom to fetters more quickly than their minds made the transformation. They may be in a mild or severe state of shock or denial.

Do's

Initial contacts should be limited to reassuring statements that may or may not be accepted or believed. Expect hostility. Expect the hostage to blame you for their plight. Assess their stress level. Their mind set may be that if the police would leave, they would be free. They do not care about our policies. Their needs are understandably very self-centered. They want to live. They do not care that giving in to all the demands of a hostage taker will encourage others. They want to live. They could care less that if allowed to leave their abductor may injure others. They want to live.

Repeatedly acknowledge their plight and fears. Ask them if they have been injured. Assure them that you are doing everything in your power to ensure their safety and the safety of everyone in their location. Say things like, "I can assure you that we are doing everything we can to end this situation as quickly as possible without anyone getting hurt. Are you okay?" Expect anger and blame. It is safer for them you yell at and blame you than focus their anger on the subject.

Contact their families and/or significant others. Bring a representative to the site to gain intelligence on the hostages. Use this person as an initial re-contact for the hostage upon release before your intelligence gathering interview. Say things like, "Through your employer, friends, neighbors, (or whomever you have contacted), we have located your and they are here with us."

Do not lie to the hostage unless you believe that your misrepresentation is in their best interest. Then write down your lie so you and others will remember what was said.

Don'ts

Do not say, "Be calm" or "relax." If this were possible for them to achieve, they would not be in complete control of their senses. They are and should be frightened. They are looking to you for help while harboring the thought that you are the cause of their plight. They may believe that if you would go away they would be free. They are in fear for their lives. They are not particularly concerned with the long range political or legal consequences of allowing a hostage taker to go free. Their goals are short sighted, self serving, and survival oriented---they want out. Now!

Do not attempt to gather intelligence until you are certain that you are speaking to a reliable person. Intelligence from an emotional hostage may be of marginal value or totally wrong. We learned this during the three day B'nai B'rith Siege in Washington, D.C. Your primary concern is to keep them as safe and calm as possible. Prevent them from making a bad situation worse. Do not allow them to become their own worst enemy by aggravating the already frightened and hostile hostage holder. Remember, our primary goal is the preservation of life.

Have a plan

What do you want to achieve by talking with a hostage? Is the subject listening? Is this person a resource for valuable information or should you limit your contacts to reassuring statements?

One way to help identify the veracity of the information one gets from a hostage is to determine if they were targeted or a victim chosen at random. Is there a previous relationship with the hostage taker? If so, the chances are that their information may be reliable.

Who are the hostages?

Is the hostage a police officer from whom you can expect reliable information? Remember Constable Treavor Locke provided Scotland Yard with valuable intelligence during the week long Spring of 1980 Iranian Embassy Siege. He was decorated for his valor by a grateful government.

Are we fortunate enough to have a trained hostage like an airline, bank, or embassy employee upon whom we can rely for information? Conversely, is the hostage a stranger to, and possible adversary of, law enforcement?

A litany of legendary animosity and mis-information

What guarantee do you have that the hostage taker is not listening? During a bank robbery in Las Vegas, the hostage taker took time to listen on an extension during every telephonic conversation the negotiator had with the lone hostage. Fortunately, he asked

her mundane questions and reassured her repeatedly during his conversations.

In a siege at the Travel Lodge in San Diego, the hostage told the subject everything the negotiator said to him.

On a more positive note, the Memphis Police Department was able to gather reliable information from doctors who were held hostage by a deranged father of a former patient. They fully understood the gravity of the situation. They knew that police were doing the best they possibly could. They were intelligent enough to understand that the subject was deranged. They knew the constraints of the police and their own vulnerability.

Conversely, during the Chula Vista, California Redi-Care City Medical Clinic siege in February, 1992, an adolescent male who was a part time law student was an antagonistic hostage. When he finally learned that the hostage taker had killed one person and wounded a police officer, his attitude changed. However, during most of the siege, he was a serious problem for the police and could not be reasoned with or trusted. He later appeared on a TV talk show and recognized the error of his ways and the effect of the Stockholm Syndrome on his behavior.

More positively, during the Sacramento, California Good Guys April, 1991 siege, the sheriff's office negotiator spoke with a store employee who always wanted to be a police officer. They obtained excellent intelligence from him.

However, a few months before, in October, 1990, at Henry's Pub in Berkeley, a male hostage filtered information and did not allow the hostage taker to talk.

Conversely, during a Torrence, California jewelry store robbery that turned into a hostage siege, the adolescent female hostages taunted the police by saying, "Are you cowards? Why don't you come in here," etc.

On a totally different note, the Bank of America in Placentia, California was robbed on New Year's Eve, 1991. The police believed that there were two subjects. One left and was shot and killed at a freeway off ramp traffic jam. Back at the bank, other officers were negotiating with hostages in a situation where they believed the subject left a bomb. In addition to these complications, they ended up negotiating with a person who, though a hostage, was a wanted felon from Florida.

Finally, there is the infamous incident in September of 1973 in Stockholm, Sweden. It has been said that one of the hostages was romantically involved with the subjects, two remained aloof, and a fourth hostage was verbally and physically abused by the subjects.

The Role of the Hostage in the Surrender

Avoid snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. Be sure to prepare the hostage for their role in the surrender scenario. They want to live. They may see the surrender scenario as the end of their nightmare and the realization of their fondest dreams. They must understand that this process, like that of their ordeal, will not happen as quickly as they might wish. To ensure their safety, it will take time. Ease them into the role change from fetters back to freedom. Let them know that they will be searched, questioned, and treated like a subject until they are positively identified. Advise them of other aspects of the surrender process so the tactical team does not startle them. Consider telling them

the name of the police officers who will meet and process them prior to the release to their families. Consider using your mental health assets to ease them back and suggest the scheduling of a post Critical Incident Stress Debrief for them.

Summary

Therefore, every negotiator should remember that when dealing with a hostage one is talking to an unknown commodity. We all know that one negotiates differently with an Antisocial hostage taker versus a person who is suffering from Paranoid Schizophrenia or is the leader of a cult. We listen to the subject, gather intelligence from several sources, make an assessment, and direct our dialogue accordingly. Similarly, each hostage is unique. It takes time to evaluate them. We need intelligence to determine the direction for our dialogue. The primary constant is their need to believe that we understand their plight and are doing our very best to ensure their personal safety. Our goal remains **the preservation of human life**, not the expeditious ending of a siege to save time and money at the expense of a human life.

Post-Traumatic Stress and Hostages

Like negotiators, hostages suffer from the impact of traumatic stress. During the crisis stage of the incident, when they feel that they have no power or control, hostages experience fear, tension, and panic. They try to deny reality (Ochberg, 1979; Strentz, 1987). Their cognitive processing, judgment, and decisionmaking shuts down and they may experience what Symonds (1975) has called frozen fright—fear so intense that they are overwhelmed. They experience a number of the physiological effects of heightened arousal (increased adrenaline), including dry mouth, general gastric distress, rapid heartbeat, cold and clammy hands, numbness, time distortions, irritability, and a decreased sense of social concern.

All of this results from the hostages' sense of having lost control of their lives. They feel a threat to their lives, to their body, to their security, and to their sense of self (Hillman, 1983). They feel as though all their basic needs are in someone else's hands.

As the incident settles down and is more under control, the hostages' sense of emotional arousal diminishes. They move into an adaptation stage of their own. Like the hostage taker, they have to focus on strategies for getting what they want—survival. To do that, they have to be realistic about their situation; they have to control themselves, their behavior, their feelings, and their thoughts; and they have to be subservient without giving in. Most importantly, they have to act in a way that does not draw attention to themselves but at the same time begins to personalize themselves.

Like the victims of other traumas, hostages experience the short-and long-term consequences of having their lives threatened, their freedom restricted, their person demeaned, and their worldview shaken. Research has shown that people who are held hostage for as little as four hours suffer the aftereffects of trauma (Hillman, 1983). Even though they

may not rise to the level of developing post-traumatic stress disorder, it is helpful for people to know what to expect as a result of the aftermath of a life-threatening and powerful event, so that they understand that their reactions, although uncomfortable, are normal.

From research with POWs, the severity of aftereffects of captivity were predicted by severity of captivity, experience of torture, degree of biological and psychological hardship, amount of weight loss, lower precaptivity socioeconomic status, lower military rank, and lack of social supports during captivity (Speed, Engdahl, Schwartz, & Eberly, 1989; Sutker, Bugg & Allain, 1990, 1991; Ursano & Rundell, 1990). If the impact of an incident persists for more than one month, and the following pattern is intense enough to intervene with the hostage's functioning, the problem may very well rise to level of the diagnosable problem of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-IV* (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) defines PTSD as:

1. The incident must be outside the usual range of human experience. (Certainly being held hostage, having one's life threatened, and oneself demeaned is outside the range of most human experience.)
2. It must be such that it would cause distress in most normally functioning people.
3. It must result in increased arousal.
4. It must result in blunting of enthusiasm for life.

The PTSD reaction to captivity affects the total system of the ex-hostage (Eberly & Engdahl, 1991). The aftereffects of captivity have several distinct components that affect daily functioning. There are emotional effects of captivity, cognitive functioning is impaired, behaviors are affected, physical effects are common manifestations of PTSD, and medical conditions can be elicited or exacerbated by the PTSD response. In some ex-hostages, the PTSD reaction involves a positive component as well. While the following discussion of the PTSD reaction is separated into distinct components, realize that the reactions—emotional, cognitive, physical, medical, and positive—are intertwined to produce a total systemic effect. For example, for the ex-hostage who has a great deal of unresolved anger (an emotional effect), this anger will affect cognitive functioning, behaviors, physical symptoms, and extant medical conditions.

Emotional aftereffects

In addition to general degraded psychological functioning (Fairbank, Hansen & Fitterling, 1991) and psychological impairment (Sutker, Winstead, Goist & Malow, 1986), increased general anxiety levels are one emotional aftereffect of captivity (Ursano & Rundell, 1990; Sutker, Allain & Winstead, 1993; Ohry, Solomon, Neria & Waysman, 1994—all research with ex-POWs). The ex-hostage is unable to emotionally relax, remains fearful of the future, and becomes apprehensive, tense, and nervous, experiencing an anxiety-like attack. He or she will shake uncontrollably, experiencing unexplained fear, almost to the point of catatonia. Not only can this anxiety attack occur at unpredictable times, it intensifies when the ex-hostage is confronted with new or unique environments. This general trait anxiety, furthermore, is largely responsible for a heightened state of nervous system arousal (see section on medical

effects).

Anxiety reactions are common. They are characterized by a general feeling of dread and fear for no apparent reason. The reaction is very similar to an anxiety attack, having no associated external stimulus. The person will be going about their normal, everyday routine, and suddenly, out of the blue, will be overcome by an almost paralyzing fear. Anger is an emotional aftereffect experienced by many ex-hostages. Few can find it in themselves to forgive or forget. Ex-hostages may have a deep sense of insecurity after release, rooted in a perception of losing control over their lives. All sense of personal control over one's fate was completely taken away when captured, persisting for the duration of captivity.

There may be a sense of emotional guilt, the ex-hostage believing he or she let others down, did not act admirably or how they should have, and that they were somehow a "failure" for having been taken captive. Phobias and paranoia may be present as a duo of emotional aftereffects that continue to haunt ex-hostages. They may be terrified of change in their life, of the dark, small spaces, etc. They may also display an exaggerated startle response to loud noises or sudden movement. The ex-hostage may experience severe mood swings. They will become highly elated, followed by a deep depression. Emotions will swing, with no apparent reason, between joy and sadness.

One of the most common and serious of the emotional aftereffects is chronic depression. This depression often leads to suicide (Tennant, Goulston & Dent, 1986). A quote from LaForte and Marcello (1993) more than sums up this point: "One ailment rarely spoken of but evident in reasons given for Lost Battalion members' deaths since 1945 is gunshot wounds." The leading causes of death among ex-POWs of the Japanese are accidents, homicide, and suicide (Stenger, 1992). The suicide rate among these ex-POWs is two to five times greater than the national average. Not only have the ex-POWs failed to cope with the trauma of their captivity, the lingering ramifications of that captivity are so great they cannot live with the emotional pain it has caused (Engdahl, Speed, Eberly & Schwartz, 1991). It is worth repeating at this point that these emotional aftereffects often occur in combination and, when taken together, life does not seem worth living with these emotional scars.

Cognitive aftereffects

Closely related to the emotional aftereffects of captivity are the cognitive aftereffects. Many ex-hostages believe they "failed" themselves, co-workers, friends, and family; that somehow they are less of a person for having been taken captive. Because of their experience, they may believe their value as a functioning member of society has been diminished. Self-criticism and second-guessing are fairly common. Statements such as, "If only I had done so-and-so I wouldn't have been captured," are commonly heard. Psychosomatic ailments, diseases, and illnesses may be experienced when there is, in fact, no physical ailment present. Every scratch, cough, tic, twitch, rash, bump, bruise, and hiccup is endemic of a serious, debilitating, and life-threatening illness. A medical examination will reveal nothing wrong, but the ex-hostage refuses to be convinced, believing the doctor is wrong, missed a diagnosis, or does not understand his illness. Consultations among numerous physicians are common. Eventually, without psychological intervention, the psychosomatic ailment can become a real physical illness (e.g., a self-fulfilling prophecy).

Insecurity in one's ability to think and function in the world is another common cognitive aftereffect. The ex-hostage deems him-or herself not as smart, not as good a person, or not as valuable to himself, family, or society as he or she should be. This cognitive insecurity is closely allied with emotional insecurity. In a study of twins (one twin a combat veteran and the other twin a POW), Sutker, Allain, and Johnson (1993) found that the POW twin had deficits in visuospatial analysis and organization, planning ability, impulse control, concept formation, and nonverbal memory, as compared to the non-POW twin.

Behavioral aftereffects

Even as there can be many internal aftereffects, there can also be many external aftereffects. The external aftereffects manifest themselves both behaviorally and physically. Behavioral aftereffects can include social and self-isolation, uncontrollable crying, an increase or decrease in aggression, poor concentration, intrusive thoughts, trouble with authority figures, an increased startle response and alcohol and drug abuse. Although perhaps self-explanatory, several behavioral aftereffects deserve further attention.

Many ex-hostages will manifest emotional aftereffects in behavioral ways. For example, unresolved emotional anger will often result in increased aggression. There need not be any real reason for this aggression: the ex-hostage will suddenly, and for no apparent reason, become aggressive. The ex-hostage will look for situations and locations to express this aggression. He or she may, for example, frequent bars where bar fights are common. He or she may show a propensity toward domestic violence, physically abusing his or her spouse and children. On occasion, the ex-hostage may look for ways to channel this aggression positively. They may choose a career that allows for the expression of this aggression in legitimate ways: joining a military combat unit, becoming a police officer, or working in similar high-risk occupations.

Many ex-hostages have difficulty concentrating for periods of time. They will be engaged in some mental task (reading, studying for an exam, balancing a checkbook, etc.), and will suddenly find themselves with a blank mind. Whatever they have been concentrating on is totally forgotten and cannot be recalled. One component of this lack of ability to concentrate is having intrusive thoughts about captivity. The ex-hostage may have difficulty adjusting to the control of a boss or supervisor. Authority figures remind the ex-hostage of subjugation under a threatening and dangerous person.

An exaggerated startle response is also a common behavioral aftereffect of the hostage experience. Most people are startled by unexpected noises, people entering their visual field, and other surprising external stimuli. Most people, however, merely gasp (or do something else very innocuous) and say, "Oh, you scared me." The ex-hostage may dive behind a piece of furniture or prostrate him-or herself on the ground when startled. The normal response to unexpected stimuli becomes greatly exaggerated and severe.



PHOTO 10.3 Hostage survival is a key element in hostage negotiations. Negotiators have to consciously dedicate their efforts to hostage well-being. Often, negotiators make assumptions about hostages' stress and emotional states while negotiating, believing that if nothing negative is occurring inside an incident, they are okay. It is recommended that negotiators actively try to speak with hostages to guide their behavior and emotions.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

Physical aftereffects

One of the most common physical aftereffects experienced by ex-hostages is sleep disorder. For example, 50 years after the event, almost all ex-POWs of the Japanese still experienced sleep disorders (Peters, Van-Kammen, Van-Kammen & Neylan, 1990). Some cannot sleep an entire night, some sleep much more than they did before captivity, some sleep much less, some can only cat-nap, some require medication to sleep, some do not enter into Stage 4 sleep, and some very seldom engage in REM (Rapid Eye Movement, or dream) sleep. Stage 4 sleep is the deep sleep that immediately precedes REM sleep, that deep sleep necessary for the body to replenish itself, and the stage where the greatest physiological benefits of sleep are derived. REM sleep is necessary for psychological replenishment, because without Stage 4 and REM sleep, neither the mind nor body can be renewed and revitalized. Lack of proper sleep also affects many other PTSD symptoms.

Nightmares are another common experience of ex-hostages. The nightmares include the sights, sounds, smells, tastes, physical pains and emotions of captivity. Many nightmares revolve around a common theme or a specific incident that occurred during captivity. Usually in persons suffering from PTSD, the nightmares fade with time (in both intensity and frequency). These nightmares help integrate the experience into the person's psyche. As the experience becomes integrated, the frequency and intensity of nightmares decrease. Flashbacks are another common physical aftereffect of captivity—sensory remembrances (in an awake state) of the sensory stimuli present during the incident. Flashbacks occur in the absence of other external stimuli, lasting only for a few seconds at most, but are distressing. However, they are not dangerous. In general, flashbacks are associated with the sensory system that has the strongest memory.

Withdrawal from close personal relationships is another aftereffect. The ex-hostage may erect an invisible wall and not allow anyone inside that wall. Post-release friendships and

relationships are superficial. Closely related to this aftereffect is that of sexual difficulties. Sexual relationships are the most personal of all human relationships. To keep people outside of the “wall,” the ex-hostage may not engage in normal sexual practices. Eating disorders may appear. Other physical aftereffects the ex-hostage may experience include constipation, menstrual disorders, weight loss, increased irritability, general somatic complaints, and increased psychophysiological complaints. Again, these aftereffects, in some respects, are normal reactions to the conditions of captivity.

Medical aftereffects

For the vast majority of hostages, there will be no long-term medical affects. For the very few who experience prolonged, severe, and physically abusive captivity (i.e., Iranian Embassy hostages, terrorist hostages, and maybe even prison sieges), medical aftereffects may be an issue. A database on POW captivity shows that, compared to the general population (including combat veterans), POWs have higher incidents of nutritional disorders, neuritis, peripheral nerve damage, eye disorders, gastrointestinal disorders, liver and genito-urinary disorders, diseases of the bones and joints, and heart disease. Additionally, POWs are admitted to hospitals more frequently and stay longer (Hyer, Walker, Swanson & Sperr, 1992). Eberly, Harkness, and Engdahl (1991), in fact, have theorized that many social symptoms of PTSD, such as social isolation and alcohol/drug abuse, may merely be secondary symptoms resulting from a primary symptom of stress-induced biological change. This is an area that needs much more research and clinical examination.

The ordeal of captivity “resets” the nervous system to a higher level of resting potential. As a simplified illustration, if prior to captivity only one in 1,000 neurons randomly fired at any given time during periods of no activity, during captivity 100 in 1,000 neurons fired at any given time during rest periods. The general homeostasis of the entire nervous system is elevated because of the stresses inherent in the hostage situation. The elevation of the nervous system response also leads to corresponding increases in other stress response systems; elevated heart rate and blood pressure, impairment of general cognitive functioning (due to increased random neuronal nervous system activity), decreased digestion, increased stomach acidity and increased liver activity. For years it was believed that once the stress of a situation had passed, nervous system activity returned to precaptivity levels. We now know that such is not the case, that the increased nervous system activity is one effect of PTSD. Left at this elevated state, many debilitating physiological conditions can be elicited or exacerbated by the increased nervous system activity. Heart disease, strokes, arteriosclerosis, liver damage, and ulcers are just a few of the medical conditions than may result from prolonged, elevated nervous system activity.

Positive aftereffects

Along with the litany of negative aftereffects listed above, some ex-hostages have positive changes in their lives. Some, instead of having lowered self-esteem, have heightened self-esteem. They believe themselves to be better people for having suffered and endured under

captivity, and the experience of captivity made them a stronger person. Some enjoy a heightened enjoyment of the world around them. The nearness of death for so long, seeing close friends and comrades die, and realizing just how fragile the human body is, resolved to make them enjoy every second of every day. Others, instead of refusing to allow personal relationships to form, have encouraged as many close, personal and intense relationships as possible. Because of their experience, some ex-hostages have also improved relationships with their families.

Recovery from PTSD and the Role of Negotiators

The role of negotiators is not to be long-term caregivers, counselors, or mental health providers. Negotiators have a responsibility at the scene to provide short-term debriefings for released hostages and then to provide referral information to the ex-hostages. Police officers who work with victims of hostage incidents need to be alert for both long-and short-term symptoms, as well as the symptoms of PTSD. As people who are in positions of authority, they can be of help to the victims. By reassuring them that their reactions are normal during the early days after an incident (i.e., the first four weeks) and by suggesting that people who are experiencing symptoms like those associated with PTSD contact a mental health professional after the first month, police officers can help reduce the “secondary wound” (Symonds, 1975) that many victims experience at the hands of the authorities. Emotional and PTSD debriefings have traditionally been the role of the mental health professional on the team (Bohl, 1997; Hatcher, Mohandie, Turner & Gelles, 1998; Ricketts, 1995). They can certainly be a part of the debriefing, but other members of the negotiating team should also assist in debriefing hostages. Most negotiators have received extensive training in stress, stress management, stress-related issues, and PTSD (Allen, Fraser, & Inwald, 1990) and should put that training to use in debriefing ex-hostages.

Even before the hostages leave the scene, negotiators are in a position to minimize the traumatic impact of the incident. Mullins (1988) has suggested the following guidelines for officers who deal with hostages at the scene:

1. Interview the hostage in comfortable, familiar surroundings.
2. Restore a sense of power to the hostage by allowing him or her to choose the debriefing site.
3. The victim should be given a warm reception.
4. Special attention should be paid to unharmed victims, so they do not feel less important than injured victims.
5. Victims should be warned about the tendency for others to “blame the victim” for their being held hostage.
6. They should be reassured that they acted properly.
7. The police should explain why they took the actions they did.
8. The victim should be allowed to ventilate, if he or she wants.
9. Officers can ask the victims what can be done to help potential hostages prepare for the experience.

10. Victims should be allowed to form a support group among themselves to discuss the incident and debrief one another.
11. The hostages' families should be kept apprised of the reasons for police decisions and the impact of being a hostage and ways of coping with the changes that will result.

Recovery from the severe stress that captivity can cause involves moving through four stages. The first two, *shock/disbelief* and *reality* (or *acceptance*) — occur during captivity. The third, *traumatic depression*, begins after release, and the hostage has to move through it to reach the fourth stage — *recovery* or *resolution*. Negotiators can do several things to assist the ex-hostage in moving through Traumatic Depression and into Recovery. First, allow the person to ventilate emotions and express what happened during captivity. Second, restore a sense of power by allowing them to make small decisions (i.e., “Would you like water or soda?”). This allows the person to regain control of his or her life. Third, keep communications honest and informative. Try to avoid ordering and being authoritative. Fourth, reassure the person that they acted appropriately, that they did what was necessary to survive, and that there is nothing to feel guilty about. Fifth, explain what aftereffects and long-term effects may be experienced. Let the ex-hostage know that any aftereffects experienced are normal, common, and shared by others who have been captive or exposed to extreme stress situations. Sixth, restore a sense of worth and value to the ex-hostage by asking them what can be done to help others in the future. This also allows the person to express negative experiences in a positive manner and put events in a positive context.

Another concern that negotiators need to attend to are anniversary dates. Anniversary dates are significant dates from their captivity such as day captured, day released, loved ones' birthdays missed, holidays, etc. On these days, there is likely to be an increase in the impact of negative aftereffects. Although transitory in nature, the person may feel overwhelmed by the negative effects and that he or she is regressing back into the “PTSD cyclone.” Part of the rise in stress on anniversary dates comes from a sense of having been forgotten. The incident is over, people have gone home, the world has moved on, and other events have supplanted the hostages' experience. Being in the limelight for a short period and then being forgotten is stressful and distressing. A short contact with the person as an anniversary date approaches can help ward off an increase in levels of negative aftereffects and help the person to understand and prepare for what might occur. It also tells the person they are important, have not been forgotten, and that their experience was an important event.

Summary

The third leg of the crisis incident triad involves hostages. Negotiators and tactical officers receive training, experience and practice in dealing with hostage situations. Hostages do not (nor should they). As a result, the emotional, psychological and cognitive effects of crisis incidents have the greatest impact on hostages. Unfortunately, the least consideration is given to hostages. Knowing what occurs to people taken hostage, how they act inside the situation, what they are experiencing (physically and psychologically), and what they may or may not do are crucial to our ability to resolve these incidents. It is unfortunate that many negotiators,

as soon as a situation is resolved, pack up and leave, paying little or no attention to hostages. As negotiators, we have a responsibility to interview, debrief, and provide long-term resources to ex-hostages. What we do as negotiators in regard to hostages can increase the probability of success in negotiating crisis incidents. We can also turn a potential enemy into an ally by paying more attention to hostages. Many hostages do not experience the Stockholm Syndrome. Any negative emotions or feelings toward response elements are generally caused by a sense of being neglected and ignored by response elements.

In addition, hostages can teach us a great deal about negotiating hostage-taking situations. Unfortunately, we have historically overlooked this source of data and have neglected to conduct extensive post-incident interviews with released hostages. By collecting data, conducting in-depth interviews, analyzing the hostage experience, and disseminating the data, we become better negotiators.

Note

¹ For completeness, some of the material in this section is repeated from Chapter 1.

Discussion Questions

1. If you know a former prisoner of war, or know someone who knows a former prisoner of war, interview him or her about his or her experiences. Include as part of the interview any long-term effects they may be experiencing. You may have to prompt them by listing some long-term effects.
2. If possible, interview someone who has experienced a traumatic incident (i.e., car accident, burglarized home). Conduct an emotional debriefing with that person. Do you notice any symptoms common to people who experience PTSD?
3. If possible, emotionally debrief a police officer who has recently been in a traumatic incident. Are they in the recovery stage? If they are in the traumatic depression stage, what could you say to get them moving toward the recovery stage?
4. What differences would you expect in civilians, correctional officers, police officers, or military personnel who were taken hostage? Who might be the best hostage? Worst hostage?
5. What types of emotional debriefing differences do you believe there would be for police and prison officials following a hostage incident?
6. Design a training program for schoolteachers on how to act if taken hostage. What suggestions could you include for how to handle their students while in the hostage situation?
7. What types of training do you believe could be given to negotiators to minimize the emotions of a situation, especially one that has a negative outcome?

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Chapter 11

Crisis Management: Managing Stress and Trauma

Chapter Outline

Definitions of stress

Transactional model for negotiators

Demands

Perception of abilities

Coping and 'feed forward'

Feedback

Yerkes-Dodson law

Effects of stress

Stress in the hostage situation

Stress on the hostage taker

Stress on the hostages

Stress on the negotiator

Stress management

Post-incident debriefing

Operational debriefing of hostage incidents

Critical decision debriefing: A methodology for debriefing crisis intervention

Emotional debriefing

Emotional impact on the negotiator

Debriefing negotiators

Stages of a trauma

Goals of debriefing

Debriefing the impact

Note

References

Learning Objectives

1. Define stress.
2. Understand the transactional model of stress and how it applies to hostage situations.
3. Know how different personality types are affected by stress.

4. Understand how people cope with stress.
5. Know the Yerkes-Dodson Law and how stress relates to performance.
6. Understand how stress affects people physiologically, behaviorally, emotionally, and cognitively.
7. Understand how stress affects the different participants in a hostage situation.
8. Understand how to reduce stress on all participants in a hostage situation.
9. Understand specific stress mediation techniques.
10. Understand the purpose of conducting an operational debriefing.
11. Understand the value of maintaining a standard record of information like HOBAS in debriefing an incident.
12. Understand how to conduct a debriefing using the critical decision point method.
13. Understand the purpose of conducting an emotional debriefing.
14. Understand how to conduct an emotional debriefing.
15. Understand the basics of a critical incident debriefing.
16. Understand the reasons that therapies that have been shown effective in intervening in ASD and PTSD may be more effective than an emotional debriefing.

A teacher saw the actor enter the school carrying a long rifle and called 911. Patrol officers responded within 2 minutes and rushed inside the school. The responding officers had received training in responding to active shooter situations and raced to confront the potential shooter. They saw the actor just as he entered a classroom and began firing. Upon engagement, the actor turned and fired at officers, striking and killing one. The actor then ran to another room in the school and barricaded himself inside.

CRT responded within 20 minutes, established a tactical plan and prepared to negotiate. The injured officer was rushed to the hospital where he died. Negotiators attempted to contact the actor and were initially unsuccessful. Tactical reported that in the classroom where the actor first entered, two students were shot, both with non-life threatening wounds. The actor ran into a lounge with three adult teachers. Negotiators called the lounge and after 10 minutes the actor answered the phone. He began screaming incoherently, telling negotiators he was on a mission ordered by his handlers on Alpha Centauri. He threatened to kill his three hostages.

Negotiators maintained communications, employing a wide range of active listening skills, refocusing the actor on describing his boss, deflecting every time he mentioned hostages, and using other communication skills designed to calm him and divert his attention from the hostages. The actor continued to be highly emotional and talk about how his "bosses" and "handlers" from Centauri were going to take him to their planet and give him eternal life in exchange for the lives of five earthlings. He told negotiators he believed he already got two (one in the classroom and one police officer). Negotiators told him he had actually reached his quota. Three students and two police officers had been killed. The actor accused the negotiator of lying, that he had only fired twice into the classroom and had missed one of the officers. The negotiator countered that he must have remembered wrong, given the excitement of everything happening at the time.

Negotiators appeared to have the actor calmed down, when he started yelling that his "handlers" were coming and he had to finish. He slammed the phone down and negotiators heard two gunshots. Tactical immediately breached the door and killed the actor. One teacher in the lounge had been seriously wounded by gunfire (she ultimately survived).

After the incident, negotiators conducted an emotional debriefing led by the mental health consultant on their team. Several days later, negotiators were still bothered by the incident, reporting they were having trouble sleeping, intrusive thoughts, and trouble concentrating in their jobs. The mental health consultant called in another professional to conduct an additional emotional debriefing (including the tactical team). Although this briefing did help, two negotiators ended up dropping off the team and one quit the department.

The incident above illustrates the impact of stress on the people who are involved in hostage incidents. All personnel were stressed because of the intense nature of the incident, because students had been shot, and because a police officer had been killed. The hostages were stressed because of the threat to their life. The actor was stressed because of his belief in the "handlers" watching and instructing him. Negotiators were stressed because the actor would not calm down and engage in rational discussion, because of the constant threats the actor made to the hostages, and because the incident ended with a tactical resolution after one

hostage had been injured. After the incident, most negotiators reported they believed they had “failed,” and that is why a hostage was wounded and the actor killed. IC was stressed because an officer was killed, children were injured and put at risk, hostages were put at risk of death, and the incident (on the scene were police administration, parents, and media) was such a high profile event. Clearly, stress can instigate and complicate a hostage incident. Negotiators should understand stress and recognize its impact, so they can better control it, minimizing unwanted effects.

Definitions of Stress

Hans Selye (1956), the father of stress research, defined stress as ‘the nonspecific (physiological) response of the body to any demand made on it.’ His Definition focuses on what happens inside people as they respond to any situation (demand). Cox (1979) pointed out that there are three ideas built into Selye’s Definition of stress:

1. A person’s response does not depend on the nature of the demand. It is a defensive reaction. The physiological response (i.e., increased heart rate, blood pressure elevation, adrenaline release into the system, etc.) appears in any situation that is stressful, is automatic and is designed to protect and preserve the person’s integrity as an organism.
2. The defense reaction progresses through three stages: the alarm reaction, in which the body shows arousal to the threat. It is energized and its resistance is reduced; the resistance stage, in which the body’s reaction stabilizes and the person copes with the higher levels of arousal through a series of learned coping skills; and the exhaustion stage, in which the person’s body has used all the energy it has available for adaptation and shuts down.
3. If these defense states are prolonged, diseases develop that are the result of overextending the energy available to the organism. Everly (1989) points out that chronic stress results in psychological as well as physical problems.

Selye’s ideas are limited as there is evidence that both the type and the intensity of the physiological response depends on the nature of the stressor (some physical conditions, such as excess heat and cold, lead to different responses) and the person’s interpretation of the situation’s meaning. Cox and Mackay (1976) developed the Transactional Model of Stress, in which the person’s environment, assessment of their abilities, plans for dealing with demands, and the feedback received about the effectiveness of those plans determine the amount of stress experienced. The elements in the Transactional Model are:

1. Demands—A request or requirement for physical or mental action. It involves the perception of how much time is available to meet a demand.
2. Perception—The perception of an imbalance between the demands people see and their perceived ability to deal with those demands. The person’s appraisal of this situation creates greater or lesser stress.

3. Coping—The physiological, behavioral, and cognitive changes people go through in an effort to deal with demands. The physiological arousal people experience is the arousal Selye described as stress. Changes in behavior and thinking are part of coping.
4. “Feed forward”—In every effort to cope with demands there is a quick assessment of the anticipated outcome of the considered solution. The expectation of success guides the selection of one option out of all the possibilities. If people expect their attempts at coping to be ineffective, their stress increases. If they expect them to be effective, their stress decreases.
5. Feedback—information about how effective coping is or is perceived to be. If a person’s attempts at solving problems are effective or ineffective, their stress level will decrease or increase respectively.

Transactional Model for Negotiators

Demands

In hostage situations there are different demands and different perceptions about the time available depending on both the stage of the negotiation and the role a person is playing. During the crisis stage, the hostage taker probably thinks the police are going to assault in the near future. The hostages may have the same perception, along with the perception that the hostage taker may hurt or kill them. The negotiators know the police are going to contain the situation and negotiate. The stress experienced by the hostage taker will be based on the perception that he has the ability to hurt or kill the hostages, police officers, or bystanders. He will not feel directly threatened but he may be aware that there is the potential for violence. The stress experienced by the hostages may be greater than that experienced by both the hostage taker and the police. The negotiator needs to keep these differences in mind. They help explain the hostages’ sometimes angry response to the negotiators and highlight the importance of reassuring and defusing both the hostage taker and the hostages.




PHOTO 11.1 Even with the support of a team, negotiation is stressful. All team members, regardless of role, experience individual stress because of the responsibilities that are on their shoulders.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

As the incident moves from the crisis stage to the accommodation stage, everyone's perception of the situation changes. The hostage taker's fears of an assault are reduced. He will believe that taking hostages has worked for him, in the sense that he is not in immediate danger as long as he has his hostages. His stress decreases. However, the value of the hostages goes up. That leads to reactions like, "Man, you must be crazy if you expect me to give those guys up; they are the only thing keeping me alive," when negotiators ask hostage takers to let their hostages go. Additionally, with time, a "closing in" effect may elevate the hostage taker's stress level. His perception is that the tactical team is physically and psychologically moving in closer to him and preparing to take tactical action against him.

The hostages begin to see the hostage taker as less threatening and the police as more threatening. Their stress level begins to decrease but their attachment to the hostage taker begins to increase. The Stockholm Syndrome may develop with the hostage's perception that the hostage taker is less dangerous than the police.

The police may begin to see the situation as stabilizing. Stress levels will decrease and the potential for violence will be reduced. The stress on the negotiators will lessen and they will be able to focus on persuading the hostage taker that better alternatives exist.

Perception of abilities

A person's appraisal of his or her ability to meet demands will depend on personality, training, experience, and the role he or she plays in a hostage drama. Everly (1989) has pointed out that a person's personality is important in both his perception of demands that are stressful and on the coping strategies the person uses to deal with those demands. Following Millon's Personality Theory, he suggests that there are basic personality styles that are sensitive to different demands: (1) the Histrionic Personality, (2) the Schizoid Personality, (3) the Compulsive Personality, (4) the Avoidant Personality, (5) the Dependent Personality, (6) the Narcissistic Personality, and (7) the Aggressive Personality. Each is discussed more fully in [Chapter 10](#), Hostage Dynamics, and the reader is referred to that chapter.

Hostage takers assess their ability to survive in different ways according to their personalities. For instance, the dependent hostage taker who has paired up with an antisocial person believes that he has to depend on this partner for survival. The antisocial hostage taker will believe that he can depend on threats and force to intimidate the authorities in the same way he has learned to intimidate others in his life. However, he will be extremely sensitive to any sign that he is losing control of the situation, while the dependent personality will be less threatened by the loss of control.

Hostages evaluate their abilities based on their personality, too. If they tend to be histrionic, they are likely to react to the threat the hostage taker poses in a dramatic and emotional way. They will feel threatened by the hostage taker's aggression and his lack of caring. Hostages who have a more aggressive personality structure may put themselves and others at risk by

being too confrontational with the hostage taker. They will react to the perceived loss of control, and whether the hostage taker cares for them will never be a question. Negotiators should know something about the hostages' motivation because that helps them predict and control the hostages' behavior.

Coping and “feed forward”

The ability to cope with problems results from personality style, temperament, and coping skills. Coping skills are a function of experience and training. An experienced and trained negotiation team will have developed better ways of dealing with incidents than the hostage taker or the hostages. They will have thought about and planned for more of the problems that arise during an incident than the hostage taker or hostages. They will have more options and will experience less stress. This is one reason training is important. Training helps develop skills in managing a variety of situations. It is also one of the reasons a negotiating team is more effective than a single negotiator and a single hostage taker. More ideas will be available for meeting the demands of a hostage situation.

Hostage takers' ability to cope with a hostage incident also will depend on their experience and training. With the exception of terrorists who have planned and practiced their actions, most hostage takers have never been in a hostage incident before. Therefore, they do not have experience or training on which to draw. Their stress levels will be high. They will search their memories for similar situations and pick the responses they think have the greatest chance of getting them what they want (Glasser, 1984). Their ability to predict what will happen is somewhat impaired by their stress. This is why the military, prisons, some businesses, and some school districts train their personnel in how to act if taken hostage. The training reduces their stress if they are taken hostage and improves their ability to cope.

Hostages will go through the same process. They will search their memory for situations that are close to the hostage situation or situations that have been stressful in the past. They will be looking for guides to how they should respond. Failing to find identical incidents, they will respond using the behavior, thoughts, and feelings that have been most successful for them in the past when they were stressed. If they have a wide range of experiences, they will have a great number of coping skills on which to draw. They will feel less stress than people who have fewer experiences. Some people have virtually no training or experience on which to draw. They experience excessive stress and generally freeze up because they can see no way of surviving.

If hostages recognize that their usual style of behaving will be counterproductive, they will have to look for other responses. This will increase their stress. For instance, the normally aggressive type of person may see that confrontation and aggression is likely to get him killed. He will have to find different ways of dealing with the situation. This generates more stress. Like a driver who is stepping on the brake and the accelerator of the car at the same time, energy is building up. Eventually, the brakes will fail or the engine will quit. Negotiators need to assess the hostages' styles and suggest stress management skills to the hostages when they can.

Feedback

If the feedback that people receive about the effectiveness of their plan is positive, the problem is solved and they move on to another problem. If the feedback is negative, they go to the beginning of the process and start over. When demanding release and threatening the hostages does not work, hostage takers have to reevaluate. They still have their needs to survive and to be in control. However, their perception of their ability to achieve these ends is changed when their demands are not met right away. They may experience additional frustration and stress. The negotiator may need to defuse them, again. They will go to their second-best solution or they may increase the intensity of their demands. The negotiator needs to defuse and play for time. After several cycles through this process, the hostage taker will run out of ideas. Then the negotiator can begin to suggest alternatives. Being a source of solutions will make the negotiator valuable to the hostage taker because he will be seen as a stress reducer.

Yerkes-Dodson Law

While one task of the negotiator is to reduce stress, the negotiator should not totally eliminate stress. Stress is needed to function in the world. The negotiator's task is to monitor the stress of the hostage taker and hostages and to control their stress. For negotiators, one important area in stress psychology is the Yerkes-Dodson Law. Established in 1908 (Yerkes & Dodson, 1980), the Yerkes-Dodson Law relates stress to performance. As shown in [Figure 11.1](#), if stress is either too low or too high, performance suffers significantly. When stress is moderate, performance reaches its peak. In hostage situations, stress levels will be at the upper end of the continuum, not the lower end. The job of the negotiator is to keep stress levels (hostage taker and hostages) at a moderate level so the hostage taker's performance is maximized and hostages do not become overly emotional and act irrationally. Thus, the stress levels of the negotiator and other team members must be kept at moderate levels so they can perform most effectively.

Several points about this relationship are important to negotiations. First, at the lower end of the continuum, creativity and problem-solving are the most efficient. Second, at moderate levels of stress, physical performance is most efficient. Third, at the highest levels, problem-solving and performance deteriorate quickly (Hart, 1991).

If the negotiators want either themselves or the hostage taker to come up with new ideas, they need to reduce the stress levels as much as possible. For instance, before starting to negotiate or between contacts with the hostage taker, negotiators may need to analyze and integrate new intelligence information into their strategy and tactics. To do this, they need to be relaxed and able to explore the new data's meaning. Similarly, if they want to problem-solve, they need to be at a low level of stress. By using deep-breathing exercises or another stress management technique just before either of these activities, they will maximize creative problem-solving.




FIGURE 11.1 The relationship between stress and performance characterized by the Yerkes-Dodson law.

Source: W. Mullins

If negotiators are in the process of communicating with the hostage taker, a moderate level of stress is necessary. Without it, negotiators will not stay focused and responsive to the situation. However, high levels of stress will interfere with negotiators' performance. They need to monitor their stress levels and maintain the appropriate level for their goals in negotiations. If negotiators want the hostage taker to consider new ideas that they present directly to him, they should present the ideas to him when he is the calmest. A good idea is to assign one person the task of monitoring stress levels because the person who is stressed is usually a poor observer of his or her own behavior. Usually, an outside observer recognizes the need for relaxation.

Effects of Stress

Primarily, the negotiator and others involved in the hostage situation will have elevated stress levels due to the stress of the situation, or stress that is usually referred to as acute stress (stress produced by the temporary situation). It may be the case, however, that part of the stress is the result of chronic conditions. The impact on the behavior, feelings, and thinking of people involved in crisis are the acute effects. Stress-related diseases and psychological problems are chronic effects. Negotiators need to stay alert to the signs of acute and chronic stress in themselves and their team mates, both during and after high conflict incidents. In addition to causing various illnesses in the long term, stress can lead to severe depression and suicide. While the data on police suicide rates is conflicting, what is clear is that police suicides are related to stress in the officer's life. D'Angelo (1999) reported that the factors related to police suicide include interpersonal and relationship problems, depression and use of

alcohol/drugs, police corruption and misconduct, isolation and alienation, exposure to human misery, overbearing police bureaucracy, inconsistencies in the criminal justice system, lack of control over working conditions, social strains, physical illness, and impending retirement. Violanti (1995), one of the leading researchers into police suicide, reported that the greatest cause of police suicide is isolation; that they have no one to turn to for confidential help dealing with stress and emotional upsets. Also, Blatt (1999) reported a relationship between perfectionism and high achievement motivation to increased suicide, two attributes that have been found in abundance among negotiators.

Negotiators must deal with a lot of information at once, coming from different directions. Stress can interfere with the ability to process that information and use it to peacefully resolve the incident.

Cox (1979) has summarized the physical, behavioral, emotional, and cognitive impact of stress.

1. *Physiological.* People under stress experience increased levels of blood sugar, catecholamines (neurotransmitter that serves, in part, to control emotional behavior), and corticosteroids (type of steroid produced by the adrenal glands that is related to emotional states. As corticosteroid levels rise, there is a rise in object loss, helplessness, depression, and a rise in aggression). There is an increase in heart rate, blood pressure, and sweating. Pupils dilate and breathing becomes difficult.
2. *Behavioral.* Acute stress leads to accident proneness, an increase or decrease in appetite, increased smoking and drinking, impulsivity, and excitability.
3. *Emotional.* People under stress experience anxiety, increased aggressiveness, boredom, fatigue, frustration, moodiness, irritability, tension, and loneliness.
4. *Cognitive.* People under stress find that their ability to concentrate and to make decisions is impaired, that they become hypersensitive to criticism, and that they are forgetful and experience mental blocks. They tend to function out of habit rather than reason. Everly (1989) points out that acute stress may lead to diagnosable psychological syndromes, including reactive psychosis, post-traumatic stress disorder, adjustment disorders, anxiety disorders, affective disorders, and some forms of schizophrenia.

Negotiators may be subject to all of these effects. They need to be particularly aware of the ability of stress to impair judgment and decisionmaking, rendering people more irritable, impulsive, and hypersensitive to criticism. All of these effects interfere with the functioning of the hostage taker, as well as the functioning of the negotiator.

[Stress in the hostage situation](#)

Stress affects everyone associated with a hostage situation. Hostage takers, hostages, police response units, bystanders, and acquaintances of hostages and hostage takers are all affected by stress. Physically, adrenaline is dumped into the system and body functions are on full alert. Emotions, anxiety, and fear are elevated. Thoughts are disrupted and interrupted by the stress of the situation, rationality is decreased, decisionmaking is impaired, and impulsive acts

may increase.

Stress on the hostage taker

For the hostage taker, the situation itself produces a great deal of stress. Whether criminal, mentally disturbed, domestic, or terrorist, the hostage taker began the incident with a stressful act, but one over which he had control. In the domestic situation, for example, a disgruntled or estranged spouse makes a decision to regain control of his family or take his estranged children. He conducts some minimal planning and carries out that plan. All of a sudden, there is no plan and the situation has gotten out of his control. The situation has become highly emotionally charged, is beyond his control, and is one he has never experienced before. This newness and uniqueness adds situational stress.

The hostage taker faces an unknown future. To him, there is no positive outcome. Like an animal backed into a corner, fangs bared, he sees no safe way out. In this situation, the stress and uncertainty may overwhelm him and he may become unpredictable. In the chapter's opening scenario, the hostage takers initially engaged in their actions because of the stress of overcrowding. Once the incident began, the stress on the hostage takers exacerbated their situation, resulting in the injury and attacks on the hostages. The prisoner hostage takers engaged in unpredictable behavior.

Situational stress is also produced by having hostages. The hostage taker is now responsible for one or more people. He must use them for his safety and security. He must attempt to formulate a plan for escape, while at the same time watch over a group of people who do not want to be captive. At least perceptually, these people pose as much of a threat to him as he does to them. He must protect himself by using force to restrict their movement, he must provide for their needs, and he must deal with their emotions. The hostages may initially be fearful, confused, and disobedient. The hostage taker does not know how to deal with their behavior. All of these factors elevate stress levels of the hostage taker.

If the hostage taker is forced to harm or kill a hostage, stress will be elevated further. Now the hostage taker is confronted with the reality of having committed a serious crime. He has to deal with the injury or death, as well as with the reactions of the hostages. His situation has become more hopeless, at least in his mind.

If there are multiple hostage takers, an added source of stress is the dynamics among hostage takers. One hostage taker may want to leave, regardless of the consequences. Another may want to kill all the hostages. Another may want to "shoot it out" with the police. There may be conflict about who is to be the leader, who is to talk to the police, who is to guard hostages, etc. This tension may produce anger and frustration. The arguing and bickering among the hostage takers will add to the stress inherent in the situation.

Another source of stress on the hostage taker is the presence of the police. To the hostage taker, the police signify only one outcome: something negative. The police mean imprisonment, injury, or death. Seeing police officers with guns pointed his way elevates the hostage taker's stress level. The police also mean continued confinement and loss of immediate freedom. The police produce uncertainty. What are they going to do? Are they sneaking up right this minute? Are they going to assault and kill me? What about after the incident? All of these questions imply uncertainty and increase stress. Even talking to a police

negotiator produces stress. In the opening incident, in addition to the presence of the tactical and negotiation teams, the prisoners knew that some of their hostages were related to prison officials. This only served to further elevate stress levels.

The hostage situation produces a threat to the basic needs of the hostage taker. Needs of security, safety, social acceptance, and love are all at risk in the hostage situation. The most basic need of survival is threatened by the inherently violent nature of the situation and the police response. Needs for food, drink, sleep, etc. are all affected by the situation. With time, these needs become predominant and are unfulfilled. The lack of fulfillment increases stress and anxiety. Social needs are threatened. Nobody likes the hostage taker: not the hostages, and certainly not the police. The world is against him. Even loved ones may turn against him. Family and friends may attempt to convince him to surrender. The hostage taker sees this as a betrayal and further deepens his “me against the world” perceptions. This loneliness increases stress.

Stress affects the hostage taker’s decision-making skills. Stress elevates emotions, speeds physiological processes, and interferes with cognitive processing. The ability to make decisions is hindered or eliminated. The uniqueness of the situation, guarding a group of strangers, and having the guns of the police pointed at him all work together to impair decisionmaking. The hostage taker does not have time to think with all the competing demands on his system. Not being able to think, in and of itself, increases stress.

As the situation progresses, the number of decisions that needs to be made increases. This increases the demands on the system, thereby increasing stress. The need to fulfill need states interferes with decision-making ability. Hunger, fatigue, and other needs all combine to wear down the hostage taker and deteriorate decisionmaking. This leads to more frustration, which worsens decision-making skills further. This cycle repeats time and again, each time increasing stress, frustration, anxiety, and anger.

With time, the negotiator can reduce stress, calm the hostage taker, improve decision-making skills, and fulfill most need states. The hostage taker feels better and works to resolve the incident. The hostage taker finally decides to surrender. Suddenly, stress levels are back to where they were initially, with all the associated problems. The hostage taker is faced with uncertainty, his world is no longer static, he is going to give himself to the police, and fear increases. Because of the stressors on the hostage taker, the resolution phase is as dangerous as the crisis stage of a hostage situation. Emotions are high and reasoning ability is impaired.

Stress on the hostages

The hostages are under a great deal of stress. At the onset, the hostages are confronted with loss of life, serious injury, loss of freedom, and loss of self-respect. The hostages are dealing with a person threatening to harm or kill them. They are panicky, anxious, uncertain, and fearful (Oots & Wiegele, 1985). They may feel overwhelming helplessness, existential fear, and sensory input overload (Hillman, 1981). Some may have been injured or killed, which adds to the survivors’ stress. The hostages see themselves as victims of circumstance. They were going about their normal, everyday activities in an orderly world. All at once, the order of their lives has disappeared and they are facing an uncertain, and possibly short, future. More importantly, they are in a situation in which their actions, thoughts, and emotions are being

controlled by someone else.

The stress confronting the hostages produces a physical arousal. This physical arousal is likely greater for the hostages than for other participants in the situation. Hostages will experience an increase in blood pressure, heart rate, neural interference, and may experience loss of muscular control (Gilmartin & Gibson, 1985). They may lose bladder control, faint, vomit, or even have heart failure, hemorrhage, or stroke. The hostage may hyperventilate or experience an asthma-like attack. The stress of the hostage situation may cause an onset of any medical condition of the hostage (Nudell & Antokol, 1990). Diabetes, migraine headaches, gastrointestinal disorders, and other illnesses may appear. The stress may be so great, in fact, that some of the hostages may hallucinate (Lanza, 1986). Siegel (1984) reported that almost 25 percent of hostages may hallucinate. These hallucinations include sensitivity to light, difficulty in visual focusing, disorientation, preoccupation with body imagery, dissociation, geometric patterns, tunnel vision, tactile-kinesthetic hallucinations, and auditory hallucinations.

The hostages are stressed by their loss of self-respect. They perceive themselves as “bad” people because they are hostages. Their families and friends might think less of them because they allowed themselves to be taken hostage. Their perception of how others think of them may produce more stress than the situation. The hostages may feel guilty because they got taken hostage to begin with (“why didn’t I do something to get away from here?” “what did I do to deserve this?”) or because they did not do something to resolve the incident (physically fight the hostage taker or reason with him). Many former prisoners of war believe they “let down their country” by being captured or not escaping captivity. Many hostages feel the same way.

As the situation progresses, the initial stress dissipates and the hostages calm down and begin dealing with the situation. After a period of time, stress begins to increase as basic needs are not met. The presence of the police produces stress. The hostage does not know how or if the police can differentiate them from the hostage taker and thus are as much a threat to life as is the hostage taker.

The resolution phase produces a threat to hostages. By the resolution phase, the hostages have settled into a routine and become familiar with their situation. The resolution produces uncertainty and anxiety. They realize the hostage taker may become irrational and let his fear overcome his ability to act in a rational manner. As they are released, the hostages are treated as criminals by the police.

In domestic situations, there is a special stress on the hostage/spouse. The hostage knows the hostage taker intimately and knows what the hostage taker is capable of. Additionally, the spouse/hostage feels some responsibility to assist the hostage taker to resolve the incident successfully (i.e., not only get out of the situation alive, but also to not go to jail). In these situations, the hostage feels a responsibility to assist in resolving the incident as well as the stress produced regarding his or her own survival.

In prisons, hostages also have the additional stressors of knowing their captors. Unlike the domestic situation, however, the hostages are aware of the violence their captors are capable of. Often, people are injured before they become hostages. All the hostages know that if the authorities do not fulfill demands and resolve the situation, the hostage takers will injure or kill the hostages. The hostages know the hostage takers hate the hostages and would, in some cases, be glad to harm the hostages. In jail and prison situations, the nature of the relationship

between the hostages and hostage takers in and of itself significantly increases stress on the hostages.

Stress on the negotiator

The police are under a great deal of stress. The police, in fact, may be under more stress than the hostage taker. The negotiators know they are talking to a person who may kill people. The negotiator is faced with role ambiguity. He is expected to uphold the law, arrest criminals, and protect the public. As a negotiator, he is expected to be able to talk with and become friendly with a criminal. He must set aside his values and beliefs and operate from a different belief structure. There is an associated role conflict for negotiators. Instead of arresting and jailing a criminal, the negotiator is negotiating for the freedom (perceptually) of the hostage taker. The negotiator is not a police officer “cleaning the streets”—the negotiator is talking and compromising with the criminal. The hostage negotiator is dealing with someone who does not recognize the authority of the negotiator. The negotiator is accustomed to having people obey his or her commands. The hostage taker not only rejects the negotiator’s commands, but may give orders to the negotiator, a situation not familiar to a police officer.



PHOTO 11.2 At the Hostage Negotiator Competition held at Texas State University – San Marcos, TX, stress is magnified in a training scenario because expert and experienced negotiators are watching and evaluating a team’s performance. Over the years, many teams have reported the stress at the competition is greater than that at a real incident.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

The negotiator realizes that every word said, every action taken, and every decision made may cost lives. The negotiator is in a critical role and literally holds the lives of others in his or her hands. One mistake, one miscue, one poor decision may cost lives: of the hostage taker, the hostages, or police officers. This fear can significantly increase stress. The negotiator may even go into denial (“this cannot be happening to me,” Bohl, 1992b). To make matters worse, the negotiator must internalize these feelings. The negotiator cannot let the fear show, either to fellow officers or the hostage taker. Containing and hiding these emotions further increase stress.

The physical dynamics of the situation produces stress. The performance of the negotiator is constantly being monitored and evaluated. A move cannot be made without someone

watching. The negotiator is confined in a small space for long periods and is attempting to converse with someone who may not even be listening. Basic needs may have to go unfulfilled because he or she cannot leave the telephone. The negotiator becomes fatigued, hungry, sore, and cramped.

Stress on the negotiator comes from other police officials at the incident (Davidson, 1981). Other negotiators may want them to take a different approach, or offer suggestions. The tactical team may want to assault or snipe the hostage taker. The commander may pressure the negotiator to hurry and end the situation for a variety of reasons. The patrol commander may want a quick resolution to the incident so that patrol officers may return to regular duties. When the negotiator attempts to delay further, stress increases. One of the major stressors is that other response elements (such as the tactical team, perimeter team, even command personnel) do not fully understand the role of the negotiator. Byron Sage, a retired FBI negotiator, reports that at the Davidian siege in Waco, Texas, he often received the brunt of anger from the tactical team because they did not know or understand what the negotiators were attempting or were doing. The negotiator may become angry and hostile to other police officers because of these pressures.

The negotiator may experience stress due to the public and news media. The hostage situation may seriously inconvenience the public. A situation that occurs in a city's downtown area during rush hour may cause the mayor and city government to pressure the police into a quick resolution. The media also may produce stress by their reporting of the incident. During the Hanafi Muslim hostage situation in Washington D.C. in the 1980s, one news reporter, in a live interview, asked the hostage takers' leader if he could trust the police. This question created doubts in the mind of the leader, and a period of time elapsed before trust could be re-established between him and the negotiator. Additionally, the media may criticize the police, bias their reporting, and perform other acts that increase the negotiator's stress.

Time produces more stress on the negotiator. The negotiator becomes fatigued and must make important decisions. Additionally, the negotiator has to deal with time demands from the hostage taker. The negotiator's commanders may interfere with or impede his or her ability to handle time demands from the hostage taker.

The negotiator will face increased stress during the resolution phase. The negotiator is responsible for the safety of all parties involved in the hostage situation. The negotiator must: (1) ensure that the hostage taker receives clear instructions on how to release the hostages; (2) communicate to the tactical team; (3) instruct the hostages on how to surrender; and (4) coordinate the actions of the police, hostages, and hostage taker. Further, the negotiator must do this while physically and mentally drained. Additionally, if the situation must be resolved tactically or if people are killed during negotiations, the negotiators may develop post-trauma stress (Mullins, 1999).

After the incident is over, negotiators continue to experience stress from the incident. They may be criticized for their actions and role in the crisis. The negotiator who had to negotiate with a person who killed a police officer, for example, may be vilified by peers for talking a "cop killer" into surrendering. In other instances, negotiators may be the recipients of anger, frustration, or criticism from the media, the public, and families of hostage takers and hostages (McMains, 1995).

Bear in mind that negotiators are under a high level of stress at the crisis situation in

addition to the stressors that are in their normal lives. Like all of us, negotiators are susceptible to the stresses of family and work, in addition to some specific stressors from being on the negotiating team. Max Howard (1999, 2000) has pointed out that it is rather common for crisis negotiators to experience stress due to such factors as lack of support from administration, management issues, politics, and image maintenance.

Stress Management

The negotiator must be able to reduce stress in the hostage taker. The negotiator can employ several strategies to accomplish this goal. First, the negotiator can be calming and reassuring. The hostage taker should be allowed to ventilate and talk out problems. The negotiator can have the hostage taker slow down and take time to think and make decisions, help the hostage taker make decisions, and educate the hostage taker. The negotiator can clearly convey consequences to the hostage taker.

Second, the negotiator can reduce the hostage takers' stress by using active listening skills. The negotiator can focus on the feelings of the hostage taker, can demonstrate understanding of the fear, anxiety, and anger the hostage taker is experiencing, can show respect for the hostage taker and his position and not be judgmental or condescending, can empathize with the hostage taker ("I understand how you must feel. I remember a time when I felt that way"), and can restate the hostage takers' position or message. That is, he or she can summarize (using different words) what the hostage taker said. Just by having someone listen, the hostage taker's stress will be reduced.

Third, the negotiator should be nonaggressive and nonthreatening to the hostage taker. Loaded words and name calling should be avoided. For example, the negotiator should avoid using words like "bub," "boy," "dude," curse words, etc. He or she should share the negotiator's feelings and stressors. The negotiator should not judge the actions of the hostage taker. This does not mean the negotiator has to agree with the hostage taker, but it does mean that the negotiator should not let disagreement be known to the hostage takers and should avoid taking sides.

The negotiator can use stress mediation techniques on the hostage taker. The negotiator can instruct the hostage taker in a simple relaxation and breathing exercise. Over the telephone, the negotiator can lead the hostage taker through this simple exercise, and then ask the hostage taker if it helped him calm down. The negotiator can assist the hostage taker in visualization exercises. For example, in the communications chapter, we discussed some techniques of suggestion. One of these techniques involves having the hostage taker visualize a less stressful time in his life. The negotiator can encourage this visualization when the hostage taker begins to become frustrated, angry, or emotional.

The negotiator can assist in reducing hostage stress. He or she can work on relaxation exercises and breathing exercises through the hostage taker. The negotiator can talk to a hostage on the telephone and use the same communicating, active listening, and stress mediation techniques used with the hostage taker. If possible, the negotiator can relay to the hostage what is occurring, why no hostages have yet been freed, and other information. It may be advisable to first tell the hostage taker what is being planned before talking with the

hostages.

The police (negotiators, tactical team, and other responding officers) can use several techniques to reduce their stress during an incident. Education is one of the most beneficial and effective stress mediation techniques. Prior to an incident, negotiators should receive training about stress. This training should include education in the sources of stress during negotiations, factors that can worsen stress (children as hostages, death of a hostage, death of an officer, etc.), hostage taker factors that worsen stress (presence of alcohol or drugs, emotionally disturbed, emotional irritability, etc.), symptoms of stress (during and after the incident), long-term symptoms of stress, and stress mediation techniques. Having this knowledge is probably the single most effective stress mediation technique in the negotiator's arsenal. An empirical examination of stress education by Deffenbacher and Shepard (1989) found that education concerning stress and stress management significantly reduced the subject's general anxiety, anger, situational stress reactivity, and stress-related physiological reactions. Further, long-term follow-up on these subjects found that the positive benefits persisted over time.

The negotiator can engage in some simple progressive relaxation and breathing exercises (Nelson et al., 1989). Progressive relaxation techniques can significantly reduce physiological reactions to stress (i.e., blood pressure, heart rate) (Albright et al., 1991), anxiety, and tension, and improve cognitive functioning and decisionmaking. For relaxation exercises to be most effective, they should be practiced or used before a hostage situation. Relaxation exercises, for example, should be done daily for 10 to 15 minutes.

Exercise can reduce stress. The negotiator should use aerobic exercise and stretching once every hour or after a particularly difficult conversation with the hostage taker. If the negotiator cannot leave his or her chair, simple leg, arm, torso, and neck stretching exercises should be used. With arms and legs, reach as far as possible, change the plane occupied by the legs and arms, and repeat. Do this a minimum of three times. If the negotiator can leave his or her chair, a short jog around the room, down the hall and back, or around the negotiating vehicle can be of immense benefit in reducing stress. These short jogs will allow the negotiator to remain within quick reach of the telephone. Other team members or responding police officers can take longer walks or jogs, or engage in more complex stretching and aerobic exercises.

Periodic time-outs can be used to reduce stress. Taking a few minutes to eat, take a coffee break, or just sit and mentally relax can reduce stress. The negotiator may use a visualization technique during the timeout. Visualization is using positive mental imagery to reduce stress and clear the mind. To use visualization, sit in a comfortable position, relax, and mentally picture a pleasing scene or period in life. Vividly recalling a fishing trip, vacation, or playing with your children are effective visualization techniques.

Diet is important in controlling stress. The negotiator (and other responding police) should eat small meals and limit intake of liquids. Caffeine intake should be limited. Negotiations are not the time to drink cup after cup of coffee. Decaffeinated beverages are preferable and coffee drinking should be mixed with drinking other liquids such as water, decaffeinated sodas, or tea. Limit sugar intake. Coffee should be taken without sugar or with a sugar substitute. Sodas should be sugar free. Fatty foods should be avoided. Light meals such as salads, chicken (not fried), vegetables, etc. are preferable. Small portions should be eaten. If the negotiator gets

hungry between meal periods, he or she should eat light snack foods. The responding police officers should not become overly hungry or thirsty as this increases stress and reduces the ability to think clearly and rapidly.

If the negotiator smokes, he or she should do so sparingly. Monitor nicotine intake carefully. Smoking while on the telephone with the hostage taker should be avoided. During periods of high stress, smoking should be avoided and a negotiator should wait at least 15 minutes following the stress before smoking. Nicotine stimulates the system (as does stress). The negotiator does not need the cumulative effects of stress and nicotine [Box 11.1](#).

[BOX 11.1](#) Using Negotiations Everyday

Captain Kevin Hunter has been with the Fort Wayne, Indiana Police Department since 1989. In 2001 Captain Hunter joined the Fort Wayne Police Department's Crisis Response (Negotiations) Team and in 2005 took over as the team commander. Captain Hunter is also past president of the Indiana Association of Hostage/Crisis Negotiators, helped coordinate six annual conferences for the IAHCN and attended two NCNA meetings representing the IAHCN. Captain Hunter has presented incident debriefs during conferences at the South Carolina Negotiators Association, the Wisconsin Crisis Negotiators Association and the Indiana Association of Hostage/Crisis Negotiators. Captain Hunter is a graduate of the 233rd Session of the FBI National Academy, and the FBI's National Crisis Negotiation Course. Captain Hunter is a graduate of Indiana Tech, with a Bachelors Degree in Criminal Justice and a Masters Degree in Organizational Leadership.

What many may not realize is the extent to which we practice negotiations in our daily interactions with others. In fact, negotiations are an essential part of life and the more skilled a person is in negotiating with others; the smoother they can navigate what comes their way. The foundations of good negotiating skills are active listening skills. Whether or not a person is using active listening is evident when interacting with angry citizens, co-workers, a boss and even family members. Remembering to practice active listening in my daily routines with others and mindful use of active listening has strengthened my negotiating skills. I recently worked as an Internal Affairs Investigator where part of my job was to take calls from angry citizens making complaints against officers within the department. It is easy to identify a person who feels strongly that they have been wronged and who wants something done to rectify the situation. To defuse and calm the other person in that situation, I used active listening. A phrase that echoes from earlier training in negotiations is the concept that "unexpressed feelings never die". With that in mind, during these types of calls, I gave the citizen an opportunity to vent and identify their anger and emotions. I reflected back to the caller, through emotion labeling and summarizing their story as they had expressed concerns to me. By validating their concerns the anger seemed to dissipate and often I was even thanked for listening before the call ended. Similarly, these skills are essential as part of good police work as evidenced in patrol officer's daily routines. Patrol officers regularly come into contact with angry and highly emotional citizens, and by using active

listening, officers can better understand and defuse these types of situations. After all, it seems most people want to know they are heard and understood.

In my personal life, I have used active listening skills in discussing issues with my children and have found it to be helpful to understand what the real issues were. Using active listening skills, specifically open-ended questions and summarization, is helpful to gain a total picture of the story that is being told, and assists in making sure what you heard is an accurate account of the issues.

Through daily negotiations, I have also learned the importance of “being present”. Often an officer’s primary interest is in resolving or clearing one run in order to quickly move to the next. This approach likely works until dealing with emotionally charged individuals or when more time is needed to iron out disputes. Being present means officers need to stop and make sure their attention is focused on what is going on right then and there. Being present means not thinking about the next minute, the next hour or the next day, instead living in that moment and giving undivided attention to the situation. Using active listening skills helps officers be present in the moment, listen and validate the issues, and hopefully take steps to resolve them. Some outcomes of “not being present” have been obvious in my own personal life too. An example many may have experienced is when distracting thoughts of work or other things penetrate and interfere in our daily interactions with our loved ones. One indicator of not being present is when a loved one says, “did you hear me” or “you’re not listening to me”. By being present and actively listening to others helps avoid this disconnect and paves the way for improved interactions and more positive negotiations.

Using negotiations every day has taught me the importance of being prepared in anything a person does. Doing background or intelligence work is an important part of police work. Successful detectives do intelligence work prior to interrogating a suspect, and pro-active patrol officers look at the background of people involved in runs they are going to. By gathering information on a suspect prior to an interview, a detective can better understand the suspect’s strengths, weaknesses and prior offense history and conduct a more thorough interview. By researching information on people living in the house that a patrol officer is responding to, that officer has a better understanding of past behavior, which is the best prediction of future behavior.

Typically no one likes the process of purchasing a new car. While I dreaded the thought of going into a car dealership and going back and forth to still feel like I received the raw end of a deal, I took a different stance during my last car purchase. I realized that business negotiations and crisis negotiations are not much different. One needs to make sure they have all of the proper information before starting a negotiation process, or otherwise things may be slow going until all of the pertinent information is gathered, or worse, the negotiations break down. I remembered the times my team had timely intelligence on a suspect or situation, and how that information could be used to our advantage. I also remember the times my team was lacking good intelligence on a suspect, and how we struggled to gain that knowledge and how it negatively affected the negotiation process. On my last car purchase, I did as much research as I could on the car I wanted to buy, read up on the pros and cons of the vehicle, found all of the discounts that applied to my situation, and had come to a rough figure on what I wanted

to spend for this new car. I built an “intelligence file” that I could reference during the negotiations, and had set aside the whole day to accomplish this task. As the sales representative had to clear any proposal I made through his boss, I too used this tactic and had to clear things through my wife, who was purposely not present during the car negotiation process. After about four hours of back-and-forth negotiations, the sales representative and I completed the deal at a price we were both comfortable with. While the average person does not buy a new car every day, we still negotiate with people whom we interact with on a daily basis. I am not going to ask my Chief for five new people for my division unless I have done my homework and gathered intelligence as to why I need those five new people, and be able to present my case in a logical manner backed up with facts.

Using negotiations every day has also helped me learn how to do a better job at building rapport with people. Building rapport, or creating a relationship of mutual trust, is an important concept and should be practiced on a daily basis. I recently moved from one division of my agency to another, and had to work on building rapport with this new group of officers. I started by building a norm of reciprocity with this new group of officers by making sure I did what I said I would do, and being transparent in my interactions with them. I also have an open door policy, meaning that any officer can come in and talk with me about any issue at any time. I have found that by being present and actively listening to officers who come in to my office, I am building trust between us by promoting cooperation and respect.

Using negotiations every day has also taught me the idea of being empathetic toward fellow human beings. To experience empathy for another person it is not necessary that I feel what they are feeling. What is important is that I understand and identify the other person’s motives, situation and feelings involved in that moment. A patrol officer or detective can better connect with complainants or victims by using empathy by identifying or understanding the other person’s situation and feelings. When a patrol officer deals with car crash victims, it would be wise to identify with the discomfort of being involved in a crash and empathizing with these victims to make the experience better.

Being a better negotiator is a life-long process, and by practicing these skills each day, one can better negotiate the twists and turns that life throws your way. Becoming a better negotiator can also help a person become a better detective, patrol officer, spouse and human being.

If the hostage incident is not successfully negotiated or if people are killed, the negotiator may experience long-term stressors. These may range from a simple reaction such as an uncomfortable feeling that the negotiator did not do his or her job to a full-blown post-traumatic stress response (Mullins, 1999). Again, education can help mitigate these effects. Teaching negotiators how to focus on the positive aspects of the situation and reinforce their positive performance, and what not to do when negotiations fail (i.e., do not assign blame, do not dwell on the incident, do not feel guilt, etc.) can be one of the most effective techniques for reducing long-term stress. Most important, the entire team needs to remember that the team did not make the hostage taker’s decisions. The hostage taker alone made the decisions that

led to a negative outcome. Negotiators tried to persuade him to make the correct decisions and the hostage taker did not take their advice. The point is that negotiators are not responsible for the poor decisionmaking on the part of the hostage taker.

Negotiators, especially following unsuccessful negotiations, should be emotionally debriefed by a mental health professional or peer support team member. This debriefing should be conducted shortly after the incident ends and be as short as possible. The debriefing should focus on: (1) information gathering—letting the negotiator describe the physical scenario and his or her role, when the negotiator arrived, who the actors were, what they did; (2) negotiator thoughts—what thoughts the negotiator had during the incident, attitudes, perceptions; (3) negotiator emotions—what emotions the negotiator experienced as the incident progressed and after the resolution; (4) physical signs of stress—what, if any, physical stress symptoms he or she is experiencing; (5) unfinished business—how any prior unsuccessful incidents influence emotions, beliefs, or attitudes concerning this incident; (6) teaching—explain post-trauma stress and explain that his or her reactions are normal, and how to properly cope with any long-term stress; and (7) summarize—answer the negotiator’s questions and provide information for further assistance (Bohl, 1992a; 1992b).

A cohesive negotiator team that trains and socializes together can reduce stress in individual team members (Cox, 1991; Lazarus, 1991; McHugh & Brennan, 1992). Because negotiating units cannot be made a full-time unit within the police agency, all possible opportunities for team interaction (away from a hostage situation) should be provided. This critical interaction will build teamwork and cohesion but, just as importantly, reduce stress during an actual incident. The negotiating team will, in effect, become its own peer support team and stress reduction network. If one team member becomes overly stressed, other team members will intervene to reduce the stress.

Stress reduction begins long before a critical incident begins. Negotiators should concentrate on reducing stress in their personal lives and at work. This means, in large part, teaching stress management and stress reduction techniques to the families of negotiators. Spouses and families often become frustrated and angry about the negotiator being called out at night, during family outings, during social events, and at other times that interrupt family activities. Families are also fearful for the life of their loved ones. Training families in the role and functions of negotiators can significantly mitigate some of these emotions (Mullins, 1998). Training negotiators to deal with family stress should be conducted. At home, negotiators must also actively listen, should take the concerns of the family seriously, and show the family a caring attitude.

Negotiations are an emotional process. Part of the reason a team is important is to work together to reduce team emotions and stress levels.

Families should be taught to provide support roles for the negotiators. By talking out emotions and frustrations from the incident with family members, the family can (and should) become one of the primary supports for the negotiator. Family members should avoid second-guessing the negotiator, especially if the incident was traumatic. Do not ask questions such as, “Why didn’t you ...?” or “Is there anything else you think you could have done?” The family should be taught to be reassuring and supportive and ask questions or make statements such as, “It sounds to me like you did everything possible to prevent his death, given the situation,” “Isn’t second guessing a natural part of what happens following one of these?” and “Things

may look bad now, but they will get better.”

To optimize stress reduction, all of the techniques discussed above should be utilized (Latack & Havlovic, 1992; McHugh & Brennan, 1992; Buhler, 1993). Engaging in a relaxation or breathing exercise while gulping coffee or smoking a cigarette is not very beneficial. The relaxation techniques should be practiced and learned before a hostage incident. When under stress, the stress mediation techniques should come naturally and without the person having to think about them. Learning and practicing beforehand will enable the negotiator to concentrate solely on negotiating and remain calm and composed.

Post-Incident Debriefing

Incidents have many points where they could go wrong. If they go wrong and someone dies, they generate strong feelings in negotiators. They need to be debriefed. The entire crisis management team, commanders, tactical team members, and negotiators need to review each incident to improve and refine their skills. Negotiators need to review the incidents in two ways: operationally, to identify the reasons for the injury or death, and emotionally, to defuse the impact of the trauma on the negotiators. The former needs to examine the details of the incident: how it was managed, what negotiating strategies and tactics were used, and how the situation can be improved. The latter needs to start the process of helping the negotiator accept the fact that he or she did the best job possible, given the circumstances.

Operational debriefing of hostage incidents

Kidd (2005) has suggested that negotiations has come far enough to develop “best practices,” which are criteria against which a specific incident can be measured. He suggests a set of standards to use to “audit” a team’s performance, so they can refine and improve their performance. He states, “These standards provide some tools to enable us to move closer to peak performance. They provide a set of guidelines by which we can assess our individual skills, and the performance level of our teams.”

Operational debriefings using a set of standards serve two purposes: (1) they refine the art of crisis management, and (2) they document the actions taken by police during the incident. Noesner (1999) pointed out that incident commanders are expected to explain their decisions. Having a systematic way of reviewing the incident will help put departments in the best position for defending their actions. Incidents in which hostages are taken deserve close scrutiny after the incident, so that negotiators can learn from their experience what works—when, how, why, and for whom. The purpose of operational debriefings is to identify and solve potential problems, not to place blame. It should be done in an atmosphere of respect for the participants and with an eye toward solving problems.

After every incident, an operational debriefing should be conducted. In some incidents, it may be necessary to conduct an emotional debriefing.

An issue in debriefings is “What information needs to be collected and evaluated?” There have been several databases that have collected information about incidents over the years.

After the incident in Waco, the FBI established HOBAS, a national database for collecting data after incidents that can be used to standardize the information reviewed in an operational debriefing. HOBAS represents the most extensive nationwide source of information about negotiator activity and it has the largest existing sample of negotiations incidents from which to learn. It provides a summary of the nature of incidents and the data collected is the minimum amount needed by teams in reviewing their functioning. It is recommended that teams begin their debriefing by gathering the data needed by HOBAS, which includes:

1. Information about the incident itself, including: the type of incident; the date and time of the incident; the location of the incident; when violence occurred during the incident, if it did; and who the violence occurred against.
2. Nature of the contact with the subject, including: who initiated communications; what types of communication were used during the incident; whether or not a TPI was used; the type of TPI; whether or not the TPI was helpful; whether a mental health consultant was used.
3. How the incident was resolved, including: type of resolution; type of tactical actions taken, if any; time and date of assault, if any; CNT's role in tactical resolution, if any.
4. Post-incident information, including: injuries; deaths; property damage; language in which negotiations were conducted.
5. Data on the subject, including: age; sex; marital status; race; language fluency; employment; education; military experience; criminal history; prior suicide attempts; mental health problems; substance abuse history; substances used during incident; explosives used during incident; weapons used during incident; restraining order on subject; status of subject at the end of the incident.
6. Hostage/victim data, including: age, sex, race, English fluency (language), how victim was treated during incident, mobility allowed during incident, subject manipulated by victim, Stockholm Syndrome, type and timing of release, subject's use of victim to talk for him, victim talked to law enforcement, was victim injured or killed during the incident.

Critical decision debriefing: A methodology for debriefing crisis intervention

After the basic information is summarized, crisis management teams need to review their decisions and actions. Negotiators should debrief every incident, whether or not the crisis management team does. Incidents that are primarily crisis intervention can be debriefed using an intensive case-study method that focuses on critical decision points during the incident. Every negotiation incident has critical decisions that must be made if the situation is to be resolved peacefully. How these critical decision points were reached and how the decisions were made should be reviewed. The focus should be on what information was available at the time the decision was made, how the information was used, and what the impact of that use was. Recommendations for training and operational changes can be made on the basis of a critical decision review (McMains, 2000). The decision points usually occur sequentially as the incident unfolds over time. They include:

1. Was the type of incident assessed and what did that tell you about strategy and tactics?
2. Was appropriate intelligence gathered, analyzed, and disseminated?
3. Was the incident negotiable or was it made negotiable?
4. Were the demands recorded and what did they tell you about the person?
5. Was the subject's emotional, behavioral, and cognitive status assessed and how did that help develop strategies and tactics?
6. Was the subject's suicide potential assessed?
7. Was the subject's risk of aggression assessed?
8. Were witnesses, family members, and bystanders managed?
9. Was an opening planned with safety and security in mind?
10. Were communications skills appropriate for the crisis stage used?
11. Were persuasion techniques used? How did they work?
12. Were open, clear, and timely channels of communication with command and tactical maintained?
13. Was there a review of the subject's behavior and a plan developed for responding to the behavior between calls?
14. Were backup plans developed in the event that the first one was not received well?
15. Were basic guidelines used?
16. What worked and what did not work?
17. What recommendations are there for next time?

Emotional Debriefing

Like other traumatic situations, a negotiating incident that ends in death has an emotional, cognitive, and psychological impact that can stay with a person for weeks, months, or years. At best, it disrupts the lives of the negotiators, and at worst, it changes them permanently. Negotiators must understand the emotional impact of a death during negotiations, be prepared for the emotional impact, have developed a method of intervening that reduces the impact, and practice this method like any other negotiation skill. The following reprint illustrates the issues negotiators have to deal with when a situation ends badly.

Post-Incident Stress for the Negotiator

Nineteen of my 20 years as a veteran of the San Antonio Police Department have been spent as a street officer. Fifteen of those years were on concurrent assignment as a crisis negotiator. During my 15 years as a negotiator, I responded to more than 200 critical incidents. During one of these incidents, I learned some important lessons that I would like to share with you.

As in any line of police work, all of our experiences are not positive ones. Oftentimes, officers do not receive emotional support to help them cope with difficult experiences, nor do they have the necessary knowledge to support themselves. Post-incident stress

for the crisis negotiator is an area which many times is not recognized or dealt with by negotiation units. Because of this, some crisis negotiators who have had to deal with post-incident stress have not had the proper support. I have experienced post-incident stress, and perhaps you have also. The following should help you recognize and deal with post-incident stress, should it happen to you.

In 1988, a street transient gunned down two San Antonio police officers, working in the Foot Patrol Division. After the gunfire, the transient barricaded himself in a building, not far from the incident. Our Negotiation Unit was activated at this time. I was the primary negotiator at the scene, and after a period of negotiations, and after considerable communication, the transient surrendered. This process is what negotiators spend their time training for, and the outcome was what was expected or hoped for based on that training.

After the surrender, other members of my unit and I went to the Homicide Unit. An officer I had known for 15 years, a friend, approached us and told us we should have killed the transient. Never before in my career had I been met by such negative feelings from a peer. As time went on, I discovered that this officer's feelings echoed those of many officers in the department.

The day after the shooting, because I was the primary negotiator, I was ordered into a press conference by my chain of command. The press conference caused my picture to be shown on television news stations, and it was also pictured in the newspaper. This publicity caused me to be identified as the negotiator who had successfully negotiated with the transient who had shot two police officers. I did not ask for any recognition in connection with this incident, but because of the publicity, I became associated with the incident, and it put me in the forefront for negative reactions from my peers. They were angry and trying very hard to deal with the shooting. In the past six months, six San Antonio police officers had been shot, and officers were looking for some "street justice," and I had not provided that for them.

One of the officers had been released from the hospital; however, the other was in critical condition. We all knew that he probably would not live. His dying became my greatest fear and I started perceiving myself as the police officer (negotiator) that had saved the life of a "cop killer." For the next four months the officer remained in a coma until his death.

During those four months, I began to question my work as a crisis negotiator. At the time, I had successfully resolved a conflict based on eight years of experience as a negotiator; however, it was contrary to the beliefs of a lot of the officers around me. The officers believed something else should have been done. I no longer had confidence in myself and my part as a negotiator in this incident. Nor could I justify the job I had done, either to myself, or to my peers. I began to have trouble sleeping at night and had some dreams about the incident. My feelings would range from anger to depression. I would wake up each morning fearing that today was the day that the officer would die. I isolated myself from everyone in my unit and from everyone in the department, by not talking about how I felt. The only person I talked to during this time was my future wife, Valerie. I did express my feelings to her concerning the incident and she was very comforting and understanding. Without her support during this time, I probably would

have resigned from the unit and police work altogether.

The day the officer died was one of the worst days I have ever experienced. On that day I tagged myself as the police officer that had saved the life of a “cop killer.” This was a tag that I thought I would never wear, and because of my beliefs, I felt I had no right to attend the officer’s funeral. I did not attend the funeral and this caused me to feel even more isolated from my department. This was a very painful time for me, because I would not allow myself to grieve the loss of the officer with my own police family. I felt like I was no longer a member of that family.

Sometime after this incident, I discovered that other members of my unit felt some of the same feelings I had felt. We talked about how we felt. From these conversations, I began to accept what I had done as a crisis negotiator. Members of my unit and I have formulated the following guide to help crisis negotiators who experience similar feelings.

First, let’s talk about who we really are and where we come from. When we first became police officers, we probably had no intention of ever becoming a crisis negotiator. When we talked to brother officers about officers being shot, it went something like this: “Man, if you ever get shot, you can bet I’ll make sure the guy never makes it to the jail.” When you made the scene of a critical incident, where a guy was held up, you wondered why they just didn’t go in and get him. Then somewhere down the line we matured and developed the ideas of a crisis negotiator. We respond to critical incidents and talk people out, people who are suicidal, trapped criminals, and so on. Officers on the outside probably have made the comment, “I don’t understand why they talked them out instead of just going in and getting them.” We just kind of shrug these messages off and keep on successfully operating as a crisis negotiator within our normal work environment. Officers on the outside don’t really give us any big hassles over it, because we haven’t really crossed the line. What I mean by that is that no officer or civilian that they really care about all that much has really been hurt during an incident. Then, we make that one critical incident where someone has been injured or killed that they *do* really care about. Now, we may really face the heat. It happened to me, and I was no longer able to feel comfortable about my work environment or myself. For that reason, we have to be able to justify why we are negotiators to others and ourselves.

There are some hard facts about crisis negotiators that you should remember. As regular law enforcement officers, we are isolated from the understanding of the general public. As crisis negotiators, we are not only isolated from the understanding of the general public, but also isolated from the understanding of most law enforcement officers. In some cases, the crisis negotiator who is experiencing post-incident stress may become isolated from his own negotiation unit members. He begins to question his own existence as a crisis negotiator and isolates himself from everyone. This is what I did to myself. I call this the “Triple Whammy.” Whatever you do, don’t isolate yourself. Talk to your unit members about how you feel. We are an elite group and have to depend on each other for support.

There are some policies in place for dealing with and reducing post-incident stress.

1. First, recognize and identify incidents that may produce that stress. Put yourself on the alert.

2. Have good team support within your unit for fellow negotiators and use debriefings to talk about the emotions you and your team members are feeling.
3. Have a person trained in debriefing present during the debriefings. He should direct the debriefing and it is very important that he was not involved in the actual critical incident being debriefed.
4. Don't allow a crisis negotiator to be singled out to his peers after a critical incident that may receive critical response from fellow officers. This is what occurred to me at my press conference. I became the target of officers angry about the incident.
5. Start educating your department concerning the responsibilities of a crisis negotiator. This can be done through a First Responder Training Program provided to fellow officers.

It is important that you recognize, as a crisis negotiator, that there are normal signs and symptoms of post-incident stress following a critical incident where you receive: (a) negative feedback from fellow officers; (b) there has been a loss of life; or (c) you feel you didn't do your job the best it could have been done. The signs and symptoms of post-incident stress can be one or more of the following: (a) Heightened sense of vulnerability, (b) Anger, anxiety regarding future situations, (c) Intruding thoughts or flashbacks, (d) Isolation, (e) Withdrawal, (f) Emotional numbing, (g) Sleep difficulties, (h) Alienation, (i) Depression, (j) Problems with authority, (k) Nightmares, (l) Family problems, (m) Alcohol or drug abuse, (n) Sexual dysfunction, (o) Just flat denial that anything is wrong with you, (p) Significant physical problems such as: tension headaches, stomach problems; digestive problems, and aching bones.

Don't think you're going crazy. All these signs and symptoms are normal, and you're really doing okay. You're just feeling stress. I felt a lot of these signs and symptoms after my critical incident. Just realize you need to recognize the situation, talk about the situation and these problems should take care of themselves within six to eight weeks, at the most. If they don't, professional help may be necessary.

There are other things that you can do to help reduce the stress of being the crisis negotiator with post-incident stress. Moderate exercise and relaxation exercises will help. Maintain a balanced diet and do not increase alcohol intake. Recognize that signs and symptoms of stress are normal and that it is okay to have these feelings. Most important of all, accept what you did as a crisis negotiator.

Finally, justify to others and yourself why you do the job of a crisis negotiator. It is not hard to recognize that after the onset of a critical incident, at the time of an assault, is when it is most likely that an officer will die. Even if it is the worst-case scenario, and one officer has already been shot and critically wounded as a result of the critical incident, such as the situation I dealt with, why make it possible for another officer to die on an assault, instead of negotiating? In short, we do the job as a crisis negotiator to save the lives of fellow officers. Every time my unit successfully negotiates a critical incident, I know we may have saved a police officer's life. Remember you're the professional who is the "calm" during the storm. You are the one who makes sense out of a bad situation and brings it to a successful resolution without loss of life. Remember that we do the best that we can do, and if it doesn't work out just the way we wanted it

to, remember what we were working with. Human nature is unpredictable.

The incident that I went through has only made me a stronger and better crisis negotiator. I only wish I had known then what I know now so the pain and confusion I was experiencing would not have lasted so long. I hope some of the ideas that my unit has come up with for dealing with post-incident stress will help you if you are dealing with it or may deal with it in the future.

officer C.J. Ricketts

San Antonio Crisis Police Department

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Post-Incident Stress for the Negotiator: 25 Years Later

In March of 2013, Dr. Michael McMains, co-author of this book, contacted me, requesting that I write a follow-up to this article. He asked if the lessons I learned during the incident in 1988 are still applicable and useful in my life today.

When the first article was written, I was an active member of the Hostage Negotiation Unit. I served six more years as a negotiator, participating in the successful resolution of approximately 200 critical incidents during my negotiations career. I served a total of 36 years on the police department before retiring in March 2011. I am now a Senior Vice President of a security company, handling the day-to-day operations, and what I learned 25 years ago is with me today.

Most importantly, the 1988 incident and its aftermath gave me knowledge and skills that enabled me to stand up to my worst critic, myself. I have applied the knowledge and skills in both my personal and professional life in the management of numerous issues in which I could have beaten myself up and not learned anything. Rather, I have been able to look more objectively at my behavior and corrected what needed to be corrected and let go of the things I could not do anything about.

What lasting lessons did I learn?

1. I now understand the importance of our mental health, self-esteem, and how good we feel about ourselves. The better we feel about ourselves, the less negative impact stressful issues and others' criticisms will have on us and the better we will be able to objectively evaluate, use, or discard others' criticism.
2. I learned that what we must understand is that what is correct is not always popular with everybody around us.
3. It is very important to have pride in ourselves for doing what is correct and not to question ourselves for not doing what is popular. The people who criticize for not doing the popular thing are usually the minority, not the majority. Even when they are the majority numerically, sometimes doing a good job means you are a majority of one.
4. It is important to communicate and seek support from people who care, are

trustworthy, and can provide a good support system for us as needed.

During the incident in 1988, I played what I now call “worst-case scenario” on myself. I thought the worst because of what I believed the majority of officers thought of me, which was actually the minority opinion. I withdrew from others, missing the first police officer’s funeral in my career. By handling the situation the way I did, I became my own worst critic.

Not having anybody to talk with left me with only my own thoughts about what others thought of my work as a negotiator and police officer, and those thoughts were bad.

I did not immediately communicate or seek support from the system that was already in place. SAPD had psychological services, a peer support team, and resources in the community available at the time—not to mention friends who appreciated the professional job I did as a negotiator. I did not seek them out early on but waited until the pressure inside me had built to the point that I could not keep it in.

Today I use the same support system that I did in 1988 for advice on both personal and professional issues. Dr. Michael McMains was a large part of that support system and, as you can see, we are still communicating and supporting each other today.

Emotional impact on the negotiator

The above article poignantly illustrates the impact on a negotiator when an incident does not go as expected. It is important to note that the incident was handled by a well-trained, experienced officer who did his job well. Still, the emotional impact was profound. Other authors (Bohl, 1997; Lanceley, 1999) have described the potential emotional impact of critical incidents on negotiators. They describe officers who feel excessive responsibility for the outcome of the incidents. They describe symptoms of depression, including insomnia and preoccupation with their responsibility, second-guessing and rumination. Officers have reported intrusive thoughts in the form of both nightmares and uncontrolled images and thoughts about the incident. Bohl (1997) has reported officers’ replaying the incident in their minds and making the outcome worse than it was originally. To deal with the emotional impact of these incidents, debriefings need to be established as a regular procedure for negotiators.

Debriefing negotiators

The *Encyclopedia of Psychology* (Eysenck et al., 1972) defines psychic trauma as: “... any painful individual experience, especially if that experience is associated with permanent environmental change(s). As a rule a psychic trauma involves a loss of possible motive gratification.” Figley (1988) goes on to say that a traumatic event is “an extraordinary event or series of events which is sudden and overwhelming and often dangerous, either to oneself or significant others.” Nielsen (1986) points out that traumas are characterized by four things:

1. A sudden and unexpected onset;
2. A threat to life;
3. A loss of some kind, usually to the person's sense of self;
4. A disruption of values.

An event that has a sudden and unexpected onset is traumatic because it gives people a sense of unpredictability and uncontrollability. It is like walking into your bedroom and having someone jump at you from behind the door, yelling, "Boo!" You are startled and feel an immediate sense of arousal. You were not expecting to be jumped at in your own room (it was unpredictable) and you could do nothing to stop it or to prepare yourself for it (it was uncontrollable). Research has shown that tension, anxiety, and stress rise when an incident that is unpredictable and uncontrollable occurs.



PHOTO 11.3 At the Hostage Negotiator Competition held at Texas State University – San Marcos, TX, evaluators use a standardized evaluation form to assess negotiator performance. Even teams who have been coming to the competition for years report the stress levels within the team tend to be at maximum levels. Teams often employ mental health consultants to deal strictly with team stress levels.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

A hostage incident in which a life is lost is sudden and unpredictable because of experience. Experience shows that 95 percent of hostage incidents are resolved without loss of life (FBI, 1984). This means negotiators go into situations expecting to be successful and that the odds are in their favor. When a life is lost, it violates expectations of success. It is sudden and unexpected because it does not go along with the script we have in our head.

Hostage incidents are always a threat to life. They threaten the hostages, the police, bystanders, and even the hostage taker. The stakes are high, the cost of failure extreme. If the negotiator fails, someone dies. This makes the stress high and failure a trauma. Most police officers are people who were taught the value of life before they put on the uniform, the badge, and the gun. Loss of life is a serious issue for them.

Additionally, the loss of life reminds us of our own vulnerability and mortality (NOVA, 1991). The threat to another person's life is a threat to our own. It underlines the lack of permanence and the fragility of life. It raises questions about life's ultimate meaning and purpose. It gives us a sense of powerlessness and purposelessness. To be successful, negotiators have to believe in their goals. They must value life, respect others, and have a wish to help. They need to see themselves as helpers.

The loss of a human life is the ultimate failure for negotiators. It strikes at the heart of their mission. It threatens their professional identity and their sense of self, to the degree that negotiators accept their job to be the preservation of life. There is a loss of self-esteem. This is the third characteristic of a trauma.

Finally, a trauma involves the disruption of values. Values are things that are important to a person. They involve clusters of feelings, thoughts, and behavior that are focused on goals and are normative in character. They prescribe the appropriateness of behaviors, thoughts, and feelings, what is acceptable and what is not. The value of human life is one that people in our culture learn long before they become police officers. The just-world hypothesis is another. The meaningfulness of life is yet a third value that is accepted by most on faith. Traumas challenge all three of these values because they are uncontrollable, unpredictable, life-threatening, and self-esteem destroying. They challenge the assumptions of meaningfulness, fairness, and value in life. What is left are some basic questions about life at best, and nihilistic meaninglessness at worst.

Stages of a trauma

As early as 1951, Tyhurst suggested that most traumas follow a similar pattern. They can be thought of as having three stages:

1. Impact stage
2. Recoil stage
3. Adaptation stage

The impact stage begins with the realization that there is a threat to the person's well-being and ends when the person no longer experiences that threat. For a negotiator this could be a matter of minutes, hours, or days, depending on how long the incident lasts, how long the review of the incident lasts, and how long the negotiator needs to relive the incident in his mind. The specific threat for a negotiator is usually the threat to self-esteem and to values. Unlike a physical threat, this sense of failure is something a negotiator does to himself. It is in his or her thoughts. Therefore, it is not over as soon as the incident is over. Rather, it is over when the negotiator quits thinking about it.

The recoil stage of a trauma begins when the precipitating stressor ends and lasts until the time the negotiators' normal life resumes. This stage is characterized by a hypersensitivity to others. Negotiators will seek support from friends, family, and others. During this stage, they may need to go over the incident repeatedly to help resolve their feelings of failure, guilt, frustration, and anger. This stage may last days or weeks after the incident.

The adaptation stage begins when negotiators are no longer preoccupied with the incident and when they return to their normal functioning. If they have not successfully resolved the incident, negotiators have intrusive thoughts about the incident or they have periods of emotional numbing in which they just do not feel anything. If they have accepted the incident, they will be able to think and talk about it without excessive emotion.

Goals of debriefing

If officers move through the stages of a trauma without incident, all is well and good. However, sometimes negotiators become preoccupied with the incident. When this happens, they may experience a number of the symptoms described above. Debriefing is a process that is designed to help keep officers from getting stuck. Bohl (1997) outlines three specific goals of debriefings: (1) to alleviate pain associated with the incident; (2) to prevent subsequent PTSD from developing; and (3) to return the officer to his pre-incident level of functioning.

Debriefing the impact

To help negotiators who have been involved in a traumatic incident, a critical incident debriefing (Mitchell & Bray, 1990) may be helpful. Critical incident debriefing (CID) is a group process designed to start officers talking about what they did and how they reacted to their actions during an incident. It is usually done by a combination of professionals and peers who have been trained in CID. It assumes that the people the debriefer is working with are normal people who are dealing with an abnormal situation, that people have the resources to support each other and to resolve their own problems, that early intervention can facilitate their ability to move beyond their emotional arousal before it becomes a chronic problem, and that peers are a credible resource in beginning their resolution of the emotional impact of a crisis (McMains, 1986).

There are several models of debriefing (McMains, 1986; Mitchell & Bray, 1990; NOVA, 1992; Bohl, 1997; Hatcher et al., 1998), but they all have three elements in common:

1. They all review what happened to the person and to others during an incident.
2. They all review how people felt about what happened to them.
3. They all educate by providing information about the usual reactions to a trauma.

Generally, a debriefing is done in a group setting by a team of debriefers. The group is told that the purpose of the debriefing is to provide a setting in which it is safe to talk about how they have reacted to the incident. To help establish the safety of the situation, it is explained that the group is not an operation debriefing, that there is no rank in the room, and that they all must agree not to talk about anyone else's experience outside the debriefing room. Then, a debriefer asks each person to describe what he or she did during the incident. Each person has a turn at describing his or her part of the operation so an overall picture is developed of what happened to whom and when. Next, the debriefer asks each person how he or she reacted to the incident and to his or her part in it. These accounts are reported and listened to without criticism by the group members. Finally, the accounts are used as examples to summarize the impact of a traumatic incident on people. There are several points that need to be made about typical reactions (Nielsen, 1986):

1. During the impact stage, it is normal to feel stunned and bewildered, to go about life like they are on "automatic pilot." Emotions are contained by rigid denial and isolation. The person cannot allow the intensity of emotions to interfere with

functioning. Compliance with authority and rules is frequent.

2. During the recoil stage, people can expect to continue to function with a sense that things are not real. They will need to go over the incident in an almost compulsive way. They will be preoccupied. They may be oversensitive to criticism from others. They may withdraw from their usual activities and interests.
3. During the adaptation stage, people may feel alternating periods of depression and anxiety. They may be troubled with nightmares. Unwanted memories of the incident may intrude on the negotiators. They need to know that, as they come to terms with the trauma, these experiences will abate.
4. It is important to continue to talk about the incident with accepting, caring, and understanding friends.
5. It is important to know that:
 - a. Judging themselves on the basis of the results is self-defeating. Rather, people need to be able to believe that they did the best with what they had to work with.
 - b. The cataclysm of emotions they felt is the same as how most people feel in a crisis. Their feelings are OK.
 - c. Trauma by definition involves incidents that are out of control and that people who take hostages have a mind, plan, and goals of their own. It is OK not to be in complete control all the time.
 - d. By nature, people are limited in their knowledge, skills, and abilities. They are subject to feelings of anger, frustration, rage, fear, panic, and confusion. It is OK to be human.

The goals of debriefing are to:

1. provide an intellectual understanding of both the incident and its emotional impasse;
2. start to develop an acceptance of the negotiator's thoughts, feelings, and actions during the incident; and
3. desensitize the person to the excessive emotional arousal that frequently accompanies a traumatic incident.

By doing this, it is hoped that the impact of a trauma can be reduced to manageable levels, negotiators who are involved can put their performance into perspective, and the harmful impact of the trauma can be eliminated much in the same way that it has been for officers involved in shootings.

The effectiveness of debriefings has been suggested by Allen et al. (1990) in a study of personality characteristics of successful hostage negotiators. The authors tested 12 experienced hostage negotiators who had responded to a total of 500 incidents. One of the purposes of the study was to explore the possibility of post-traumatic stress disorders in these officers who had been exposed to multiple traumatic incidents. No officers showed the typical PTSD profile as described by Keene et al. (1984). The authors suggested that the lack of symptoms may have been the result of immediately debriefing negotiators at the scene. They thought that an on-the-scene debriefing may provide for an exploration of the negotiator's actions and feelings in

a setting that provided social support and that facilitated desensitization of excessive arousal.

An alternative interpretation of the data is that officers were more likely to be experiencing an acute stress disorder that is like PTSD, but shows fewer symptoms and lasts for a shorter period. In 1990, ASD was not recognized as a diagnostic category in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* of the American Psychiatric Association.

In the general population, there is little evidence to support the effectiveness of debriefings alone in the reduction of PTSD. In fact, there are controlled studies that suggest that under certain conditions and with certain populations, debriefings may lead to an increase in PTSD symptoms. What debriefings seemed to do is bring groups who have experienced life-threatening events closer together as a group.

Several interventions have shown to be effective in reducing ASD/PTSD symptoms among the general public. Friedman (2001) reports that the cognitive behavioral therapies such as Exposure Therapy, Cognitive Therapy, Cognitive Processing Therapy, and Stress Inoculation Therapy have proven the most effective interventions in reducing symptoms of PTSD. One reason for the efficacy of these treatment modalities is that they intervene at behavioral, cognitive, and emotional levels. Many of these therapies have the same elements as the debriefing model. The major difference is that they take place over a period of time, rather than at one time. It may be that more than one session is required for people who are experiencing PTSD/ASD symptoms to reduce the physiological arousal and change the self-evaluative/self-critical statements they associate with a traumatic incident.



PHOTO 11.4 At the banquet following the Negotiator Competition, teams are ready to relax and decompress. The BBQ is the ideal emotional debriefing after a long, stressful week.

(Photo by W. Mullins)

One of the neurophysiological effects of being threatened by uncontrollable events is that the nervous system becomes more “irritable.” The receptor sites on the nerve endings increase in number up to 300 percent after a traumatic experience (Everly, 1989). It is this neurological change that makes people irritable and jumpy after a trauma. In addition to an understanding of this fact, people are benefited by methods of returning the nervous system to normal levels. Systematic relaxation exercises have the advantage of giving people an activity that effectively reduces the reactivity of the nervous system.

Another issue is the self-evaluative statements people are likely to make at the time of a traumatic event. If an officer thinks that he or she has somehow failed to meet a standard

during the trauma of a life-threatening event, he or she may think of him-or herself as a poor police officer or an inadequate human being. These self-evaluative thoughts may become fixed in the officer's head, leading to the need to avoid situations that challenge his or her sense of "efficacy." Therefore, interventions that focus on restructuring the self-critical statements need to be part of an intervention for PTSD.

Hogewood (2005) suggested that debriefings alone are not enough in dealing with the impact of traumatic stress in policing. Rather, he argues that policing itself leads to cumulative stress that can affect functioning, morale, and the mental health of officers without their realizing it. In addition, he argues (along with others) that police officers are reluctant to use mental health resources. Therefore, he recommends that debriefings be a part of a larger peer counseling program. Using peers who are readily available to officers who have experienced the impact of traumatic stress and who "know the job" has the advantage of instant credibility without the stigma of being seen as a "shrink."

The authors' experience has been that the majority of officers who are involved in traumatic incidents, including negotiators, experience an acute stress disorder and that they benefit from having understanding, accepting, and caring people to whom they can turn for support when they are questioning themselves. For officers, this is usually other officers, because they do not believe that people outside the job understand the job. Having trained peer support officers is a valuable resource because they have the attitude, the listening skills, and the knowledge to know when an acute stress reaction is developing into something more serious and when to refer to the professionals.

It is the authors' opinion that there is a place for knowledgeable mental health professionals in policing. Although not common, PTSD does occur among police officers. Over the years, the authors have intervened with officers who were beaten 18 years before and developed PTSD symptoms, with officers who were involved in a shooting 18 months before and were experiencing symptoms, and officers who shot and killed teenagers who shot other officers and were experiencing PTSD symptoms, as well as a negotiator who was the first to find the body of six-month-old baby who was killed by the subject with whom the negotiator had talked for six hours. They had all been debriefed, talked with their peers, their families, and their chaplains about the events without any relief. Professional intervention was required to return them to the level of functioning at which they worked before.

The authors have long believed that negotiators are the best and brightest in policing. As such, they deserve the best from policing. That best includes debriefing, peer counseling, and dedicated professionals who are there to support and care for those who support and care for people in crisis.

Summary

In any hostage incident, there are at least three groups that are affected by the stress of the situation: the hostages, the hostage takers, and the negotiators. Each will have his or her own perceptions of the demands of the situation, his or her own abilities to deal with the incident, and his or her own coping styles. Each will experience different levels of stress. The negotiators need to be aware of the stress levels of all three of these groups to create the right

atmosphere for negotiating. During the crisis stage, they will want to keep their own stress levels down and reduce the stress of others, so that the situation can be brought under control and reason can take the place of emotion. At a later time, the negotiators may want to increase the stress levels of the hostage takers, so they will use more energy or become less critical. If they want creative problem solving, as in the resolution stage, they will want to minimize stress levels. Therefore, the negotiators must be able to recognize and manage stress.

Stress is one of the few constants in a hostage situation. Stress affects all participants in the hostage situation. Stress increases emotions, reduces the ability to think rationally, and interferes with decisionmaking. Being aware of how stress affects a person and how the system responds to stress, and learning to recognize the symptoms of stress can go a long way in controlling the negotiator's stress and that of the hostages and hostage taker. Once the sources and symptoms of stress are recognized, it is important to know how to mediate stress and control it. Making frequent use of stress mediation techniques will improve your effectiveness as a negotiator and allow you to control the stress of others.

When an incident "goes bad," someone dies. Both the police and the hostages need to be able to manage the aftereffects of such a trauma. Even when no one dies, hostages are frequently traumatized by the experience of losing control of their lives. They need to deal with the emotional impact of the incident. Both the negotiators and the hostages need to start the process of dealing with the aftereffects by debriefing, peer support, and appropriate mental health support. Negotiators will debrief both the operation (to gain a better understanding about what can be improved) and the impact (the emotional effects) of the incident. The hostages will debrief the impact. Both can minimize the long-term consequences of a life-changing event by immediately starting to understand that everyone did the best they could with what they had. Success has to be measured by the quality of the effort, not by the results.

Note

¹ The list of best practices above is a summary of the "best practices" that are currently being developed. Negotiations teams and police departments should contact Deputy William Kidd, Sonoma Sheriff's Office, for a complete version of the standards.

Discussion Questions

1. Think of a policing situation to which you have recently responded (i.e., traffic stop, domestic disturbance, burglary of a building, etc.) that produced stress. How did your perception of that event influence the stress you were under? What can you do to reduce the stress of that type of situation?
2. According to the Everlys' schema, what is your basic personality style? Is this how you act when demands are placed upon you? Knowing this, how could you reduce stress in your life?
3. List five coping strategies you have developed to deal with stress. Are these strategies

effective or ineffective? If they are ineffective, what coping strategies can they be replaced with?

4. Assume you are the negotiator in the opening scenario. What could you do to reduce the stress among the various groups of hostage takers? To reduce danger to the hostages?
5. Assume you are the prison administrator in the opening scenario. What would you do to reduce stress on the tactical team? On the negotiators? What would you do for the commander whose wife had been injured?
6. Jason was called into his boss's office and given his pink slip. Jason began shouting and cursing at his boss, who ordered him out of the room and picked up the phone to call security. Jason threw a heavy ashtray across the room and accidentally struck the boss in the head, killing him. He then barricaded himself in the room and the police were called. You are the primary negotiator. When you first speak to Jason, he is hysterical with fright. He has never been in trouble before (not even a traffic citation). He is afraid not only of what will happen to him, but what will happen with his family, his son who is graduating from high school and getting ready to enroll in college, and his youngest daughter, who is autistic and needs a lot of parental support. What kind of things could you say to Jason to reduce his stress, calm him down, and set the framework for successful negotiations?
7. Self-monitor your heart rate during a stressful activity. Practice the progressive relaxation technique every day for a period of two weeks. Practice about 20 minutes per day. Following this two-week period, again measure your heart rate during a stressful activity. Did you see a decrease?
8. Team up with a classmate. Ask them to recall a serious stressful event in the recent past. Conduct an emotional debriefing with them concerning this event.
9. Review the incident described at the beginning of this chapter and draft a report utilizing the HOBAS data as a guide to what information you need on the incident. If information is not available, mark it N/A. Discuss with the class the importance of the missing data. What would it add, if you had it? How could you use it to improve team performance?
10. Think about the most traumatic incident you have experienced. Identify one person with whom you would be comfortable talking with about incident and one with whom you would be least comfortable. What is the difference in these two people and what do those differences tell you about debriefing an incident?
11. If you were the officer described in Officer Ricketts' article, what would you have done before, during, and after the incident to protect yourself from the long-term emotional impact of the incident?
12. When should an officer who has been involved in a negotiation incident in which a person dies be required to attend a debriefing, be approached by a peer counselor, and be referred to the department mental health professional?
13. What are the similarities and the differences between an emotional debriefing and the counseling/therapies that have been shown to be effective with PTSD/ASD.

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Bullet Points for the Field

Chapter 1

Guidelines from history/experience

- NYPD
 - Contain and negotiate
 - Understand story—motivation and personality
 - From Cases
- From Cases
 - Meet the legitimate needs of the actor
 - Resolve issues fairly
 - Separate issues from the person
 - Use trained personnel
 - Secure all released hostages
 - Personalize hostages
 - Confirm intelligence from released hostages
 - Provide for the press's needs
 - Assess: Is it planned or spontaneous
 - Consider third party intermediary (TPI)
 - TPI are best introduced after the crisis has stabilized and the value of TPIs can be made.
 - Select TPIs that will benefit your goals.
 - Script them carefully, so that the interaction is focused on the goals.
 - Do not allow TPIs to vary from the script.
 - Use safe methods of contact.
 - Attitudes of Negotiator
- Attitudes of Negotiator
 - Avoid either-or thinking—show acceptance of the actor's ideas and feelings, if not his actions
 - Avoid minimizing the actor's feelings—reflect feelings every chance you get
 - Avoid the “action imperative”—be patient, respectful and slow
 - Show caring, concern and interest—focus on the HT
 - Focus on solving the problem, not defeating the person
 - Be firm but accepting—hard on the problem, soft on the person
 - Praise often—to build self-esteem
 - Praise—to shape behavior

- Develop and use a plan that includes SWAT and negotiators in a coordinated way.
- If possible, gather pre-incident intelligence.
- Allow surrender with dignity.
- Assess the degree of planning involved in the incident.
- Nuance the threat assessment on the basis of the kind of incident.
- Pay careful attention to signs of de-escalation during the incident.
- Use a trained chain of command.
- Avoid roadblocks
 - threats
 - argument
 - the excessive use of power
 - interrogation
 - preaching like the expert
 - poor listening
- Watch for signs that things are going well
 - Less violent content in the hostage taker's conversations
 - More frequency and longer conversations
 - Slower rate and lower pitch and volume of actor's speech
 - Actor talks about personal issues
 - A deadline is talked past and there is no incident
 - Threats from the actor decrease
 - Hostages are released
- Communication guidelines
 - Listen for themes, not just facts
 - Listen for useful ideas
 - Listen for changes in emotional intensity—more emotional vs. less emotional
 - Reduce noise in the system
 - Define communication goals between calls
 - Use Active Listening Skills (ALS)
- Prison incidents
 - Allowing time to pass
 - Negotiating with the identified leader
 - Negotiating in English rather than Spanish
 - Tape-recording and reviewing negotiations
 - Using mental health consultants
 - Providing a surrender ritual
 - Allow detainees to vent their frustrations with the system
 - Buy time for the tactical team
 - Gather intelligence on conditions in the unit that was helpful in tactical

planning

- Introduce changes in the situation that benefited the tactical team
- Lull the detainees into a sense of safety and security, increasing the element of surprise for the tactical team
- Be sure chain of command is trained
- Noncorrectional negotiators need input from corrections personnel
- Adjust the location and size of the NOC to accommodate a lengthy siege
- Develop MOUs and relationships with support agencies outside the prison before the incident
- Utilize ICS to manage incidents
- Use team to plan tactics between calls
- Recognize the need to maintain operations as a prison

Terrorist incidents

- Use more empathy to understand the terrorist.
- Use of active listening skills to deal with the expressive elements of an incident, increase rapport, and ultimately increase influence.
- Understand the difference between empathy and sympathy—understanding is not agreeing with terrorist's actions.
- Recognize the terrorists' logic and rational decision.
- Be flexible in implementing accepted negotiating principles.
- We need to change our expectations.
- Realistic goal in barricaded, deliberate sieges—get as many people out alive as possible.
- Apprehension may not always be possible.
- The request for free passage needs to come from the terrorist.
- Many of the usual risk factors are part of the deliberate siege.
- Killing a hostage during an incident may not be reason enough to assault.
- A suicidal posture is not an intent to die.
- May need to increase the use of third-party intermediaries.
- Containment may not be possible given the organizational structure of terrorist operation (the leadership is often at another location) and the availability of modern communications (cell phones, the Internet, etc.).

Chapter 2

Teams

- Teams – general
 - Cover all the tasks
 - Play to team members' strengths in making assignments
 - Focus the team on the mission: As many as possible go home
 - Set up communications with SWAT and Command
 - Be sure negotiators, SWAT and Command are working toward the same goal
- Triad of Command – tasks
 - Command post is established
 - TOC is in place
 - NOC is in place
 - Containment is established
 - Intelligence is being gathered
 - Perimeters are established
 - Press area is in place with PIO
 - Tactical plan that includes SWAT and negotiators is developed
 - All stakeholders are notified
- Incident Commander Checklist
 - Is this an appropriate incident for Negotiations with SWAT support, crisis intervention, or a tactical solution **with Negotiations support**?
 - What are the relative risks of the negotiation, crisis intervention, or tactical intervention?
 - Is the plan an integrated plan with clearly defined roles for all operational elements?
 - Does the plan make clear how tactical and negotiators complement each other?
 - Is it negotiable? Are all the elements of a negotiable incident in place? Can they be put into place?
 - Is the situation secured? Have both inner and outer perimeters been established?
 - Have the appropriate personnel been notified?
 - Is the command post set up at a central location?
 - Are communications established between operational elements?
 - Is intelligence flowing?
 - Is the incident criminal, emergency, or mental health in nature?
 - Have the chief and other key city staff people been alerted?

- As the incident progresses, have officers' needs for food, drinks, and restrooms been considered? Have officers manning posts been relieved periodically?
 - Has the risk changed? Which directions and what are we doing about it? Does it change our tactical plan?
 - Are the tactical and negotiator supervisors keeping me informed?
 - Are the actions we take necessary to save lives?
 - Can we expect the action to be more effective than our other options?
 - Are the actions we are considering acceptable to our profession and our community?
- Negotiations commander checklist
 - What type of siege is it?
 - Is it negotiable? If not, can we make it negotiable? How?
 - What is the initial risk of violence?
 - Are the people being held hostages or potential victims?
 - Are all negotiator tasks being done by somebody?
 - Is the proper equipment available?
 - Have the IC and Tactical commander been consulted?
 - Is there an overall strategic plan that identifies the tactics to be used?
 - Has the negotiating area been set up?
 - Is there an effective intelligence-gathering operation under way?
 - Has the opening been planned?
 - Are the primary and secondary ready?
 - Are we projecting an attitude of respect, caring and patience?
 - Are we responding to the actor's needs?
 - Are we developing trust and rapport?
 - As the incident progresses, are we keeping the OSC informed (NPP prepared)?
 - Are we tracking the risk level for increasing or decreasing risk?
 - Are we reviewing our tactics after each phone call to see if they have accomplished what we wanted?
 - Are we changing tactics as needed?
 - Are we dealing with our own stress breaks, time outs, deep-breathing exercises?
 - Team tasks
 - Gather intelligence about the incident, the hostage taker, the hostages, etc. from witnesses, first responders, family, friends, neighbors, employers, etc.
 - Develop tactics designed to defuse the incident, influence the hostage taker, and reduce the risk of loss of life.
 - Establish communication with the hostage taker as early as possible.
 - Record relevant intelligence information on boards and timeline that capture fluctuations in emotional level and risk. Board topics:
 - Subject ID and data

- Hostages ID and data
 - Risk level-initial and after each call
 - Positive police actions
 - Hooks
 - Barbs
 - Weapons
 - Relevant medical information
 - Surrender plan (from SWAT)
 - Delivery plan (from SWAT)
 - Hostage recovery plan (from SWAT)
 - Escape plan (from SWAT)
 - Attitude toward authority
- Keep a record of the negotiations, including demands and promises.
- Maintain equipment.
- Coordinate and communicate with IC and tactical team.

Chapter 3

REACCT

- Principles – general
 - ‘Semper Gumby’ = stay flexible
 - Stay focused on goal: “It is seeking a meeting of the minds, without the knocking of the heads.”
 - Be empathetic
 - Use the Basic Listening Sequence: An opening question, encouragers and summary
- Analyze what is going on at the scene
 - Negotiable
 - Victims or hostage?
 - Type of siege?
 - Initial risk?
 - Clues to the type of person
- Decide how to engage this actor.
 - Use ALS that gets you what you want.

Listening Skill	Expected Results
Open-ended question	Expect: Actor will talk more and give more details
Effective pauses	Expect: Actor should give more details of his/her story
Minimal encouragers	Expect: More openness, smoother tone, more complete story, less jumping around
Mirroring	Expect: More openness, more details, a smoother tone, more complete story, and fewer jumps in topic
Paraphrasing	Expect: The subject to feel heard, to provide more details without repeating exactly the same story, and to correct any inaccuracies
Emotion labeling	Expect: The actor to elaborate more on feelings and reasons in his or her story and/or correct misperceptions

- Start with the actor’s first concerns
 - Demands
 - Emotions
- Listen for basic needs
 - Security-physical and emotional safety; freedom from harm
 - Recognition – his view is understood.

- Control – feels he has some say, especially in the decisions that affect him
- Dignity – being able to save face
- Accomplishment – a sense of having achieved something
- Listen for expectations
- Listen for SAFE triggers
 - Substance demands
 - Attunement issues
 - Face issues
 - Emotions
- Listen for “change talk”
- Listen for resistance and ambivalence
 - Ambivalence about negotiator
 - Ambivalence about self
 - Ambivalence about person held
 - Ambivalence about the situation
 - Ambivalence about surrender
- Develop discrepancy between actor values and beliefs and their current actions
 - Ask questions that focus on change talk-the reason change is good and staying stuck is bad
 - Ask actor to elaborate on reasons for change – What would it be like if-----
-----?
 - Ask about extremes – What is the best that could happen, if-----
? What is the
worst that would happen, if-----?
 - Looking back
 - Looking forward
 - exploring goals and values
- Roll with resistance – do not challenge, argue, etc.
 - Use the BLS model to define the problem from the subject’s point of view, as discussed above-be empathetic.
 - Elicit change talk from the subject.
 - Shift the actor’s focus away from the reasons change is not possible to another issue.
 - Reframe reasons that change is bad and not changing is good. Validate observation with a new interpretation.
 - Agree with a twist is a reflection followed by a reframe. This involves validating the subject’s observations, feelings, and thoughts, and puts a different interpretation on it.

- Emphasize the actor's ability to choose to enhance his or her sense of self-efficacy.
- Come alongside as a partner who is interested in actor solving his problem.

Chapter 4

- Principles – general
 - Assess probability of risk-how likely is violence to occur?
 - Assess the imminence of risk – how likely is risk to occur right now?
 - Assess extent of damage possible – if violence occurs, what is the MOST damage that will result?
- General risk factors of aggression toward others
 - Personality factors
 - Gender
 - Age
 - History of the use of violence
 - Ideas of persecution
 - Low intelligence
 - Personality disorders
 - Poor coping skills
 - Situational factors
 - Families that used violence
 - Peer group that uses violence
 - Job instability
 - Significant losses
 - Availability of a weapon (include choking)
 - Availability of a target
 - Alcohol or stimulant use
 - Been victimized
 - Biological factors
 - Central nervous system trauma, infection, seizures
 - Major mental disorder
 - Risk factors for people who have been incarcerated
 - Parents separated before actor was 16
 - Discipline problems and truancy in elementary school
 - Actor or biological parents were alcohol dependent or abuser
 - Prior arrests for either violent or nonviolent crimes
 - Revocation of probation or parole

- Age
- Personality disorder
- Schizophrenic

Dynamic risk factors

- Substance abuse or dependence
- Persecutory delusions
- Command hallucinations
- Nonadherence with treatment
- Impulsivity
- Homicidality
- Depression
- Hopelessness
- Suicidality
- Feasibility of homicidal plan
- Access to weapons
- Recent move of a weapon out of storage

Violent risk appraisal guide factors

- Lived with both biological parents until age 16? Violent offenders who did not live in a two-parent family until 16 have a higher risk of acting out violently.
- Well adjusted in elementary/middle school? Generally, the more serious problems in elementary school (up to grade eight), the higher the risk of future violence.
- Actor or biological parents have a history of abuse or dependence on alcohol?
- Marital status. Unless domestic violence incident, actors who have never been married are a greater risk than those who have been married. If it is a domestic incident, see the risk factors below in thinking through the risk.
- Actor been arrested, charged, and/or convicted of nonviolent criminal offenses?
- Actor placed on probation or parole and had to be returned to confinement for violation of his or her probation?
- Age?
- Female victim?
- Actor meets DSM criteria for any personality disorder?
- Actor meets the DSM criteria for schizophrenia?
- Actor shows signs of a psychopathic personality as described by the Hare Psychopathy Checklist?

Domestic violence (DV) risk factors

- Prior violence in current home

- Prior violence in public
- Substance abuse
- Availability of a deadly weapon
- Prior chaotic relationship with potential victim
- Violence in home of origin
- Neurological impairment
- Increasing pattern of violence
- Recent loss of a relationship or job
- Leaving the relationship
- Risk Factor for DV incidents: Indicators of “femicide”:
 - Choking victim
 - Forced sex
 - Excessive control over victim
 - Child abuse along with DV
 - Abuse of pregnant victim
 - Victim is convinced she or he at risk
 - Violent jealousy

Mental illness correlates with violence

- Substance abuse, alone and in combination with mental disorders, has consistently correlated with violence.
- Sociodemographic factors contribute significantly more than mental health factors to violence.
- Research findings are inconsistent and conflicting on the relationship between psychosis (and other symptoms of mental illness) and violence.

Risk specific to negotiation incidents

- Hostage or a nonhostage incident? Nonhostage incidents mean increased risk.
- Precipitating event: Incidental versus expressive—Is it emotion driven? If so, increased risk.
- Initiation of the call: Did the subject initiate the call, suggesting that he is inviting a confrontation, or did someone else (family member, stranger, neighbor)?
- Location of incident: Was the call to a residence? If so, it may mean a relationship-based, emotionally driven incident, and increased risk.
- Relationship of subject and victim: Intimate partners are at risk.
- Timing of violence: Was there violence at the beginning of the incident and/or did it continue through the episode? If so, increased risk.
- General demeanor of subject.
- Recent and multiple losses increase the risk.

- Prior impulsive violence increases the risk.
- Substance abuse.
- Demands: No demands suggest increased risk.
- Threats: Offensive, defensive, unconditional.
- Suicide is always possible: If threats and depression are present, it increases the risk of violence.
- FBI Identified Risk Factors associated with INCREASED RISK IN *crisis incidents*
 - Nonhostage incidents
 - Emotion driven
 - Subject initiated call
 - Located at actor's residence
 - Person held – Intimate partners or bosses
 - Violence continues through the episode
 - AGITATED actor
 - Recent and multiple losses
 - Prior impulsive violence
 - Prior instrumental violence
 - Substance abuse
 - No demands
 - Unconditional threats
 - Suicide is always possible: If threats and depression are present, it increases the risk of violence.

Indicators of reduced risk

- Shift from threatening, violent language to nonthreatening language
- Subject discloses personal information
- Shift from emotional to rational content
- Willingness to discuss topics unrelated to the incident
- Lower level of voice
- Slower voice pattern
- Longer conversations
- Increased desire to speak with the negotiator or decision makers and a willingness to bargain
- Reduced violent behavior
- Positive statements about hostage or victim welfare
- Releasing hostages
- Lowering of demands
- Deadlines passing without incident
- Rapport develop between subject and negotiator
- Increase in subject's willingness to follow negotiator's suggestions
- Discussion of surrender

Violence Risk Factors Summary Sheet

Risk Assessment—Imminence		Date
FBI Guidelines	Present	Absent
Continued use of or escalation of threats		
Does not disclose personal information		
Failure to defuse		
Refusal to discuss peripheral topics/demands		
High fast voice		
Short conversations/one way conversations		
No desire to talk to negotiator or boss		
Continued violence		
Negative statements about the victim/ hostage—face attacks		
Not releasing hostages		
Insistence on demands		
Hurts victim		
No rapport between subject and negotiator		
Resistance to suggestions from negotiator		
Refusal to discuss/consider surrender		
Situational Factors—Strentz		
Weapon tied to the hostage taker or to the hostage taker and hostage		
Subject becomes angry during negotiations		
Subject insists that a particular person be brought to the scene		
Hours of negotiation, no clear demands/ outrageous demands		
Current use of alcohol/drugs		
SAFE triggers		
Increasing anger		
Increasing face attack statements		
Increasing focus on or hardening of central demands		
Other		
Subject:	Case #	

The intelligence process

- Planning and Direction
- Collection
- Processing/Collation
- Analysis and Production
- Dissemination, Utilization, Reevaluation

Intelligence data banks

- Police/jail records
- CCH
- State CIC/NCIC/LIDR/MVD records

- Medical/mental health records
- Military records
- Public/personal files
- Financial records
- Newspaper
- Probation/parole records
- Personnel records
- School records
- Building maintenance records

Interviewing intelligence sources using structured cognitive interview

- Motivate the person.
- Use multisensory memories.
- Ask open-ended questions.
- Maintain silence.
- Use repetition to focus attention.
- Use follow-up questions to focus on specific details following the flow of the original report.

Chapter 5

Communication tips

- Communications-general
 - Use the same language as the HT
 - Continually evaluate the impact of your communications
 - Always strive for honesty to build trust
- Avoid taking extreme positions
- Don't use always, never, everybody, nobody-allness
- Work toward informal, more relaxed style of communication
- Respond to the last thing said, to show you are listening
- Summarize frequently
- Reduce/soften demands
- Check your own attitudes
 - Avoid either/or thinking – show acceptance of the actor's ideas and feelings, if not his actions
 - Avoid minimizing the actors feeling – reflect feelings every chance you get
 - Avoid the “action imperative” – be patient, respectful and slow
 - Show caring, concern and interest-focus on the HT
- Focus on solving the problem; not defeating the person
- Be firm but accepting – hard on the problem, soft on the person
- Praise – to build self-esteem
- Praise – to shape behavior
- Avoid roadblocks to communications
 - threats, argument
 - the excessive use of power
 - interrogation
 - preaching like the expert
 - poor listening
- Watch for signs that things are going well
 - There is less violent content in the hostage taker's conversations
 - The hostage taker talks more often and longer to the negotiator; The hostage taker speaks at a slower rate and his speech pitch and volume are lower;
 - The hostage taker talks about personal issues;
 - A deadline is talked past and there is no incident;

- Threats from the hostage taker decrease;
 - Hostages are released; and
 - No one has been killed or injured since the onset of negotiations.
 - Listen for useful ideas
- Listen for themes, not facts
 - Listen for changes in emotional intensity-more emotional v. less emotional
 - Reduce noise in the system
 - Define communication goals between calls
 - Use Active Listening Skills (ALS)
 - Getting Past NO – difficult HTs
 - Go to the Balcony-view the problem from afar= do not let the HT get you emotionally involved
 - Step to his side – become an ally in solving our problem
 - Change the game – instead of a power struggle, take every opportunity to make it a cooperative problem-solving incident
 - Build Golden Bridge – make it easy for the HT to say yes
 - Make it hard for the HT to say No – focus them on the negatives of not cooperating and the positives of cooperation.
- Communicating in the Digital Age
 - Know the equipment
 - Use the system the HT uses
 - Assume you cannot isolate the communications
 - Learn and keep current the language of the digital age
 - Take into account the loss of meaning in the messages – especially the emotional content.
- Use Influencing and Compliance techniques when appropriate
 - Rule of reciprocity-give gifts when it does not cost you much and it will move you close to a resolution-ask for it all and settle for less, as a start
 - Consistency
 - Write down and announce agreements – get agreement on small things and then on larger.
 - Social Proofs – what other, similar people have done in similar situations
 - Liking – find common interests, ideas, values to the HT and discuss them.
 - Scarcity – the boss is only going to let me do this for the next ____minutes
 - Gently confront discrepancies in who the person thinks they are and what they are doing, to raise ambivalence about their actions.

Chapter 6

Negotiating with emotionally disturbed and mentally ill

- Principles – general
 - Mental illness is different from emotional disturbance.
 - All incidents involve emotionally disturbed people
 - Heightened emotions reduce problem-solving
 - Defuse emotions before trying to solve the problem
 - Check your attitude
 - Focus on the actor
 - Semper Gumby – stay flexible
 - Extreme and inflexible Blaming of others and justification of his or her own behavior is a sign of a personality disorder.
 - NEVER SACRIFICE SAFETY FOR RAPPORT
 - In dealing with Mentally Ill, generally:

Expectations

Expect the mentally ill person to be in crisis—high emotion, low reason
Expect the incident to take time

Safety

Always do a tactical assessment first
If the person is an immediate threat to self or others, take the necessary tactical action.
Use force, if necessary
If the person is not an immediate threat:

Slow it down
Watch hands
Look for weapons Maintain cover
Be aware of distance

Adjust attitude:

Understanding—show empathy
Patience—time to respond
Acceptance
Compassion
Show respect and let them maintain dignity

Control self and scene—remain calm

Defuse the incident:

Speak low and slow

Be careful to use a non-threatening tone of voice

Use active listening skills to establish contact

Control chaos—keep environmental distractions low

Build rapport and trust

Use reassurance

Give feedback on what you hear the person saying:

Paraphrasing

reflection

Summarizing

Safety

Assess problem:

Is an emergency detention needed?

Mental illness—look and listen:

Behavior, Affect, Cognitions

Ask about medication

Ask about seeing a doctor

Ask about hallucinations

Ask about beliefs, delusions, without arguing

Risk to self or others:

Be aware of the subject's location—Is it safe?

Appearance—Does the person look like they have been caring for himself
or herself

Threats—Do they threaten other because of their illness?

Suicide—Is there a suicide risk?

Resources:

Friends, family, groups

Influencing the person:

After establishing relationship, give firm and clear directions

Give them as many choices as possible

Help them choose options

- Dealing with Expressive (highly emotional) people

- Have frequent contact
- Focus on emotions
- Allow spontaneity
- Reward and recognize often
- Allow the actor to think he or she is controlling the conversation

- Dealing with High Conflict People

DO NOT admonish, give advice or apologize.

DO send brief, informative, friendly and firm messages.

REALITY CHECK

- Personality Disorders

Disorder	Threats	Attitude Towards Authority
Antisocial Personality Disorder	Loss of power and control	Rebellious
Borderline Personality Disorder	Loss of relationship; loss of dependence on others	Mixed
Histrionic	Loss of attention from others	Mixed
Narcissistic Personality Disorder	Loss of self-worth, privilege and admiration from others	Rebellious
Paranoid Personality Disorder	Danger to survival and disrespect	Rebellious

- Guidelines for Personality Disorders, Mentally Ill

Personality	Expected Issues	Action Steps
Normal person in crisis	High emotion-low reasoning Adequate internal resources	Basic REACCT Mode I – defuse, move to problem-solving after defusing, lower expectations, ask guiding questions to focus on the side of ambivalence that support release and surrender.
Personality types		
Antisocial Personality Likely involved in crime or domestic incidents	Increased risk of violence Sensitivity to face issues Hostility toward authority Power and control issues Attunement issues Self-centered Lack of empathy	Careful risk assessment Attitude – Always show respect; reinforce self-efficacy Defuse with BLS, using paraphrasing instead of emotion labeling. Role with resistance Keep track of promises Maximize gain, minimize losses-use bargaining Shorten relationship building, no Stockholm
Dependent Personality May be involved in crime, domestic incident, suicide attempt	Poor planning Initial aggression Difficulty making decisions Needing guidance Ambivalence-authority Face issues	Negotiator takes lead in problem-solving Defuse with BLS Help resolve ambivalence Establish rapport and trust, and then gently take control Help resolve ambivalence Support self-efficacy
Obsessive Personality Domestic incidents and workplace violence	Cognitive focus Respect for authority Shame issues are major Alcohol abuse Potential for suicide as incident unfolds	Use BLS and minimize emotional labeling Use experience to establish authority Always show respect – reinforce self-efficacy Assess and manage alcohol use during incident Careful suicide assessment and intervention
Narcissistic Personality Domestic and workplace	Expects special favors Grandiose Face issues Anger when privilege is frustrated	Emphasize what you have done for them – Enlist their expertise about themselves. Respect-reinforce self-efficacy when it is focused on a peaceful resolution-BLS- Careful risk assessment
Psychosis		
Paranoid Schizophrenic	Issues: Safety and face Contact with reality-hallucinations Delusions-grandiose and paranoid Suicide potential Medication Experience with Mental Health	Reassurance, and reinforce self-efficacy Refocus Side-step and re-focus Careful suicide assessment Evaluate medication use Assess during assessment of resource – Use MI on ambivalence
Bipolar Disorder	Intense affect Lack of focus Suicide potential when depressed Rapid cycling Self-medication	Basic BLS but is aware of the need for negotiator to lead Patience, Refocus Careful suicide assessment and appropriate intervention Stay alert for sudden mood changes Assess current drug use
Mood disorder		
Major Depressive Disorder	Slow responding Slow problem-solving Suicide potential Self medication-substance abuse Mental Health experience	Attitude: Patience Pacing: Start slow and increase pace gradually Assessment: Careful assessment-Suicide intervention protocol Current use-adjust time frame, get non-use agreement Assess prior experience and motivation, MI for ambivalence
Anxiety disorders		
PTSD	Mixed emotions Flashbacks Self medication-substance abuse Mental Health experience	Assessment: ID depression and/or anxiety Current use-adjust time frame, get non-use agreement Assess prior experience and motivation, MI for ambivalence
Dementia, Developmental Disorders, Organic Brain Syndrome	Impaired cognitive functioning Reactive depression to loss	Attitude: Patience, Patience, Patience Suicide assessment

- Guidelines for Developmental Disorders

Category	Clues	Management
Retardation	Physical appearance Education history Speech/language problems Social behavior Performance tasks Criminal history	Notify parents or custodian Contact agency dealing with MR Attitude Quiet/private place Go low and slow Short sentences One direction at a time Repeat as necessary
Autism	Impaired socially Impaired language Autistic/repetitive behavior Sensory impairments	No not touch Simple language Go low and slow Concrete terms Give praise and encouragement Do not stop self-stimulation Show indirect attention
	Stiff, jerky movements Unsteady and	

Cerebral Palsy	shaky Poor balance Trouble holding self up Random, involuntary movements Seizures Lazy eye	Usually motor impairment only Use REACT Model
Epilepsy	Generalized/Grand Mal Stiffening Jerking muscles Loss of consciousness Loss of bladder control Auras Partial/Petite Mal Staring Loss of consciousness Going blank	Help the person lie down Put something soft under head Remove person's eye glasses Loosen tight clothing Clear area of sharp objects <i>Do not</i> force anything into person's mouth <i>Do not</i> restrain person Turn on side Have person stay with them Medical attention if extended
Hearing Impairment	Impairment—a loss of physical or mental functioning at the organ level. Disability—Impairment is severe enough to interfere with functioning. Handicap—obstructions imposed by society that inhibits the pursuit of independence Deaf—the inability to hear enough recognize sound and word combinations	Decide on method of communication-sign, notes, etc. Be patient Face the person Listen to both sides of story

Chapter 7

Negotiating with depressed and suicidal people

- Recognize depression
 - Dejected, gloomy
 - Self-blame
 - Self-doubt
 - Inadequacy
 - Hopeless
 - Helpless
 - Low self-esteem
- Behavioral clues to depression
 - Sleep disturbance
 - Chronic fatigue
 - Decreased energy and activity
 - Withdrawal from friends and family
 - Low productivity at work
 - Low speech, thinking and movement
 - Tearfulness and crying
 - Irritability
 - Concentration problem
- Managing depression
 - Start by nurturing the actor—show an attitude of caring, warmth, and concern.
 - Start slowly and pick up the pace of the conversation over time—depressed individuals are frequently slowed cognitively. It takes them longer to process information. Give them time.
 - Ask open-ended questions and be ready for long pauses.
 - Be ready to be more direct in questioning if the person does not respond to open-ended questions.
 - Reflect their feelings—their depression is usually masking pain and anger. It is helpful to recognize these feelings, to show them that the negotiator can handle their real feelings.
 - Be reassuring as often as is necessary (Greenstone et al., in press)
 - Expect a slow response (Greenstone et al., in press; Lanceley, 1999)
 - Beware of a sudden improvement in mood (Greenstone et al., in press; Lanceley, 1999)

- Be alert for the possibility of suicide by cop (Lanceley, 1999; DiVasto, 1997)
- Discuss concrete, real-world issues rather than abstract principles (Lanceley, 1999)
- Postpone suicidal actions (Lanceley, 1999)
- Changing beliefs about depression
 - Identify relationship between beliefs and depression.
 - Explore of beliefs, noting self-critical statements.
 - Challenge beliefs with evidence, by asking for proof of statements.
 - Identify overgeneralization; all, always, never, etc.
 - Identify either/or thinking.
 - Challenge of these situations
 - “How much of the time do you feel depressed?”
 - “If you were to put a percentage on the amount of your life that has been ruined by this, what would it be?”
 - “When was the last time you were not depressed?”
 - “What did you do to get out of your depression the last time?”
- Verbal clues to suicidal intent:

Situational References	Time References	Relationship References
The doctor says there is nothing he can do. Nothing will make it better. I have nothing. Tell my family I love them. I just want out of it all. This ruins everything. There is no way out.	It won't matter after today. I just called to say goodbye. It is time to do it. There will be no tomorrow. I want to sleep forever. I can't live like this one more day.	He/she is better off without me. They will be sorry when they find me. Everything will be OK when my wife finds me. He deserves what I am going to do. My children will be OK. I really messed up our marriage.

- Suicide Checklist and Intervention

Suicide Checklist

Current plan		
Location of suicide	Public	Private
Lethality of Plan	Pills	Gun
Prior attempts		
Self	Yes	No
Significant other	Yes	No
Resources		
Lifestyle	Stable	Unstable
Alcohol/Drug abuse	No	Yes
Hostility toward negotiator	No	Yes
Current Personality	Mentally Ill	Normal
Past Psychiatric HX	Yes	No
Past Coping Abilities	Poor	Good
Daily Activities	Active	Passive
Daily Functioning	Passive	Active
Family Life	Chaotic	Intimate
Social Life	Withdrawn	Active
Depression	Severe	Mild
Anxiety	Severe	Mild

Strategies

1. Build rapport
 - Introduce self and ask how you can help
 - Let them know that you take their threat seriously
 - Listen attentively and communicate understanding
 - Reflect feelings and do not argue with them about how they feel
 - Do not hesitate to talk to person about suicidal plan
 - Expect them to need to be reassured about your sincerity
 - Offer food, drink, candy, etc. (not alcohol)
2. Make environment safe
 - Could you put the _____ down for now.
3. Evaluate suicide potential (see above)
4. Try to get more information about problem
 - Tell me what's been going on.
5. Support the life-seeking part of the person
 - I know you are hurting but part of you wants to see hope
 - It can get better; let's see what we can figure out.
6. Focus on one problem at a time, beginning with the main one
7. Explore alternatives the person has tried to solve problems
 - And offer others
8. Try to get a non-suicide contract
9. Plan a concrete course of action, including contact with
 - Friends and family
10. Immediate referral to hospital, mhmr, or doctor.
11. Debrief family
12. Foster HOPE:
 - Persistence
 - Pervasiveness
 - Personal

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Chapter 8

Juvenile issues

- Communication Issues
 - Text message more than talk
 - Email and instant messaging the norm
 - Do not play and engage in interpersonal communications as did previous generations
 - Although poor, verbal skills are better than written skills
 - Many are afraid to “talk”
 - Most popular way to ask for a date is text
 - Many see Facebook connection as a date
 - Many have never written a letter or take notes
 - Active listening is critical
 - Empathy is better than sympathy
 - Keep emotions in check
 - Watch your anger, frustration, curtness, etc.
 - Do not respond to words, threats or acts with any emotion (secondary and MCH critical)
 - Do not use “surrender” but instead “come out,” “leave the room,” etc.
 - Isolating them technologically is difficult
 - Expect them to be in contact with outside world
 - Solve immediate crisis
 - Most significant crisis to juvenile is relationship
- Information processing live through others (Secondhand and vicariously)
 - Too much information is available to process and use
 - Multitask well
 - Assume technology can solve any of their problems
 - Do not know how to filter (i.e., internet is “omnipotent, do not realize info is unfiltered and unreviewed)
 - Expect short attention span
 - Do not respond to “micromanaging”
 - Explore entire range of response options
- Emotional/personality issues
 - Area with most room for variability
 - Optimistic and unrealistic world view

- Self-worth vs. self esteem
 - Lifetime of self-esteem (what can I get for me?)
 - Need self worth (what can I contribute?)
 - Need frequent recognition and reward (fragile personalities)
 - Egos not fully developed, so reinforce often
 - Desensitized to violence
 - Assaulted with sex and importance of sex
 - Cannot accept or handle rejection
 - Fearful of world around them
 - Relationships more important than achievement
 - Always check internet sites (i.e., MySpace, Facebook, twitter, LinkedIn, etc.)
 - Likely engaged in actions today as a flight/fight response
 - Will have high expectations of your expertise and ability
 - Expect them to project blame onto others
 - Can have same mental health problems as adults
 - There are always expressive needs and demands (emotional needs that require fulfilling)
 - May not understand seriousness of situation
- Learning/cognitive issues
 - Unskilled group
 - Do not learn as completely or as well as previous generations
 - Poor retention rates
 - More concrete, less abstract
 - Bullet-point thinking
 - Expect demands to test you
 - Adult role models likely faulty, you need to build rapport to replace
 - Do respect structure, positions and titles
 - Many need “life” mentoring and will be looking to you for that (undercurrent of desperation)
 - Often frustrated by powerless stature
- Socialization/peer issues
 - Individualistic, profess wanting to be different
 - Irrelevance of institutions
 - Quality of life more important than money
 - Unattended to and undisciplined
 - Others are responsible
 - Do not play anymore, and thus, do not learn to “take the hits”
 - Alcohol, drug use, other addictive behaviors highest ever
 - Solve immediate crisis
 - Life is constant state of crisis and problem-solving
 - Personalize the actor and see actor as individual

- Paradox is they prefer group, so build rapport and “us” versus “them”
- Be aware of authority issues and conflict with authority
- Do not force your values and goals
- Be careful about challenging them
- Explain decisions
- Saving face is critical

Negotiating with the elderly

- Make generational assessment
 - Negotiator and elderly – good match
 - Priorities have changed
 - Low and slow
 - Use familiar and common words
 - Watch questioning tactics
 - Maximize active/creative listening
 - Repeat, repeat, repeat
 - Be empathetic
 - Do not interrupt or fill in blanks when they struggle for word or phrase
 - Do not finish sentences
 - Monitor tone of voice
 - Meaning of “No”
 - Give extra time
 - Force attention to you
 - Learn triggers
 - Memory “wanders”
 - Minimize all distractions
 - Determine physical limitations
 - Use name often
 - Do not interrupt
 - Do not contradict
 - Keep conversations and decisions short
 - Single issue only
 - Only two options
 - Do not treat like children
 - Do not make decisions for them
 - Encourage reminiscing
 - Do not try too hard to help them recall events
 - Time of day is important
 - Sundowning – late-day confusion

Negotiating with Warfighters

- Watch for signs of “Honorable Death” and remove that option
- Get them back to the veteran community
- Start slow and build
- Be nonjudgmental
- Avoid lecturing
- Do not discount feelings
- Avoid moralizing
- Avoid giving advice
- Avoid using your rank or position of authority
- Recognize testing, scanning, tactical preparedness
- Go slow (take a deep breath and then take another)
- Reduce actor’s anger
- Do not intimidate
- You are a problem solver
- Orient to *here and now*
- Watch for alcohol and drug use
- Pay attention to other dangerous elements: weapons, “the kill zone”
- Avoid sudden movements, especially among tactical personnel
- Watch for and stop impulsive behavior
- Practice coping and adaptation skills
- Use active listening skills
- Build rapport
- Stay on phone as much as possible
- Watch for suicide or homicide
- Continually reassure you are there to help and work with
- Prepare for sudden emotional shifts
- Be careful about friends or relatives talking to actor

Chapter 9

Prison negotiations

- Planned or spontaneous
- Demands self-serving or benefit all inmates
- Identified leader
- In riot, do not negotiate until stabilized
- Use time to let inmates vent, calm
- Establish NOC that is well-laid out and comfortable
- Use NPPs
- Plan surrender early and make it detailed
- Plan team rotation schedule

Demands

- Do not negotiate:
 - Release or escape
 - Weapons
 - Exchange of hostages
 - Pardon or parole

Protest movements and negotiations

- Protest is legal and constitutional; are you there legally?
- ALS to deescalate
- Remove command personnel
- Is the protest planned or spontaneous?
- Encourage crowd to self-regulate behavior

Chapter 10

- Is incident a hostage or nonhostage event?
 - Hostage:
 - Unknown to actor
 - Substantive demands
 - Victim:
 - Known to actor
 - Domestic incident
 - No substantive demands
 - Hostage:
 - A person held as a security for the fulfillment of certain terms.
- Stockholm Syndrome
 - Hostages develop positive feelings toward captors
 - Hostages develop negative attitudes toward police
 - Hostage retain empathy and compassion for hostage takers after release
- Stockholm Syndrome Does Not Occur in All Incidents:
 - Duration is short
 - Incident is not intense enough
 - Hostage taker and hostages know each other
 - Hostage may have strong resolve against being victimized
- Personalize Hostages
 - Get names
 - Ask about injury and illness
 - Refer to everyone when talking about needs
 - Do not use the term “hostage”
 - Use time
- Psychological Effects of Being Taken Hostage
 - Threat to life
 - Threat of bodily injury
 - Threat to security

- Threat to self-image
- Personality Type to Help Predict How Hostages Might Act:
 - Histrionic – Constant need for approval and affiliation
 - Schizoid – Isolation, aloofness, withdrawal from others
 - Compulsive – Perfection and social acceptance
 - Avoidant – Acceptance by others
 - Dependent – Acquiesce to desires of others to gain acceptance
 - Narcissistic – Instant gratification and seen by others as competent
 - Aggressive – Need to control others, vigilant, mistrustful
- Defense Mechanisms
 - Beneficial
 - Intellectualization
 - Creative Elaboration
 - Humor
 - Detrimental
 - Counter-phobic reaction
 - Denial
 - Reaction Formation
 - Identification
- Coping Strategies Used by Hostages
 - Relinquish control
 - Rationalization
 - Control emotions
 - Creating diversions
 - Role rehearsal
 - Humor
 - Gathering information
 - Maintain a daily routine
 - Religion and prayer
 - Positive bonding with other hostages
 - Forming relationships with other hostages
 - Cooperation with captors

Purpose for survival

Survivors	Succumbers
1. Blend in with other captives	1. Stand out (too subservient or compliant)
2. Do not try to lead	2. Want to lead

3. Contain and hide hatred/disdain	3. Show hatred/disdain
4. Avoids religion/political, inflammatory, hostile language	4. Uses hostile language
5. Concentrates on survival	5. Concentrates on retaliation
6. Controls outward appearance and emotions	6. "Bowl of jelly," and raises everyone's attention
7. Projects confidence and self-esteem	7. Projects fear and anxiety
8. Positive mental attitude and faith in military and country	8. Forgotten by outside world
9. Uses fantasy and daydreaming	9. Dwells on hopelessness and despair
10. Keeps to routines	10. Has no routines
11. Affiliates with other POWs	11. Loners
12. Accepts fate and adjusts	12. Constantly second-guessing
13. Uses humor and imagery	13. Dwells on seriousness and morbidity

Aftereffects of being held hostage

- Emotional
- Cognitive
- Behavioral
- Physical
- Medical
- Positive

Helping released hostages minimize the traumatic impact

- Comfortable place to interview
- Restore sense of power
- Give warm reception
- Pay special attention to unharmed victims
- Warn about others who may want to "blame the victim"
- Reassure they acted properly
- Explain police actions
- Allow ventilation
- Ask what can be done to help others in the future
- Form support group
- Keep families apprised

Chapter 11

Managing stress and trauma

- The Definition and Process of Stress
 - Demands—A request or requirement for physical or mental action.
 - Perception—The perception of an imbalance between the demands people see and their perceived ability to deal with those demands.
 - Coping—The physiological, behavioral, and cognitive changes people go through in an effort to deal with demands.
 - “Feed forward”—A quick assessment of the anticipated outcome of the considered solution.
 - Feedback—Information about how effective coping is or is perceived to be.
- • Be aware – Yerkes-Dodson—Impact of stress:
 - *Physiological* – a rise in helplessness, depression, and aggression.
 - *Behavioral* – an increase in drinking, impulsivity, and excitability.
 - *Emotional* – increased anxiety, aggressiveness, boredom, fatigue, frustration, moodiness, irritability, tension, and loneliness.
 - *Cognitive* – decrease concentration and impaired decision making, hypersensitive to criticism; forgetful and mental blocks. They tend to function out of habit rather than reason.
- Negotiator Stressors
 - Role ambiguity
 - Role conflict
 - High cost of failure
 - Hiding emotions
 - Criticism from others
 - Commander
 - Tactical
 - Other negotiator
 - Press
 - Public
 - Family
 - Physical limits of area – cramped spaces
 - Fatigue
 - Hunger

- Thirst
- Extended periods of time
- Need for intense concentration
- Managing Negotiator's stress
 - Before the incident
 - Educate self, family and friends
 - Develop support system
 - Practice relaxation and imagery exercises daily
 - Develop exercise routine
 - Get in the habit of eating well
 - During the incident
 - Start by slowing down – take three deep breaths
 - Call time outs
 - Rely on team
 - Use quick visualization or breathing techniques between calls
 - During extended incidents, eat and drink well
 - Take potty breaks
 - Smoke sparingly, if at all
 - After the incident
 - Use support system
 - Maintain exercise routine
 - Watch increase in alcohol, smoking, sex or decrease in personal contacts with friends and family
- Managing actor's stress
 - Allow ventilation
 - Use ALS to show interest and concern
 - Normalize stress reaction
 - Remain nonthreatening, noncritical and reassuring
 - If approved by actor, negotiator can teach simple relaxation techniques over the phone
 - Deep breathing
 - Relaxing imagery
- Managing hostage/victim's stress
 - Allow ventilation
 - Use ALS to show interest and understanding

- Normalize strong emotions
- Nonjudgmental and reassuring attitude
- Teach simple relaxation techniques
- After the event, say, “The worst is over.”

Traumatic stress

- Characteristics of traumatic stress – If it goes wrong.
 - A sudden and unexpected onset;
 - A threat to life;
 - A loss of some kind, usually to the person’s sense of self;
 - A disruption of values.
- Reaction to traumatic stress
 - **First 3 days** – stunned and bewildered, on “automatic pilot.”
 - Emotions – rigid denial and isolation – intensity of emotions to interfere with functioning.
 - Compliance with authority and rules is frequent.
 - **Three days to 6 weeks** – expect to continue to function – sense that things are not real. Compulsive reliving of traumatic incident. They will be preoccupied, oversensitive to criticism, withdrawn from their usual activities and interests.
 - **After 6 weeks** – alternating periods of depression and anxiety, troubled with nightmares. Unwanted memories of the incident.
- Emotional debriefing
 - Review what happened to the person and to others during an incident.
 - Review how people felt about what happened to them.
 - Educate by providing information about the usual reactions to a trauma.
- Traumatic stress management – Intervention
 - Talk to trusted resource about the incident – accepting, caring, and understanding friends.
 - Do not judge self on the basis of the results – self-defeating.
 - Accept “You did the best with what they had to work with.”
 - Normalize feelings.
 - It is OK not to be in complete control all the time.
 - Accept your limitations and feelings. By nature, people are limited in their knowledge, skills, and abilities. They are subject to feelings of anger, frustration, rage, fear, panic, and confusion. It is OK to be human.

Operational debriefing

- Review and gather:
 - the type of incident;
 - the date and time of the incident;
 - the location of the incident;
 - when violence occurred during the incident, if it did; and
 - who committed violence
 - who the target was
 - risk level at start
 - chronology of change in risk level
 - chronology of change in tactics during the incident
 - evaluation of the effectiveness of tactics used
- Review the nature of the contact with the subject, including:
 - who initiated communications;
 - what types of communication were used during the incident;
 - whether or not a TPI was used;
 - the type of TPI;
 - whether or not the TPI was helpful;
 - whether a mental health consultant was used.
- Review and capture how the incident was resolved, including:
 - communication skills that were used
 - type of resolution;
 - type of tactical actions taken, if any;
 - time and date of assault, if any; CNT's role in tactical resolution, if any.
 - details of the surrender plan
- Post-incident information, including:
 - injuries;
 - deaths;
 - property damage;
 - language in which negotiations were conducted.
 - Referral of victims and witnesses to social services
- Data on the subject, including:
 - age;
 - sex;
 - marital status;
 - race;

- language fluency;
 - employment history;
 - education history;
 - military experience;
 - prior probation or parole revocations;
 - criminal history;
 - prior aggression;
 - prior suicide attempts;
 - mental health problems;
 - substance abuse history;
 - substances used during incident;
 - explosives used during incident;
 - weapons used during incident;
 - restraining order on subject; status of subject at the end of the incident.
- Hostage/victim data, including:
 - age,
 - sex,
 - race,
 - English fluency (language),
 - how victim was treated during incident,
 - depersonalization of victim,
 - Face attacking statement toward victim,
 - Threats toward victim during incident,
 - mobility allowed during incident,
 - subject manipulated by victim,
 - Stockholm Syndrome, type and timing of release, subject's use of victim to talk for him, victim talked to law enforcement, was victim injured or killed during the incident.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ALS Active Listening Skills
ASD Acute Stress Disorder
ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
BATNA Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement
BITAC Basic Intelligence and Threat Analysis Course
BLS Basic Listening Sequence
CCH Computerized Criminal History
CID Critical Incident Debriefing
CIRG Critical Incident Response Group
CIT Crisis Intervention Team
CNT Crisis Negotiation Team
CRT Crisis Response Team
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOC Department of Corrections
DTO Drug Trafficking Operation
EMS Emergency Medical Services
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FTO Field Training Officer
HN Hostage Negotiator
HOBAS Hostage Barricade Database System
HT Hostage Taker
IC Incident Commander
LEO Law Enforcement Online
MHC Mental Health Consultant
MI Motivational Interviewing
MST Military Sexual Trauma
NC Negotiations Commander
NIMS National Incident Management System
NOC Negotiators Operations Center
NOVA National Organization for Victim Assistance
NPP Negotiation Position Paper
NTOA National Tactical Officers Association
NYPD New York City Police Department
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom
OiF Operation Iraqi Freedom
OSC On-Scene Commander
OSINT Open Source Intelligence

PIO Public Information Officer
PSS Problem-Solving Sequence
PTSD Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
REACCT Recognition, Engagement, Assessment, Contracting, Controlling and Transferring
(six major tasks of negotiations)
SAFE Substantive issue, Attunement, Face, and Emotions (major areas of concern for most
actors in negotiations)
SbC Suicide by Cop
SMS Short Message Service
SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics TC Tactical Commander
TPI Third Party Intermediary
VRAG Violence Risk Appraisal Guide

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